Allow some confined users send to lldpad over a unix dgram socket

Note this is for lldptool and vdptool connecting to the lldpad daemon
from the lldpad package - Intel LLDP Agent.

The commit addresses the following AVC denial example:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(10/24/2024 10:22:07.718:854) : proctitle=lldptool -p
type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(10/24/2024 10:22:07.718:854) : saddr={ saddr_fam=local path=/com/intel/lldpad }
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(10/24/2024 10:22:07.718:854) : arch=x86_64 syscall=connect success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x3 a1=0x55c239a95312 a2=0x14 a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=10028 pid=10029 auid=user27128 uid=user27128 gid=user27128 euid=user27128 suid=user27128 fsuid=user27128 egid=user27128 sgid=user27128 fsgid=user27128 tty=pts3 ses=6 comm=lldptool exe=/usr/sbin/lldptool subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(10/24/2024 10:22:07.718:854) : avc:  denied  { sendto } for  pid=10029 comm=lldptool path=/com/intel/lldpad scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:system_r:lldpad_t:s0 tclass=unix_dgram_socket permissive=0

Resolves: RHEL-58072

policy/modules/roles/staff.te

@@ -208,6 +208,10 @@ optional_policy(`
     iotop_run(staff_t, staff_r)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+	lldpad_dgram_send(staff_t)
+')
+
 optional_policy(`
 	logadm_role_change(staff_r)
 ')

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te

@@ -379,6 +379,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 	libs_run_ldconfig(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+	lldpad_dgram_send(sysadm_t)
+')
+
 optional_policy(`
 	logrotate_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')

policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te

@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 	irc_role(user_r, user_t)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+	lldpad_dgram_send(user_t)
+')
+
 optional_policy(`
 	oident_manage_user_content(user_t)
 	oident_relabel_user_content(user_t)