dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra-07.txt

ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Richardson
Expires: February 9, 2018                                            SSW
                                                            M. Behringer
                                                                   Cisco
                                                            S. Bjarnason
                                                          Arbor Networks
                                                               K. Watsen
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                          August 8, 2017


        Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
               draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-07

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of a remote secure
   key infrastructure (BRSKI) using vendor installed X.509 certificate,
   in combination with a vendor's authorizing service, both online and
   offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
   address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
   or on limited/disconnected networks.  Support for lower security
   models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
   legacy reasons but not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when
   the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
   successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
   connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
   device as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 9, 2018.




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Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Other Bootstrapping Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.1.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.2.  Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.3.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.4.  Lack of realtime clock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.5.  Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   3.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.1.  Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.1.1.  Proxy Discovery Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.1.2.  Registrar Discovery Protocol Details  . . . . . . . .  18
     3.2.  Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar  . . . . . . .  19
     3.3.  Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA  . . . . . . . . . .  21
     3.4.  Voucher Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.4.1.  Completing authentication of Provisional TLS
               connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.5.  Voucher Status Telemetry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.6.  MASA authorization log Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       3.6.1.  MASA authorization log Response . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     3.7.  EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.7.1.  EST Distribution of CA Certificates . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.7.2.  EST CSR Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.7.3.  EST Client Certificate Request  . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.7.4.  Enrollment Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.7.5.  EST over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   4.  Reduced security operational modes  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     4.1.  Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     4.2.  Pledge security reductions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32



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     4.3.  Registrar security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     4.4.  MASA security reductions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     5.1.  PKIX Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     5.2.  MIME  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Appendix A.  IPv4 operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     A.1.  IPv4 Link Local addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     A.2.  Use of DHCPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   Appendix B.  mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options . . . . . . . .  41
   Appendix C.  IPIP Join Proxy mechanism  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     C.1.  Multiple Join networks on the Join Proxy side . . . . . .  42
     C.2.  Automatic configuration of tunnels on Registrar . . . . .  43
     C.3.  Proxy Neighbor Discovery by Join Proxy  . . . . . . . . .  43
     C.4.  Use of connected sockets; or IP_PKTINFO for CoAP on
           Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     C.5.  Use of socket extension rather than virtual interface . .  44
   Appendix D.  To be deprecated: Consolidation remnants . . . . . .  44
     D.1.  Functional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       D.1.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       D.1.2.  Behavior of a Join Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       D.1.3.  Behavior of the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       D.1.4.  Behavior of the MASA Service  . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       D.1.5.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  .  59
       D.1.6.  Interactions with Network Access Control  . . . . . .  59
     D.2.  Domain Operator Activities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       D.2.1.  Instantiating the Domain Certification Authority  . .  60
       D.2.2.  Instantiating the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       D.2.3.  Accepting New Entities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       D.2.4.  Automatic Enrollment of Devices . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       D.2.5.  Secure Network Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62

1.  Introduction

   BRSKI provides a foundation to securely answer the following
   questions between an element of the network domain called the
   "Registrar" and an unconfigured and untouched device called a
   "Pledge":

   o  Registrar authenticating the Pledge: "Who is this device?  What is
      its identity?"





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   o  Registrar authorization the Pledge: "Is it mine?  Do I want it?
      What are the chances it has been compromised?"

   o  Pledge authenticating the Registrar/Domain: "What is this domain's
      identity?"

   o  Pledge authorization the Registrar: "Should I join it?"

   This document details protocols and messages to the endpoints to
   answer the above questions.  The Registrar actions derive from Pledge
   identity, third party cloud service communications, and local access
   control lists.  The Pledge actions derive from a cryptographically
   protected "voucher" message delivered through the Registrar.

   The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].  This document details automated protocol
   mechanisms to obtain vouchers.

   BRSKI results in the Pledge storing an X.509 root certificate
   sufficient for verifying the Registrar identity.  In the process a
   TLS connection is established which can be directly used for
   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST).  The Pledge can use these
   credentials to secure additional protocol exchanges.

   BRSKI is agile enough to support bootstrapping alternative key
   infrastructures, such as a symmetric key solutions, but no such
   system is described in this document.

1.1.  Other Bootstrapping Approaches

   To literally "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" is an impossible
   action.  Similarly the secure establishment of a key infrastructure
   without external help is also an impossibility.  Today it is commonly
   accepted that the initial connections between nodes are insecure,
   until key distribution is complete, or that domain-specific keying
   material is pre-provisioned on each new device in a costly and non-
   scalable manner.  Existing mechanisms are known as non-secured 'Trust
   on First Use' (TOFU) [RFC7435], 'resurrecting duckling'
   [Stajano99theresurrecting] or 'pre-staging'.

   Another approach is to try and minimize user actions during
   bootstrapping.  The enrollment protocol EST [RFC7030] details a set
   of non-autonomic bootstrapping methods in this vein:

   o  using the Implicit Trust Anchor database (not an autonomic
      solution because the URL must be securely distributed),





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   o  engaging a human user to authorize the CA certificate using out-
      of-band data (not an autonomic solution because the human user is
      involved),

   o  using a configured Explicit TA database (not an autonomic solution
      because the distribution of an explicit TA database is not
      autonomic),

   o  and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not
      an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key
      material is not autonomic).

   These "touch" methods do not meet the requirements for zero-touch.

   There are "call home" technologies where the Pledge first establishes
   a connection to a well known vendor service using a common client-
   server authentication model.  After mutual authentication appropriate
   credentials to authenticate the target domain are transfered to the
   Pledge.  This creates serveral problems and limitations:

   o  the pledge requires realtime connectivity to the vendor service,

   o  the domain identity is exposed to the vendor service (this is a
      privacy concern),

   o  the vendor is responsible for making the authorization decisions
      (this is a liability concern),

   BRSKI addresses these issues by defining extensions to the EST
   protocol for the automated distribution of vouchers.

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   The following terms are defined for clarity:

   DomainID:  The domain identity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the BIT
      STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the domain trust anchor that is
      stored by the Domain CA.  This is consistent with the
      Certification Authority subject key identifier (Section 4.2.1.2
      [RFC5280]) of the Domain CA's self signed root certificate.  (A
      string value bound to the Domain CA's self signed root certificate
      subject and issuer fields is often colloquially used as a




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      humanized identity value but during protocol discussions the more
      exact term as defined here is used).

   drop ship:  The physical distribution of equipment containing the
      "factory default" configuration to a final destination.  In zero-
      touch scenarios there is no staging or pre-configuration during
      drop-ship.

   imprint:  The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key
      material to identify and trust future interactions with a network.
      This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new
      ducklings: during a critical period, the duckling would assume
      that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their
      mother.  An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint
      of the network's root certification authority certificate.  A
      device that imprints on an attacker suffers a similar fate to a
      duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf.  Securely imprinting is a
      primary focus of this document.[imprinting].  The analogy to
      Lorenz's work was first noted in [Stajano99theresurrecting].

   enrollment:  The process where a device presents key material to a
      network and acquires a network specific identity.  For example
      when a certificate signing request is presented to a certification
      authority and a certificate is obtained in response.

   Pledge:  The prospective device, which has an identity installed by a
      third-party (e.g., vendor, manufacturer or integrator).

   Voucher  A signed statement from the MASA service that indicates to a
      Pledge the cryptographic identity of the Registrar it should
      trust.  There are different types of vouchers depending on how
      that trust asserted.  Multiple voucher types are defined in
      [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]

   Domain:  The set of entities that trust a common key infrastructure
      trust anchor.  This includes the Proxy, Registrar, Domain
      Certificate Authority, Management components and any existing
      entity that is already a member of the domain.

   Domain CA:  The domain Certification Authority (CA) provides
      certification functionalities to the domain.  At a minimum it
      provides certification functionalities to a Registrar and stores
      the trust anchor that defines the domain.  Optionally, it
      certifies all elements.

   Join Registrar (and Coordinator):  A representative of the domain
      that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new
      device is allowed to join the domain.  The administrator of the



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      domain interfaces with a Join Registrar (and Coordinator) to
      control this process.  Typically a Join Registrar is "inside" its
      domain.  For simplicity this document often refers to this as just
      "Registrar".  The term JRC is used in common with other bootstrap
      mechanisms.

   Join Proxy:  A domain entity that helps the pledge join the domain.
      A Proxy facilitates communication for devices that find themselves
      in an environment where they are not provided connectivity until
      after they are validated as members of the domain.  The pledge is
      unaware that they are communicating with a proxy rather than
      directly with a Registrar.

   MASA Service:  A third-party Manufacturer Authorized Signing
      Authority (MASA) service on the global Internet.  The MASA signs
      vouchers.  It also provides a repository for audit log information
      of privacy protected bootstrapping events.  It does not track
      ownership.

   Ownership Tracker:  An Ownership Tracker service on the global
      internet.  The Ownership Tracker uses business processes to
      accurately track ownership of all devices shipped against domains
      that have purchased them.  Although optional this component allows
      vendors to provide additional value in cases where their sales and
      distribution channels allow for accurately tracking of such
      ownership.  Ownership tracking information is indicated in
      vouchers as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]

   IDevID:  An Initial Device Identity X.509 certificate installed by
      the vendor on new equipment.

   TOFU:  Trust on First Use. Used similarly to [RFC7435].  This is
      where a Pledge device makes no security decisions but rather
      simply trusts the first Registrar it is contacted by.  This is
      also known as the "resurrecting duckling" model.

1.3.  Scope of solution

   Questions have been posed as to whether this solution is suitable in
   general for Internet of Things (IoT) networks.  This depends on the
   capabilities of the devices in question.  The terminology of
   [RFC7228] is best used to describe the boundaries.

   The solution described in this document is aimed in general at non-
   constrained (i.e. class 2+) devices operating on a non-Challenged
   network.  The entire solution as described here is not intended to be
   useable as-is by constrained devices operating on challenged networks
   (such as 802.15.4 LLNs).



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   In many target applications, the systems involved are large router
   platforms with multi-gigabit inter-connections, mounted in controlled
   access data centers.  But this solution is not exclusive to the
   large, it is intended to scale to thousands of devices located in
   hostile environments, such as ISP provided CPE devices which are
   drop-shipped to the end user.  The situation where an order is
   fulfilled from distributed warehouse from a common stock and shipped
   directly to the target location at the request of the domain owner is
   explicitly supported.  That stock ("SKU") could be provided to a
   number of potential domain owners, and the eventual domain owner will
   not know a-priori which device will go to which location.

   The bootstrapping process can take minutes to complete depending on
   the network infrastructure and device processing speed.  The network
   communication itself is not optimized for speed; for privacy reasons,
   the discovery process allows for the Pledge to avoid announcing it's
   presence through broadcasting.

   This protocol is not intended for low latency handoffs.  In networks
   requiring such things, the pledge SHOULD already have been enrolled.

   Specifically, there are protocol aspects described here which might
   result in congestion collapse or energy-exhaustion of intermediate
   battery powered routers in an LLN.  Those types of networks SHOULD
   NOT use this solution.  These limitations are predominately related
   to the large credential and key sizes required for device
   authentication.  Defining symmetric key techniques that meet the
   operational requirements is out-of-scope but the underlying protocol
   operations (TLS handshake and signing structures) have sufficient
   algorithm agility to support such techniques when defined.

   The imprint protocol described here could, however, be used by non-
   energy constrained devices joining a non-constrained network (for
   instance, smart light bulbs are usually mains powered, and speak
   802.11).  It could also be used by non-constrained devices across a
   non-energy constrained, but challenged network (such as 802.15.4).
   The certificate contents, and the process by which the four questions
   above are resolved do apply to constrained devices.  It is simply the
   actual on-the-wire imprint protocol which could be inappropriate.

   This document presumes that network access control has either already
   occurred, is not required, or is integrated by the proxy and
   registrar in such a way that the device itself does not need to be
   aware of the details.  Although the use of an X.509 Initial Device
   Identity is consistant with IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID], and allows for
   alignment with 802.1X network access control methods, its use here is
   for Pledge authentication rather than network access control.
   Integrating this protocol with network access control, perhaps as an



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   Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method (see [RFC3748]), is
   out-of-scope.

2.  Architectural Overview

   The logical elements of the bootstrapping framework are described in
   this section.  Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the
   components.  Each component is logical and may be combined with other
   components as necessary.

