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+# [RFC] FlyteAdmin RBAC + Project/Domain Isolation
+
+**Authors:**
+
+- @sovietaced
+
+## 1 Executive Summary
+
+We propose support for role based access control in Flyte Admin with support for project and domain level isolation/filtering.
+
+## 2 Motivation
+
+Support for authorization in Flyte Admin is minimal and may be unsuitable for production deployments. Flyte Admin only 
+supports blanket authorization which does not align with information security best practices like the  
+[principle of least privilege](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_privilege). Flyte's project and domain 
+concepts seem like strong constructs for supporting multi-tenancy but there are no mechanisms in place to prevent users 
+of one tenant from accidentally or maliciously manipulating another tenant's executions, tasks, launch plans, etc.
+
+At Stack AV we have solved this problem in our fork and are looking to contribute our work back after several requests 
+from the community. 
+
+## 3 Proposed Implementation
+
+### High Level Design 
+
+![High Level Design](/rfc/images/rbac-high-level-black.png)
+
+This proposal introduces an authorization interceptor that will be executed after the authentication interceptor. The 
+authorization interceptor will consult the auth or authorization config to understand how it should resolve roles from 
+the identity context along with what authorization policies are tied to the user's roles. If the user has an authorization 
+policy that permits the incoming request the project and domain level scope will be extracted from the authorization 
+policy and injected into the authorization context for use in the repository layer. The request will hit the service layer which 
+will make requests to the repository layer. The repository layer will leverage some utility functions to 1) authorize 
+whether resources can be created in a project/domain and 2) generate some SQL filters to be injected into queries that 
+read/update/delete resources. 
+
+Ultimately the authorization interceptor will provide RPC level authorization and set context for later use. The changes to the repository layer 
+will provide resource level isolation within the target RPC. Below is a breakdown of the three primary components of the design. 
+
+#### Authorization Config 
+The authorization config will be used to configure the authorization behavior. The first thing it describe is a way to
+resolve roles from the user's identity context. Ideally this should be flexible enough to resolve a role from different
+elements of a token to support various use cases (ie. standard and custom JWT claims). 
+
+```yaml
+authorization:
+  roleResolutionStrategies: # one or more can be configured
+    - scopes # attempts to use token scopes as roles
+    - claims # attempts to use token claim values as roles
+    - userID # attempts to use the user ID as the role
+  
+  # below is an example of what configuring custom claims might look like  
+  claimRoleResolver: # claim based role resolution requires additional configuration
+    - key: groups # this is the key to look for in the token claims
+      type: list # this declares the structure of the value. parse value as comma separated string
+    - key: group # this is the key to look for in the token claims
+      type: string # this declares the structure of the value. parse value as single string
+```
+
+The second part of the authorization will include exceptions. There are some RPCs which should not be authorized. 
+```yaml
+authorization:
+  methodBypassPatterns: # ideally these should be enabled by default
+    - "/grpc.health.v1.Health/.*" # health checking for k8s
+    - "/flyteidl.service.AuthMetadataService/.*" # auth metadata used by other Flyte services
+```
+
+The last part of the authorization will declare the authorization policies. The authorization policies will include the 
+name of the role and will include a list of permitting rules. Each rule must specify an RPC pattern which is
+regex statement that matches the target gRPC method. Each rules includes optional project and domain isolation/filtering 
+fields. If the project and domain fields are not included it is implied that the rule applies to all projects and domains.
+Below is an example authorization configuration with a variety of use cases of both RBAC and project and domain isolation/filtering.
+```yaml
+authorization:
+  policies: # policies is a list instead of a map since viper map keys are case insensitive
+    - name: admin
+      rules: # list of rules
+        - name: "allow all" # name / description of the rule
+          methodPattern: ".*" # regex pattern to match on gRPC method
+    - name: read-only
+      rules:
+        - name: "read everything"
+          methodPattern: "Get.*|List.*"
+    - name: mapping-team
+      rules:
+        - name: "r/w for the mapping project in dev only"
+          methodPattern: ".*"
+          project: mapping # access to only the mapping project
+          domain: development # access to only the development domain within the mapping project
+    - name: ci
+      rules:
+        - name: "r/w for every project in production"
+          methodPattern: ".*"
+          domain: production # you can wildcard project and declare domain level access
+    - name: 0oahjhk34aUxGnWcZ0h7 # the names can even include things like okta app IDs
+      rules:
+        - name: "flyte propeller"
+          methodPattern: ".*"
+```
+
+#### Authorization Interceptor 
+
+The authorization interceptor logic will behave like so: 
+1. The interceptor checks to see if the target RPC method is configured to be bypassed. Call the next handler if bypassed. 
