-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 7
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Remove DNS-02, elaborate on security benefits #45
base: main
Are you sure you want to change the base?
Conversation
@@ -66,15 +66,11 @@ Furthermore, since each domain only has a single authorization label, it creates | |||
|
|||
In multi-region deployments, where separate availability zones serve the same content, and dependencies across them are avoided, operators need a way to obtain a separate certificate per zone, for the same domain name. Similarly, in cases of zero-downtime migration, two different setups of the infrastructure may coexist for a long period of time, and both need access to valid certificates. | |||
|
|||
This document specifies two new challenge types. `dns-02` and `dns-account-01`, which aim to address these deficiencies. | |||
This document specifies the `dns-account-01` validation method, which aim to address these deficiencies. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
This document specifies the `dns-account-01` validation method, which aim to address these deficiencies. | |
This document specifies the `dns-account-01` validation method, which aims to address these deficiencies. |
## DNS-02 | ||
|
||
The `dns-02` challenge adds onto `dns-01` by introducing a scoping mechanism to the domain authorization label. This allows for the client to specify if the intended domain validation is for a specific host, a wildcard domain, or a domain and all of its subdomains. | ||
This RFC does not intend to deprecate the `dns-01` challenge specified in {{!RFC8555}}. Since these new challenges do not modify any pre-existing challenges, the ability to complete the `dns-account-01` challenge requires ACME server operators to deploy new changes to their codebase. This makes adopting and using these challenges an opt-in process. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
This RFC does not intend to deprecate the `dns-01` challenge specified in {{!RFC8555}}. Since these new challenges do not modify any pre-existing challenges, the ability to complete the `dns-account-01` challenge requires ACME server operators to deploy new changes to their codebase. This makes adopting and using these challenges an opt-in process. | |
This RFC does not intend to deprecate the `dns-01` challenge specified in {{!RFC8555}}. The `dns-account--01` challenge requires ACME server operators to deploy new changes to their codebase and is an opt-in process. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Plural "challenges" was used a few times in these sentences. I also find it a bit awkward so I tried to simplify the text without losing meaning. I think there is still room for improvement on it. Feel free to further edit.
In both `dns-account-01` and `dns-02`, the same security considerations apply for the integrity of authorizations ({{!RFC8555, Section 10.2}}) and DNS security ({{!RFC8555, Section 11.2}}) as in the original specification for `dns-01`. They both differ from `dns-01` in that the challenges are scoped to the particular name being validated without relying upon CAA ({{!RFC8659}}). | ||
The new `dns-account-01` challenge shares the same security considerations as the original `dns-01` specification regarding the integrity of authorizations {{!RFC8555, Section 10.2}} and DNS security {{!RFC8555, Section 11.2}}. | ||
|
||
The `dns-account-01` challenge differs from the original specification by scoping the challenge to the specific name being validated, without relying on CAA records {{!RFC8659}}. This modification enables an ACME client to verify and validate an ACME server's operations with respect to the DNS names it queries. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
The `dns-account-01` challenge differs from the original specification by scoping the challenge to the specific name being validated, without relying on CAA records {{!RFC8659}}. This modification enables an ACME client to verify and validate an ACME server's operations with respect to the DNS names it queries. | |
The `dns-account-01` challenge differs from the `dns-01` challenge by scoping the authorization to the specific name being validated, without relying on CAA records {{!RFC8659}}. This modification enables an ACME client to verify and validate an ACME server's operations with respect to the DNS names it queries. |
In both `dns-account-01` and `dns-02`, the same security considerations apply for the integrity of authorizations ({{!RFC8555, Section 10.2}}) and DNS security ({{!RFC8555, Section 11.2}}) as in the original specification for `dns-01`. They both differ from `dns-01` in that the challenges are scoped to the particular name being validated without relying upon CAA ({{!RFC8659}}). | ||
The new `dns-account-01` challenge shares the same security considerations as the original `dns-01` specification regarding the integrity of authorizations {{!RFC8555, Section 10.2}} and DNS security {{!RFC8555, Section 11.2}}. | ||
|
||
The `dns-account-01` challenge differs from the original specification by scoping the challenge to the specific name being validated, without relying on CAA records {{!RFC8659}}. This modification enables an ACME client to verify and validate an ACME server's operations with respect to the DNS names it queries. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
This modification enables an ACME client to verify and validate an ACME server's operations with respect to the DNS names it queries.
This alone does not verify the server is performing correctly and only grants authorization to the intended identifier or performs its job ultimately correctly according to policy? I am not sure I fully understand the benefit.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
I think we could pull/reference language from the "best practice" draft depending on what we keep.
No description provided.