Add notion of a steering committee #4
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We can be self-regulating/self-deprecating steering committee so long as its purpose is clear: creation of standing, select, special committees. Suggest we begin with creation of steering committee, to provide minimum oversight for creation of
Before creating sub/committees avoid:
Definitions: |
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TAM: agreement on actionable work Typical Tam contains 3-5 objectives. If there is more, mission is too broad/ambiguous. Before creating standing/select/special committees, assess for 1) desirability risk 2) viability risk 3) feasibility risk 4) adaptability risk |
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I like the idea of the steering committee being a bootstrap committee. Ideally we don't wish to see things be overly bureaucratic. I believe many are in crypto because they prefer rules over rulers. And so, dissolving a committee once the DAO is truly up and running, makes sense. Another approach would be to have temporary "committees" that are tasked with an objective. Once the objective is complete, then dissolve the committee. Another committee could then be created for the next task the Decentralists DAO wishes to accomplish. This way, each committee member is only stepping forward to volunteer for objectives they believe they can competently contribute towards. And in this light, maybe a better term would be "task force" or "task team". One task that seems to be needed is creating a framework for grant committees. Cosmos Hub Prop 95 is just the beginning imho. There is already another grant committee being proposed in the Cosmos governance forum: https://forum.cosmos.network/t/cosmos-hub-ecosystem-growth-developer-acquisition-2023/9381 The community surrounding the Cosmos Hub seems to rally around needing a certain "thing" all at the same time. As of now, that thing is grant committees, which main purpose is to foster incentives to bring developers to Cosmos. The problem we are seeing however, is the lack of tooling that would allow for the community to hold a grant committee accountable. There also doesn't seem to be a way to see exactly how this money is going to be spent. There is a big "trust me bro" element with these grant committees (as was with Cosmos Hub Prop 82). Perhaps a first task could be figuring out how to build a chain that can house the many DAOs/committees proposed for the Cosmos Hub. If these DAOs/committees believe they can use Cosmos Hub community pool funds that will return value to the ATOM stakers, let them do it in the light of transparency and rigorous standards. Perhaps this chain could be a consumer chain secured via ICS by the Cosmos Hub. My personal background is real estate and new construction, so let me give an analogy here as I don't believe this to be some kind of decentralized pipe-dream fantasy land idea. What I am proposing is something that already happens in the real world. When banks provide construction loans to customers, the bank releases the funds in "draws". A typical draw schedule might contain 6 draws and be as such: 10%, 20%, 20%, 20%, 20%, 10%. In other words, when a customer signs a contract for a home-builder to build them a home, the bank does not release all the funds all at once. The home-builder must complete everything they said they will complete during their current draw (according to the contract) to receive their next draw. However, the bank does not just take the builder's word that they have completed their current draw. They often send out inspectors to the job site, and also check with a 3rd party, the title company involved in the transaction, to make sure there are no liens against the property. In other words, the title company is checking to make sure the home-builder has paid all of its sub-contractors for the work performed. Only after the customer, bank, and title company give the green light is the next draw released. I believe a similar structure could be put in place for these grant committees. Loosely, we could think of the community pool as the bank, the ATOM stakers as the customers, the consumer app-chain as the title company, and the grant committee as the home-builder. There needs to be a way to have checks and balances on these committees. Committees could have draw schedules that would only be released after said work is completed. It would force theses grant committees to set a more precise plan with more measurable outcomes. |
More members can be added with +2/3 votes.
Each member gets 1 vote.
We altogether create and maintain this forum so it stays decentralized and all sides get representation.
What can the steering committee do?
From an official capacity, its function should be limited, and ideally it need not be an active role, and maybe in practice it isn't even consulted at all. For example, if there is some disagreement about how the forum itself should be governed, then maybe the steering committee can pick among proposals on how to move forward.
If the steering committee isn't performing an active executive role, then what is? Whatever it is, it should be sufficiently self regulating, so that it can react to the needs of the community so that every person/project/view can get representation.
Ideally, soon after such a self regulating body under the steering committee proves itself, the steering committee itself should dissolve and forfeit its authority. So in this way the steering committee is a bootstrapping committee, and eventually we are autonomous on a DAO.
And in this way, there is less focus and weight on the choice of steering committee -- because everything is public, and if we don't do a good job then the community would fork it away from us anyways.
All ideas and feedback welcome.
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