Developer's certificate of origin の訳語 #1
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DCOに対応する日本語の適切な訳語は聞いたことがありません。確かに Origin に対応する良い単語が見つからないですね。源流か、出所か... 別のアイディアとしては それでも、コミュニティにパッチを出す人は少なくとも英語がそれなりには |
この案がいいと思います。略号の DCO を付けるとより親切かもしれませんね。 これに限らず、訳語集を作るとよさそうです。ja_JP/ の下に置きましょうか? |
akiyks
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kernfs_remove supported NULL kernfs_node param to bail out but revent per-fs lock change introduced regression that dereferencing the param without NULL check so kernel goes crash. This patch checks the NULL kernfs_node in kernfs_remove and if so, just return. Quote from bug report by Jirka ``` The bug is triggered by running NAS Parallel benchmark suite on SuperMicro servers with 2x Xeon(R) Gold 6126 CPU. Here is the error log: [ 247.035564] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 247.036009] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 247.036009] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 247.036009] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 247.036009] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 247.058060] CPU: 1 PID: 6546 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.16.0393c3714081a53795bbff0e985d24146def6f57f+ torvalds#16 [ 247.058060] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11DDW-L, BIOS 2.0b 03/07/2018 [ 247.058060] RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove+0x8/0x50 [ 247.058060] Code: 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 49 c7 c4 f4 ff ff ff eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 <48> 8b 47 08 48 89 fd 48 85 c0 48 0f 44 c7 4c 8b 60 50 49 83 c4 60 [ 247.058060] RSP: 0018:ffffbbfa48a27e48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 247.058060] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff89e31f98 RCX: 0000000080200018 [ 247.058060] RDX: 0000000080200019 RSI: fffff6760786c900 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 247.058060] RBP: ffffffff89e31f98 R08: ffff926b61b24d00 R09: 0000000080200018 [ 247.122048] R10: ffff926b61b24d00 R11: ffff926a8040c000 R12: ffff927bd09a2000 [ 247.122048] R13: ffffffff89e31fa0 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 [ 247.122048] FS: 00007f01be0a8c40(0000) GS:ffff926fa8e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 247.122048] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 247.122048] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001145c6003 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 247.122048] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 247.122048] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 247.122048] PKRU: 55555554 [ 247.122048] Call Trace: [ 247.122048] <TASK> [ 247.122048] rdt_kill_sb+0x29d/0x350 [ 247.122048] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 [ 247.122048] cleanup_mnt+0x131/0x190 [ 247.122048] task_work_run+0x5c/0x90 [ 247.122048] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x229/0x230 [ 247.122048] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40 [ 247.122048] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 [ 247.122048] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 247.122048] RIP: 0033:0x7f01be2d735b ``` Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215696 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAE4VaGDZr_4wzRn2___eDYRtmdPaGGJdzu_LCSkJYuY9BEO3cw@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 393c371 (kernfs: switch global kernfs_rwsem lock to per-fs lock) Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Jirka Hladky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jirka Hladky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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A crash was observed in the ORC unwinder: BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000000dd984a2 (stack is 00000000d1caafca..00000000613712f0) kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 93 PID: 23787 Comm: context_switch1 Not tainted 5.4.145 #1 RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame Call Trace: <NMI> perf_callchain_kernel get_perf_callchain perf_callchain perf_prepare_sample perf_event_output_forward __perf_event_overflow perf_ibs_handle_irq perf_ibs_nmi_handler nmi_handle default_do_nmi do_nmi end_repeat_nmi This was really two bugs: 1) The perf IBS code passed inconsistent regs to the unwinder. 2) The unwinder didn't handle the bad input gracefully. Fix the latter bug. The ORC unwinder needs to be immune against bad inputs. The problem is that stack_access_ok() doesn't recheck the validity of the full range of registers after switching to the next valid stack with get_stack_info(). Fix that. [ jpoimboe: rewrote commit log ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
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kvm->arch.arm_pmu is set when userspace attempts to set the first PMU attribute. As certain attributes are mandatory, arm_pmu ends up always being set to a valid arm_pmu, otherwise KVM will refuse to run the VCPU. However, this only happens if the VCPU has the PMU feature. If the VCPU doesn't have the feature bit set, kvm->arch.arm_pmu will be left uninitialized and equal to NULL. KVM doesn't do ID register emulation for 32-bit guests and accesses to the PMU registers aren't gated by the pmu_visibility() function. This is done to prevent injecting unexpected undefined exceptions in guests which have detected the presence of a hardware PMU. But even though the VCPU feature is missing, KVM still attempts to emulate certain aspects of the PMU when PMU registers are accessed. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference like this one, which happens on an odroid-c4 board when running the kvm-unit-tests pmu-cycle-counter test with kvmtool and without the PMU feature being set: [ 454.402699] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000150 [ 454.405865] Mem abort info: [ 454.408596] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 454.411638] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 454.416901] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 454.419909] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 454.423010] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 454.427841] Data abort info: [ 454.430687] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 454.434484] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 454.437404] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000c924000 [ 454.443800] [0000000000000150] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 454.450528] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 454.456036] Modules linked in: [ 454.459053] CPU: 1 PID: 267 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc4 torvalds#113 [ 454.465697] Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-C4 (DT) [ 454.470612] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 454.477512] pc : kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x14/0x74 [ 454.482427] lr : kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type+0x2c/0x80 [ 454.487775] sp : ffff80000a9839c0 [ 454.491050] x29: ffff80000a9839c0 x28: ffff000000a83a00 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 454.498127] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00000a510000 [ 454.505198] x23: ffff000000a83a00 x22: ffff000003b01000 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 454.512271] x20: 000000000000001f x19: 00000000000003ff x18: 0000000000000000 [ 454.519343] x17: 000000008003fe98 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 454.526416] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 454.533489] x11: 000000008003fdbc x10: 0000000000009d20 x9 : 000000000000001b [ 454.540561] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000d00 x6 : 0000000000009d00 [ 454.547633] x5 : 0000000000000037 x4 : 0000000000009d00 x3 : 0d09000000000000 [ 454.554705] x2 : 000000000000001f x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 454.561779] Call trace: [ 454.564191] kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x14/0x74 [ 454.568764] kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type+0x2c/0x80 [ 454.573766] access_pmu_evtyper+0x128/0x170 [ 454.577905] perform_access+0x34/0x80 [ 454.581527] kvm_handle_cp_32+0x13c/0x160 [ 454.585495] kvm_handle_cp15_32+0x1c/0x30 [ 454.589462] handle_exit+0x70/0x180 [ 454.592912] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1c4/0x5e0 [ 454.597485] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x23c/0x940 [ 454.601280] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xf0 [ 454.605160] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 454.608869] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc [ 454.613527] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 [ 454.616803] el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 [ 454.619822] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130 [ 454.624049] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 454.627675] Code: a9be7bfd 910003fd f9000bf3 52807ff3 (b9415001) [ 454.633714] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- In this particular case, Linux hasn't detected the presence of a hardware PMU because the PMU node is missing from the DTB, so userspace would have been unable to set the VCPU PMU feature even if it attempted it. What happens is that the 32-bit guest reads ID_DFR0, which advertises the presence of the PMU, and when it tries to program a counter, it triggers the NULL pointer dereference because kvm->arch.arm_pmu is NULL. kvm-arch.arm_pmu was introduced by commit 46b1878 ("KVM: arm64: Keep a per-VM pointer to the default PMU"). Until that commit, this error would be triggered instead: [ 73.388140] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 73.388189] Unknown PMU version 0 [ 73.390420] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 264 at arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c:36 kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.399821] Modules linked in: [ 73.402835] CPU: 1 PID: 264 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 5.17.0 torvalds#114 [ 73.409132] Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-C4 (DT) [ 73.414048] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 73.420948] pc : kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.425863] lr : kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.430779] sp : ffff80000a8db9b0 [ 73.434055] x29: ffff80000a8db9b0 x28: ffff000000dbaac0 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 73.441131] x26: ffff000000dbaac0 x25: 00000000c600000d x24: 0000000000180720 [ 73.448203] x23: ffff800009ffbe10 x22: ffff00000b612000 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 73.455276] x20: 000000000000001f x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 73.462348] x17: 000000008003fe98 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 73.469420] x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffff800009d32488 x12: 00000000000004e6 [ 73.476493] x11: 00000000000001a2 x10: ffff800009d32488 x9 : ffff800009d32488 [ 73.483565] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff800009d8a488 x6 : ffff800009d8a488 [ 73.490638] x5 : ffff0000f461a9d8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 73.497710] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000000dbaac0 [ 73.504784] Call trace: [ 73.507195] kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.511768] kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type+0x2c/0x80 [ 73.516770] access_pmu_evtyper+0x128/0x16c [ 73.520910] perform_access+0x34/0x80 [ 73.524532] kvm_handle_cp_32+0x13c/0x160 [ 73.528500] kvm_handle_cp15_32+0x1c/0x30 [ 73.532467] handle_exit+0x70/0x180 [ 73.535917] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x20c/0x6e0 [ 73.540489] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2b8/0x9e0 [ 73.544283] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xf0 [ 73.548165] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 73.551874] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc [ 73.556531] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 [ 73.559808] el0_svc+0x28/0x80 [ 73.562826] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130 [ 73.567054] el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 [ 73.570676] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 73.575382] kvm: pmu event creation failed -2 The root cause remains the same: kvm->arch.pmuver was never set to something sensible because the VCPU feature itself was never set. The odroid-c4 is somewhat of a special case, because Linux doesn't probe the PMU. But the above errors can easily be reproduced on any hardware, with or without a PMU driver, as long as userspace doesn't set the PMU feature. Work around the fact that KVM advertises a PMU even when the VCPU feature is not set by gating all PMU emulation on the feature. The guest can still access the registers without KVM injecting an undefined exception. Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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間違えてクローズしていたようです。忘れないように再オープンします。 |
akiyks
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Resource dump menu may span over more than a single page, support it. Otherwise, menu read may result in a memory access violation: reading outside of the allocated page. Note that page format of the first menu page contains menu headers while the proceeding menu pages contain only records. The KASAN logs are as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812b2e1fd0 by task systemd-udevd/496 CPU: 5 PID: 496 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G B 5.16.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_01_10_23_12 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 ? strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 ? strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf ? strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 mlx5_rsc_dump_init+0x4ab/0x780 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_rsc_dump_destroy+0x80/0x80 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 ? raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 ? aomic_notifier_chain_register+0x32/0x40 mlx5_load+0x104/0x2e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_init_one+0x41b/0x610 [mlx5_core] .... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812b2e0000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 The buggy address is located 4048 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [ffff88812b2e0000, ffff88812b2e1000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000009d69807a refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88812b2e6000 pfn:0x12b2e0 head:000000009d69807a order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2) raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888100043040 raw: ffff88812b2e6000 0000000080040000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812b2e1e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88812b2e1f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88812b2e1f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88812b2e2000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812b2e2080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 12206b1 ("net/mlx5: Add support for resource dump") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
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Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep torvalds#6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- [email protected] Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]>
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The calling of siw_cm_upcall and detaching new_cep with its listen_cep should be atomistic semantics. Otherwise siw_reject may be called in a temporary state, e,g, siw_cm_upcall is called but the new_cep->listen_cep has not being cleared. This fixes a WARN: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 201 at drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_cm.c:255 siw_cep_put+0x125/0x130 [siw] CPU: 2 PID: 201 Comm: kworker/u16:22 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.17.0-rc7 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: iw_cm_wq cm_work_handler [iw_cm] RIP: 0010:siw_cep_put+0x125/0x130 [siw] Call Trace: <TASK> siw_reject+0xac/0x180 [siw] iw_cm_reject+0x68/0xc0 [iw_cm] cm_work_handler+0x59d/0xe20 [iw_cm] process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 kthread+0xe5/0x110 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: 6c52fdc ("rdma/siw: connection management") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d528d83466c44687f3872eadcb8c184528b2e2d4.1650526554.git.chengyou@linux.alibaba.com Reported-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cheng Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
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May 7, 2022
