From ef69f20f27f69aca62ac113612160067e65f3caf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hattizai Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 17:51:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix vitalik blog link --- EIPS/eip-908.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/EIPS/eip-908.md b/EIPS/eip-908.md index a019b67bd84e2..f6f3582b10bdb 100644 --- a/EIPS/eip-908.md +++ b/EIPS/eip-908.md @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ A miner could create a client and fill their block with transactions that only c ### More details on the access list -The access list prevents anyone inserting any address to the first element of the vector, where there may be a way to prevent censorship and centralization of authority of who decides to register new addresses in the list, e.g. on-chain governance with signalling (possibly similar to [EIP-1015](./eip-1015.md), which also specifies an alternative way of sending funds) or a layer 2 proof of authority network where new addresses can be added via a smart contract. Note that there may be serious drawbacks to implementing either of these listed examples. There is a refutation of [on-chain governance](https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/against-on-chain-governance-a4ceacd040ca) as well as of [plutocracy](https://vitalik.ca/general/2018/03/28/plutocracy.html). [Proof of Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-of-authority) isn't suitable for a public network since it doesn't distribute trust well. However, using signalling in layer 2 contracts is more acceptable, but Vlad Zamfir argues that using that to influence outcomes in the protocol can disenfranchise miners from being necessary participants in the governance process. Thus, in light of these counterpoints, having an access list may not be suitable until a decentralized, trustless way of maintaining it is implemented and ideally accepted by the majority of a random sample that represents the population of Ethereum users. +The access list prevents anyone inserting any address to the first element of the vector, where there may be a way to prevent censorship and centralization of authority of who decides to register new addresses in the list, e.g. on-chain governance with signalling (possibly similar to [EIP-1015](./eip-1015.md), which also specifies an alternative way of sending funds) or a layer 2 proof of authority network where new addresses can be added via a smart contract. Note that there may be serious drawbacks to implementing either of these listed examples. There is a refutation of [on-chain governance](https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/against-on-chain-governance-a4ceacd040ca) as well as of [plutocracy](https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2018/03/28/plutocracy.html). [Proof of Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-of-authority) isn't suitable for a public network since it doesn't distribute trust well. However, using signalling in layer 2 contracts is more acceptable, but Vlad Zamfir argues that using that to influence outcomes in the protocol can disenfranchise miners from being necessary participants in the governance process. Thus, in light of these counterpoints, having an access list may not be suitable until a decentralized, trustless way of maintaining it is implemented and ideally accepted by the majority of a random sample that represents the population of Ethereum users. However, another alternative to managing the access list would be to have decentralized verification that the address produced from querying an index in the access list does correspond to that of a "legitimate" client. Part of this verification would involve checking that there is a client that claims that this address is owned by them, that they are happy to receive funds in this manner and agree or arranged to putting the address in the access list, and that the client passes all tests in the [Ethereum test suite](https://github.com/ethereum/tests). However, this last proviso would then preclude new clients being funded from the start of development, although such would-be clients would not be able to receive funds in-protocol until they implement the client anyway (as an aside, they could raise funds in various ways—a DAII, pronounced die-yee, is recommended, while a platform for DAIIs is under development by [Dogezer](https://dogezer.com/)). All of this could be done off-chain, and if anyone found that some address in the access list was not legitimate, then they could challenge that address with a proof of illegitimacy, and the participant that submitted the address to the access list could be slashed (while they must hold a deposit in order to register and keep an address in the access list).