                                             .
                                             .+------------------------+
      +--------------Drop Ship-------------->.| Vendor Service         |
      |                                      .+------------------------+
      |                                      .| M anufacturer|         |
      |                                      .| A uthorized  |Ownership|
      |                                      .| S igning     |Tracker  |
      |                                      .| A uthority   |         |
      |                                      .+--------------+---------+
      |                                      ..............  ^
      V                                                      |
   +-------+     ............................................|...
   |       |     .                                           |  .
   |       |     .  +------------+       +-----------+       |  .
   |       |     .  |            |       |           |       |  .
   |Pledge |     .  |   Circuit  |       | Domain    <-------+  .
   |       |     .  |   Proxy    |       | Registrar |          .
   |       <-------->            <------->           |          .
   |       |     .  |            |       |           |          .
   |X.509  |     .  +------------+       +-----+-----+          .
   |IDevID |     .                             |                .
   |       |     .           +-----------------+----------+     .
   |       |     .           | Key Infrastructure         |     .
   |       |     .           | (e.g. PKI Certificate      |     .
   +-------+     .           |       Authority)           |     .
                 .           +----------------------------+     .
                 .                                              .
                 ................................................
                               "Domain" components


   Figure 1

   We assume a multi-vendor network.  In such an environment there could
   be a Vendor Service for each vendor that supports devices following
   this document's specification, or an integrator could provide a
   generic service authorized by multiple vendors.  It is unlikely that
   an integrator could provide Ownership Tracking services for multiple



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   vendors due to the required sales channel integrations necessary to
   track ownership.

   The domain is the managed network infrastructure with a Key
   Infrastructure the Pledge is joining.  The a domain provides initial
   device connectivity sufficient for bootstrapping with a Circuit
   Proxy.  The Domain registrar authenticates the Pledge, makes
   authorization decisions, and distributes vouchers obtained from the
   Vendor Service.  Optionally the Registrar also acts as a PKI
   Registration Authority.

2.1.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers

   A voucher is a cryptographically protected statement to the Pledge
   device authorizing a zero-touch imprint on the Registrar domain.

   The format and cryptographic mechanism of vouchers is described in
   detail in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].

   Vouchers provide a flexible mechanism to secure imprinting: the
   Pledge device only imprints when a voucher can be validated.  At the
   lowest security levels the MASA server can indiscriminately issue
   vouchers.  At the highest security levels issuance of vouchers can be
   integrated with complex sales channel integrations that are beyond
   the scope of this document.  This provides the flexibility for a
   number of use cases via a single common protocol mechanism on the
   Pledge and Registrar devices that are to be widely deployed in the
   field.  The MASA vendor services have the flexibility to leverage
   either the currently defined claim mechanisms or to experiment with
   higher or lower security levels.

   Vouchers provide a signed but non-encrypted communication channel
   between the Pledge, the MASA, and the Registrar.  The Registrar
   maintains control over the transport and policy decisions allowing
   the local security policy of the domain network to be enforced.

2.2.  Initial Device Identifier

   Pledge authentication is via an X.509 certificate installed during
   the manufacturing process.  This Initial Device Identifier provides a
   basis for authenticating the Pledge during subsequent protocol
   exchanges and informing the Registrar of the MASA URI.  There is no
   requirement for a common root PKI hierarchy.  Each device vendor can
   generate their own root certificate.

   The following previously defined fields are in the X.509 IDevID
   certificate:




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   o  The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber"
      attribute with the device's unique serial number.

   o  The subject-alt field's encoding SHOULD include a non-critical
      version of the RFC4108 defined HardwareModuleName.

   In order to build the voucher "serial-number" field these IDevID
   fields need to be converted into a serial-number of "type string".
   The following methods is used depending on the first available IDevID
   certificate field (attempted in this order):

   o  An RFC4514 String Representation of the Distinguished Name
      "serialNumber" attribute.

   o  The HardwareModuleName hwSerialNum OCTET STRING base64 encoded.

   o  The RFC4514 String Representation of the Distinguished Name
      "common name" attribute.

   The following newly defined field SHOULD be in the X.509 IDevID
   certificate: An X.509 non-critical certificate extension that
   contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to an
   on-line Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority.  The URI is
   represented as described in Section 7.4 of [RFC5280].

   Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to
   URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed
   in the certificate extension.  The URI provides the authority
   information.  The BRSKI .well-known tree is described in Section 3

   The new extension is identified as follows:




















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   <CODE BEGINS>

   MASAURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
   internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
   id-mod(0) id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS
   EXTENSION
   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
   security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
   id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }

   id-pe
   FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
   security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
   id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;
   MASACertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-MASAURL, ... }
   ext-MASAURL EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX MASAURLSyntax
   IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-masa-url }

   id-pe-masa-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe TBD }

   MASAURLSyntax ::= IA5String

   END

   <CODE ENDS>

   The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of
   [RFC5280], "These extensions may be used to direct applications to
   on-line information about the issuer or the subject".  The MASA URL
   is precisely that: online information about the particular subject.

2.3.  Protocol Flow

   A representative flow is shown in Figure 2:

   +--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+
   | Pledge |         | Circuit |    | Domain     |     | Vendor     |
   |        |         | Proxy   |    | Registrar  |     | Service    |
   |        |         |         |    |            |     | (Internet  |
   +--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+



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     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<-RFC3927 IPv4 adr   | Appendix A        |                    |
   or|<-RFC4862 IPv6 adr   |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |-------------------->|                   |                    |
     | optional: mDNS query| Appendix B        |                    |
     | RFC6763/RFC6762     |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<--------------------|                   |                    |
     | GRASP M_FLOOD       |                   |                    |
     |   periodic broadcast|                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<------------------->C<----------------->|                    |
     |              TLS via the Circuit Proxy  |                    |
     |<--Registrar TLS server authentication---|                    |
   [PROVISIONAL accept of server cert]         |                    |
     P---X.509 client authentication---------->|                    |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P---Voucher Request (include nonce)------>|                    |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P                     |       /--->       |                    |
     P                     |       |      [accept device?]          |
     P                     |       |      [contact Vendor]          |
     P                     |       |           |--Pledge ID-------->|
     P                     |       |           |--Domain ID-------->|
     P                     |       |           |--optional:nonce--->|
     P                     |       |           |     [extract DomainID]
     P                     |       |           |                    |
     P                     |    optional:      |     [update audit log]
     P                     |       |can        |                    |
     P                     |       |occur      |                    |
     P                     |       |in         |                    |
     P                     |       |advance    |                    |
     P                     |       |if         |                    |
     P                     |       |nonceless  |<-device audit log--|
     P                     |       |           |<- voucher ---------|
     P                     |       \---->      |                    |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P                     |       [verify audit log and voucher]   |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P<------voucher---------------------------|                    |
   [verify voucher ]       |                   |                    |
   [verify provisional cert|                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<--------------------------------------->|                    |
     | Continue with RFC7030 enrollment        |                    |
     | using now bidirectionally authenticated |                    |
     | TLS session.        |                   |                    |



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     |                     |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |

   Figure 2

2.4.  Lack of realtime clock

   Many devices when bootstrapping do not have knowledge of the current
   time.  Mechanisms like Network Time Protocols can not be secured
   until bootstrapping is complete.  Therefore bootstrapping is defined
   in a method that does not require knowledge of the current time.

   Unfortunately there are moments during bootstrapping when
   certificates are verified, such as during the TLS handshake, where
   validity periods are confirmed.  This paradoxical "catch-22" is
   resolved by the Pledge maintaining a concept of the current "window"
   of presumed time validity that is continually refined throughout the
   bootstrapping process as follows:

   o  Initially the Pledge does not know the current time.

   o  During Pledge authentiation by the Registrar a realtime clock can
      be used by the Registrar.  This bullet expands on a closely
      related issue regarding Pledge lifetimes.  RFC5280 indicates that
      long lived Pledge certifiates "SHOULD be assigned the
      GeneralizedTime value of 99991231235959Z" [RFC7030] so the
      Registrar MUST support such lifetimes and SHOULD support ignoring
      Pledge lifetimes if they did not follow the RFC5280
      recommendations.

   o  The Pledge authenticates the voucher presented to it.  During this
      authentication the Pledge ignores certificate lifetimes (by
      necessity because it does not have a realtime clock).

   o  If the voucher contains a nonce then the Pledge MUST confirm the
      nonce matches the original voucher request.  This ensures the
      voucher is fresh.  See / (Section 3.2).

   o  Once the voucher is accepted the validity period of the
      domainCAcert in the voucher (see Section 3.4) now serves as a
      valid time window.  Any subsequent certificate validity periods
      checked during RFC5280 path validation MUST occur within this
      window.

   o  When accepting an enrollment certificate the validity period
      within the new certificate is assumed to be valid by the Pledge.




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      The Pledge is now willing to use this credential for client
      authentication.

2.5.  Cloud Registrar

   The Pledge MAY contact a well known URI of a cloud Registrar if a
   local Registrar can not be discovered or if the Pledge's target use
   cases do not include a local Registrar.

   If the Pledge uses a well known URI for contacting a cloud Registrar
   an Implicit Trust Anchor database (see [RFC7030]) MUST be used to
   authenticate service as described in RFC6125.  This is consistent
   with the human user configuration of an EST server URI in [RFC7030]
   which also depends on RFC6125.

3.  Protocol Details

   The Pledge MUST initiate BRSKI after boot if it is unconfigured.  The
   Pledge MUST NOT automatically initiate BRSKI if it has been
   configured or is in the process of being configured.

   BRSKI is described as extensions to EST [RFC7030] to reduce the
   number of TLS connections and crypto operations required on the
   Pledge.  The Registrar implements the BRSKI REST interface within the
   same .well-known URI tree as the existing EST URIs as described in
   EST [RFC7030] section 3.2.2.  A MASA URI is therefore "https://
   authority "./well-known/est".

   Establishment of the TLS connection for bootstrapping is as specified
   in EST [RFC7030] section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA
   Certificates" [RFC7030] with the following extensions for automation:

   Automation extensions for the Pledge (equivalent to EST client) are:

   o  The Pledge provisionally accepts the Registrar certificate during
      the TLS handshake as detailed in EST.

   o  If the Registrar responds with a redirection to other web origins
      the Pledge MUST follow only a single redirection.  (EST supports
      redirection but does not allow redirections to other web origins
      without user input).

   o  The Registar MAY respond with an HTTP 202 ("the request has been
      accepted for processing, but the processing has not been
      completed") as described in EST [RFC7030] section 4.2.3 wherein
      the client "MUST wait at least the specified 'retry-after' time
      before repeating the same request".  The Pledge is RECOMMENDED to
      provide local feed (blinked LED etc) during this wait cycle if



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      mechanisms for this are available.  To prevent an attacker
      Registrar from significantly delaying bootstrapping the Pledge
      MUST limit the 'retry-after' time to 60 seconds.  To avoid
      blocking on a single erroneous Registrar the Pledge MUST drop the
      connection after 5 seconds in which there has been no progress on
      the TCP connection.  It should proceed to other discovered
      Registrars if there are any.  If there were no other Registrars
      discovered, the pledge MAY continue to wait, as long as it is
      concurrently listening for new proxy announcements.

   o  Ideally the Pledge could keep track of the appropriate retry-after
      value for any number of outstanding Registrars but this would
      involve a large state table on the Pledge.  Instead the pledge MAY
      ignore the exact retry-after value in favor of a single hard coded
      value that takes effect between discovery (Appendix D.1.1.1)
      attempts.  A Registrar that is unable to complete the transaction
      the first time due to timing reasons will have future chances.

   o  The Pledge requests and validates a voucher using the new REST
      calls described below.

   o  If necessary the Pledge calls the EST defined /cacerts method to
      obtain the domain owners' CA certificate.  The
      pinnedDomainCertificate element from the voucher should validate
      this certificate, or be identical to it.

   o  The Pledge completes authentication of the server certificate as
      detailed in Section 3.4.1.  This moves the TLS connection out of
      the provisional state.  Optionally the TLS connection can now be
      used for EST enrollment.

   The Pledge establishes the TLS connection with the Registrar through
   the circuit proxy (see Appendix D.1.2) but the TLS connection is with
   the Registar; so in the above section the "Pledge" is the TLS client
   and the "Registrar" is the TLS server.  All security associations
   established are between the new device and the Registrar regardless
   of proxy operations.

   The extensions for a Registrar (equivalent to EST server) are:

   o  Client authentication is automated using Initial Device Identity.
      The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber"
      attribute with the device's unique serial number.  In the language
      of RFC6125 this provides for a SERIALNUM-ID category of identifier
      that can be included in a certificate and therefore that can also
      be used for matching purposes.  The SERIALNUM-ID whitelist is
      collated according to vendor trust anchor since serial numbers are
      not globally unique.