When inserting a key range item (BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY) while logging a directory, we don't expect the insertion to fail with -EEXIST, because we are holding the directory's log_mutex and we have dropped all existing BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY keys from the log tree before we started to log the directory. However it's possible that during the logging we attempt to insert the same BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY key twice, but for this to happen we need to race with insertions of items from other inodes in the subvolume's tree while we are logging a directory. Here's how this can happen: 1) We are logging a directory with inode number 1000 that has its items spread across 3 leaves in the subvolume's tree: leaf A - has index keys from the range 2 to 20 for example. The last item in the leaf corresponds to a dir item for index number 20. All these dir items were created in a past transaction. leaf B - has index keys from the range 22 to 100 for example. It has no keys from other inodes, all its keys are dir index keys for our directory inode number 1000. Its first key is for the dir item with a sequence number of 22. All these dir items were also created in a past transaction. leaf C - has index keys for our directory for the range 101 to 120 for example. This leaf also has items from other inodes, and its first item corresponds to the dir item for index number 101 for our directory with inode number 1000; 2) When we finish processing the items from leaf A at log_dir_items(), we log a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY key with an offset of 21 and a last offset of 21, meaning the log is authoritative for the index range from 21 to 21 (a single sequence number). At this point leaf B was not yet modified in the current transaction; 3) When we return from log_dir_items() we have released our read lock on leaf B, and have set *last_offset_ret to 21 (index number of the first item on leaf B minus 1); 4) Some other task inserts an item for other inode (inode number 1001 for example) into leaf C. That resulted in pushing some items from leaf C into leaf B, in order to make room for the new item, so now leaf B has dir index keys for the sequence number range from 22 to 102 and leaf C has the dir items for the sequence number range 103 to 120; 5) At log_directory_changes() we call log_dir_items() again, passing it a 'min_offset' / 'min_key' value of 22 (*last_offset_ret from step 3 plus 1, so 21 + 1). Then btrfs_search_forward() leaves us at slot 0 of leaf B, since leaf B was modified in the current transaction. We have also initialized 'last_old_dentry_offset' to 20 after calling btrfs_previous_item() at log_dir_items(), as it left us at the last item of leaf A, which refers to the dir item with sequence number 20; 6) We then call process_dir_items_leaf() to process the dir items of leaf B, and when we process the first item, corresponding to slot 0, sequence number 22, we notice the dir item was created in a past transaction and its sequence number is greater than the value of *last_old_dentry_offset + 1 (20 + 1), so we decide to log again a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY key with an offset of 21 and an end range of 21 (key.offset - 1 == 22 - 1 == 21), which results in an -EEXIST error from insert_dir_log_key(), as we have already inserted that key at step 2, triggering the assertion at process_dir_items_leaf(). The trace produced in dmesg is like the following: assertion failed: ret != -EEXIST, in fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3857 [198255.980839][ T7460] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [198255.981666][ T7460] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3617! [198255.983141][ T7460] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [198255.984080][ T7460] CPU: 0 PID: 7460 Comm: repro-ghost-dir Not tainted 5.18.0-5314c78ac373-misc-next+ [198255.986027][ T7460] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [198255.988600][ T7460] RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x1c/0x1e [198255.989465][ T7460] Code: 8b 4c 89 (...) [198255.992599][ T7460] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007387188 EFLAGS: 00010282 [198255.993414][ T7460] RAX: 000000000000003d RBX: 0000000000000065 RCX: 0000000000000000 [198255.996056][ T7460] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8b62b180 RDI: fffff52000e70e24 [198255.997668][ T7460] RBP: ffffc90007387188 R08: 000000000000003d R09: ffff8881f0e16507 [198255.999199][ T7460] R10: ffffed103e1c2ca0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffef [198256.000683][ T7460] R13: ffff88813befc630 R14: ffff888116c16e70 R15: ffffc90007387358 [198256.007082][ T7460] FS: 00007fc7f7c24640(0000) GS:ffff8881f0c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [198256.009939][ T7460] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [198256.014133][ T7460] CR2: 0000560bb16d0b78 CR3: 0000000140b34005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 [198256.015239][ T7460] Call Trace: [198256.015674][ T7460] <TASK> [198256.016313][ T7460] log_dir_items.cold+0x16/0x2c [198256.018858][ T7460] ? replay_one_extent+0xbf0/0xbf0 [198256.025932][ T7460] ? release_extent_buffer+0x1d2/0x270 [198256.029658][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.031114][ T7460] ? lock_acquired+0xbe/0x660 [198256.032633][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.034386][ T7460] ? lock_release+0xcf/0x8a0 [198256.036152][ T7460] log_directory_changes+0xf9/0x170 [198256.036993][ T7460] ? log_dir_items+0xba0/0xba0 [198256.037661][ T7460] ? do_raw_write_unlock+0x7d/0xe0 [198256.038680][ T7460] btrfs_log_inode+0x233b/0x26d0 [198256.041294][ T7460] ? log_directory_changes+0x170/0x170 [198256.042864][ T7460] ? btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x60/0x60 [198256.045130][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.046568][ T7460] ? lock_release+0xcf/0x8a0 [198256.047504][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.048712][ T7460] ? ilookup5_nowait+0x81/0xa0 [198256.049747][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.050652][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa9/0x100 [198256.051618][ T7460] ? __might_resched+0x128/0x1c0 [198256.052511][ T7460] ? __might_sleep+0x66/0xc0 [198256.053442][ T7460] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [198256.054251][ T7460] ? iget5_locked+0xbd/0x150 [198256.054986][ T7460] ? run_delayed_iput_locked+0x110/0x110 [198256.055929][ T7460] ? btrfs_iget+0xc7/0x150 [198256.056630][ T7460] ? btrfs_orphan_cleanup+0x4a0/0x4a0 [198256.057502][ T7460] ? free_extent_buffer+0x13/0x20 [198256.058322][ T7460] btrfs_log_inode+0x2654/0x26d0 [198256.059137][ T7460] ? log_directory_changes+0x170/0x170 [198256.060020][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.060930][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.061905][ T7460] ? lock_contended+0x770/0x770 [198256.062682][ T7460] ? btrfs_log_inode_parent+0xd04/0x1750 [198256.063582][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.064432][ T7460] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0 [198256.065550][ T7460] ? __mutex_lock+0x580/0xdc0 [198256.066654][ T7460] ? stack_trace_save+0x94/0xc0 [198256.068008][ T7460] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [198256.072149][ T7460] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x12a/0x430 [198256.073145][ T7460] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0xcd0/0xcd0 [198256.074341][ T7460] ? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20 [198256.075345][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.076142][ T7460] ? lock_contended+0x770/0x770 [198256.076939][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1c0/0x1c0 [198256.078401][ T7460] ? btrfs_sync_file+0x5e6/0xa40 [198256.080598][ T7460] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x523/0x1750 [198256.081991][ T7460] ? wait_current_trans+0xc8/0x240 [198256.083320][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.085450][ T7460] ? btrfs_end_log_trans+0x70/0x70 [198256.086362][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.087544][ T7460] ? lock_release+0xcf/0x8a0 [198256.088305][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.090375][ T7460] ? dget_parent+0x8e/0x300 [198256.093538][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1c0/0x1c0 [198256.094918][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.097815][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa9/0x100 [198256.101822][ T7460] ? dget_parent+0xb7/0x300 [198256.103345][ T7460] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x48/0x60 [198256.105052][ T7460] btrfs_sync_file+0x629/0xa40 [198256.106829][ T7460] ? start_ordered_ops.constprop.0+0x120/0x120 [198256.109655][ T7460] ? __fget_files+0x161/0x230 [198256.110760][ T7460] vfs_fsync_range+0x6d/0x110 [198256.111923][ T7460] ? start_ordered_ops.constprop.0+0x120/0x120 [198256.113556][ T7460] __x64_sys_fsync+0x45/0x70 [198256.114323][ T7460] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [198256.115084][ T7460] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x3b/0x50 [198256.116030][ T7460] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [198256.116768][ T7460] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [198256.117555][ T7460] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [198256.118324][ T7460] ? sysvec_call_function_single+0x57/0xc0 [198256.119308][ T7460] ? asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0xa/0x20 [198256.120363][ T7460] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [198256.121334][ T7460] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7fe97b6ab [198256.122067][ T7460] Code: 0f 05 48 (...) [198256.125198][ T7460] RSP: 002b:00007fc7f7c23950 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a [198256.126568][ T7460] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc7f7c239f0 RCX: 00007fc7fe97b6ab [198256.127942][ T7460] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000056167536bcf0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [198256.129302][ T7460] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000007ffffeb8 [198256.130670][ T7460] R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000001 [198256.132046][ T7460] R13: 0000561674ca8140 R14: 00007fc7f7c239d0 R15: 000056167536dab8 [198256.133403][ T7460] </TASK> Fix this by treating -EEXIST as expected at insert_dir_log_key() and have it update the item with an end offset corresponding to the maximum between the previously logged end offset and the new requested end offset. The end offsets may be different due to dir index key deletions that happened as part of unlink operations while we are logging a directory (triggered when fsyncing some other inode parented by the directory) or during renames which always attempt to log a single dir index deletion. Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 732d591 ("btrfs: stop copying old dir items when logging a directory") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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We are accessing "desc->ops" in sof_pci_probe without checking "desc" pointer. This results in NULL pointer exception if pci_id->driver_data i.e desc pointer isn't defined in sof device probe: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:sof_pci_probe+0x1e/0x17f [snd_sof_pci] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffc043dff4. RSP: 0018:ffffac4b03b9b8d8 EFLAGS: 00010246 Add NULL pointer check for sof_dev_desc pointer to avoid such exception. Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ajit Kumar Pandey <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: [email protected] # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled, string functions will also perform dynamic checks for string size which can panic the kernel, like incase of overflow detection. In papr_scm, papr_scm_pmu_check_events function uses stat->stat_id with string operations, to populate the nvdimm_events_map array. Since stat_id variable is not NULL terminated, the kernel panics with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled at boot time. Below are the logs of kernel panic: detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:980! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] NIP [c00000000077dad0] fortify_panic+0x28/0x38 LR [c00000000077dacc] fortify_panic+0x24/0x38 Call Trace: [c0000022d77836e0] [c00000000077dacc] fortify_panic+0x24/0x38 (unreliable) [c00800000deb2660] papr_scm_pmu_check_events.constprop.0+0x118/0x220 [papr_scm] [c00800000deb2cb0] papr_scm_probe+0x288/0x62c [papr_scm] [c0000000009b46a8] platform_probe+0x98/0x150 Fix this issue by using kmemdup_nul() to copy the content of stat->stat_id directly to the nvdimm_events_map array. mpe: stat->stat_id comes from the hypervisor, not userspace, so there is no security exposure. Fixes: 4c08d4b ("powerpc/papr_scm: Add perf interface support") Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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'rmmod pmt_telemetry' panics with: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 1697 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W -------- --- 5.18.0-rc4 #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR5 RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.3056.B00.2201310233 01/31/2022 RIP: 0010:device_del+0x1b/0x3d0 Code: e8 1a d9 e9 ff e9 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 08 eb dc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d af 80 00 00 00 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 18 <4c> 8b 67 40 48 89 ef 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 31 RSP: 0018:ffffb520415cfd60 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffb520415cfd78 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb520415cfd78 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f7e198e5740(0000) GS:ffff905c9f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000010782a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __xa_erase+0x53/0xb0 device_unregister+0x13/0x50 intel_pmt_dev_destroy+0x34/0x60 [pmt_class] pmt_telem_remove+0x40/0x50 [pmt_telemetry] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0xc1/0x150 driver_detach+0x44/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xd0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x12/0x20 pmt_telem_exit+0xc/0xe4a [pmt_telemetry] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13a/0x250 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x11e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1803a05b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2d 4e 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fd 4d 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 The probe function, pmt_telem_probe(), adds an entry for devices even if they have not been initialized. This results in the array of initialized devices containing both initialized and uninitialized entries. This causes a panic in the remove function, pmt_telem_remove() which expects the array to only contain initialized entries. Only use an entry when a device is initialized. Cc: "David E. Box" <[email protected]> Cc: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Gross <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Arcari <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David E. Box <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
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Since commit f1131b9 ("net: phy: micrel: use kszphy_suspend()/kszphy_resume for irq aware devices") the following NULL pointer dereference is observed on a board with KSZ8061: # udhcpc -i eth0 udhcpc: started, v1.35.0 8<--- cut here --- Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008 pgd = f73cef4e [00000008] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 196 Comm: ifconfig Not tainted 5.15.37-dirty torvalds#94 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 SoloX (Device Tree) PC is at kszphy_config_reset+0x10/0x114 LR is at kszphy_resume+0x24/0x64 ... The KSZ8061 phy_driver structure does not have the .probe/..driver_data fields, which means that priv is not allocated. This causes the NULL pointer dereference inside kszphy_config_reset(). Fix the problem by using the generic suspend/resume functions as before. Another alternative would be to provide the .probe and .driver_data information into the structure, but to be on the safe side, let's just restore Ethernet functionality by using the generic suspend/resume. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: f1131b9 ("net: phy: micrel: use kszphy_suspend()/kszphy_resume for irq aware devices") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Function ice_plug_aux_dev() assigns pf->adev field too early prior
aux device initialization and on other side ice_unplug_aux_dev()
starts aux device deinit and at the end assigns NULL to pf->adev.
This is wrong because pf->adev should always be non-NULL only when
aux device is fully initialized and ready. This wrong order causes
a crash when ice_send_event_to_aux() call occurs because that function
depends on non-NULL value of pf->adev and does not assume that
aux device is half-initialized or half-destroyed.
After order correction the race window is tiny but it is still there,
as Leon mentioned and manipulation with pf->adev needs to be protected
by mutex.
Fix (un-)plugging functions so pf->adev field is set after aux device
init and prior aux device destroy and protect pf->adev assignment by
new mutex. This mutex is also held during ice_send_event_to_aux()
call to ensure that aux device is valid during that call.
Note that device lock used ice_send_event_to_aux() needs to be kept
to avoid race with aux drv unload.
Reproducer:
cycle=1
while :;do
echo "#### Cycle: $cycle"
ip link set ens7f0 mtu 9000
ip link add bond0 type bond mode 1 miimon 100
ip link set bond0 up
ifenslave bond0 ens7f0
ip link set bond0 mtu 9000
ethtool -L ens7f0 combined 1
ip link del bond0
ip link set ens7f0 mtu 1500
sleep 1
let cycle++
done
In short when the device is added/removed to/from bond the aux device
is unplugged/plugged. When MTU of the device is changed an event is
sent to aux device asynchronously. This can race with (un)plugging
operation and because pf->adev is set too early (plug) or too late
(unplug) the function ice_send_event_to_aux() can touch uninitialized
or destroyed fields. In the case of crash below pf->adev->dev.mutex.
Crash:
[ 53.372066] bond0: (slave ens7f0): making interface the new active one
[ 53.378622] bond0: (slave ens7f0): Enslaving as an active interface with an u
p link
[ 53.386294] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): bond0: link becomes ready
[ 53.549104] bond0: (slave ens7f1): Enslaving as a backup interface with an up
link
[ 54.118906] ice 0000:ca:00.0 ens7f0: Number of in use tx queues changed inval
idating tc mappings. Priority traffic classification disabled!
