From b778c732ee847e5672c2c5aa608271b4cbb9ce9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Noetzlin Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 13:39:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] doc: update cryptographic feature ADR (#1389) * update ADR * update changelog * nit * update changelog * Update docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md Co-authored-by: insumity --------- Co-authored-by: insumity --- .../adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md b/docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md index da83356291..657ca25355 100644 --- a/docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md +++ b/docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ title: Cryptographic verification of equivocation evidence * 5/1/2023: First draft * 7/23/2023: Add light client attacks handling * 9/6/2023: Add double signing attacks handling +* 11/3/2023: Update limitations to clarify amnesia attacks are ignored ## Status @@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ either using its infraction height or its unsigned timestamp. Note that changes The underlying reason is that a malicious validator could take advantage of getting tombstoned to avoid being slashed on the provider ([see comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1232#issuecomment-1693127641)). -- Currently, the endpoint can only handle "equivocation" light client attacks. This is because the "lunatic" attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to define the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)). +- Currently, the endpoint can only handle _equivocation_ light client attacks. This is because the _lunatic_ attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to extract the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)). In addition, "amnesia" attacks are ignored, similar to CometBFT (see [ADR-056](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blob/main/docs/architecture/tendermint-core/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md#decision)). ## Consequences