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   o  The Registrar requests and validates the Voucher from the vendor
      authorized MASA service.

   o  The Registrar forwards the Voucher to the Pledge when requested.

   o  The Registar performs log verifications in addition to local
      authorization checks before accepting optional Pledge device
      enrollment requests.

3.1.  Discovery

   The result of discovery is a logical communication with a Registrar,
   through a Proxy.  The Proxy is transparent to the Pledge but is
   always assumed to exist.

   To discover the Registrar the Pledge performs the following actions:

   a.  MUST: Obtains a local address using IPv6 methods as described in
       [RFC4862] IPv6 Stateless Address AutoConfiguration.  Use of
       [RFC4941] temporary addresses is encouraged.  A new temporary
       address SHOULD be allocated whenever the discovery process is
       forced to restart due to failures.  Pledges will generally prefer
       use of IPv6 Link-Local addresses, and discovery of Proxy will be
       by Link-Local mechanisms.  IPv4 methods are described in
       Appendix A

   b.  MUST: Listen for GRASP M_FLOOD ([I-D.ietf-anima-grasp])
       announcements of the objective: "AN_Proxy".  See section
       Section 3.1.1 for the details of the objective.  The Pledge may
       listen concurrently for other sources of information, see
       Appendix B.

   Once a proxy is discovered the Pledge communicates with a Registrar
   through the proxy using the bootstrapping protocol defined in
   Section 3.

   Each discovery method attempted SHOULD exponentially back-off
   attempts (to a maximum of one hour) to avoid overloading the network
   infrastructure with discovery.  The back-off timer for each method
   MUST be independent of other methods.

   Methods SHOULD be run in parallel to avoid head of queue problems
   wherein an attacker running a fake proxy or registrar can operate
   protocol actions intentionally slowly.

   Once a connection to a Registrar is established (e.g. establishment
   of a TLS session key) there are expectations of more timely
   responses, see Section 3.2.



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   Once all discovered services are attempted the device SHOULD return
   to listening for GRASP M_FLOOD.  It should periodically retry the
   vendor specific mechanisms.  The Pledge MAY prioritize selection
   order as appropriate for the anticipated environment.

3.1.1.  Proxy Discovery Protocol Details

   The proxy uses the GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism to announce itself.  This
   announcement is done with the same message as the ACP announcement
   detailed in [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane].

    proxy-objective = ["AN_Proxy", [ O_IPv6_LOCATOR, ipv6-address,
    transport-proto, port-number ] ]

    ipv6-address       - the v6 LL of the proxy
    transport-proto    - 6, for TCP 17 for UDP
    port-number        - the TCP or UDP port number to find the proxy

   Figure 5

3.1.2.  Registrar Discovery Protocol Details

   A Registrar is typically configured manually.  When the Registrar
   joins an Autonomic Control Plane
   ([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]) it MUST respond to GRASP
   ([I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]) M_NEG_SYN message.

   The registrar responds to discovery messages from the proxy (or GRASP
   caches between them) as follows: (XXX changed from M_DISCOVERY)

    objective         = ["AN_registrar", F_DISC, 255 ]
    discovery-message = [M_NEG_SYN, session-id, initiator, objective]

   Figure 6: Registrar Discovery

   The response from the registrar (or cache) will be a M_RESPONSE with
   the following parameters:

    response-message = [M_RESPONSE, session-id, initiator, ttl,
    (+locator-option // divert-option), ?objective)]
    initiator = ACP address of Registrar
    locator1  = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 6,  443]
    locator2  = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 17, 5683]
    locator3  = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fe80::1234, 41, nil]

   Figure 7: Registrar Response





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   The set of locators is to be interpreted as follows.  A protocol of 6
   indicates that TCP proxying on the indicated port is desired.  A
   protocol of 17 indicates that UDP proxying on the indicated port is
   desired.  In each case, the traffic SHOULD be proxied to the same
   port at the ULA address provided.

   A protocol of 41 indicates that packets may be IPIP proxy'ed.  In the
   case of that IPIP proxying is used, then the provided link-local
   address MUST be advertised on the local link using proxy neighbour
   discovery.  The Join Proxy MAY limit forwarded traffic to the
   protocol (6 and 17) and port numbers indicated by locator1 and
   locator2.  The address to which the IPIP traffic should be sent is
   the initiator address (an ACP address of the Registrar), not the
   address given in the locator.

   Registrars MUST accept TCP / UDP traffic on the ports given at the
   ACP address of the Registrar.  If the Registrar supports IPIP
   tunnelling, it MUST also accept traffic encapsulated with IPIP.

   Registrars MUST accept HTTPS/EST traffic on the TCP ports indicated.
   Registrars MAY accept DTLS/CoAP/EST traffic on the UDP in addition to
   TCP traffic.

3.2.  Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar

   When the Pledge bootstraps it makes a request for a Voucher from a
   Registrar.

   This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of
   "/requestvoucher".

   The request media types are:

   application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=voucher-request  The request is a
      "YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a PKCS#7
      structure" as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] using the JSON
      encoded described in [RFC7951].  The Registrar MUST sign the
      request.  The entire Registrar certificate chain, up to and
      including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the PKCS#7 structure.
      [EDNOTE: once/if voucher-requests are defined in this document
      then the reference needs to be updated]

   application/voucher-request  The request is the "YANG-defined JSON
      document" as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] with exception
      that it is not within a PKCS#7 structure.  It is protected only by
      the TLS client authentication.  This reduces the cryptographic
      requirements on the Pledge.  [EDNOTE: once/if voucher-requests are
      defined in this document then the reference needs to be updated]



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   For simplicity the term 'voucher request' is used to refer to either
   of these media types.  Registrar impementations SHOULD anticipate
   future media types but of course will simply fail the request if
   those types are not yet known.

   The Pledge populates the voucher request fields as follows:

   created-on:  Pledges that have a realtime clock are RECOMMENDED to
      populate this field.  This provides additional information to the
      MASA.

   nonce:  The voucher request MUST contain a cryptographically strong
      random or pseudo-random number nonce.  Doing so ensures
      Section 2.4 functionality.  The nonce MUST NOT be reused for
      multiple bootstrapping attempts.

   assertion:  The voucher request MAY contain an assertion of
      "proximity".

   pinned-domain-cert:  In a Pledge voucher request this is the
      Registrar certificate as extracted from the TLS handshake (for
      example the first certificate in the TLS 'certificate_list'
      sequence (see [RFC5246]).  This MUST be populated in a Pledge's
      voucher request if the "proximity" assertion is populated.

   All other fields MAY be ommitted in the voucher request.

   An example JSON payload of a voucher request from a Pledge:

   {
     "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
       "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
       "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
       "assertion": "proximity",
       "pinned-domain-cert": "<base64 encoded certificate>"
     }
   }

   The Registrar validates the client identity as described in EST
   [RFC7030] section 3.3.2.  If the request is signed the Registrar
   confirms the 'proximity' asserion and associated 'pinned-domain-cert'
   are correct.  The registrar performs authorization as detailed in
   [[EDNOTE: UNRESOLVED.  See Appendix D "Pledge Authorization"]].  If
   these validations fail the Registrar SHOULD respond with an
   appropriate HTTP error code.






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   If authorization is successful the Registrar obtains a voucher from
   the MASA service (see Section 3.3) and returns that MASA signed
   voucher to the pledge as described in Section 3.4.

3.3.  Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA

   when a Registrar receives a voucher request from a Pledge it in turn
   requests a voucher from the MASA service.  For simplicity this is
   defined as an optional EST message between a Registrar and an EST
   server running on the MASA service although the Registrar is not
   required to make use of any other EST functionality when
   communicating with the MASA service.  (The MASA service MUST properly
   reject any EST functionality requests it does not wish to service; a
   requirement that holds for any REST interface).

   This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of
   "/requestvoucher".

   The request media type is:

   application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=voucher-request  The request is a
      "YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a PKCS#7
      structure" as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] using the JSON
      encoded described in [RFC7951].  The Registrar MUST sign the
      request.  The entire Registrar certificate chain, up to and
      including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the PKCS#7 structure.
      [EDNOTE: once/if voucher-requests are defined in this document
      then the reference needs to be updated]

   For simplicity the term 'voucher request' is used.  MASA
   impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of course
   will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known.

   The Registrar populates the voucher request fields as follows:

   created-on:  Registrars are RECOMMENDED to populate this field.  This
      provides additional information to the MASA.

   nonce:  The optional nonce value from the Pledge request if desired
      (see below).

   serial-number:  The serial number of the Pledge the Registrar would
      like a voucher for.

   idevid-issuer:  The idevid-issuer value from the pledge certificate
      is included to ensure a statistically unique identity.  The
      Pledge's serial number is extracted from the X.509 IDevID.  See
      Section 2.2.



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   prior-signed-voucher:  If the Pledge provided a signed voucher
      request then it SHOULD be included in the voucher request built by
      the Registrar.

   All other fields MAY be ommitted in the voucher request.

   An example JSON payload of a voucher request from a Registrar:

   {
     "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
       "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
       "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
       "assertion": "proximity"
       "idevid-issuer": "<base64 encoded Authority Key Identifier>"
       "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
       "prior-signed-voucher": "<base64 encode prior voucher request>"
     }
   }

   A Registrar MAY exclude the nonce from the voucher request it submits
   to the MASA.  Doing so allows the Registrar to request a Voucher when
   the Pledge is offline, or when the Registrar is expected to be
   offline when the Pledge is being deployed.  These use cases require
   the Registrar to learn the appropriate IDevID SerialNumber field from
   the physical device labeling or from the sales channel (out-of-scope
   of this document).  If a nonce is not provided the MASA server MUST
   authenticate the Registrar as described in EST [RFC7030] section
   3.3.2 to reduce the risk of DDoS attacks and to provide an
   authenticated identity as an input to sales channel integration and
   authorizations (also out-of-scope of this document).

   The MASA verifies that the voucher request is internally consistent
   but does not authenticate the domain identity information since the
   domain is not know to the MASA server in advance.  The MASA
   validation checks before issuing a voucher are as follows:

   Renew for expired voucher:  As described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]
      vouchers are normally short lived to avoid revocation issues.  If
      the request is for a previous (expired) voucher using the same
      Registrar (as determined by the Registrar pinned-domain-cert) and
      the MASA has not been informed that the claim is invalid then the
      request for a renewed voucher SHOULD be automatically authorized.

   Voucher signature consistency:  The MASA MUST verify that the voucher
      request is signed by a Registrar.  This is confirmed by verifying
      that the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage extension field (as
      detailed in EST RFC7030 section 3.6.1) exists in the certificate
      of the entity that signed the voucher request.  This verification



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      is only a consistency check that the unauthenticated domain CA
      intended this to be a Registrar.  Performing this check provides
      value to domain PKI by assuring the domain administrator that the
      MASA service will only respect claims from authorized Registration
      Authorities of the domain.  (The requirement for the Registrar to
      include the Domain CA certificate in the signature structure was
      stated above).

   Registrar revocation consistency:  The MASA SHOULD check for
      revocation of the Registrar certificate.  The maximum lifetime of
      the voucher issued SHOULD NOT exceed the lifetime of the
      Registrar's revocation validation (for example if the Registrar
      revocation status is indicated in a CRL that is valid for two
      weeks then that is an appropriate lifetime for the voucher).
      Because the Registar certificate authority is unknown to the MASA
      in advance this is only an extended consistency check and is not
      required.  The maximum lifetime of the voucher issued SHOULD NOT
      exceed the lifetime of the Registrar's revocation validation (for
      example if the Registrar revocation status is indicated in a CRL
      that is valid for two weeks then that is an appropriate lifetime
      for the voucher).

   Pledge proximity assertion:  The MASA server MAY verify that the
      Registrar signed voucher includes the 'prior-signed-voucher' field
      populated with a Pledge signed voucher that includes a pinned-
      domain-cert that is consistent with the Registrar certificate
      chain.  The MASA server is aware of which Pledge's support signing
      of their voucher requests and can use this information to confirm
      proximity of the Pledge with the Registrar.

   The root certificate is extracted from the signature method and used
   to populate the "pinned-domain-cert" of the Voucher being issued.
   The domain ID (e.g. hash of the public key of the domain) is
   extracted from the root certificate and is used to update the audit
   log.

3.4.  Voucher Response

   The voucher response to requests from the Pledge and requests from a
   Registrar are in the same format.  A Registrar either caches prior
   MASA responses or dynamically requests a new Voucher based on local
   policy.