[ 54.233374] ice 0000:ca:00.1 ens7f1: Number of in use tx queues changed inval
idating tc mappings. Priority traffic classification disabled!
[ 54.248204] bond0: (slave ens7f0): Releasing backup interface
[ 54.253955] bond0: (slave ens7f1): making interface the new active one
[ 54.274875] bond0: (slave ens7f1): Releasing backup interface
[ 54.289153] bond0 (unregistering): Released all slaves
[ 55.383179] MII link monitoring set to 100 ms
[ 55.398696] bond0: (slave ens7f0): making interface the new active one
[ 55.405241] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
[ 55.405289] bond0: (slave ens7f0): Enslaving as an active interface with an u
p link
[ 55.412198] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 55.412200] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 55.412201] PGD 25d2ad067 P4D 0
[ 55.412204] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 55.412207] CPU: 0 PID: 403 Comm: kworker/0:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S
5.17.0-13579-g57f2d6540f03 #1
[ 55.429094] bond0: (slave ens7f1): Enslaving as a backup interface with an up
link
[ 55.430224] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/06V45N, BIOS 1.4.4 10/07/
2021
[ 55.430226] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ 55.468169] RIP: 0010:mutex_unlock+0x10/0x20
[ 55.472439] Code: 0f b1 13 74 96 eb e0 4c 89 ee eb d8 e8 79 54 ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ef 01 00 31 d2 <f0> 48 0f b1 17 75 01 c3 e9 e3 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48
[ 55.491186] RSP: 0018:ff4454230d7d7e28 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 55.496413] RAX: ff1a79b208b08000 RBX: ff1a79b2182e8880 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 55.503545] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff4454230d7d7db0 RDI: 0000000000000080
[ 55.510678] RBP: ff1a79d1c7e48b68 R08: ff4454230d7d7db0 R09: 0000000000000041
[ 55.517812] R10: 00000000000000a5 R11: 00000000000006e6 R12: ff1a79d1c7e48bc0
[ 55.524945] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1a79d0ffc305c0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 55.532076] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1a79d0ffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 55.540163] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 55.545908] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000003487ae003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
[ 55.553041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 55.560173] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 55.567305] PKRU: 55555554
[ 55.570018] Call Trace:
[ 55.572474] <TASK>
[ 55.574579] ice_service_task+0xaab/0xef0 [ice]
[ 55.579130] process_one_work+0x1c5/0x390
[ 55.583141] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 55.587326] worker_thread+0x30/0x360
[ 55.590994] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 55.595180] kthread+0xe6/0x110
[ 55.598325] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 55.603116] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 55.606698] </TASK>
Fixes: f9f5301 ("ice: Register auxiliary device to provide RDMA")
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Gurucharan <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
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Kernel panic when injecting memory_failure for the global huge_zero_page, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled, as follows. Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x109ff9 at process virtual address 0x20ff9000 page:00000000fb053fc3 refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x109e00 head:00000000fb053fc3 order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x17fffc000010001(locked|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) raw: 017fffc000010001 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(is_huge_zero_page(head)) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:2499! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 553 Comm: split_bug Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ torvalds#11 Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 3288b3c 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:split_huge_page_to_list+0x66a/0x880 Code: 84 9b fb ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 08 31 f6 e8 9f 5d 2a 00 b8 b8 02 00 00 e9 e8 fb ff ff 48 c7 c6 e8 47 3c 82 4c b RSP: 0018:ffffc90000dcbdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000003c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff823e4c4f RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff88843fffdb40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000fffeffff R10: ffffc90000dcbc48 R11: ffffffff82d68448 R12: ffffea0004278000 R13: ffffffff823c6203 R14: 0000000000109ff9 R15: ffffea000427fe40 FS: 00007fc375a26740(0000) GS:ffff88842fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc3757c9290 CR3: 0000000102174006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: try_to_split_thp_page+0x3a/0x130 memory_failure+0x128/0x800 madvise_inject_error.cold+0x8b/0xa1 __x64_sys_madvise+0x54/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fc3754f8bf9 Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda93a1d8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc3754f8bf9 RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 0000000000003000 RDI: 0000000020ff9000 RBP: 00007ffeda93a200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400490 R13: 00007ffeda93a2e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 We think that raising BUG is overkilling for splitting huge_zero_page, the huge_zero_page can't be met from normal paths other than memory failure, but memory failure is a valid caller. So we tend to replace the BUG to WARN + returning -EBUSY, and thus the panic above won't happen again. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f35f8b97377d5d3ede1bc5ac3114da888c57cbce.1651052574.git.xuyu@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: d173d54 ("mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in memory_failure()") Fixes: 6a46079 ("HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7") Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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The following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() is triggered when memory error event happens on the (thp/folio) pages which are about to be freed: [ 1160.232771] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.236916] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.240684] flags: 0x57ffffc0800000(hwpoison|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 1160.243458] raw: 0057ffffc0800000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 1160.246268] raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1160.249197] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) [ 1160.251815] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1160.253438] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:788! [ 1160.256162] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1160.258172] CPU: 2 PID: 115368 Comm: mceinj.sh Tainted: G E 5.18.0-rc1-v5.18-rc1-220404-2353-005-g83111+ #3 [ 1160.262049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [ 1160.265103] RIP: 0010:dump_page.cold+0x27e/0x2bd [ 1160.266757] Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 81 f1 5a 98 e9 4c fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 a1 95 59 98 e9 40 fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 50 bf 5a 98 48 89 ef e8 9d 04 6d ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 c4 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 9f fd ff ff 49 8b 04 24 a9 00 00 [ 1160.273180] RSP: 0018:ffffaa2c4d59fd18 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1160.274969] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1160.277263] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff985995a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1160.279571] RBP: ffffdc9c45a80000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 1160.281794] R10: ffffaa2c4d59fb08 R11: ffffffff98940d08 R12: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.283920] R13: ffffffff985b6f94 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.286641] FS: 00007eff54ce1740(0000) GS:ffff99c67bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1160.289498] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1160.291106] CR2: 00005628381a5f68 CR3: 0000000104712003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 [ 1160.293031] Call Trace: [ 1160.293724] <TASK> [ 1160.294334] get_hwpoison_page+0x47d/0x570 [ 1160.295474] memory_failure+0x106/0xaa0 [ 1160.296474] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 [ 1160.297524] hard_offline_page_store+0x43/0x80 [ 1160.298684] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 1160.299829] new_sync_write+0xf9/0x160 [ 1160.300810] vfs_write+0x209/0x290 [ 1160.301835] ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0 [ 1160.302718] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1160.303664] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1160.304981] RIP: 0033:0x7eff54b018b7 As shown in the RIP address, this VM_BUG_ON in folio_entire_mapcount() is called from dump_page("hwpoison: unhandlable page") in get_any_page(). The below explains the mechanism of the race: CPU 0 CPU 1 memory_failure get_hwpoison_page get_any_page dump_page compound = PageCompound free_pages_prepare page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP folio_entire_mapcount VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) So replace dump_page() with safer one, pr_err(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 74e8ee4 ("mm: Turn head_compound_mapcount() into folio_entire_mapcount()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: William Kucharski <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured. When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing null RX ring pointer. PID: 1449 TASK: ff187d28ed658040 CPU: 34 COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51" #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c torvalds#6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4 torvalds#7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91] RIP: ffffffffc076db8b RSP: ff1966a94a713e98 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4 RBX: ff187d269dd3c180 RCX: ff187d269cd4d018 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ff187d269cfcc644 R8: ff187d339b9641b0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff187d269cfcc648 R13: ffffffff9f128784 R14: ffffffff9d101b70 R15: ff187d269cfcc640 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice] torvalds#9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b torvalds#10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d torvalds#11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping") Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dave Cain <[email protected]> Tested-by: Gurucharan <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
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Will reported the following splat when running with Protected KVM enabled: [ 2.427181] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.427668] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c:489 __create_hyp_private_mapping+0x118/0x1ac [ 2.428424] Modules linked in: [ 2.429040] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00084-g8635adc4efc7 #1 [ 2.429589] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 2.430286] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2.430734] pc : __create_hyp_private_mapping+0x118/0x1ac [ 2.431091] lr : create_hyp_exec_mappings+0x40/0x80 [ 2.431377] sp : ffff80000803baf0 [ 2.431597] x29: ffff80000803bb00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2.432156] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 2.432561] x23: ffffcd96c343b000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff80000803bb40 [ 2.433004] x20: 0000000000000004 x19: 0000000000001800 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2.433343] x17: 0003e68cf7efdd70 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: fffffc81f602a2c8 [ 2.434053] x14: ffffdf8380000000 x13: ffffcd9573200000 x12: ffffcd96c343b000 [ 2.434401] x11: 0000000000000004 x10: ffffcd96c1738000 x9 : 0000000000000004 [ 2.434812] x8 : ffff80000803bb40 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 544f422effff306b [ 2.435136] x5 : 000000008020001e x4 : ffff207d80a88c00 x3 : 0000000000000005 [ 2.435480] x2 : 0000000000001800 x1 : 000000014f4ab800 x0 : 000000000badca11 [ 2.436149] Call trace: [ 2.436600] __create_hyp_private_mapping+0x118/0x1ac [ 2.437576] create_hyp_exec_mappings+0x40/0x80 [ 2.438180] kvm_init_vector_slots+0x180/0x194 [ 2.458941] kvm_arch_init+0x80/0x274 [ 2.459220] kvm_init+0x48/0x354 [ 2.459416] arm_init+0x20/0x2c [ 2.459601] do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x238 [ 2.459809] do_initcall_level+0x94/0xb4 [ 2.460043] do_initcalls+0x54/0x94 [ 2.460228] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28 [ 2.460407] kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x178 [ 2.460610] kernel_init+0x20/0x1a0 [ 2.460817] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 2.461274] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Indeed, the Protected KVM mode promotes __create_hyp_private_mapping() to a hypercall as EL1 no longer has access to the hypervisor's stage-1 page-table. However, the call from kvm_init_vector_slots() happens after pKVM has been initialized on the primary CPU, but before it has been initialized on secondaries. As such, if the KVM initcall procedure is migrated from one CPU to another in this window, the hypercall may end up running on a CPU for which EL2 has not been initialized. Fortunately, the pKVM hypervisor doesn't rely on the host to re-map the vectors in the private range, so the hypercall in question is in fact superfluous. Skip it when pKVM is enabled. Reported-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <[email protected]> [maz: simplified the checks slightly] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The splat below can be seen when running kvm-unit-test:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.18.0-rc7 #5 Tainted: G IOE
-----------------------------
/home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:80 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by qemu-system-x86/35124:
#0: ffff9725391d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x77/0x710 [kvm]
#1: ffffbd25cfb2a0b8 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: vcpu_enter_guest+0xdeb/0x1900 [kvm]
#2: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0x79/0x1e0 [kvm]
#3: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: irqfd_resampler_ack+0x5/0x110 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 35124 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G IOE 5.18.0-rc7 #5
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9b
irqfd_resampler_ack+0xfd/0x110 [kvm]
kvm_notify_acked_gsi+0x32/0x90 [kvm]
kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0xc5/0x1e0 [kvm]
kvm_hv_set_msr_common+0xec1/0x1160 [kvm]
kvm_set_msr_common+0x7c3/0xf60 [kvm]
vmx_set_msr+0x394/0x1240 [kvm_intel]
kvm_set_msr_ignored_check+0x86/0x200 [kvm]
kvm_emulate_wrmsr+0x4f/0x1f0 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x6fb/0x7e0 [kvm_intel]
vcpu_enter_guest+0xe5a/0x1900 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16e/0xac0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x710 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
resampler-list is protected by irq_srcu (see kvm_irqfd_assign), so fix
the false positive by using list_for_each_entry_srcu().