+2. The interceptor consults the role resolver to obtain a list of role names for the user. 
+3. The interceptor iterates over the list of role names and searches for any authorization policies tied to the role names. If no matching authorization policies are found return Permission Denied.
+4. The interceptor iterates over the matching authorization policies to see if they permit the target RPC. Each rule that matches is added to a list. If no matching rules are found return Permission Denied. 
+5. The interceptor extracts the project and domain scope out of each of the permitting rules and sets authorized resource scope on the authorization context. 
+6. The interceptor calls the next handler.
+
+Below is a high level overview of what the authorization context would look like. 
+
+```go
+type ResourceScope struct {
+    Project string
+    Domain string
+}
+
+type AuthorizationContext struct {
+    resourceScopes []ResourceScope
+}
+
+// TargetResourceScope represents the scope of an individual resource. Sometimes only project level or domain level scope
+// is applicable to a resource. In such cases, a user's resource scope may need to be truncated to matcht he depth 
+// of the target resource scope.
+type TargetResourceScope = int
+
+const (
+    ProjectTargetResourceScope = 0
+    DomainTargetResourceScope = 1
+)
+```
+
+#### Authorization Utils + DB Layer
+
+The final piece of the puzzle is what performs resource level authorization and filtering. Historically, I have found 
+that the best (albeit challenging) way to do this is at the database layer for a few reasons: 
+* Filtering resources at the database works natively with any pagination
+* Filtering resources at the database is the most performant since the database engine is fast and ends up returning a smaller data set over the network
+* Filtering resources at the database plays nicely with logic to handle records that aren't found and does not leak data about which resources may or may not be present.
+
+We propose to have utility functions for two different workflows: 
+1. Creating Resources
+   * This is a dedicated utility function used in repository code to create resource since you cannot add a WHERE clause filter for records that don't exist yet :) 
+   * ```go
+     func (r *ExecutionRepo) Create(ctx context.Context, input models.Execution, executionTagModel []*models.ExecutionTag) error {
+         if err := util.AuthorizeResourceCreation(ctx, input.Project, input.Domain); err != nil {
+             return err
+         }
+     
+         ...
+     }
+     ```
+2. Reading, Updating, Deleting resources with util
+   * This is a utility function used in repository code that translates project/domain level scope into gorm where clause operations that can be attached to existing gorm queries.
+   * ```go 
+     var (
+        executionColumnNames = util.ResourceColumns{Project: "executions.execution_project", Domain: "executions.execution_domain"}
+     )
+     
+     func (r *ExecutionRepo) Get(ctx context.Context, input interfaces.Identifier) (models.Execution, error) {
+         authzFilter := util.GetAuthzFilter(ctx, DomainTargetResourceScope, executionColumnNames)
+         var execution models.Execution
+         tx := r.db.WithContext(ctx).Where(&models.Execution{....})
+         
+         if authzFilter != nil {
+             cleanSession := tx.Session(&gorm.Session{NewDB: true})
+             tx = tx.Where(cleanSession.Scopes(authzFilter.GetScopes()...))
+         }
+     
+         tx = tx.Take(&execution)
+     
+         ...
+     }
+
+     ```
+
+## 4 Metrics & Dashboards
+
+Existing metrics should measure RPC response codes. 
+
+## 5 Drawbacks
+
+This change will introduce additional complexity into Flyte Admin.
+
+## 6 Alternatives
+
+There was an alternative approach described in another [RFC](https://github.com/flyteorg/flyte/pull/5204) which did 
+authorization at the middleware layer but this approach is challenging since deriving the target project and domain 
+involves inspecting application payloads. 
+
+## 7 Potential Impact and Dependencies
+
+This feature is a net new feature that should be opt in so I don't think it will impact users unless they enable the feature. 
+I also don't see any new attack vectors this introduces since it strengthens security. 
+
+## 8 Unresolved questions
+
+None at this time
+
+## 9 Conclusion
+
+TBA