   If the join operation is successful, the server response MUST contain
   an HTTP 200 response code.  The server MUST answer with a suitable
   4xx or 5xx HTTP [RFC2616] error code when a problem occurs.  The
   response data from the MASA server MUST be a plaintext human-readable




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   (ASCII, english) error message containing explanatory information
   describing why the request was rejected.

   The response media type is:

   application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=voucher  The response is a "YANG-
      defined JSON document that has been signed using a PKCS#7
      structure" as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] using the JSON
      encoded described in [RFC7951].  The MASA MUST sign the request.

   The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].  For example, the voucher consists of:

   {
     "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
       "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
       "assertion": "logging"
       "pinned-domain-cert": "<base64 encoded certificate>"
       "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
     }
   }

   The Pledge verifies the signed voucher using the manufacturer
   installed trust anchor associated with the vendor's selected
   Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority.

   The 'pinned-domain-cert' element of the voucher contains the domain
   CA's public key.  The Pledge MUST use the 'pinned-domain-cert' trust
   anchor to immediately complete authentication of the provisional TLS
   connection.

   The Pledge MUST be prepared to parse and fail gracefully from an
   Voucher response that does not contain a 'pinned-domain-cert' field.
   The Pledge MUST be prepared to ignore additional fields it does not
   recognize.

3.4.1.  Completing authentication of Provisional TLS connection

   If a Registrar's credentials can not be verified using the pinned-
   domain-cert trust anchor from the voucher then the TLS connection is
   immediately discarded and the Pledge abandons attempts to bootstrap
   with this discovered registrar.  The pledge SHOULD send voucher
   status telemetry (described below) before closing the TLS connection.
   The pledge MUST attempt to enroll using any other proxies it has
   found.  It SHOULD return to the same proxy again after attempting
   with other proxies.  Attempts should be attempted in the exponential
   backoff described earlier.  Attempts SHOULD be repeated as failure
   may be the result of a temporary inconsistently (an inconsistently



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   rolled Registrar key, or some other mis-configuration).  The
   inconsistently could also be the result an active MITM attack on the
   EST connection.

   The Registrar MUST use a certificate that chains to the pinned-
   domain-cert as its TLS server certificate.

   The Pledge's PKIX path validation of a Registrar certificate's
   validity period information is as described in Section 2.4.  Once the
   PKIX path validation is successful the TLS connection is no longer
   provisional.

   The pinned-domain-cert is installed as an Explicit Trust Anchor for
   future operations.  It can therefore can be used to authenticate any
   dynamically discovered EST server that contain the id-kp-cmcRA
   extended key usage extension as detailed in EST RFC7030 section
   3.6.1; but to reduce system complexity the Pledge SHOULD avoid
   additional discovery operations.  Instead the Pledge SHOULD
   communicate directly with the Registrar as the EST server.  The '
   pinned-domain-cert' is not a complete distribution of the EST section
   4.1.3 CA Certificate Response which is an additional justification
   for the recommendation to proceed with EST key management operations.
   Once a full CA Certificate Response is obtained it is more
   authoritative for the domain than the limited 'pinned-domain-cert'
   response.'

3.5.  Voucher Status Telemetry

   The domain is expected to provide indications to the system
   administrators concerning device lifecycle status.  To facilitate
   this it needs telemetry information concerning the device's status.

   To indicate Pledge status regarding the Voucher, the pledge SHOULD
   post a status message.

   The posted data media type: application/json

   The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the EST well
   known URI /voucher_status.  The Status field indicates if the Voucher
   was acceptable.  If it was not acceptable the Reason string indicates
   why.  In the failure case this message is being sent to an
   unauthenticated, potentially malicious Registrar and therefore the
   Reason string SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an
   attacker.  The operational benefit of this telemetry information is
   balanced against the operational costs of not recording that an
   Voucher was ignored by a client the registar expected to continue
   joining the domain.




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   {
     "version":"1",
     "Status":FALSE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail"
     "Reason":"Informative human readable message"
   }

   The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with
   an HTTP 404 error.  The client ignores any response.  Within the
   server logs the server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.

3.6.  MASA authorization log Request

   A registrar requests the MASA authorization log from the MASA service
   using this EST extension.  If a device had previously registered with
   another domain, a Registrar of that domain would show in the log.

   This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of
   "/requestauditlog".

   The registrar MUST HTTP POSTs the same Voucher Request as when
   requesting a Voucher.  It is posted to the /requestauditlog URI
   instead.  The "idevid-issuer" and "serial-number" informs the MASA
   server which log is requested so the appropriate log can be prepared
   for the response.  Using the same media type and message minimizes
   cryptographic and message operations although it results in
   additional network traffic.  The relying MASA server implementation
   MAY leverage internal state to associate this request with the
   original, and by now already validated, voucher request so as to
   avoid an extra crypto validation.

   The request media type is:

   application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=voucher-request  The request is a
      "YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a PKCS#7
      structure" as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] using the JSON
      encoded described in [RFC7951].  The Registrar MUST sign the
      request.  The entire Registrar certificate chain, up to and
      including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the PKCS#7 structure.
      [EDNOTE: once/if voucher-requests are defined in this document
      then the reference needs to be updated]

3.6.1.  MASA authorization log Response

   A log data file is returned consisting of all log entries.  For
   example:






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  {
    "version":"1",
    "events":[
      {
       "date":"<date/time of the entry>",
       "domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the domain CA certificate
                    within the CMS of the audit voucher request>",
       "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
      },
      {
       "date":"<date/time of the entry>",
       "domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the domain CA certificate
                    within the CMS of the audit voucher request>",
       "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
      }
    ]
  }

   Distribution of a large log is less than ideal.  This structure can
   be optimized as follows: All nonce-less entries for the same domainID
   MAY be condensed into the single most recent nonceless entry.

   A Registrar SHOULD use this log information to make an informed
   decision regarding the continued bootstrapping of the Pledge.  For
   example if the log includes unexpected domainIDs this is indicative
   of problematic imprints by the Pledge.  If the log includes nonce-
   less entries this is indicative of the permanent ability for the
   indicated domain to trigger a reset of the device and take over
   management of it.  Equipment that is purchased pre-owned can be
   expected to have an extensive history.  A Registrar MAY request logs
   at future times.  A Registrar MAY be configured to ignore the history
   of the device but it is RECOMMENDED that this only be configured if
   hardware assisted NEA [RFC5209] is supported.

   Log entries containing the Domain's ID can be compared against local
   history logs in search of discrepancies.

   This document specifies a simple log format as provided by the MASA
   service to the registar.  This format could be improved by
   distributed consensus technologies that integrate vouchers with a
   technologies such as block-chain or hash trees or the like.  Doing so
   is out of the scope of this document but are anticipated improvements
   for future work.  As such, the Registrar client SHOULD anticipate new
   kinds of responses, and SHOULD provide operator controls to indicate
   how to process unknown responses.






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3.7.  EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping

   This section describes EST extensions necessary to enable fully
   automated bootstrapping.  Although the Voucher request/response
   structure members "idevid-issuer" and "pinned-domain-cert" are
   specific to PKI bootstrapping these are the only PKI specific aspects
   of the extensions and future voucher definitions might replace them
   with non-PKI fields.

   Once the Voucher is received, as specified in this document, the
   client has sufficient information to leverage the existing
   communication channel with a Registrar to continue an EST RFC7030
   enrollment.  The voucher provides an automated mechanism for the
   "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates" described in [RFC7030]
   section 4.1.1 wherein the Pledge "MUST [...]. engage a human user to
   authorize the CA certificate using out-of-band" information".
   Instead the Pledge now can automate this process using the voucher
   provided "pinned-domain-cert".

   The Pledge SHOULD use the existing current TLS connection to proceed
   with EST enrollment, thus reducing the total amount of cryptographic
   and round trip operations required during bootstrapping.  After
   voucher verification the Pledge continues with EST enrollment
   operations including "CA Certificates Request", "CSR Attributes" and
   "Client Certificate Request" or "Server-Side Key Generation" etc.

   The Pledge is RECOMMENDED to implement the following EST automation
   extensions.  They supplement the RFC7030 EST to better support
   automated devices that do not have an end user.

3.7.1.  EST Distribution of CA Certificates

   The Pledge MUST request the full EST Distribution of CA Certificates
   message.  See RFC7030, section 4.1.

   This ensures that the Pledge has the complete set of current CA
   certificates beyond the domainCAcert (see Section 3.4 for a
   discussion of the limitations).  Although these restrictions are
   acceptable for a Registrar integrated with initial bootstrapping they
   are not appropriate for ongoing PKIX end entity certificate
   validation.

3.7.2.  EST CSR Attributes

   Automated bootstrapping occurs without local administrative
   configuration of the Pledge.  In some deployments its plausible that
   the Pledge generates a certificate request containing only identity
   information known to the Pledge (essentially the X.509 IDevID



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   information) and ultimately receives a certificate containing domain
   specific identity information.  Conceptually the CA has complete
   control over all fields issued in the end entity certificate.
   Realistically this is operationally difficult with the current status
   of PKI certificate authority deployments where the CSR is submitted
   to the CA via a number of non-standard protocols.  Even with all
   standardized protocols used, it could operationally be problematic to
   expect that service specific certificate fields can be created by a
   CA that is likely operated by a group that has no insight into
   different network services/protocols used.  For example, the CA could
   even be outsourced.

   To alleviate these operational difficulties, the Pledge MUST request
   the EST "CSR Attributes" from the EST server and the EST server needs
   to be able to reply with the attributes necessary for use of the
   certificate in its intended protocols/services.  This approach allows
   for minimal CA integrations and instead the local infrastructure (EST
   server) informs the Pledge of the proper fields to include in the
   generated CSR.  This approach is beneficial to automated boostrapping
   in the widest number of environments.

   If the hardwareModuleName in the X.509 IDevID is populated then it
   SHOULD by default be propagated to the LDevID along with the
   hwSerialNum.  The EST server SHOULD support local policy concerning
   this functionality.

   In networks using the BRSKI enrolled certificate to authenticate the
   ACP (Autonomic Control Plane), the EST attributes MUST include the
   "ACP information" field.  See
   [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] for more details.

   The Registar MUST also confirm the resulting CSR is formatted as
   indicated before forwarding the request to a CA.  If the Registar is
   communicating with the CA using a protocol like full CMC which
   provides mechanisms to override the CSR attributes, then these
   mechanisms MAY be used even if the client ignores CSR Attribute
   guidance.

3.7.3.  EST Client Certificate Request

   The Pledge MUST request a new client certificate.  See RFC7030,
   section 4.2.

3.7.4.  Enrollment Status Telemetry

   For automated bootstrapping of devices the adminstrative elements
   providing bootstrapping also provide indications to the system
   administrators concerning device lifecycle status.  This might



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   include information concerning attempted bootstrapping messages seen
   by the client, MASA provides logs and status of credential
   enrollment.  The EST protocol assumes an end user and therefore does
   not include a final success indication back to the server.  This is
   insufficient for automated use cases.

   To indicate successful enrollment the client SHOULD re-negotiate the
   EST TLS session using the newly obtained credentials.  This occurs by
   the client initiating a new TLS ClientHello message on the existing
   TLS connection.  The client MAY simply close the old TLS session and
   start a new one.  The server MUST support either model.

   In the case of a FAIL the Reason string indicates why the most recent
   enrollment failed.  The SubjectKeyIdentifier field MUST be included
   if the enrollment attempt was for a keypair that is locally known to
   the client.  If EST /serverkeygen was used and failed then the field
   is omitted from the status telemetry.

   In the case of a SUCCESS the Reason string is omitted.  The
   SubjectKeyIdentifier is included so that the server can record the
   successful certificate distribution.

   Status media type: application/json

   The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the new EST well
   known URI /enrollstatus.

  {
    "version":"1",
    "Status":TRUE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail"
    "Reason":"Informative human readable message"
    "SubjectKeyIdentifier":"<base64 encoded subjectkeyidentifier for the
                             enrollment that failed>"
  }

   The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with
   an HTTP 404 error.

   Within the server logs the server MUST capture if this message was
   received over an TLS session with a matching client certificate.
   This allows for clients that wish to minimize their crypto operations
   to simply POST this response without renegotiating the TLS session -
   at the cost of the server not being able to accurately verify that
   enrollment was truly successful.