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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The rcutorture module is used to run torture tests that validate RCU. rcutorture takes a variety of module parameters that configure the functionality of the test. Amongst these parameters are the types of synchronization mechanisms that the rcu_torture_writer and rcu_torture_fakewriter tasks may use, and the torture_type of the run which determines what read and sync operations are used by the various writer and reader tasks that run throughout the test. When the module is configured to only use sync types for which the specified torture_type does not implement the necessary operations, we can end up in a state where nsynctypes is 0. This is not an erroneous state, but it currently crashes the kernel with a #DE due to nsynctypes being used with a modulo operator in rcu_torture_fakewriter(). Here is an example of such a #DE: $ insmod ./rcutorture.ko gp_cond=1 gp_cond_exp=0 gp_exp=0 gp_poll_exp=0 gp_normal=0 gp_poll=0 gp_poll_exp=0 verbose=9999 torture_type=trivial ... [ 8536.525096] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 8536.525101] CPU: 30 PID: 392138 Comm: rcu_torture_fak Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.17.0-rc1-00179-gc8c42c80febd torvalds#24 [ 8536.525105] Hardware name: Quanta Twin Lakes MP/Twin Lakes Passive MP, BIOS F09_3A23 12/08/2020 [ 8536.525106] RIP: 0010:rcu_torture_fakewriter+0xf1/0x2d0 [rcutorture] [ 8536.525121] Code: 00 31 d2 8d 0c f5 00 00 00 00 48 63 c9 48 f7 f1 48 85 d2 0f 84 79 ff ff ff 48 89 e7 e8 78 78 01 00 48 63 0d 29 ca 00 00 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 8b 04 95 00 05 4e a0 83 f8 06 0f 84 ad 00 00 00 7f 1f 83 [ 8536.525124] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000777fef0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 8536.525127] RAX: 00000000223d006e RBX: cccccccccccccccd RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 8536.525130] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff824315b9 RDI: ffffc9000777fef0 [ 8536.525132] RBP: ffffc9000487bb30 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000002a580 [ 8536.525134] R10: ffffffff82c5f920 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881a2c35d00 [ 8536.525136] R13: ffff8881540c8d00 R14: ffffffffa04d39d0 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 8536.525137] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88903ff80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8536.525140] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8536.525142] CR2: 00007f839f022000 CR3: 0000000002c0a006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 8536.525144] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8536.525145] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8536.525147] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8536.525148] Call Trace: [ 8536.525150] <TASK> [ 8536.525153] kthread+0xe8/0x110 [ 8536.525161] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 8536.525167] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 8536.525174] </TASK> The solution is to gracefully handle the case of nsynctypes being 0 in rcu_torture_fakewriter() by not performing any work. This is already being done in rcu_torture_writer(), though there is a missing return on that path which will be fixed in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: David Vernet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
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It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq) and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544 CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 ? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0 bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0 bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420 ? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0 ? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70 ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0 __bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270 bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160 ? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260 ? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0 ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280 ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10 ? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740 Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/[email protected]/ CC: [email protected] Fixes: 430a67f ("block, bfq: merge bursts of newly-created queues") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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If bitmap area contains invalid data, kernel will crash then mdadm triggers "Segmentation fault". This is cluster-md speical bug. In non-clustered env, mdadm will handle broken metadata case. In clustered array, only kernel space handles bitmap slot info. But even this bug only happened in clustered env, current sanity check is wrong, the code should be changed. How to trigger: (faulty injection) dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sda dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sdb mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb mdadm -Ss echo aaa > magic.txt == below modifying slot 2 bitmap data == dd if=magic.txt of=/dev/sda seek=16384 bs=1 count=3 <== destroy magic dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda seek=16436 bs=1 count=4 <== ZERO chunksize mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb == kernel crashes. mdadm outputs "Segmentation fault" == Reason of kernel crash: In md_bitmap_read_sb (called by md_bitmap_create), bad bitmap magic didn't block chunksize assignment, and zero value made DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T() trigger "divide error". Crash log: kernel: md: md0 stopped. kernel: md/raid1:md0: not clean -- starting background reconstruction kernel: md/raid1:md0: active with 2 out of 2 mirrors kernel: dlm: ... ... kernel: md-cluster: Joined cluster 44810aba-38bb-e6b8-daca-bc97a0b254aa slot 1 kernel: md0: invalid bitmap file superblock: bad magic kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot can't get bitmap from slot 2 kernel: md-cluster: Could not gather bitmaps from slot 2 kernel: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 1603 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 5.14.6-1-default kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc22ac0843ba0 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: ... ... kernel: Call Trace: kernel: ? dlm_lock_sync+0xd0/0xd0 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0] kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot+0x2c/0x290 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: load_bitmaps+0xec/0x210 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0] kernel: md_bitmap_load+0x81/0x1e0 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: do_md_run+0x30/0x100 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: md_ioctl+0x1290/0x15a0 [md_mod 24ea....d3a] kernel: ? mddev_unlock+0xaa/0x130 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: ? blkdev_ioctl+0xb1/0x2b0 kernel: block_ioctl+0x3b/0x40 kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 kernel: ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ab/0x230 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f4a15fa722b kernel: ... ... kernel: ---[ end trace 8afa7612f559c868 ]--- kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod] Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
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On our ZynqMP system we observe, that a NVMe drive that resets itself while doing a firmware update causes a Kernel crash like this: [ 67.720772] pcieport 0000:02:02.0: pciehp: Slot(2): Link Down [ 67.720783] pcieport 0000:02:02.0: pciehp: Slot(2): Card not present [ 67.720795] nvme 0000:04:00.0: PME# disabled [ 67.720849] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 67.720853] nwl-pcie fd0e0000.pcie: Slave error Analysis: When nvme_dev_disable() is called because of this PCIe hotplug event, pci_is_enabled() is still true. And accessing the NVMe drive which is currently not available as it's in reboot process causes this "synchronous external abort" on this ARM64 platform. This patch adds the pci_device_is_present() check as well, which returns false in this "Card not present" hot-plug case. With this change, the NVMe driver does not try to access the NVMe registers any more and the FW update finishes without any problems. Signed-off-by: Stefan Roese <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
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Use hypercall to emulate MSR read/write for the TDX platform. There are two viable approaches for doing MSRs in a TD guest: 1. Execute the RDMSR/WRMSR instructions like most VMs and bare metal do. Some will succeed, others will cause a #VE. All of those that cause a #VE will be handled with a TDCALL. 2. Use paravirt infrastructure. The paravirt hook has to keep a list of which MSRs would cause a #VE and use a TDCALL. All other MSRs execute RDMSR/WRMSR instructions directly. The second option can be ruled out because the list of MSRs was challenging to maintain. That leaves option #1 as the only viable solution for the minimal TDX support. Kernel relies on the exception fixup machinery to handle MSR access errors. #VE handler uses the same exception fixup code as #GP. It covers MSR accesses along with other types of fixups. For performance-critical MSR writes (like TSC_DEADLINE), future patches will replace the WRMSR/#VE sequence with the direct TDCALL. RDMSR and WRMSR specification details can be found in Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) for Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) specification, sec titled "TDG.VP. VMCALL<Instruction.RDMSR>" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.WRMSR>". Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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A panic was reported in the init process on AMD: Run /sbin/init as init process init[1]: segfault at f7fd5ca0 ip 00000000f7f5bbc7 sp 00000000ffa06aa0 error 7 in libc.so[f7f51000+4e000] Code: 8a 44 24 10 88 41 ff 8b 44 24 10 83 c4 2c 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 53 83 ec 08 8b 5c 24 10 81 fb 00 f0 ff ff 76 0c e8 ba dc ff ff f7 db <89> 18 83 cb ff 83 c4 08 89 d8 5b c3 e8 81 60 ff ff 05 28 84 07 00 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc7-next-20220519 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d panic+0x10f/0x28d do_exit.cold+0x18/0x48 do_group_exit+0x2e/0xb0 get_signal+0xb6d/0xb80 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x31/0x760 ? show_opcodes.cold+0x1c/0x21 ? force_sig_fault+0x49/0x70 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x131/0x1a0 irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x5/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 RIP: 0023:0xf7f5bbc7 Code: 8a 44 24 10 88 41 ff 8b 44 24 10 83 c4 2c 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 53 83 ec 08 8b 5c 24 10 81 fb 00 f0 ff ff 76 0c e8 ba dc ff ff f7 db <89> 18 83 cb ff 83 c4 08 89 d8 5b c3 e8 81 60 ff ff 05 28 84 07 00 RSP: 002b:00000000ffa06aa0 EFLAGS: 00000217 RAX: 00000000f7fd5ca0 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000f7fd5b60 RDI: 00000000f7fd5b60 RBP: 00000000f7fd1c1c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The task's CX register got corrupted by commit 8c42819 ("x86/entry: Use PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS for compat"), which overlooked the fact that compat SYSCALL apparently stores the user's CX value in BP. Before that commit, CX was saved from its stashed value in BP: pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->cx (stashed in bp) */ But then it got changed to: pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */ So the wrong value got saved and later restored back to the user. Fix it by pushing the correct value again (BP) for regs->cx. Fixes: 8c42819 ("x86/entry: Use PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS for compat") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5a26592c9dd60bbacdf97974a7433fd802a5593.1652985970.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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[BUG] Syzbot reports the following crash: BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): disabling free space tree BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): clearing compat-ro feature flag for FREE_SPACE_TREE (0x1) BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): clearing compat-ro feature flag for FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID (0x2) Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:backup_super_roots fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1691 [inline] RIP: 0010:write_all_supers+0x97a/0x40f0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4041 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1eae/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2530 btrfs_delete_free_space_tree+0x383/0x730 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1312 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xf28/0x1300 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3012 btrfs_remount_rw fs/btrfs/super.c:1309 [inline] btrfs_reconfigure+0xae6/0x2d40 fs/btrfs/super.c:1534 btrfs_reconfigure_for_mount fs/btrfs/super.c:2020 [inline] btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2079 [inline] btrfs_get_tree+0x918/0x1920 fs/btrfs/super.c:2115 vfs_get_tree+0x90/0x2b0 fs/super.c:1800 do_new_mount+0x2be/0xb40 fs/namespace.c:3472 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3812 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4020 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d6/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3997 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [CAUSE] To support mounting different subvolume with different RO/RW flags for the new mount APIs, btrfs introduced two workaround to support this feature: - Skip mount option/feature checks if we are mounting a different subvolume - Reconfigure the fs to RW if the initial mount is RO Combining these two, we can have the following sequence: - Mount the fs ro,rescue=all,clear_cache,space_cache=v1 rescue=all will mark the fs as hard read-only, so no v2 cache clearing will happen. - Mount a subvolume rw of the same fs. We go into btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), but fc_mount() returns EBUSY because our new fc is RW, different from the original fs. Now we enter btrfs_reconfigure_for_mount(), which switches the RO flag first so that we can grab the existing fs_info. Then we reconfigure the fs to RW. - During reconfiguration, option/features check is skipped This means we will restart the v2 cache clearing, and convert back to v1 cache. This will trigger fs writes, and since the original fs has "rescue=all" option, it skips the csum tree read. And eventually causing NULL pointer dereference in super block writeback. [FIX] For reconfiguration caused by different subvolume RO/RW flags, ensure we always run btrfs_check_options() to ensure we have proper hard RO requirements met. In fact the function btrfs_check_options() doesn't really do many complex checks, but hard RO requirement and some feature dependency checks, thus there is no special reason not to do the check for mount reconfiguration. Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: f044b31 ("btrfs: handle the ro->rw transition for mounting different subvolumes") CC: [email protected] # 6.8+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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When creating a trace_probe we would set nr_args prior to truncating the arguments to MAX_TRACE_ARGS. However, we would only initialize arguments up to the limit. This caused invalid memory access when attempting to set up probes with more than 128 fetchargs. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1769 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ torvalds#8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__set_print_fmt+0x134/0x330 Resolve the issue by applying the MAX_TRACE_ARGS limit earlier. Return an error when there are too many arguments instead of silently truncating. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: 035ba76 ("tracing/probes: cleanup: Set trace_probe::nr_args at trace_probe_init") Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
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During the migration of Soundwire runtime stream allocation from the Qualcomm Soundwire controller to SoC's soundcard drivers the sdm845 soundcard was forgotten. At this point any playback attempt or audio daemon startup, for instance on sdm845-db845c (Qualcomm RB3 board), will result in stream pointer NULL dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101ecf000 [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: aplay Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-qcomlt-arm64-00059-g9d78f315a362-dirty torvalds#18 Hardware name: Thundercomm Dragonboard 845c (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] lr : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] sp : ffff80008a2035c0 x29: ffff80008a2035c0 x28: ffff80008a203978 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 00000000000000c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff1676025f4800 x23: ffff167600ff1cb8 x22: ffff167600ff1c98 x21: 0000000000000003 x20: ffff167607316000 x19: ffff167604e64e80 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffcec265074160 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff167600ff1cec x5 : ffffcec22cfa2010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000003 x2 : ffff167613f836c0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff16761feb60b8 Call trace: sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] wsa881x_hw_params+0x68/0x80 [snd_soc_wsa881x] snd_soc_dai_hw_params+0x3c/0xa4 __soc_pcm_hw_params+0x230/0x660 dpcm_be_dai_hw_params+0x1d0/0x3f8 dpcm_fe_dai_hw_params+0x98/0x268 snd_pcm_hw_params+0x124/0x460 snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x998/0x16e8 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x34/0x58 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf8 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xe0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: aa0403fb f9418400 9100e000 9400102f (f8420f22) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 0000000000006108 <sdw_stream_add_slave>: 6108: d503233f paciasp 610c: a9b97bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-112]! 6110: 910003fd mov x29, sp 6114: a90153f3 stp x19, x20, [sp, torvalds#16] 6118: a9025bf5 stp x21, x22, [sp, torvalds#32] 611c: aa0103f6 mov x22, x1 6120: 2a0303f5 mov w21, w3 6124: a90363f7 stp x23, x24, [sp, torvalds#48] 6128: aa0003f8 mov x24, x0 612c: aa0203f7 mov x23, x2 6130: a9046bf9 stp x25, x26, [sp, torvalds#64] 6134: aa0403f9 mov x25, x4 <-- x4 copied to x25 6138: a90573fb stp x27, x28, [sp, torvalds#80] 613c: aa0403fb mov x27, x4 6140: f9418400 ldr x0, [x0, torvalds#776] 6144: 9100e000 add x0, x0, #0x38 6148: 94000000 bl 0 <mutex_lock> 614c: f8420f22 ldr x2, [x25, torvalds#32]! <-- offset 0x44 ^^^ This is 0x6108 + offset 0x44 from the beginning of sdw_stream_add_slave() where data abort happens. wsa881x_hw_params() is called with stream = NULL and passes it further in register x4 (5th argument) to sdw_stream_add_slave() without any checks. Value from x4 is copied to x25 and finally it aborts on trying to load a value from address in x25 plus offset 32 (in dec) which corresponds to master_list member in struct sdw_stream_runtime: struct sdw_stream_runtime { const char * name; /* 0 8 */ struct sdw_stream_params params; /* 8 12 */ enum sdw_stream_state state; /* 20 4 */ enum sdw_stream_type type; /* 24 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ here-> struct list_head master_list; /* 32 16 */ int m_rt_count; /* 48 4 */ /* size: 56, cachelines: 1, members: 6 */ /* sum members: 48, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* padding: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 56 bytes */ Fix this by adding required calls to qcom_snd_sdw_startup() and sdw_release_stream() to startup and shutdown routines which restores the previous correct behaviour when ->set_stream() method is called to set a valid stream runtime pointer on playback startup. Reproduced and then fix was tested on db845c RB3 board. Reported-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 15c7fab ("ASoC: qcom: Move Soundwire runtime stream alloc to soundcards") Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Cc: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Steev Klimaszewski <[email protected]> # Lenovo Yoga C630 Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Since adding the PCI power control code, we may end up with a race between the pwrctl platform device rescanning the bus and host controller probe functions. The latter need to take the rescan lock when adding devices or we may end up in an undefined state having two incompletely added devices and hit the following crash when trying to remove the device over sysfs: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Call trace: __pi_strlen+0x14/0x150 kernfs_find_ns+0x80/0x13c kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x54/0xf0 sysfs_remove_bin_file+0x24/0x34 pci_remove_resource_files+0x3c/0x84 pci_remove_sysfs_dev_files+0x28/0x38 pci_stop_bus_device+0x8c/0xd8 pci_stop_bus_device+0x40/0xd8 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x28/0x48 remove_store+0x70/0xb0 dev_attr_store+0x20/0x38 sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x78 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xe8/0x184 vfs_write+0x2dc/0x308 ksys_write+0x7c/0xec Fixes: 4565d26 ("PCI/pwrctl: Add PCI power control core code") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Konrad Dybcio <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Dybcio <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
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…n_net
In the normal case, when we excute `echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads`, the
function `nfs4_state_destroy_net` in `nfs4_state_shutdown_net` will
release all resources related to the hashed `nfs4_client`. If the
`nfsd_client_shrinker` is running concurrently, the `expire_client`
function will first unhash this client and then destroy it. This can
lead to the following warning. Additionally, numerous use-after-free
errors may occur as well.