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3.7.5.  EST over CoAP

   This document describes extensions to EST for the purposes of
   bootstrapping of remote key infrastructures.  Bootstrapping is
   relevant for CoAP enrollment discussions as well.  The defintion of
   EST and BRSKI over CoAP is not discussed within this document beyond
   ensuring proxy support for CoAP operations.  Instead it is
   anticipated that a definition of CoAP mappings will occur in
   subsequent documents such as [I-D.vanderstok-ace-coap-est] and that
   CoAP mappings for BRSKI will be discussed either there or in future
   work.

4.  Reduced security operational modes

   A common requirement of bootstrapping is to support less secure
   operational modes for support specific use cases.  The following
   sections detail specific ways that the Pledge, Registrar and MASA can
   be configured to run in a less secure mode for the indicated reasons.

4.1.  Trust Model

   +--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+
   | Pledge |         | Circuit |    | Domain     |     | Vendor     |
   |        |         | Proxy   |    | Registrar  |     | Service    |
   |        |         |         |    |            |     | (Internet  |
   +--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+

   Figure 10

   Pledge:  The Pledge could be compromised and providing an attack
      vector for malware.  The entity is trusted to only imprint using
      secure methods described in this document.  Additional endpoint
      assessment techniques are RECOMMENDED but are out-of-scope of this
      document.

   Proxy:  Provides proxy functionalities but is not involved in
      security considerations.

   Registrar:  When interacting with a MASA server a Registrar makes all
      decisions.  When Ownership Vouchers are involved a Registrar is
      only a conduit and all security decisions are made on the vendor
      service.

   Vendor Service, MASA:  This form of vendor service is trusted to
      accurately log all claim attempts and to provide authoritative log
      information to Registrars.  The MASA does not know which devices
      are associated with which domains.  These claims could be
      strengthened by using cryptographic log techniques to provide



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      append only, cryptographic assured, publicly auditable logs.
      Current text provides only for a trusted vendor.

   Vendor Service, Ownership Validation:  This form of vendor service is
      trusted to accurately know which device is owned by which domain.

4.2.  Pledge security reductions

   The Pledge can choose to accept vouchers using less secure methods.
   These methods enable offline and emergency (touch based) deployment
   use cases:

   1.  The Pledge MUST accept nonceless vouchers.  This allows for
       offline use cases.  Logging and validity periods address the
       inherent security considerations of supporting these use cases.

   2.  The Pledge MAY support "trust on first use" for physical
       interfaces such as a local console port or physical user
       interface but MUST NOT support "trust on first use" on network
       interfaces.  This is because "trust on first use" permanently
       degrades the security for all use cases.

   3.  The Pledge MAY have an operational mode where it skips Voucher
       validation one time.  For example if a physical button is
       depressed during the bootstrapping operation.  This can be useful
       if the vendor service is unavailable.  This behavior SHOULD be
       available via local configuration or physical presence methods to
       ensure new entities can always be deployed even when autonomic
       methods fail.  This allows for unsecured imprint.

   It is RECOMMENDED that "trust on first use" or skipping voucher
   validation only be available if hardware assisted Network Endpoint
   Assessment [RFC5209] is supported.  This recommendation ensures that
   domain network monitoring can detect innappropriate use of offline or
   emergency deployment procedures.

4.3.  Registrar security reductions

   A Registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods.
   These methods are acceptable when low security models are needed, as
   the security decisions are being made by the local administrator, but
   they MUST NOT be the default behavior:

   1.  A registrar MAY choose to accept all devices, or all devices of a
       particular type, at the administrator's discretion.  This could
       occur when informing all Registrars of unique identifiers of new
       entities might be operationally difficult.




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   2.  A registrar MAY choose to accept devices that claim a unique
       identity without the benefit of authenticating that claimed
       identity.  This could occur when the Pledge does not include an
       X.509 IDevID factory installed credential.  New Entities without
       an X.509 IDevID credential MAY form the Section 3.2 request using
       the Section 3.3 format to ensure the Pledge's serial number
       information is provided to the Registar (this includes the IDevID
       AuthorityKeyIdentifier value which would be statically configured
       on the Pledge).  The Pledge MAY refuse to provide a TLS client
       certificate (as one is not available).  The Pledge SHOULD support
       HTTP-based or certificate-less TLS authentication as described in
       EST RFC7030 section 3.3.2.  A Registrar MUST NOT accept
       unauthenticated New Entities unless it has been configured to do
       so by an administrator that has verified that only expected new
       entities can communicate with a Registrar (presumably via a
       physically secured perimeter).

   3.  A Registrar MAY request nonce-less Vouchers from the MASA service
       (by not including a nonce in the request).  These Vouchers can
       then be transmitted to the Registrar and stored until they are
       needed during bootstrapping operations.  This is for use cases
       where target network is protected by an air gap and therefore can
       not contact the MASA service during Pledge deployment.

   4.  A registrar MAY ignore unrecognized nonce-less log entries.  This
       could occur when used equipment is purchased with a valid history
       being deployed in air gap networks that required permanent
       Vouchers.

4.4.  MASA security reductions

   Lower security modes chosen by the MASA service effect all device
   deployments unless bound to the specific device identities.  In which
   case these modes can be provided as additional features for specific
   customers.  The MASA service can choose to run in less secure modes
   by:

   1.  Not enforcing that a nonce is in the Voucher.  This results in
       distribution of Voucher that never expires and in effect makes
       the Domain an always trusted entity to the Pledge during any
       subsequent bootstrapping attempts.  That this occurred is
       captured in the log information so that the Domain registrar can
       make appropriate security decisions when a Pledge joins the
       Domain.  This is useful to support use cases where Registrars
       might not be online during actual device deployment.  Because
       this results in long lived Voucher and does not require the proof
       that the device is online this is only accepted when the
       Registrar is authenticated by the MASA server and authorized to



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       provide this functionality.  The MASA server is RECOMMENDED to
       use this functionality only in concert with an enhanced level of
       ownership tracking (out-of-scope).  If the Pledge device is known
       to have a real-time-clock that is set from the factory use of a
       voucher validity period is RECOMMENDED.

   2.  Not verifying ownership before responding with an Voucher.  This
       is expected to be a common operational model because doing so
       relieves the vendor providing MASA services from having to track
       ownership during shipping and supply chain and allows for a very
       low overhead MASA service.  A Registrar uses the audit log
       information as a defense in depth strategy to ensure that this
       does not occur unexpectedly (for example when purchasing new
       equipment the Registrar would throw an error if any audit log
       information is reported).  The MASA should verify the 'prior-
       signed-voucher' information for Pledge's that support that
       functionality.  This provides a proof-of-proximity check that
       reduces the need for ownership verification.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests the following Parameter Values for the smime-
   type Parameters:

   o  voucher-request

   o  voucher

   This document requests the following media types:

   o  application/voucher-request"

5.1.  PKIX Registry

   This document requests a number for id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) from
   the pkix(7) id-mod(0) Registry.  [[EDNOTE: fix names]]

   This document requests a number from the id-pe registry for id-pe-
   masa-url.  XXX

5.2.  MIME

   Type name:

   Subtype name:

   Required parameters:




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   Optional parameters:

   Encoding considerations:

   Security considerations:

   Interoperability considerations:

   Published specification:

   Applications that use this media type:

   Fragment identifier considerations:

   Additional information:

   Deprecated alias names for this type:

        Magic number(s):

        File extension(s):

        Macintosh file type code(s):

      Person and email address to contact for further information:

   Intended usage:  LIMITED USED

   Restrictions on usage:

   Author:

   Change controller:

   Provisional registration? (standards tree only):

6.  Security Considerations

   There are uses cases where the MASA could be unavailable or
   uncooperative to the Registrar.  They include planned and unplanned
   network partitions, changes to MASA policy, or other instances where
   MASA policy rejects a claim.  These introduce an operational risk to
   the Registrar owner that MASA/vendor behavior might limit the ability
   to re-boostrap a Pledge device.  For example this might be an issue
   during disaster recovery.  This risk can be mitigated by Registrars
   that request and maintain long term copies of "nonceless" Vouchers.
   In that way they are guaranteed to be able to repeat bootstrapping
   for their devices.



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   The issuance of nonceless vouchers themselves create a security
   concern.  If the Registrar of a previous domain can intercept
   protocol communications then it can use a previously issued nonceless
   voucher to establish management control of a pledge device even after
   having sold it.  This risk is mitigated by recording the issuance of
   such vouchers in the MASA audit log that is verified by the
   subsequent Registrar.  This reduces the resale value of the equipment
   because future owners will detect the lowered security inherent in
   the existence of a nonceless voucher that would be trusted by their
   Pledge.  This reflects a balance between partition resistant recovery
   and security of future bootstrapping.  Registrars take the Pledge's
   audit history into account when applying policy to new devices.

   The MASA server is exposed to DoS attacks wherein attackers claim an
   unbounded number of devices.  Ensuring a Registrar is representative
   of a valid vendor customer, even without validating ownership of
   specific Pledge devices, helps to mitigate this.  Pledge signatures
   on the initial voucher request, as forwarded by the Registrar in the
   prior-signed-voucher field, significantly reduce this risk by
   ensuring the MASA can confirm proximity between the Pledge and the
   Registrar making the request.  This mechanism is optional to allow
   for constrained devices.

   It is possible for an attacker to request a voucher from the MASA
   service directly after the real Registrar obtains an audit log.  If
   the attacker could also force the bootstrapping protocol to reset
   there is a theoretical opportunity for the attacker to use their
   voucher to take control of the Pledge but then proceed to enroll with
   the target domain.  Possible prevention mechanisms include:

   o  Per device rate limits on the MASA service ensure such timing
      attacks are difficult.

   o  The Registrar can repeat the request for audit log information at
      some time after bootstrapping is complete.

   To facilitate logging and administrative oversight the Pledge reports
   on Voucher parsing status to the Registrar.  In the case of a failure
   this information is informative to a potentially malicious Registar
   but this is RECOMMENDED anyway because of the operational benefits of
   an informed administrator in cases where the failure is indicative of
   a problem.

   To facilitate truely limited clients EST RFC7030 section 3.3.2
   requirements that the client MUST support a client authentication
   model have been reduced in Section 4 to a statement that the
   Registrar "MAY" choose to accept devices that fail cryptographic




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   authentication.  This reflects current (poor) practices in shipping
   devices without a cryptographic identity that are NOT RECOMMENDED.

   During the provisional period of the connection all HTTP header and
   content data MUST treated as untrusted data.  HTTP libraries are
   regularly exposed to non-secured HTTP traffic: mature libraries
   should not have any problems.

   Pledge's might chose to engage in protocol operations with multiple
   discovered Registrars in parallel.  As noted above they will only do
   so with distinct nonce values, but the end result could be multple
   voucher's issued from the MASA if all registrars attempt to claim the
   device.  This is not a failure and the Pledge choses whichever
   voucher to accept based on internal logic.  The Registrar's verifying
   log information will see multiple entries and take this into account
   for their analytics purposes.

7.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in
   particular Brian Carpenter, Toerless Eckert, Fuyu Eleven, Eliot Lear,
   Sergey Kasatkin, Markus Stenberg, and Peter van der Stok

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]
              Behringer, M., Eckert, T., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
              Control Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
              plane-08 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]
              Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-ietf-
              anima-voucher-04 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [I-D.vanderstok-ace-coap-est]
              Kumar, S., Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Furuhed, M., and S.
              Raza, "EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)", draft-
              vanderstok-ace-coap-est-02 (work in progress), June 2017.

   [IDevID]   IEEE Standard, , "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.






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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3542]  Stevens, W., Thomas, M., Nordmark, E., and T. Jinmei,
              "Advanced Sockets Application Program Interface (API) for
              IPv6", RFC 3542, May 2003.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC3927]  Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
              Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927, May
              2005.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5386]  Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing
              Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386,
              November 2008.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5660]  Williams, N., "IPsec Channels: Connection Latching",
              RFC 5660, October 2009.






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   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7951]  Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
              RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap]
              Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              "Bootstrapping Trust on a Homenet", draft-behringer-
              homenet-trust-bootstrap-02 (work in progress), February
              2014.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
              Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
              Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
              grasp-15 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
              Watsen, K., Abrahamsson, M., and I. Farrer, "Zero Touch
              Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF based Management",
              draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-14 (work in progress), June
              2017.

   [I-D.lear-mud-framework]
              Lear, E., "Manufacturer Usage Description Framework",
              draft-lear-mud-framework-00 (work in progress), January
              2016.






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   [I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter]
              Richardson, M., "Considerations for stateful vs stateless
              join router in ANIMA bootstrap", draft-richardson-anima-
              state-for-joinrouter-01 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [imprinting]
              Wikipedia, , "Wikipedia article: Imprinting", July 2015,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imprinting_(psychology)>.

   [RFC2473]  Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
              IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.

   [RFC7217]  Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
              Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.

   [RFC7435]  Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
              Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
              December 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

   [RFC7575]  Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
              Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.

   [Stajano99theresurrecting]
              Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The resurrecting duckling:
              security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks", 1999,
              <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/papers/1999-StajanoAnd-
              duckling.pdf>.

Appendix A.  IPv4 operations

A.1.  IPv4 Link Local addresses

   Instead of an IPv6 link-local address, an IPv4 address may be
   generated using [RFC3927]  Dynamic Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local
   Addresses.

   In the case that an IPv4 Local-Local address is formed, then the
   bootstrap process would continue as in the IPv6 case by looking for a
   (circuit) proxy.






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A.2.  Use of DHCPv4

   The Plege MAY obtain an IP address via DHCP [RFC2131].  The DHCP
   provided parameters for the Domain Name System can be used to perform
   DNS operations if all local discovery attempts fail.

Appendix B.  mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options

   The Pledge MAY perform DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] over
   Multicast DNS [RFC6762] searching for the service
   "_bootstrapks._tcp.local.".

   To prevent unaccceptable levels of network traffic the congestion
   avoidance mechanisms specified in [RFC6762] section 7 MUST be
   followed.  The Pledge SHOULD listen for an unsolicited broadcast
   response as described in [RFC6762].  This allows devices to avoid
   announcing their presence via mDNS broadcasts and instead silently
   join a network by watching for periodic unsolicited broadcast
   responses.

   Performs DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] over normal DNS
   operations.  The service searched for is
   "_bootstrapks._tcp.example.com".  In this case the domain
   "example.com" is discovered as described in [RFC6763] section 11.
   This method is only available if the host has received a useable IPv4
   address via DHCPv4 as suggested in Appendix A.

   If no local bootstrapks service is located using the GRASP
   mechanisms, or the above mentioned DNS-based Service Discovery
   methods the Pledge MAY contact a well known vendor provided
   bootstrapping server by performing a DNS lookup using a well known
   URI such as "bootstrapks.vendor-example.com".  The details of the URI
   are vendor specific.  Vendors that leverage this method on the Pledge
   are responsible for providing the bootstrapks service.

   The current DNS services returned during each query is maintained
   until bootstrapping is completed.  If bootstrapping fails and the
   Pledge returns to the Discovery state it picks up where it left off
   and continues attempting bootstrapping.  For example if the first
   Multicast DNS _bootstrapks._tcp.local response doesn't work then the
   second and third responses are tried.  If these fail the Pledge moves
   on to normal DNS-based Service Discovery.

Appendix C.  IPIP Join Proxy mechanism

   The Circuit Proxy mechanism suffers from requiring a state on the
   Join Proxy for each connection that is relayed.  The Circuit Proxy
   can be considered a kind of Algorithm Gateway [FIND-good-REF].



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   An alternative to proxying at the TCP layer is to selectively forward
   at the IP layer.  This moves all per-connection to the Join
   Registrar.  The IPIP tunnel statelessly forwards packets.  This
   section provides some explanation of some of the details of the
   Registrar discovery procotol which are not important to Circuit
   Proxy, and some implementation advice.

   The IPIP tunnel is described in [RFC2473].  Each such tunnel is
   considered a unidirectional construct, but two tunnels may be
   associated to form a bidirectional mechanism.  An IPIP tunnel is
   setup as follows.  The outer addresses are an ACP address of the Join
   Proxy, and the ACP address of the Join Registrar.  The inner
   addresses seen in the tunnel are the link-local addresses of the
   network on which the join activity is occuring.

   One way to look at this construct is to consider that the Registrar
   is extending attaching an interface to the network on which the Join
   Proxy is physically present.  The Registrar then interacts as if it
   were present on that network using link-local (fe80::) addresses.
   The Join node is unaware that the traffic is being proxied through a
   tunnel, and does not need any special routing.

   There are a number of considerations with this mechanism which
   require cause some minor amounts of complexity.  Note that due to the
   tunnels, the Registrar sees multiple connections to a fe80::/10
   network on not just physical interfaces, but on each of the virtual
   interfaces represending the tunnels.

C.1.  Multiple Join networks on the Join Proxy side

   The Join Proxy will in the general case be a routing device with
   multiple interfaces.  Even a device as simple as a wifi access point
   may have wired, and multiple frequencies of wireless interfaces,
   potentially with multiple ESSIDs.

   Each of these interfaces on the Join Proxy may be seperate L3 routing
   domains, and therefore will have a unique set of link-local
   addresses.  An IPIP packet being returned by the Registrar needs to
   be forwarded to the correct interface, so the Join Proxy needs an
   additional key to distinguish which network the packet should be
   returned to.

   The simplest way to get this additional key is to allocate an
   additional ACP address; one address for each network on which join
   traffic is occuring.  The Join Proxy SHOULD do a GRASP M_NEG_SYN for
   each interface which they wish to relay traffic, as this allows the
   Registrar to do any static tunnel configuration that may be required.




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C.2.  Automatic configuration of tunnels on Registrar

   The Join Proxy is expected to do a GRASP negotiation with the proxy
   for each Join Interface that it needs to relay traffic from.  This is
   to permit Registrars to configure the appropriate virtual interfaces
   before join traffic arrives.

   A Registrar serving a large number of interfaces may not wish to
   allocate resources to every interface at all times, but can instead
   dynamically allocate interfaces.  It can do this by monitoring IPIP
   traffic that arrives on it's ACP interface, and when packets arrive
   from new Join Proxys, it can dynamically configure virtual
   interfaces.

   A more sophisticated Registrar willing to modify the behaviour of
   it's TCP and UDP stack could note the IPIP traffic origination in the
   socket control block and make information available to the TCP layer
   (for HTTPS connections), or to the application (for CoAP connections)
   via a proprietary extension to the socket API.

C.3.  Proxy Neighbor Discovery by Join Proxy

   The Join Proxy MUST answer neighbor discovery messages for the
   address given by the Registrar as being it's link-local address.  The
   Join Proxy must also advertise this address as the address to which
   to connect to when advertising it's existence.

   This proxy neighbor discovery means that the pledge will create TCP
   and UDP connections to the correct Registrar address.  This matters
   as the TCP and UDP pseudo-header checksum includes the destination
   address, and for the proxy to remain completely stateless, it must
   not be necessary for the checksum to be updated.

C.4.  Use of connected sockets; or IP_PKTINFO for CoAP on Registrar

   TCP connections on the registrar SHOULD properly capture the ifindex
   of the incoming connection into the socket structure.  This is normal
   IPv6 socket API processing.  The outgoing responses will go out on
   the same (virtual) interface by ifindex.

   When using UDP sockets with CoAP, the application will have to pay
   attention to the incoming ifindex on the socket.  Access to this
   information is available using the IP_PKTINFO auxiliary extension
   which is a standard part of the IPv6 sockets API.

   A registrar application could, after receipt of an initial CoAP
   message from the Pledge, create a connected UDP socket (including the
   ifindex information).  The kernel would then take care of accurate



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   demultiplexing upon receive, and subsequent transmission to the
   correct interface.

C.5.  Use of socket extension rather than virtual interface

   Some operating systems on which a Registrar need be implemented may
   find need for a virtual interface per Join Proxy to be problematic.
   There are other mechanism which can make be done.

   If the IPIP decapsulator can mark the (SYN) packet inside the kernel
   with the address of the Join Proxy sending the traffic, then an
   interface per Join Proxy may not be needed.  The outgoing path need
   just pay attention to this extra information and add an appropriate
   IPIP header on outgoing.  A CoAP over UDP mechanism may need to
   expose this extra information to the application as the UDP sockets
   are often not connected, and the application will need to specify the
   outgoing path on each packet send.

   Such an additional socket mechanism has not been standardized.
   Terminating L2TP connections over IPsec transport mode suffers from
   the same challenges.

Appendix D.  To be deprecated: Consolidation remnants

   [[EDNOTE: As per working group feedback there were multiple instances
   where this document repeated itself.  To address this we have moved
   all text to this appendix and restored only one copy of each
   normative discussion.  The next pass will reduce and delete this
   appendix to '0'; although some may be maintained in a design
   considerations appendix.]]

D.1.  Functional Overview

   Entities behave in an autonomic fashion.  They discover each other
   and autonomically bootstrap into a key infrastructure delineating the
   autonomic domain.  See [RFC7575] for more information.

   This section details the state machine and operational flow for each
   of the main three entities.  The pledge, the domain (primarily a
   Registrar) and the MASA service.

   A representative flow is shown in Figure 2:

   +--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+
   | Pledge |         | Circuit |    | Domain     |     | Vendor     |
   |        |         | Proxy   |    | Registrar  |     | Service    |
   |        |         |         |    |            |     | (Internet  |
   +--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+



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     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<-RFC3927 IPv4 adr   | Appendix A        |                    |
   or|<-RFC4862 IPv6 adr   |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |-------------------->|                   |                    |
     | optional: mDNS query| Appendix B        |                    |
     | RFC6763/RFC6762     |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<--------------------|                   |                    |
     | GRASP M_FLOOD       |                   |                    |
     |   periodic broadcast|                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<------------------->C<----------------->|                    |
     |              TLS via the Circuit Proxy  |                    |
     |<--Registrar TLS server authentication---|                    |
   [PROVISIONAL accept of server cert]         |                    |
     P---X.509 client authentication---------->|                    |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P---Request Voucher (include nonce)------>|                    |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P                     |       /--->       |                    |
     P                     |       |      [accept device?]          |
     P                     |       |      [contact Vendor]          |
     P                     |       |           |--Pledge ID-------->|
     P                     |       |           |--Domain ID-------->|
     P                     |       |           |--optional:nonce--->|
     P                     |       |           |     [extract DomainID]
     P                     |       |           |                    |
     P                     |    optional:      |     [update audit log]
     P                     |       |can        |                    |
     P                     |       |occur      |                    |
     P                     |       |in         |                    |
     P                     |       |advance    |                    |
     P                     |       |           |                    |
     P                     |       |           |<-device audit log--|
     P                     |       |           |<- voucher ---------|
     P                     |       \---->      |                    |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P                     |       [verify audit log and voucher]   |
     P                     |                   |                    |
     P<------voucher---------------------------|                    |
   [verify voucher ]       |                   |                    |
   [verify provisional cert|                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |<--------------------------------------->|                    |
     | Continue with RFC7030 enrollment        |                    |
     | using now bidirectionally authenticated |                    |
     | TLS session.        |                   |                    |



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     |                     |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |
     |                     |                   |                    |

   Figure 2

   [[UNRESOLVED:need to restore some functional overview section for all
   these diagrams]]In order to obtain a Voucher and associated logs a
   Registrar contacts the MASA service Service using REST calls:

              +-----------+ +----------+ +-----------+ +----------+
              | New       | | Circuit  | |           | |          |
              | Entity    | | Proxy    | | Registrar | | Vendor   |
              |           | |          | |           | |          |
              ++----------+ +--+-------+ +-----+-----+ +--------+-+
               |               |               |                |
               |               |               |                |
               |   TLS hello   |  TLS hello    |                |
   Establish   +---------------C--------------->                |
   TLS         |               |               |                |
   connection  |               | Server Cert   |                |
               <---------------C---------------+                |
               | Client Cert   |               |                |
               +---------------C--------------->                |
               |               |               |                |
   HTTP REST   | POST /requestvoucher          |                |
   Data        +--------------------nonce------>                |
               |               .               | /requestvoucher|
               |               .               +---------------->
               |                               <----------------+
               |                               | /requestlog    |
               |                               +---------------->
               |            voucher            <----------------+
               <-------------------------------+                |
               | (optional config information) |                |
               |               .               |                |
               |               .               |                |

   Figure 8

   In some use cases the Registrar may need to contact the Vendor in
   advanced, for example when the target network is air-gapped.  The
   nonceless request format is provided for this and the resulting flow
   is slightly different.  The security differences associated with not
   knowing the nonce are discussed below:






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              +-----------+ +----------+ +-----------+ +----------+
              | New       | | Circuit  | |           | |          |
              | Entity    | | Proxy    | | Registrar | | Vendor   |
              |           | |          | |           | |          |
              ++----------+ +--+-------+ +-----+-----+ +--------+-+
               |               |               |                |
               |               |               |                |
               |               |               | /requestvoucher|
               |               |  (nonce       +---------------->
               |               |  unknown)     <----------------+
               |               |               | /requestlog    |
               |               |               +---------------->
               |               |               <----------------+
               |   TLS hello   |  TLS hello    |                |
   Establish   +---------------C--------------->                |
   TLS         |               |               |                |
   connection  |               | Server Cert   |                |
               <---------------C---------------+                |
               | Client Cert   |               |                |
               |               |               |                |
   HTTP REST   | POST /requestvoucher          |                |
   Data        +----------------------nonce---->   (discard     |
               |            voucher            |   nonce)       |
               <-------------------------------+                |
               | (optional config information) |                |
               |               .               |                |
               |               .               |                |

   Figure 9

D.1.1.  Behavior of a Pledge

   A pledge that has not yet been bootstrapped attempts to find a local
   domain and join it.  A pledge [[RESOLVED:MUST NOT]] automatically
   initiate bootstrapping if it has already been configured or is in the
   process of being configured.