nfsd_client_shrinker echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads
expire_client nfsd_shutdown_net
unhash_client ...
nfs4_state_shutdown_net
/* won't wait shrinker exit */
/* cancel_work(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work)
* nfsd_file for this /* won't destroy unhashed client1 */
* client1 still alive nfs4_state_destroy_net
*/
nfsd_file_cache_shutdown
/* trigger warning */
kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_slab)
kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_mark_slab)
/* release nfsd_file and mark */
__destroy_client
====================================================================
BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on
__kmem_cache_shutdown()
--------------------------------------------------------------------
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 764 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd]
nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
====================================================================
BUG nfsd_file_mark (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining
nfsd_file_mark on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
--------------------------------------------------------------------
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xc8/0x210 [nfsd]
nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
To resolve this issue, cancel `nfsd_shrinker_work` using synchronous
mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net.
Fixes: 7c24fa2 ("NFSD: replace delayed_work with work_struct for nfsd_client_shrinker")
Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
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Add check for the return value of spi_get_csgpiod() to avoid passing a NULL pointer to gpiod_direction_output(), preventing a crash when GPIO chip select is not used. Fix below crash: [ 4.251960] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 4.260762] Mem abort info: [ 4.263556] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 4.267308] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 4.272624] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 4.275681] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 4.278822] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 4.283704] Data abort info: [ 4.286583] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 4.292074] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 4.297130] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 4.302445] [0000000000000000] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 4.308805] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 4.315072] Modules linked in: [ 4.318124] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-next-20241023-00008-ga20ec42c5fc1 torvalds#359 [ 4.328130] Hardware name: LS1046A QDS Board (DT) [ 4.332832] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 4.339794] pc : gpiod_direction_output+0x34/0x5c [ 4.344505] lr : gpiod_direction_output+0x18/0x5c [ 4.349208] sp : ffff80008003b8f0 [ 4.352517] x29: ffff80008003b8f0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffc96bcc7e9068 [ 4.359659] x26: ffffc96bcc6e00b0 x25: ffffc96bcc598398 x24: ffff447400132810 [ 4.366800] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000011e1a300 x21: 0000000000020002 [ 4.373940] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 4.381081] x17: ffff44740016e600 x16: 0000000500000003 x15: 0000000000000007 [ 4.388221] x14: 0000000000989680 x13: 0000000000020000 x12: 000000000000001e [ 4.395362] x11: 0044b82fa09b5a53 x10: 0000000000000019 x9 : 0000000000000008 [ 4.402502] x8 : 0000000000000002 x7 : 0000000000000007 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.409641] x5 : 0000000000000200 x4 : 0000000002000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.416781] x2 : 0000000000022202 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.423921] Call trace: [ 4.426362] gpiod_direction_output+0x34/0x5c (P) [ 4.431067] gpiod_direction_output+0x18/0x5c (L) [ 4.435771] dspi_setup+0x220/0x334 Fixes: 9e264f3 ("spi: Replace all spi->chip_select and spi->cs_gpiod references with function call") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Frank Li <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Under memory pressure it's possible for GFP_ATOMIC order-0 allocations to fail even though free pages are available in the highatomic reserves. GFP_ATOMIC allocations cannot trigger unreserve_highatomic_pageblock() since it's only run from reclaim. Given that such allocations will pass the watermarks in __zone_watermark_unusable_free(), it makes sense to fallback to highatomic reserves the same way that ALLOC_OOM can. This fixes order-0 page allocation failures observed on Cloudflare's fleet when handling network packets: kswapd1: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x820(GFP_ATOMIC), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0-7 CPU: 10 PID: 696 Comm: kswapd1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.6.43-CUSTOM #1 Hardware name: MACHINE Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x3c/0x50 warn_alloc+0x13a/0x1c0 __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xc9d/0xd10 __alloc_pages+0x327/0x340 __napi_alloc_skb+0x16d/0x1f0 bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x96/0x1b0 [bnxt_en] bnxt_rx_pkt+0x201/0x15e0 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_poll_work+0x156/0x2b0 [bnxt_en] bnxt_poll+0xd9/0x1c0 [bnxt_en] __napi_poll+0x2b/0x1b0 bpf_trampoline_6442524138+0x7d/0x1000 __napi_poll+0x5/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x342/0x740 handle_softirqs+0xcf/0x2b0 irq_exit_rcu+0x6c/0x90 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 </IRQ> [[email protected]: update comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGis_TWzSu=P7QJmjD58WWiu3zjMTVKSzdOwWE8ORaGytzWJwQ@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 1d91df8 ("mm/page_alloc: handle a missing case for memalloc_nocma_{save/restore} APIs") Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing the information to the callback. This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram. This leads to undefined behavior after reboot. If the kexec buffer is never touched, nothing happens. If the kexec buffer is touched, it could lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior. Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory, TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. Adding printk's showed the flags were being discarded and as a result the check for IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes. find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem)) start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(83000200) locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0) [.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000 [.] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [.] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [.] PGD c04c8bf067 P4D c04c8bf067 PUD c04c8be067 PMD 0 [.] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [.] RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0 [.] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000d3a80 EFLAGS: 00010286 [.] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff89834ffff000 [.] RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff89834ffff000 RDI: ffff89834ffff018 [.] RBP: ffffc900000d3ba0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: ffff888132b8a900 [.] R10: 4000000000000000 R11: 000000003a616d69 R12: 0000000000000000 [.] R13: ffffffff8404ac28 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89834ffff000 [.] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893d44640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [.] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [.] ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300) [.] CR2: ffff89834ffff000 CR3: 000001034d00f001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [.] PKRU: 55555554 [.] Call Trace: [.] <TASK> [.] ? __die+0x78/0xc0 [.] ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0 [.] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0x130 [.] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [.] ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0 [.] ? template_desc_init_fields+0x317/0x410 [.] ? crypto_alloc_tfm_node+0x9c/0xc0 [.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30 [.] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x72/0xa0 [.] ima_init+0x44/0xa0 [.] __initstub__kmod_ima__373_1201_init_ima7+0x1e/0xb0 [.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30 [.] do_one_initcall+0xad/0x200 [.] ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0xaa/0x110 [.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420 [.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420 [.] ? number+0x12a/0x430 [.] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x80 [.] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 [.] ? parse_args+0xd4/0x380 [.] ? parse_args+0x14b/0x380 [.] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c1/0x2b0 [.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0 [.] kernel_init+0x16/0x1a0 [.] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 [.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0 [.] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [.] </TASK> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 7acf164 ("resource: add walk_system_ram_res_rev()") Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Cc: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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…ing to satisfy some BPF verifiers
In a RHEL8 kernel (4.18.0-513.11.1.el8_9.x86_64), that, as enterprise
kernels go, have backports from modern kernels, the verifier complains
about lack of bounds check for the index into the array of syscall
arguments, on a BPF bytecode generated by clang 17, with:
; } else if (size < 0 && size >= -6) { /* buffer */
116: (b7) r1 = -6
117: (2d) if r1 > r6 goto pc-30
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=24688,imm=0) R1_w=inv-6 R2=map_value(id=0,off=16,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R3=inv(id=0) R5=inv40 R6=inv(id=0,umin_value=18446744073709551610,var_off=(0xffffffff00000000; 0xffffffff)) R7=map_value(id=0,off=56,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R8=invP6 R9=map_value(id=0,off=20,ks=4,vs=24,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16=map_value fp-24=map_value fp-32=inv40 fp-40=ctx fp-48=map_value fp-56=inv1 fp-64=map_value fp-72=map_value fp-80=map_value
; index = -(size + 1);
118: (a7) r6 ^= -1
119: (67) r6 <<= 32
120: (77) r6 >>= 32
; aug_size = args->args[index];
121: (67) r6 <<= 3
122: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24)
123: (0f) r1 += r6
last_idx 123 first_idx 116
regs=40 stack=0 before 122: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24)
regs=40 stack=0 before 121: (67) r6 <<= 3
regs=40 stack=0 before 120: (77) r6 >>= 32
regs=40 stack=0 before 119: (67) r6 <<= 32
regs=40 stack=0 before 118: (a7) r6 ^= -1
regs=40 stack=0 before 117: (2d) if r1 > r6 goto pc-30
regs=42 stack=0 before 116: (b7) r1 = -6
R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=24688,imm=0) R1_w=inv1 R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=16,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R3_w=inv(id=0) R5_w=inv40 R6_rw=invP(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=0) R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=56,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R8_w=invP6 R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=20,ks=4,vs=24,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16_w=map_value fp-24_r=map_value fp-32_w=inv40 fp-40=ctx fp-48=map_value fp-56_w=inv1 fp-64_w=map_value fp-72=map_value fp-80=map_value
parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks
last_idx 110 first_idx 98
regs=40 stack=0 before 110: (6d) if r1 s> r6 goto pc+5
regs=42 stack=0 before 109: (b7) r1 = 1
regs=40 stack=0 before 108: (65) if r6 s> 0x1000 goto pc+7
regs=40 stack=0 before 98: (55) if r6 != 0x1 goto pc+9
R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=24688,imm=0) R1_w=invP12 R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=16,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R3_rw=inv(id=0) R5_w=inv24 R6_rw=invP(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=2147483647) R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R8_rw=invP4 R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=12,ks=4,vs=24,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16_rw=map_value fp-24_r=map_value fp-32_rw=invP24 fp-40_r=ctx fp-48_r=map_value fp-56_w=invP1 fp-64_rw=map_value fp-72_r=map_value fp-80_r=map_value
parent already had regs=40 stack=0 marks
124: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r1 +16)
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=24688,imm=0) R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=8272,umax_value=34359738360,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff8),s32_max_value=2147483640,u32_max_value=-8) R2=map_value(id=0,off=16,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R3=inv(id=0) R5=inv40 R6_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=34359738360,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff8),s32_max_value=2147483640,u32_max_value=-8) R7=map_value(id=0,off=56,ks=4,vs=8272,imm=0) R8=invP6 R9=map_value(id=0,off=20,ks=4,vs=24,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16=map_value fp-24=map_value fp-32=inv40 fp-40=ctx fp-48=map_value fp-56=inv1 fp-64=map_value fp-72=map_value fp-80=map_value
R1 unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access
processed 466 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 2 total_states 20 peak_states 20 mark_read 3
If we add this line, as used in other BPF programs, to cap that index:
index &= 7;
The generated BPF program is considered safe by that version of the BPF
verifier, allowing perf to collect the syscall args in one more kernel
using the BPF based pointer contents collector.
With the above one-liner it works with that kernel:
[root@dell-per740-01 ~]# uname -a
Linux dell-per740-01.khw.eng.rdu2.dc.redhat.com 4.18.0-513.11.1.el8_9.x86_64 #1 SMP Thu Dec 7 03:06:13 EST 2023 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
[root@dell-per740-01 ~]# ~acme/bin/perf trace -e *sleep* sleep 1.234567890
0.000 (1234.704 ms): sleep/3863610 nanosleep(rqtp: { .tv_sec: 1, .tv_nsec: 234567890 }) = 0
[root@dell-per740-01 ~]#
As well as with the one in Fedora 40:
root@number:~# uname -a
Linux number 6.11.3-200.fc40.x86_64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Oct 10 22:31:19 UTC 2024 x86_64 GNU/Linux
root@number:~# perf trace -e *sleep* sleep 1.234567890
0.000 (1234.722 ms): sleep/14873 clock_nanosleep(rqtp: { .tv_sec: 1, .tv_nsec: 234567890 }, rmtp: 0x7ffe87311a40) = 0
root@number:~#
Song Liu reported that this one-liner was being optimized out by clang
18, so I suggested and he tested that adding a compiler barrier before
it made clang v18 to keep it and the verifier in the kernel in Song's
case (Meta's 5.12 based kernel) also was happy with the resulting
bytecode.
I'll investigate using virtme-ng[1] to have all the perf BPF based
functionality thoroughly tested over multiple kernels and clang
versions.
[1] https://kernel-recipes.org/en/2024/virtme-ng/
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Maguire <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zw7JgJc0LOwSpuvx@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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I got a syzbot report without a repro [1] crashing in nf_send_reset6() I think the issue is that dev->hard_header_len is zero, and we attempt later to push an Ethernet header. Use LL_MAX_HEADER, as other functions in net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89b1d008 len:74 put:14 head:ffff88803123aa00 data:ffff88803123a9f2 tail:0x3c end:0x140 dev:syz_tun kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7373 Comm: syz.1.568 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00631-g6d858708d465 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216 Code: 0d 8d 48 c7 c6 60 a6 29 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 ba 30 38 02 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffc900045269b0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000088 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: cd66dacdc5d8e800 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000200 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88802d39a3d0 R08: ffffffff8174afec R09: 1ffff920008a4ccc R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008a4ccd R12: 0000000000000140 R13: ffff88803123aa00 R14: ffff88803123a9f2 R15: 000000000000003c FS: 00007fdbee5ff6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000005d322000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636 eth_header+0x38/0x1f0 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3208 [inline] nf_send_reset6+0xce6/0x1270 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c:358 nft_reject_inet_eval+0x3b9/0x690 net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c:48 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline] nft_do_chain+0x4ad/0x1da0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288 nft_do_chain_inet+0x418/0x6b0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:161 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:269 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x63e/0x770 net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c:184 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_bridge_pre net/bridge/br_input.c:277 [inline] br_handle_frame+0x9fd/0x1530 net/bridge/br_input.c:424 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x13e8/0x4570 net/core/dev.c:5562 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5666 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x12f/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5781 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5867 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x1e8/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5926 tun_rx_batched+0x1b7/0x8f0 drivers/net/tun.c:1550 tun_get_user+0x3056/0x47e0 drivers/net/tun.c:2007 tun_chr_write_iter+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/net/tun.c:2053 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:590 [inline] vfs_write+0xa6d/0xc90 fs/read_write.c:683 ksys_write+0x183/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:736 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fdbeeb7d1ff Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 c9 8d 02 00 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 1c 8e 02 00 48 RSP: 002b:00007fdbee5ff000 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fdbeed36058 RCX: 00007fdbeeb7d1ff RDX: 000000000000008e RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000000000c8 RBP: 00007fdbeebf12be R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000000000008e R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fdbeed36058 R15: 00007ffc38de06e8 </TASK> Fixes: c8d7b98 ("netfilter: move nf_send_resetX() code to nf_reject_ipvX modules") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== The patch set fixes several issues in bits iterator. Patch #1 fixes the kmemleak problem of bits iterator. Patch #2~#3 fix the overflow problem of nr_bits. Patch #4 fixes the potential stack corruption when bits iterator is used on 32-bit host. Patch #5 adds more test cases for bits iterator. Please see the individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. --- v4: * patch #1: add ack from Yafang * patch #3: revert code-churn like changes: (1) compute nr_bytes and nr_bits before the check of nr_words. (2) use nr_bits == 64 to check for single u64, preventing build warning on 32-bit hosts. * patch #4: use "BITS_PER_LONG == 32" instead of "!defined(CONFIG_64BIT)" v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t * split the bits-iterator related patches from "Misc fixes for bpf" patch set * patch #1: use "!nr_bits || bits >= nr_bits" to stop the iteration * patch #2: add a new helper for the overflow problem * patch #3: decrease the limitation from 512 to 511 and check whether nr_bytes is too large for bpf memory allocator explicitly * patch #5: add two more test cases for bit iterator v2: http://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes In this patchset: - Tx header should be pushed for each packet which is transmitted via Spectrum ASICs. Patch #1 adds a missing call to skb_cow_head() to make sure that there is both enough room to push the Tx header and that the SKB header is not cloned and can be modified. - Commit b5b60bb ("mlxsw: pci: Use page pool for Rx buffers allocation") converted mlxsw to use page pool for Rx buffers allocation. Sync for CPU and for device should be done for Rx pages. In patches #2 and #3, add the missing calls to sync pages for, respectively, CPU and the device. - Patch #4 then fixes a bug to IPv6 GRE forwarding offload. Patch #5 adds a generic forwarding test that fails with mlxsw ports prior to the fix. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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The purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error of split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper layer. However, it's not working well on some cases. * Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error When btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls btrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that btrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function is btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() accesses the orig_bbio's bio context to increase the error count. That works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough fast, orig_bbio's (remaining part after split) bio context may not be properly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio (the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier split btrfs_bio's completion. That will result in NULL pointer dereference. That bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1] and it shows the following trace. [1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create "-d raid0 -m raid1" FS. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ torvalds#474 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5) RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080 RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58 R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0 ? _printk+0x58/0x73 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750 ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs] btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs] dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0 __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410 btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0 btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs] ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs] extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs] extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs] ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs] do_writepages+0xd4/0x240 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x4c0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xb0 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22c/0x560 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0 wb_writeback+0x1d6/0x3f0 wb_workfn+0x334/0x520 process_one_work+0x1ee/0x570 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc6/0x130 worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xee/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: dm_mod btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq rapl CR2: 0000000000000020 * Case 2. Earlier completion of orig_bbio for mirrored btrfs_bios btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() assumes the end_io function for orig_bbio is called last among split bios. In that case, btrfs_orig_write_end_io() sets the bio->bi_status to BLK_STS_IOERR by seeing the bioc->error [2]. Otherwise, the increased orig_bio's bioc->error is not checked by anyone and return BLK_STS_OK to the upper layer. [2] Actually, this is not true. Because we only increases orig_bioc->errors by max_errors, the condition "atomic_read(&bioc->error) > bioc->max_errors" is still not met if only one split btrfs_bio fails. * Case 3. Later completion of orig_bbio for un-mirrored btrfs_bios In contrast to the above case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() is not working well if un-mirrored orig_bbio is completed last. It sets orig_bbio->bio.bi_status to the btrfs_bio's error. But, that is easily over-written by orig_bbio's completion status. If the status is BLK_STS_OK, the upper layer would not know the failure. * Solution Considering the above cases, we can only save the error status in the orig_bbio (remaining part after split) itself as it is always available. Also, the saved error status should be propagated when all the split btrfs_bios are finished (i.e, bbio->pending_ios == 0). This commit introduces "status" to btrfs_bbio and saves the first error of split bios to original btrfs_bio's "status" variable. When all the split bios are finished, the saved status is loaded into original btrfs_bio's status. With this commit, btrfs/146 on zoned devices does not hit the NULL pointer dereference anymore. Fixes: 852eee6 ("btrfs: allow btrfs_submit_bio to split bios") CC: [email protected] # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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The following BUG was triggered: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.12.0-rc2-XXX torvalds#406 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/1:1/62 is trying to lock: ffffff8801593030 (&cpc_ptr->rmw_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpc_write+0xcc/0x370 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by kworker/1:1/62: #0: ffffff897ef5ec98 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: raw_spin_rq_lock_nested+0x2c/0x50 #1: ffffff880154e238 (&sg_policy->update_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sugov_update_shared+0x3c/0x280 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-g9654bd3e8806 torvalds#406 Workqueue: 0x0 (events) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xa4/0x130 show_stack+0x20/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x28 __lock_acquire+0x480/0x1ad8 lock_acquire+0x114/0x310 _raw_spin_lock+0x50/0x70 cpc_write+0xcc/0x370 cppc_set_perf+0xa0/0x3a8 cppc_cpufreq_fast_switch+0x40/0xc0 cpufreq_driver_fast_switch+0x4c/0x218 sugov_update_shared+0x234/0x280 update_load_avg+0x6ec/0x7b8 dequeue_entities+0x108/0x830 dequeue_task_fair+0x58/0x408 __schedule+0x4f0/0x1070 schedule+0x54/0x130 worker_thread+0xc0/0x2e8 kthread+0x130/0x148 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 sugov_update_shared() locks a raw_spinlock while cpc_write() locks a spinlock. To have a correct wait-type order, update rmw_lock to a raw spinlock and ensure that interrupts will be disabled on the CPU holding it. Fixes: 60949b7 ("ACPI: CPPC: Fix MASK_VAL() usage") Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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… non-PCI device The function cxl_endpoint_gather_bandwidth() invokes pci_bus_read/write_XXX(), however, not all CXL devices are presently implemented via PCI. It is recognized that the cxl_test has realized a CXL device using a platform device. Calling pci_bus_read/write_XXX() in cxl_test will cause kernel panic: platform cxl_host_bridge.3: host supports CXL (restricted) Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3ef17856fcae4fbd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? die_addr+0x38/0x60 ? exc_general_protection+0x1f5/0x4b0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? pci_bus_read_config_word+0x1c/0x60 pcie_capability_read_word+0x93/0xb0 pcie_link_speed_mbps+0x18/0x50 cxl_pci_get_bandwidth+0x18/0x60 [cxl_core] cxl_endpoint_gather_bandwidth.constprop.0+0xf4/0x230 [cxl_core] ? xas_store+0x54/0x660 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x13/0x40 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0xe7/0x270 cxl_region_shared_upstream_bandwidth_update+0x9c/0x790 [cxl_core] cxl_region_attach+0x520/0x7e0 [cxl_core] store_targetN+0xf2/0x120 [cxl_core] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13a/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x23b/0x410 ksys_write+0x53/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e And Ying also reported a KASAN error with similar calltrace. Reported-by: Huang, Ying <[email protected]> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: a5ab0de ("cxl: Calculate region bandwidth of targets with shared upstream link") Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: Huang, Ying <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
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In support of investigating an initialization failure report [1],
cxl_test was updated to register mock memory-devices after the mock
root-port/bus device had been registered. That led to cxl_test crashing
with a use-after-free bug with the following signature:
cxl_port_attach_region: cxl region3: cxl_host_bridge.0:port3 decoder3.0 add: mem0:decoder7.0 @ 0 next: cxl_switch_uport.0 nr_eps: 1 nr_targets: 1
cxl_port_attach_region: cxl region3: cxl_host_bridge.0:port3 decoder3.0 add: mem4:decoder14.0 @ 1 next: cxl_switch_uport.0 nr_eps: 2 nr_targets: 1
cxl_port_setup_targets: cxl region3: cxl_switch_uport.0:port6 target[0] = cxl_switch_dport.0 for mem0:decoder7.0 @ 0
1) cxl_port_setup_targets: cxl region3: cxl_switch_uport.0:port6 target[1] = cxl_switch_dport.4 for mem4:decoder14.0 @ 1
[..]
cxld_unregister: cxl decoder14.0:
cxl_region_decode_reset: cxl_region region3:
mock_decoder_reset: cxl_port port3: decoder3.0 reset
2) mock_decoder_reset: cxl_port port3: decoder3.0: out of order reset, expected decoder3.1
cxl_endpoint_decoder_release: cxl decoder14.0:
[..]
cxld_unregister: cxl decoder7.0:
3) cxl_region_decode_reset: cxl_region region3:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bc3: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[..]
RIP: 0010:to_cxl_port+0x8/0x60 [cxl_core]
[..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cxl_region_decode_reset+0x69/0x190 [cxl_core]
cxl_region_detach+0xe8/0x210 [cxl_core]
cxl_decoder_kill_region+0x27/0x40 [cxl_core]
cxld_unregister+0x5d/0x60 [cxl_core]
At 1) a region has been established with 2 endpoint decoders (7.0 and
14.0). Those endpoints share a common switch-decoder in the topology
(3.0). At teardown, 2), decoder14.0 is the first to be removed and hits
the "out of order reset case" in the switch decoder. The effect though
is that region3 cleanup is aborted leaving it in-tact and
referencing decoder14.0. At 3) the second attempt to teardown region3
trips over the stale decoder14.0 object which has long since been
deleted.
The fix here is to recognize that the CXL specification places no
mandate on in-order shutdown of switch-decoders, the driver enforces
in-order allocation, and hardware enforces in-order commit. So, rather
than fail and leave objects dangling, always remove them.
In support of making cxl_region_decode_reset() always succeed,
cxl_region_invalidate_memregion() failures are turned into warnings.
Crashing the kernel is ok there since system integrity is at risk if
caches cannot be managed around physical address mutation events like
CXL region destruction.
A new device_for_each_child_reverse_from() is added to cleanup
port->commit_end after all dependent decoders have been disabled. In
other words if decoders are allocated 0->1->2 and disabled 1->2->0 then
port->commit_end only decrements from 2 after 2 has been disabled, and
it decrements all the way to zero since 1 was disabled previously.