   States of a pledge are as follows:













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                +--------------+
                |   Factory    |
                |   default    |
                +------+-------+
                       |
                +------v-------+
                |  Discover    |
   +------------>              |
   |            +------+-------+
   |                   |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Identity    |
   ^------------+              |
   | rejected   +------+-------+
   |                   |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            | Request      |
   |            | Join         |
   |            +------+-------+
   |                   |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Imprint     |   Optional
   ^------------+              <--+Manual input (Appendix C)
   | Bad Vendor +------+-------+
   | response          |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Enroll      |
   ^------------+              |
   | Enroll     +------+-------+
   | Failure           |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Enrolled    |
   ^------------+              |
    Factory     +--------------+
    reset


   Figure 3

   State descriptions for the pledge are as follows:

   1.  Discover a communication channel to a Registrar.

   2.  Identify itself.  This is done by presenting an X.509 IDevID
       credential to the discovered Registrar (via the Proxy) in a TLS
       handshake.  (The Registrar credentials are only provisionally
       accepted at this time).




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   3.  Requests to Join the discovered Registrar.  A unique nonce
       [[RESOLVED:can be]] included ensuring that any responses can be
       associated with this particular bootstrapping attempt.

   4.  Imprint on the Registrar.  This requires verification of the
       vendor service provided voucher.  A voucher contains sufficient
       information for the Pledge to complete authentication of a
       Registrar.  (It enables the Pledge to finish authentication of
       the Registrar TLS server certificate).

   5.  Enroll.  By accepting the domain specific information from a
       Registrar, and by obtaining a domain certificate from a Registrar
       using a standard enrollment protocol, e.g.  Enrollment over
       Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030].

   6.  The Pledge is now a member of, and can be managed by, the domain
       and will only repeat the discovery aspects of bootstrapping if it
       is returned to factory default settings.

   The following sections describe each of these steps in more detail.

D.1.1.1.  Discovery

   [[RESOLVED:TEXT moved up into above]]

D.1.1.2.  Identity

   The Pledge identifies itself during the communication protocol
   handshake.  If the client identity is rejected (that is, the TLS
   handshake does not complete) the Pledge repeats the Identity process
   using the next proxy or discovery method available.

   [[RESOLVED: need normative statement in protocol section]] The
   bootstrapping protocol server is not initially authenticated.  Thus
   the connection is provisional and all data received is untrusted
   until sufficiently validated even though it is over a TLS connection.
   This is aligned with the existing provisional mode of EST [RFC7030]
   during s4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates".  See
   Section 3.4 for more information about when the TLS connection
   authentication is completed.

   [[RESOLVED:]]All security associations established are between the
   new device and the Bootstrapping server regardless of proxy
   operations.







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D.1.1.2.1.  Concurrent attempts to join

   [[RESOLVED: by dropping this text. the "priority mechanism" is
   unspecified thus any discussion is unclear.  Not only that once an
   initial request is sent to the registrar the question of multiple
   MASA interactions has already occurred.  Nothing breaks if
   implementations do this.  I've added text to the security
   considerations indicating the end result (MASA entries that might be
   ignored by the device but which confuse the end administrator)]] The
   Pledge MAY attempt multiple mechanisms concurrently, but if it does
   so, it MUST wait in the provisional state until all mechanisms have
   either succeeded or failed, and then MUST proceed with the highest
   priority mechanism which has succeed.  To proceed beyond this point,
   specifically, to provide a nonce, could result in the MASA
   gratuitously auditing a connection.

D.1.1.3.  Request Join

   The Pledge POSTs a request to join the domain to the Bootstrapping
   server.  This request contains a Pledge generated nonce and informs
   the Bootstrapping server which imprint methods the Pledge will
   accept.

   The nonce ensures the Pledge can verify that responses are specific
   to this bootstrapping attempt.  This minimizes the use of global time
   and provides a substantial benefit for devices without a valid clock.

D.1.1.3.1.  Redirects during the Join Process

   [[RESOVED via current root protocol discussion. reference to
   mdnsmethods is dropped]] EST [RFC7030] describes situations where the
   bootstrapping server MAY redirect the client to an alternate server
   via a 3xx status code.  Such redirects MAY be accepted if the pledge
   has used the methods described in Appendix B, in combination with an
   implicit trust anchor.  Redirects during the provisional period are
   otherwise unstrusted, and MUST cause a failure.

D.1.1.4.  Imprint

   The Pledge validates the voucher and accepts the Registrar ID.  The
   provisional TLS connection is validated using the Registrar ID from
   the voucher.

D.1.1.5.  Lack of realtime clock APPENDIX

   [[RESOVED: entire section promoted back into the main text]]





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   Many devices when bootstrapping do not have knowledge of the current
   time.  Mechanisms like Network Time Protocols can not be secured
   until bootstrapping is complete.  Therefore bootstrapping is defined
   in a method that does not require knowledge of the current time.

   Unfortunately there are moments during bootstrapping when
   certificates are verified, such as during the TLS handshake, where
   validity periods are confirmed.  This paradoxical "catch-22" is
   resolved by the Pledge maintaining a concept of the current "window"
   of presumed time validity that is continually refined throughout the
   bootstrapping process as follows:

   o  Initially the Pledge does not know the current time.

   o  During Pledge authentiation by the Registrar a realtime clock can
      be used by the Registrar.  This bullet expands on a closely
      related issue regarding Pledge lifetimes.  RFC5280 indicates that
      long lived Pledge certifiates "SHOULD be assigned the
      GeneralizedTime value of 99991231235959Z" [RFC7030] so the
      Registrar MUST support such lifetimes and SHOULD support ignoring
      Pledge lifetimes if they did not follow the RFC5280
      recommendations.

   o  The Pledge authenticates the voucher presented to it.  During this
      authentication the Pledge ignores certificate lifetimes (by
      necessity because it does not have a clock).  The voucher itself
      SHOULD contain the nonce included in the original request which
      proves the voucher is fresh.

   o  Once the voucher is accepted the validity period of the
      domainCAcert in the voucher (see Section 3.4) now serves as a
      valid time window.  Any subsequent certificate validity periods
      checked during RFC5280 path validation MUST occur within this
      window.

   o  When accepting an enrollment certificate the validity period
      within the new certificate is assumed to be valid by the Pledge.
      The Pledge is now willing to use this credential for client
      authentication.

D.1.1.6.  Enrollment

   As the final step of bootstrapping a Registrar helps to issue a
   domain specific credential to the Pledge.  For simplicity in this
   document, a Registrar primarily facilitates issuing a credential by
   acting as an RFC5280 Registration Authority for the Domain
   Certification Authority.




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   Enrollment proceeds as described in [RFC7030].  Authentication of the
   EST server is done using the Voucher rather than the methods defined
   in EST.

   [[RESOLVED: moved to protocol discussion]]Once the Voucher is
   received, as specified in this document, the client has sufficient
   information to leverage the existing communication channel with a
   Registrar to continue an EST RFC7030 enrollment.  Enrollment picks up
   at RFC7030 section 4.1.1.  bootstrapping where the Voucher provides
   the "out-of-band" CA certificate fingerprint (in this case the full
   CA certificate) such that the client can now complete the TLS server
   authentication.  At this point the client continues with EST
   enrollment operations including "CA Certificates Request", "CSR
   Attributes" and "Client Certificate Request" or "Server-Side Key
   Generation".

   [[RESOLVED: included into EST discussion]]For the purposes of
   creating the ANIMA Autonomic Control Plane, the contents of the new
   certificate MUST be carefully specified.
   [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] section 5.1.1 contains
   details.  The Registrar MUST provide the correct ACP information to
   populate the subjectAltName / rfc822Name field in the "CSR
   Attributes" step.

D.1.1.7.  Being Managed

   [[RESOLVED: by slight change to introduction text.]] Functionality to
   provide generic "configuration" information is supported.  The
   parsing of this data and any subsequent use of the data, for example
   communications with a Network Management System is out of scope but
   is expected to occur after bootstrapping enrollment is complete.
   This ensures that all communications with management systems which
   can divulge local security information (e.g. network topology or raw
   key material) is secured using the local credentials issued during
   enrollment.

   The Pledge uses bootstrapping to join only one domain.  Management by
   multiple domains is out-of-scope of bootstrapping.  After the device
   has successfully joined a domain and is being managed it is plausible
   that the domain can insert credentials for other domains depending on
   the device capabilities.

   See Appendix D.1.5.








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D.1.2.  Behavior of a Join Proxy

   The role of the Proxy is to facilitate communications.  The Proxy
   forwards packets between the Pledge and a Registrar that has been
   configured on the Proxy.

   [[UNRESOLVED: since proxy behavior is not visible we can limit
   ourselves to discussion of what the protocol does to enable/faciliate
   a theoretical proxy]]The Proxy does not terminate the TLS handshake.

   [[UNRESOLVED: this is an anima architecture requirement to use BRSKI?
   move to there?]] A Proxy is always assumed even if it is directly
   integrated into a Registrar.  (In a completely autonomic network, the
   Registrar MUST provide proxy functionality so that it can be
   discovered, and the network can grow concentrically around the
   Registrar)

   As a result of the Proxy Discovery process in section
   Appendix D.1.1.1, the port number exposed by the proxy does not need
   to be well known, or require an IANA allocation.

   If the Proxy joins an Autonomic Control Plane
   ([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]) it SHOULD use Autonomic
   Control Plane secured GRASP ([I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]) to discovery the
   Registrar address and port.  As part of the discovery process, the
   proxy mechanism (Circuit Proxy vs IPIP encapsulation) is agreed to
   between the Registrar and Join Proxy.

   For the IPIP encapsulation methods, the port announced by the Proxy
   MUST be the same as on the registrar in order for the proxy to remain
   stateless.

   In order to permit the proxy functionality to be implemented on the
   maximum variety of devices the chosen mechanism SHOULD use the
   minimum amount of state on the proxy device.  While many devices in
   the ANIMA target space will be rather large routers, the proxy
   function is likely to be implemented in the control plane CPU of such
   a device, with available capabilities for the proxy function similar
   to many class 2 IoT devices.

   The document [I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter] provides a
   more extensive analysis of the alternative proxy methods.

D.1.2.1.  CoAP connection to Registrar

   [[RESOLVED:this section thus removed]]The CoAP mechanism was
   depreciated.




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D.1.2.2.  HTTPS proxy connection to Registrar

   The proxy SHOULD also provide one of: an IPIP encapsulation of HTTP
   traffic on TCP port TBD to the registrar, or a TCP circuit proxy that
   connects the Pledge to a Registrar.

   When the Proxy provides a circuit proxy to a Registrar the Registrar
   MUST accept HTTPS connections.

   When the Proxy provides a stateless IPIP encapsulation to a
   Registrar, then the Registrar will have to perform IPIP
   decapsulation, remembering the originating outer IPIP source address
   in order to qualify the inner link-local address.  This is a kind of
   encapsulation and processing which is similar in many ways to how
   mobile IP works.

   Being able to connect a TCP (HTTP) or UDP (CoAP) socket to a link-
   local address with an encapsulated IPIP header requires API
   extensions beyond [RFC3542] for UDP use, and requires a form of
   connection latching (see section 4.1 of [RFC5386] and all of
   [RFC5660], except that a simple IPIP tunnel is used rather than an
   IPsec tunnel).

D.1.3.  Behavior of the Registrar

   A Registrar listens for Pledges and determines if they can join the
   domain.  A Registrar obtains a Voucher from the MASA service and
   delivers them to the Pledge as well as facilitating enrollment with
   the domain PKI.