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] [1]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 176baef ("cxl/hdm: Commit decoder state to hardware")
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>
Cc: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Cc: Zijun Hu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/172964782781.81806.17902885593105284330.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
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Currently, when configuring TMU (Time Management Unit) mode of a given router, we take into account only its own TMU requirements ignoring other routers in the domain. This is problematic if the router we are configuring has lower TMU requirements than what is already configured in the domain. In the scenario below, we have a host router with two USB4 ports: A and B. Port A connected to device router #1 (which supports CL states) and existing DisplayPort tunnel, thus, the TMU mode is HiFi uni-directional. 1. Initial topology [Host] A/ / [Device #1] / Monitor 2. Plug in device #2 (that supports CL states) to downstream port B of the host router [Host] A/ B\ / \ [Device #1] [Device #2] / Monitor The TMU mode on port B and port A will be configured to LowRes which is not what we want and will cause monitor to start flickering. To address this we first scan the domain and search for any router configured to HiFi uni-directional mode, and if found, configure TMU mode of the given router to HiFi uni-directional as well. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Gil Fine <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
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The scmi_dev->name is released prematurely in __scmi_device_destroy(), which causes slab-use-after-free when accessing scmi_dev->name in scmi_bus_notifier(). So move the release of scmi_dev->name to scmi_device_release() to avoid slab-use-after-free. | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strncmp+0xe4/0xec | Read of size 1 at addr ffffff80a482bcc0 by task swapper/0/1 | | CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.38-debug #1 | Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SA8775P Ride (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x94/0x114 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 | print_report+0xf4/0x5b0 | kasan_report+0xa4/0xec | __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c | strncmp+0xe4/0xec | scmi_bus_notifier+0x5c/0x54c | notifier_call_chain+0xb4/0x31c | blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x68/0x9c | bus_notify+0x54/0x78 | device_del+0x1bc/0x840 | device_unregister+0x20/0xb4 | __scmi_device_destroy+0xac/0x280 | scmi_device_destroy+0x94/0xd0 | scmi_chan_setup+0x524/0x750 | scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508 | platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c | really_probe+0x32c/0x99c | __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4 | driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170 | __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440 | bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178 | driver_attach+0x3c/0x58 | bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4 | driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 | __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 | scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104 | do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664 | kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | | Allocated by task 1: | kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54 | kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 | kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34 | __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8 | __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x6c/0x104 | kstrdup+0x48/0x84 | kstrdup_const+0x34/0x40 | __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x8c/0x408 | scmi_device_create+0x104/0x370 | scmi_chan_setup+0x2a0/0x750 | scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508 | platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c | really_probe+0x32c/0x99c | __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4 | driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170 | __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440 | bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178 | driver_attach+0x3c/0x58 | bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4 | driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 | __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 | scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104 | do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664 | kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | | Freed by task 1: | kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54 | kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 | kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c | __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x164 | __kmem_cache_free+0x11c/0x230 | kfree+0x70/0x130 | kfree_const+0x20/0x40 | __scmi_device_destroy+0x70/0x280 | scmi_device_destroy+0x94/0xd0 | scmi_chan_setup+0x524/0x750 | scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508 | platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c | really_probe+0x32c/0x99c | __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4 | driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170 | __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440 | bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178 | driver_attach+0x3c/0x58 | bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4 | driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 | __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 | scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104 | do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664 | kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: ee7a9c9 ("firmware: arm_scmi: Add support for multiple device per protocol") Signed-off-by: Xinqi Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cristian Marussi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> Message-Id: <20241016-fix-arm-scmi-slab-use-after-free-v2-1-1783685ef90d@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
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Running rcutorture scenario TREE05, the below warning is triggered.
[ 32.604594] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 32.605928] 6.11.0-rc5-00040-g4ba4f1afb6a9 #55238 Not tainted
[ 32.607812] -----------------------------
[ 32.609140] kernel/events/core.c:13946 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
[ 32.611595] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 32.614247] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[ 32.616392] 3 locks held by cpuhp/4/35:
[ 32.617687] #0: ffffffffb666a650 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x4e/0x200
[ 32.620563] #1: ffffffffb666cd20 (cpuhp_state-down){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x4e/0x200
[ 32.623412] #2: ffffffffb677c288 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: perf_event_exit_cpu_context+0x32/0x2f0
In perf_event_clear_cpumask(), uses list_for_each_entry_rcu() without an
obvious RCU read-side critical section.
Either pmus_srcu or pmus_lock is good enough to protect the pmus list.
In the current context, pmus_lock is already held. The
list_for_each_entry_rcu() is not required.
Fixes: 4ba4f1a ("perf: Generic hotplug support for a PMU with a scope")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/2b66dff8-b827-494b-b151-1ad8d56f13e6@paulmck-laptop/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected]
Reported-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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When we compile and load lib/slub_kunit.c,it will cause a panic. The root cause is that __kmalloc_cache_noprof was directly called instead of kmem_cache_alloc,which resulted in no alloc_tag being allocated.This caused current->alloc_tag to be null,leading to a null pointer dereference in alloc_tag_ref_set. Despite the fact that my colleague Pei Xiao will later fix the code in slub_kunit.c,we still need fix null pointer check logic for ref and tag to avoid panic caused by a null pointer dereference. Here is the log for the panic: [ 74.779373][ T2158] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 [ 74.780130][ T2158] Mem abort info: [ 74.780406][ T2158] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 74.780756][ T2158] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 74.781225][ T2158] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 74.781529][ T2158] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 74.781836][ T2158] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 74.782288][ T2158] Data abort info: [ 74.782577][ T2158] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 74.783068][ T2158] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 74.783533][ T2158] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 74.784010][ T2158] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000105f34000 [ 74.784586][ T2158] [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 74.785293][ T2158] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 74.785805][ T2158] Modules linked in: slub_kunit kunit ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute ip6table_nat ip6table_mangle 4 [ 74.790661][ T2158] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2158 Comm: kunit_try_catch Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W N 6.12.0-rc3+ #2 [ 74.791535][ T2158] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [N]=TEST [ 74.791889][ T2158] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 74.792479][ T2158] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 74.793101][ T2158] pc : alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0x120/0x270 [ 74.793607][ T2158] lr : alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0x120/0x270 [ 74.794095][ T2158] sp : ffff800084d33cd0 [ 74.794418][ T2158] x29: ffff800084d33cd0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 74.795095][ T2158] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff80007b30e314 [ 74.795822][ T2158] x23: ffff000390ff6f10 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000088 [ 74.796555][ T2158] x20: ffff000390285840 x19: fffffd7fc3ef7830 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 74.797283][ T2158] x17: ffff8000800e63b4 x16: ffff80007b33afc4 x15: ffff800081654c00 [ 74.798011][ T2158] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d383531325420 x12: 5b5d383734363537 [ 74.798744][ T2158] x11: ffff800084d337e0 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 [ 74.799476][ T2158] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : ffff80008219d188 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff [ 74.800206][ T2158] x5 : ffff0003fdbc9208 x4 : ffff800081edd188 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 74.800932][ T2158] x2 : 0beaa6dee1ac5a00 x1 : 0beaa6dee1ac5a00 x0 : ffff80037c2cb000 [ 74.801656][ T2158] Call trace: [ 74.801954][ T2158] alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0x120/0x270 [ 74.802494][ T2158] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x148/0x33c [ 74.802976][ T2158] test_kmalloc_redzone_access+0x4c/0x104 [slub_kunit] [ 74.803607][ T2158] kunit_try_run_case+0x70/0x17c [kunit] [ 74.804124][ T2158] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x2c/0x4c [kunit] [ 74.804768][ T2158] kthread+0x10c/0x118 [ 74.805141][ T2158] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 74.805540][ T2158] Code: b9400a80 11000400 b9000a80 97ffd858 (f94012d3) [ 74.806176][ T2158] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 74.808130][ T2158] Starting crashdump kernel... Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: e0a955b ("mm/codetag: add pgalloc_tag_copy()") Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <[email protected]> Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]> Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Enqueue packets in dql after dma engine starts causes race condition. Tx transfer starts once dma engine is started and may execute dql dequeue in completion before it gets queued. It results in following kernel crash while running iperf stress test: kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! <snip> Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP pc : dql_completed+0x238/0x248 lr : dql_completed+0x3c/0x248 Call trace: dql_completed+0x238/0x248 axienet_dma_tx_cb+0xa0/0x170 xilinx_dma_do_tasklet+0xdc/0x290 tasklet_action_common+0xf8/0x11c tasklet_action+0x30/0x3c handle_softirqs+0xf8/0x230 <snip> Start dmaengine after enqueue in dql fixes the crash. Fixes: 6a91b84 ("net: axienet: Introduce dmaengine support") Signed-off-by: Suraj Gupta <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Unloading the ice driver while switchdev port representors are added to a bridge can lead to kernel panic. Reproducer: modprobe ice devlink dev eswitch set $PF1_PCI mode switchdev ip link add $BR type bridge ip link set $BR up echo 2 > /sys/class/net/$PF1/device/sriov_numvfs sleep 2 ip link set $PF1 master $BR ip link set $VF1_PR master $BR ip link set $VF2_PR master $BR ip link set $PF1 up ip link set $VF1_PR up ip link set $VF2_PR up ip link set $VF1 up rmmod irdma ice When unloading the driver, ice_eswitch_detach() is eventually called as part of VF freeing. First, it removes a port representor from xarray, then unregister_netdev() is called (via repr->ops.rem()), finally representor is deallocated. The problem comes from the bridge doing its own deinit at the same time. unregister_netdev() triggers a notifier chain, resulting in ice_eswitch_br_port_deinit() being called. It should set repr->br_port = NULL, but this does not happen since repr has already been removed from xarray and is not found. Regardless, it finishes up deallocating br_port. At this point, repr is still not freed and an fdb event can happen, in which ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work() takes repr->br_port and tries to use it, which causes a panic (use after free). Note that this only happens with 2 or more port representors added to the bridge, since with only one representor port, the bridge deinit is slightly different (ice_eswitch_br_port_deinit() is called via ice_eswitch_br_ports_flush(), not ice_eswitch_br_port_unlink()). Trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf129010fd1a93284: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x8948287e8d499420-0x8948287e8d499427] (...) Workqueue: ice_bridge_wq ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work [ice] RIP: 0010:__rht_bucket_nested+0xb4/0x180 (...) Call Trace: (...) ice_eswitch_br_fdb_find+0x3fa/0x550 [ice] ? __pfx_ice_eswitch_br_fdb_find+0x10/0x10 [ice] ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work+0x2de/0x1e60 [ice] ? __schedule+0xf60/0x5210 ? mutex_lock+0x91/0xe0 ? __pfx_ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] ? ice_eswitch_br_update_work+0x1f4/0x310 [ice] (...) A workaround is available: brctl setageing $BR 0, which stops the bridge from adding fdb entries altogether. Change the order of operations in ice_eswitch_detach(): move the call to unregister_netdev() before removing repr from xarray. This way repr->br_port will be correctly set to NULL in ice_eswitch_br_port_deinit(), preventing a panic. Fixes: fff292b ("ice: add VF representors one by one") Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcin Szycik <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sujai Buvaneswaran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
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The RTC update work involves runtime resuming the UFS controller. Hence, only start the RTC update work after runtime power management in the UFS driver has been fully initialized. This patch fixes the following kernel crash: Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Workqueue: events ufshcd_rtc_work Call trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P) pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c (L) pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c ufshcd_rtc_work+0x138/0x1b4 process_one_work+0x148/0x288 worker_thread+0x2cc/0x3d4 kthread+0x110/0x114 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Reported-by: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/[email protected]/ Fixes: 6bf999e ("scsi: ufs: core: Add UFS RTC support") Cc: Bean Huo <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bean Huo <[email protected]> Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> # on SM8650-HDK Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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In unlikely event that we fail during sending the new VF GGTT configuration to the GuC, we will free only the GGTT node data struct but will miss to release the actual GGTT allocation. This will later lead to list corruption, GGTT space leak and finally risking crash when unloading the driver: [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: Failed to provision VF1 with 1073741824 (1.00 GiB) GGTT (-EIO) [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: VF1 provisioning remains at 0 (0 B) GGTT [ ] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff88813cfcd628), but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff88813cfe2028). [ ] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x6b/0xb0 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] drm_mm_insert_node_in_range+0x2c0/0x4e0 [ ] xe_ggtt_node_insert+0x46/0x70 [xe] [ ] pf_provision_vf_ggtt+0x7f5/0xa70 [xe] [ ] xe_gt_sriov_pf_config_set_ggtt+0x5e/0x770 [xe] [ ] ggtt_set+0x4b/0x70 [xe] [ ] simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb0/0x110 [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: Failed to provision VF1 with 1073741824 (1.00 GiB) GGTT (-ENOSPC) [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: VF1 provisioning remains at 0 (0 B) GGTT [ ] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ ] RIP: 0010:drm_mm_remove_node+0x1b7/0x390 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] <TASK> [ ] ? die_addr+0x2e/0x80 [ ] ? exc_general_protection+0x1a1/0x3e0 [ ] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 [ ] ? drm_mm_remove_node+0x1b7/0x390 [ ] ggtt_node_remove+0xa5/0xf0 [xe] [ ] xe_ggtt_node_remove+0x35/0x70 [xe] [ ] xe_ttm_bo_destroy+0x123/0x220 [xe] [ ] intel_user_framebuffer_destroy+0x44/0x70 [xe] [ ] intel_plane_destroy_state+0x3b/0xc0 [xe] [ ] drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0x1cd/0x2f0 [ ] intel_atomic_state_clear+0x9/0x20 [xe] [ ] __drm_atomic_state_free+0x1d/0xb0 Fix that by using pf_release_ggtt() on the error path, which now works regardless if the node has GGTT allocation or not. Fixes: 34e8042 ("drm/xe: Make xe_ggtt_node struct independent") Signed-off-by: Michal Wajdeczko <[email protected]> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 43b1dd2) Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]>
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Recently, we got a customer report that CIFS triggers oops while reconnecting to a server. [0] The workload runs on Kubernetes, and some pods mount CIFS servers in non-root network namespaces. The problem rarely happened, but it was always while the pod was dying. The root cause is wrong reference counting for network namespace. CIFS uses kernel sockets, which do not hold refcnt of the netns that the socket belongs to. That means CIFS must ensure the socket is always freed before its netns; otherwise, use-after-free happens. The repro steps are roughly: 1. mount CIFS in a non-root netns 2. drop packets from the netns 3. destroy the netns 4. unmount CIFS We can reproduce the issue quickly with the script [1] below and see the splat [2] if CONFIG_NET_NS_REFCNT_TRACKER is enabled. When the socket is TCP, it is hard to guarantee the netns lifetime without holding refcnt due to async timers. Let's hold netns refcnt for each socket as done for SMC in commit 9744d2b ("smc: Fix use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler()."). Note that we need to move put_net() from cifs_put_tcp_session() to clean_demultiplex_info(); otherwise, __sock_create() still could touch a freed netns while cifsd tries to reconnect from cifs_demultiplex_thread(). Also, maybe_get_net() cannot be put just before __sock_create() because the code is not under RCU and there is a small chance that the same address happened to be reallocated to another netns. [0]: CIFS: VFS: \\XXXXXXXXXXX has not responded in 15 seconds. Reconnecting... CIFS: Serverclose failed 4 times, giving up Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 14de99e461f84a07 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 [14de99e461f84a07] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cls_bpf sch_ingress nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 dns_resolver tcp_diag inet_diag veth xt_state xt_connmark nf_conntrack_netlink xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sm4_ce_cipher sm4 sm3_ce sm3 sha3_ce sha512_ce sha512_arm64 sha1_ce ena button sch_fq_codel loop fuse configfs dmi_sysfs sha2_ce sha256_arm64 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax efivarfs CPU: 5 PID: 2690970 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.1.103-109.184.amzn2023.aarch64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 r7g.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018 pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238 lr : __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc sp : ffff8000265db790 x29: ffff8000265db790 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 000000000000bd01 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000b4baf8000 x24: ffff00047b5e4580 x23: ffff8000265db7e0 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff00047b5e4500 x20: ffff0010e3f694f8 x19: 14de99e461f849f7 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 3f92800abd010002 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0010e3f69420 x9 : ffff800008a6f294 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffff001924354280 x3 : ffff8000265db7e0 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0010e3f694f8 x0 : ffff00047b5e4500 Call trace: fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238 __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2c4/0x398 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x60/0x8c tcp_v4_connect+0x290/0x488 __inet_stream_connect+0x108/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x78 kernel_connect+0x6c/0xac generic_ip_connect+0x10c/0x6c8 [cifs] __reconnect_target_unlocked+0xa0/0x214 [cifs] reconnect_dfs_server+0x144/0x460 [cifs] cifs_reconnect+0x88/0x148 [cifs] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x230/0x430 [cifs] cifs_read_from_socket+0x74/0xa8 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xf8/0x704 [cifs] kthread+0xd0/0xd4 Code: aa0003f8 f8480f13 eb18027f 540006c0 (b9401264) [1]: CIFS_CRED="/root/cred.cifs" CIFS_USER="Administrator" CIFS_PASS="Password" CIFS_IP="X.X.X.X" CIFS_PATH="//${CIFS_IP}/Users/Administrator/Desktop/CIFS_TEST" CIFS_MNT="/mnt/smb" DEV="enp0s3" cat <<EOF > ${CIFS_CRED} username=${CIFS_USER} password=${CIFS_PASS} domain=EXAMPLE.COM EOF unshare -n bash -c " mkdir -p ${CIFS_MNT} ip netns attach root 1 ip link add eth0 type veth peer veth0 netns root ip link set eth0 up ip -n root link set veth0 up ip addr add 192.168.0.2/24 dev eth0 ip -n root addr add 192.168.0.1/24 dev veth0 ip route add default via 192.168.0.1 dev eth0 ip netns exec root sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o ${DEV} -j MASQUERADE mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${CIFS_MNT} -o vers=3.0,sec=ntlmssp,credentials=${CIFS_CRED},rsize=65536,wsize=65536,cache=none,echo_interval=1 touch ${CIFS_MNT}/a.txt ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o ${DEV} -j MASQUERADE " umount ${CIFS_MNT} [2]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000004bbc008d has 1/1 users at sk_alloc (./include/net/net_namespace.h:339 net/core/sock.c:2227) inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:326 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1576) generic_ip_connect (fs/smb/client/connect.c:3075) cifs_get_tcp_session.part.0 (fs/smb/client/connect.c:3160 fs/smb/client/connect.c:1798) cifs_mount_get_session (fs/smb/client/trace.h:959 fs/smb/client/connect.c:3366) dfs_mount_share (fs/smb/client/dfs.c:63 fs/smb/client/dfs.c:285) cifs_mount (fs/smb/client/connect.c:3622) cifs_smb3_do_mount (fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c:949) smb3_get_tree (fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:784 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:802 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:794) vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1800) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:3508 fs/namespace.c:3834) __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:3848 fs/namespace.c:4057 fs/namespace.c:4034 fs/namespace.c:4034) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tom Talpey <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
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vp_modern_avq_cleanup() and vp_del_vqs() clean up admin vq resources by virtio_pci_vq_info pointer. The info pointer of admin vq is stored in vp_dev->admin_vq.info instead of vp_dev->vqs[]. Using the info pointer from vp_dev->vqs[] for admin vq causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference bug. In vp_modern_avq_cleanup() and vp_del_vqs(), get the info pointer from vp_dev->admin_vq.info for admin vq to clean up the resources. Also make info ptr as argument of vp_del_vq() to be symmetric with vp_setup_vq(). vp_reset calls vp_modern_avq_cleanup, and causes the Call Trace: ================================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:0000000000000000 ... CPU: 49 UID: 0 PID: 4439 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5 #1 RIP: 0010:vp_reset+0x57/0x90 [virtio_pci] Call Trace: <TASK> ... ? vp_reset+0x57/0x90 [virtio_pci] ? vp_reset+0x38/0x90 [virtio_pci] virtio_reset_device+0x1d/0x30 remove_vq_common+0x1c/0x1a0 [virtio_net] virtnet_remove+0xa1/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtio_dev_remove+0x46/0xa0 ... virtio_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0x810 [virtio_pci] ================================================================== Fixes: 4c3b54a ("virtio_pci_modern: use completion instead of busy loop to wait on admin cmd result") Signed-off-by: Feng Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
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Nov 13, 2024
In the error recovery path of mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(), the cleanup is executed and at the end put_device() is called which ends up calling mlx5_vdpa_free(). This function will execute the same cleanup all over again. Most resources support being cleaned up twice, but the recent mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() doesn't. This change drops the explicit cleanup from within the mlx5_vdpa_dev_add() and lets mlx5_vdpa_free() do its work. This issue was discovered while trying to add 2 vdpa devices with the same name: $> vdpa dev add name vdpa-0 mgmtdev auxiliary/mlx5_core.sf.2 $> vdpa dev add name vdpa-0 mgmtdev auxiliary/mlx5_core.sf.3 ... yields the following dump: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2811 Comm: vdpa Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:destroy_workqueue+0xe/0x2a0 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffff88814920b9a8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105c10000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff888100400168 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888100120c00 R09: ffffffff828578c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888131fd99a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888105c10580 FS: 00007fdfa6b4f740(0000) GS:ffff88852ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000b8 CR3: 000000018db09006 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x130 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? destroy_workqueue+0xe/0x2a0 mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources+0x2b/0x40 [mlx5_vdpa] mlx5_vdpa_free+0x45/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa] vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa] device_release+0x31/0x90 kobject_put+0x8d/0x230 mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x328/0x8b0 [mlx5_vdpa] vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x2b8/0x4c0 [vdpa] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x180/0x2b0 ? __vdpa_alloc_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [vdpa] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1fc/0x2d0 netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x410 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x105/0x160 ? __count_memcg_events+0x53/0xe0 ? handle_mm_fault+0x100/0x220 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40d/0x620 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fdfa6c66b57 Code: ... RSP: 002b:00007ffeace22998 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a498608350 RCX: 00007fdfa6c66b57 RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: 000055a498608350 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffeace229c0 R08: 00007fdfa6d35200 R09: 000000000000000c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055a4986082a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffeace233f3 </TASK> Modules linked in: ... CR2: 00000000000000b8 Fixes: 6211165 ("vdpa/mlx5: Postpone MR deletion") Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <[email protected]>
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Eric reported a division by zero splat in the MPTCP protocol: Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6094 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00291-g05b92660cdfe #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x5b4/0x1310 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3163 Code: f6 44 01 e3 89 df e8 9b 75 09 f8 44 39 f3 0f 8d 11 ff ff ff e8 0d 74 09 f8 45 89 f4 e9 04 ff ff ff e8 00 74 09 f8 44 89 f0 99 <f7> 7c 24 14 41 29 d6 45 89 f4 e9 ec fe ff ff e8 e8 73 09 f8 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc900041f7930 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000017e67 RBX: 0000000000017e67 RCX: ffffffff8983314b RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff898331b0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000005d6000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000017e67 R10: 0000000000003e80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000003e80 R13: ffff888031d9b440 R14: 0000000000017e67 R15: 00000000002eb000 FS: 00007feb5d7f16c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007feb5d8adbb8 CR3: 0000000074e4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __tcp_cleanup_rbuf+0x3e7/0x4b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1493 mptcp_rcv_space_adjust net/mptcp/protocol.c:2085 [inline] mptcp_recvmsg+0x2156/0x2600 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2289 inet_recvmsg+0x469/0x6a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:885 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1051 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x1b2/0x250 net/socket.c:1073 __sys_recvfrom+0x1a5/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2265 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2283 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2279 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2279 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7feb5d857559 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007feb5d7f1208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007feb5d8e1318 RCX: 00007feb5d857559 RDX: 000000800000000e RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007feb5d8e1310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff81000000 R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007feb5d8e131c R13: 00007feb5d8ae074 R14: 000000800000000e R15: 00000000fffffdef and provided a nice reproducer. The root cause is the current bad handling of racing disconnect. After the blamed commit below, sk_wait_data() can return (with error) with the underlying socket disconnected and a zero rcv_mss. Catch the error and return without performing any additional operations on the current socket. Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Fixes: 419ce13 ("tcp: allow again tcp_disconnect() when threads are waiting") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8c82ecf71662ecbc47bf390f9905de70884c9f2d.1731060874.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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syzbot and Daan report a NULL pointer crash in the new full swap cluster reclaim work: > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 > Workqueue: events swap_reclaim_work > RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x20/0x1c0 lib/list_debug.c:49 > Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 fe 48 83 c7 08 48 83 ec 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 19 01 00 00 48 89 f2 48 8b 4e 08 48 b8 00 00 00 > RSP: 0018:ffffc90000bb7c30 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88807b9ae078 > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000008 > RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000004f R12: dffffc0000000000 > R13: ffffffffffffffb8 R14: ffff88807b9ae000 R15: ffffc90003af1000 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 00007fffaca68fb8 CR3: 00000000791c8000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline] > __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline] > list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline] > swap_reclaim_full_clusters+0x109/0x460 mm/swapfile.c:748 > swap_reclaim_work+0x2e/0x40 mm/swapfile.c:779 The syzbot console output indicates a virtual environment where swapfile is on a rotational device. In this case, clusters aren't actually used, and si->full_clusters is not initialized. Daan's report is from qemu, so likely rotational too. Make sure to only schedule the cluster reclaim work when clusters are actually in use. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Link: systemd/systemd#35044 Fixes: 5168a68 ("mm, swap: avoid over reclaim of full clusters") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Reported-by: Daan De Meyer <[email protected]> Cc: Kairui Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Accessing `mr_table->mfc_cache_list` is protected by an RCU lock. In the following code flow, the RCU read lock is not held, causing the following error when `RCU_PROVE` is not held. The same problem might show up in the IPv6 code path. 6.12.0-rc5-kbuilder-01145-gbac17284bdcb torvalds#33 Tainted: G E N ----------------------------- net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:313 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by RetransmitAggre/3519: #0: ffff88816188c6c0 (nlk_cb_mutex-ROUTE){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __netlink_dump_start+0x8a/0x290 #1: ffffffff83fcf7a8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_dumpit+0x6b/0x90 stack backtrace: lockdep_rcu_suspicious mr_table_dump ipmr_rtm_dumproute rtnl_dump_all rtnl_dumpit netlink_dump __netlink_dump_start rtnetlink_rcv_msg netlink_rcv_skb netlink_unicast netlink_sendmsg This is not a problem per see, since the RTNL lock is held here, so, it is safe to iterate in the list without the RCU read lock, as suggested by Eric. To alleviate the concern, modify the code to use list_for_each_entry_rcu() with the RTNL-held argument. The annotation will raise an error only if RTNL or RCU read lock are missing during iteration, signaling a legitimate problem, otherwise it will avoid this false positive. This will solve the IPv6 case as well, since ip6mr_rtm_dumproute() calls this function as well. Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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@tgkz @KosukeFujimoto
SubmittingPatches の日本語訳の中で、意味不明な訳語の一つについての相談を
この issue で試してみます。
"Developer's certificate of origin" が「原作者の証明書」と訳されていますが、
"certificate of authorship" という意味にも解釈できてしまいます。
「開発者の源泉証明書」とすると、日本の場合は税金の「源泉徴収」の悪影響で
意味不明になってしまいます。
ちなみに、簡体中国語訳では「开发者来源证书」と訳されています。
ソースコードの「出どころ」の証明書の意味で使える origin の訳語が欲しいのです。
「出所」 「出所」 「由来」 「源流」 など、どれもしっくりしないですね。
DCO は LF が作ったものですが、これの定訳はあるのでしょうか？
単に "certificate of origin" の和訳を調べると、輸出入の「原産地証明書」になってしまい、
使えません。
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