   [[RESOLVED: moved to discovery discussion]] A Registrar is typically
   configured manually.  When the Registrar joins an Autonomic Control
   Plane ([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]) it MUST respond to
   GRASP ([I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]) M_DISCOVERY message.  See
   Section 3.1.2

   Registrar behavior is as follows:














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   Contacted by Pledge
           +
           |
   +-------v----------+
   | Entity           | fail?
   | Authentication   +---------+
   +-------+----------+         |
           |                    |
   +-------v----------+         |
   | Entity           | fail?   |
   | Authorization    +--------->
   +-------+----------+         |
           |                    |
   +-------v----------+         |
   | Claiming the     | fail?   |
   | Entity           +--------->
   +-------+----------+         |
           |                    |
   +-------v----------+         |
   | Log Verification | fail?   |
   |                  +--------->
   +-------+----------+         |
           |                    |
   +-------v----------+    +----v-------+
   | Forward          |    |            |
   | Voucher          |    | Reject     |
   | to the Pledge    |    | Device     |
   |                  |    |            |
   +------------------+    +------------+

   Figure 4

D.1.3.1.  Pledge Authentication

   The applicable authentication methods detailed in EST [RFC7030] are:

   o  [[RESOLVED:pointed out in protocol details]]the use of an X.509
      IDevID credential during the TLS client authentication,

   o  or the use of a secret that is transmitted out of band between the
      Pledge and a Registrar (this use case is not autonomic).

   In order to validate the X.509 IDevID credential a Registrar
   maintains a database of vendor trust anchors (e.g. vendor root
   certificates or keyIdentifiers for vendor root public keys).  For
   user interface purposes this database can be mapped to colloquial
   vendor names.  Registrars can be shipped with the trust anchors of a
   significant number of third-party vendors within the target market.



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D.1.3.2.  Pledge Authorization

   [[UNRESOLVED: this is referenced above as how the MASA does
   authorization.  That is incorrect]]

   In a fully automated network all devices must be securely identified
   and authorized to join the domain.

   A Registrar accepts or declines a request to join the domain, based
   on the authenticated identity presented.  Automated acceptance
   criteria include:

   o  allow any device of a specific type (as determined by the X.509
      IDevID),

   o  allow any device from a specific vendor (as determined by the
      X.509 IDevID),

   o  allow a specific device from a vendor (as determined by the X.509
      IDevID) against a domain white list.  (The mechanism for checking
      a shared white list potentially used by multiple Registrars is out
      of scope).

   [[RESOLVED: this looks like good text to include in above]]To look
   the Pledge up in a domain white list a consistent method for
   extracting device identity from the X.509 certificate is required.
   RFC6125 describes Domain-Based Application Service identity but here
   we require Vendor Device-Based identity.  The subject field's DN
   encoding MUST include the "serialNumber" attribute with the device's
   unique serial number.  In the language of RFC6125 this provides for a
   SERIALNUM-ID category of identifier that can be included in a
   certificate and therefore that can also be used for matching
   purposes.  The SERIALNUM-ID whitelist is collated according to vendor
   trust anchor since serial numbers are not globally unique.

   [[RESOLVED: into log request]]The Registrar MUST use the vendor
   provided MASA service to verify that the device's history log does
   not include unexpected Registrars.  If a device had previously
   registered with another domain, a Registrar of that domain would show
   in the log.

   [[RESOLVED: est integration section used 'SHOULD']]The authorization
   performed during BRSKI MAY be used for EST enrollment requests by
   proceeding with EST enrollment using the authenticated and authorized
   TLS connection.  This minimizes the number of cryptographic and
   protocol operations necessary to complete bootstrapping of the local
   key infrastructure.




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D.1.3.3.  Claiming the Pledge

   Claiming an pledge establishes an audit log at the MASA server and
   provides a Registrar with proof, in the form of the Voucher, that the
   log entry has been inserted.  As indicated in Appendix D.1.1.4 a
   Pledge will only proceed with bootstrapping if a Voucher has been
   received.  The Pledge therefore enforces that bootstrapping only
   occurs if the claim has been logged.  There is no requirement for the
   vendor to definitively know that the device is owned by the
   Registrar.

   The Registrar obtains the MASA URI via static configuration or by
   extracting it from the X.509 IDevID credential.  See Section 2.2.

   During initial bootstrapping the Pledge provides a nonce specific to
   the particular bootstrapping attempt.  [[RESOLVED: to resolve this I
   updated many points where vouchers are referenced]]The Registrar
   SHOULD include this nonce when claiming the Pledge from the MASA
   service.  Claims from an unauthenticated Registrar are only serviced
   by the MASA resource if a nonce is provided.

   The Registrar can claim a Pledge that is offline by forming the
   request using the entities unique identifier and not including a
   nonce in the claim request.  Vouchers obtained in this way do not
   have a lifetime and they provide a permanent method for the domain to
   claim the device.  Evidence of such a claim is provided in the audit
   log entries available to any future Registrar.  Such claims reduce
   the ability for future domains to secure bootstrapping and therefore
   the Registrar MUST be authenticated by the MASA service although no
   requirement is implied that the MASA associates this authentication
   with ownership.

   An Ownership Voucher requires the vendor to definitively know that a
   device is owned by a specific domain.  The method used to "claim"
   this are out-of-scope.  A MASA ignores or reports failures when an
   attempt is made to claim a device that has a an Ownership Voucher.

D.1.3.4.  Log Verification

   A Registrar requests the log information for the Pledge from the MASA
   service.  The log is verified to confirm that the following is true
   to the satisfaction of a Registrar's configured policy:

   o  Any nonceless entries in the log are associated with domainIDs
      recognized by the registrar.






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   o  Any nonce'd entries are older than when the domain is known to
      have physical possession of the Pledge or that the domainIDs are
      recognized by the registrar.

   If any of these criteria are unacceptable to a Registrar the entity
   is rejected.  [[RESOLVED: moved to main body]] A Registrar MAY be
   configured to ignore the history of the device but it is RECOMMENDED
   that this only be configured if hardware assisted NEA [RFC5209] is
   supported.

   [[RESOLVED: added to main text]]This document specifies a simple log
   format as provided by the MASA service to the registar.  This format
   could be improved by distributed consensus technologies that
   integrate vouchers with a technologies such as block-chain or hash
   trees or the like.  Doing so is out of the scope of this document but
   are anticipated improvements for future work.

D.1.4.  Behavior of the MASA Service

   [[UNRESOLVED: primary value of keeping this discussion is to
   distinguish between registrar and masa particularly wrt to the
   protocol functions provided. perhaps add statements in each protocol
   entry "provided by masa" etc?]]

   The Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority service is directly
   provided by the manufacturer, or can be provided by a third party the
   manufacturer authorizes.  It is a cloud resource.  The MASA service
   provides the following functionalities to Registrars:

   Issue Vouchers:  In response to Registrar requests the MASA service
      issues vouchers.  Depending on the MASA policy the Registrar claim
      of device ownership is either accepted or verified using out-of-
      scope methods (that are expected to improve over time).

   Log Vouchers Issued:  When a voucher is issued the act of issuing it
      includes updating the certifiable logs.  Future work to enhance
      and distribute these logs is out-of-scope but expected over time.

   Provide Logs:  As a baseline implementation of the certified logging
      mechanism the MASA is repsonsible for reporting logged
      information.  The current method involves trusting the MASA.
      Other logging methods where the MASA is less trusted are expected
      to be developed over time.








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D.1.5.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps

   As the devices have a common trust anchor, device identity can be
   securely established, making it possible to automatically deploy
   services across the domain in a secure manner.

   Examples of services:

   o  Device management.

   o  Routing authentication.

   o  Service discovery.

D.1.5.1.  Network boundaries

   When a device has joined the domain, it can validate the domain
   membership of other devices.  This makes it possible to create trust
   boundaries where domain members have higher level of trusted than
   external devices.  Using the autonomic User Interface, specific
   devices can be grouped into to sub domains and specific trust levels
   can be implemented between those.

D.1.6.  Interactions with Network Access Control

   [[RESOLVED: via paragraph in 'scope of solution' discussion.]]

   The assumption is that Network Access Control (NAC) completes using
   the Pledge 's X.509 IDevID credentials and results in the device
   having sufficient connectivity to discovery and communicate with the
   proxy.  Any additional connectivity or quarantine behavior by the NAC
   infrastructure is out-of-scope.  After the devices has completed
   bootstrapping the mechanism to trigger NAC to re-authenticate the
   device and provide updated network privileges is also out-of-scope.

   This achieves the goal of a bootstrap architecture that can integrate
   with NAC but does not require NAC within the network where it wasn't
   previously required.  Future optimizations can be achieved by
   integrating the bootstrapping protocol directly into an initial EAP
   exchange.

D.2.  Domain Operator Activities

   This section describes how an operator interacts with a domain that
   supports the bootstrapping as described in this document.






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D.2.1.  Instantiating the Domain Certification Authority

   This is a one time step by the domain administrator.  This is an "off
   the shelf" CA with the exception that it is designed to work as an
   integrated part of the security solution.  This precludes the use of
   3rd party certification authority services that do not provide
   support for delegation of certificate issuance decisions to a domain
   managed Registration Authority.

D.2.2.  Instantiating the Registrar

   This is a one time step by the domain administrator.  One or more
   devices in the domain are configured take on a Registrar function.

   A device can be configured to act as a Registrar or a device can
   auto-select itself to take on this function, using a detection
   mechanism to resolve potential conflicts and setup communication with
   the Domain Certification Authority.  Automated Registrar selection is
   outside scope for this document.

D.2.3.  Accepting New Entities

   For each Pledge the Registrar is informed of the unique identifier
   (e.g. serial number) along with the manufacturer's identifying
   information (e.g. manufacturer root certificate).  This can happen in
   different ways:

   1.  Default acceptance: In the simplest case, the new device asserts
       its unique identity to a Registrar.  The registrar accepts all
       devices without authorization checks.  This mode does not provide
       security against intruders and is not recommended.

   2.  Per device acceptance: The new device asserts its unique identity
       to a Registrar.  A non-technical human validates the identity,
       for example by comparing the identity displayed by the registrar
       (for example using a smartphone app) with the identity shown on
       the packaging of the device.  Acceptance may be triggered by a
       click on a smartphone app "accept this device", or by other forms
       of pairing.  See also [I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap] for
       how the approach could work in a homenet.

   3.  Whitelist acceptance: In larger networks, neither of the previous
       approaches is acceptable.  Default acceptance is not secure, and
       a manual per device methods do not scale.  Here, the registrar is
       provided a priori with a list of identifiers of devices that
       belong to the network.  This list can be extracted from an
       inventory database, or sales records.  If a device is detected




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       that is not on the list of known devices, it can still be
       manually accepted using the per device acceptance methods.

   4.  Automated Whitelist: an automated process that builds the
       necessary whitelists and inserts them into the larger network
       domain infrastructure is plausible.  Once set up, no human
       intervention is required in this process.  Defining the exact
       mechanisms for this is out of scope although the registrar
       authorization checks is identified as the logical integration
       point of any future work in this area.

   None of these approaches require the network to have permanent
   Internet connectivity.  Even when the Internet based MASA service is
   used, it is possible to pre-fetch the required information from the
   MASA a priori, for example at time of purchase such that devices can
   enroll later.  This supports use cases where the domain network may
   be entirely isolated during device deployment.

   Additional policy can be stored for future authorization decisions.
   For example an expected deployment time window or that a certain
   Proxy must be used.

D.2.4.  Automatic Enrollment of Devices

   The approach outlined in this document provides a secure zero-touch
   method to enroll new devices without any pre-staged configuration.
   New devices communicate with already enrolled devices of the domain,
   which proxy between the new device and a Registrar.  As a result of
   this completely automatic operation, all devices obtain a domain
   based certificate.

D.2.5.  Secure Network Operations

   The certificate installed in the previous step can be used for all
   subsequent operations.  For example, to determine the boundaries of
   the domain: If a neighbor has a certificate from the same trust
   anchor it can be assumed "inside" the same organization; if not, as
   outside.  See also Appendix D.1.5.1.  The certificate can also be
   used to securely establish a connection between devices and central
   control functions.  Also autonomic transactions can use the domain
   certificates to authenticate and/or encrypt direct interactions
   between devices.  The usage of the domain certificates is outside
   scope for this document.








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Authors' Addresses

   Max Pritikin
   Cisco

   Email: pritikin@cisco.com


   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/


   Michael H. Behringer
   Cisco

   Email: mbehring@cisco.com


   Steinthor Bjarnason
   Arbor Networks

   Email: sbjarnason@arbor.net


   Kent Watsen
   Juniper Networks

   Email: kwatsen@juniper.net




















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