diff --git a/src/appendix/appendix-a.tex b/src/appendix/appendix-a.tex index 8c197f1..f811c0c 100644 --- a/src/appendix/appendix-a.tex +++ b/src/appendix/appendix-a.tex @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ \end{center} -\newpage +\cleardoublepage \begin{figure}[ht] \vspace{-20pt} @@ -58,3 +58,5 @@ \end{center} \vspace{-20pt} \end{figure} + +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/appendix/appendix-b.tex b/src/appendix/appendix-b.tex index c7c66e6..5f05ddb 100644 --- a/src/appendix/appendix-b.tex +++ b/src/appendix/appendix-b.tex @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ \end{center} -\newpage +\cleardoublepage + The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report. @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Akhmetov, Rinat} & Former member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for Ukrainian political party, the Party of Regions. \\ - \textbf{Akhmetshin, Rinat} & US. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June~9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. \\ + \textbf{Akhmetshin, Rinat} & U.S. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June~9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. \\ \textbf{Aslanovy, Dzheykhun (Jay)} & Head of U.S. department of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ``active measures'' social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. \\ @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Boente, Dana} & Acting Attorney General (Jan.~2017--Feb.~2017); Acting Deputy Attorney General (Feb.~2017--Apr.~2017). \\ - \textbf{Bogacheva, Anna} & Internet Research Agency employee who worked on ``active measures'' social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014. \\ + \textbf{Bogacheva, Anna} & Internet Research Agency employee who worked on ``active measures'' social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014. \\ \textbf{Bossert, Thomas (Tom)} & Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. \\ @@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Burnham, James} & Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office who attended January 2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn. \\ - \textbf{Burt, Richard} & Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bank and was a board member of the Center for the National Interest. \\ + \textbf{Burt, Richard} & Former U.S. ambassador who had done work [for] Alfa-Bank and was a board member of the Center for the National Interest. \\ \textbf{Bystrov, Mikhail} & General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ``active measures'' social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. \\ @@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Fabrizio, Anthony (Tony)} & Partner at the research and consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee \& Associates. He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the election. \\ - \textbf{Fishbein, Jason} & Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on September~20, 2016. \\ + \textbf{Fishbein, Jason} & Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website \UseVerb{PutinTrumporg} on September~20, 2016. \\ \textbf{Flynn, Michael G. (a/k/a Michael Flynn Jr.)} & Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan.~20, 2017--Feb.~13, 2017). \\ @@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Garten, Alan} & General counsel of the Trump Organization. \\ - \textbf{Gates, Richard (Rick)~III} & Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate USS.laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI\null. \\ + \textbf{Gates, Richard (Rick)~III} & Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U.S. laws, as well as making false statements to the~FBI\null. \\ \textbf{Gerson, Richard (Rick)} & New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner. During the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. \\ @@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Hunt, Jody} & Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb.~2017--Oct.~2017). \\ - \textbf{Ivanov, Igor} & President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that Ivanoy advised on arranging a ``Moscow visit'' for the Trump Campaign. \\ + \textbf{Ivanov, Igor} & President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that Ivanov advised on arranging a ``Moscow visit'' for the Trump Campaign. \\ \textbf{Ivanov, Sergei} & Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael Cohen emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov. \\ @@ -304,7 +305,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Rosenstein, Rod} & Deputy Attorney General (Apr.~2017--present); Acting Attorney General for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017--Nov.~2018). \\ - \textbf{Rozoy, Andrei} & Chairman of LC. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate development corporation that signed letter of intent for the Trump Tower Moscow project in 2015. \\ + \textbf{Rozov, Andrei} & Chairman of I.C. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump Tower Moscow project in 2015. \\ \textbf{Rtskhiladze, Giorgi} & Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance, LLC who communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal. \\ @@ -320,7 +321,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Saunders, Paul J.} & Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on outlines and logistics of candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speech. \\ - \textbf{Sechin, Igor} & Executive chairman of Rosneft, a Russian-stated owned oil company. \\ + \textbf{Sechin, Igor} & Executive chairman of Rosneft, a Russian state[-]owned oil company. \\ \textbf{Sessions, Jefferson~III (Jeff)} & Attorney General (Feb.~2017--Nov.~2018); U.S. Senator (Jan.~1997--Feb.~2017); head of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. \\ @@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ \subsection{Referenced Persons} \textbf{Tillerson, Rex} & U.S. Secretary of State (Feb.~2017--Mar.~2018). \\ - \textbf{Timofeev, Ivan} & Director of program sat the Russian International Affairs Council and program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in 2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. \\ + \textbf{Timofeev, Ivan} & Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs Council and program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in 2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. \\ \textbf{Trump, Donald Jr.} & President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump Organization; helped arrange and attended the June~9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. \\ @@ -446,7 +447,7 @@ \subsection{Entities and Organizations} \textbf{Valdai Discussion Club} & Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government officials, including President Putin. \\ - \textbf{WikiLeaks} & Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online, including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government entities, Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. + \textbf{WikiLeaks} & Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online, including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government entities. Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. \end{longtable} @@ -503,3 +504,5 @@ \subsection{Index of Acronyms} \textbf{VEB} & Vnesheconombank \end{longtable} + +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/appendix/appendix-c.tex b/src/appendix/appendix-c.tex index 930a2a2..39f1824 100644 --- a/src/appendix/appendix-c.tex +++ b/src/appendix/appendix-c.tex @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ \end{center} -\newpage +\cleardoublepage \subsection{Introductory Note} @@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ \subsection{Introductory Note} Beginning in December 2017, this Office sought for more than a year to interview the President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of-justice. We advised counsel that the President was a ``subject'' of the investigation under the definition of the Justice Manual---``a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation.'' -Justice Manual \S~9-11.151 (2018). +Justice Manual \S~9-11.151~(2018). We also advised counsel that ``[a]n interview with the President is vital to our investigation'' and that this Office had ``carefully considered the constitutional and other arguments raised by \dots\ counsel, and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking an interview.''% 1 \footnote{5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel, at~1.} We additionally stated that ``it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public for an interview to take place'' and offered ``numerous accommodations to aid the President's preparation and avoid surprise.''% 2 -\footnote{5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~1; +\footnote{5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel[]'s Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~1; \textit{see} 7/30/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~1 (describing accommodations).} After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel's objective of securing the President's testimony, these accommodations included the submissions of written questions to the President on certain Russia-related topics.% 3 \footnote{9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~1 (submitting written questions).} @@ -32,11 +32,10 @@ \subsection{Introductory Note} \footnote{11/20/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office (transmitting written responses of Donald J. Trump).} In December 2018, we informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses in several respects.% 5 \footnote{12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~3.} -We noted, among other things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he ``does not `recall' or `remember' or have an `independent recollection'{}'' of information called for by the questions.% 6 +We noted, among other things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he ``does not `recall' or `remember' or have an `independent recollection'\thinspace'' of information called for by the questions.% 6 \footnote{12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~3.} Other answers were ``incomplete or imprecise.''% 7 -\footnote{12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~3; -\textit{see} (noting, ``for example,'' that the President ``did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease \dots\ but he has since made public comments about that topic'').} +\footnote{12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~3 [] (noting, ``for example,'' that the President ``did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease \dots\ but he has since made public comments about that topic'').} The written responses, we informed counsel, ``demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format, as we have had no opportunity to ask follow-up questions that would ensure complete answers and potentially refresh your client's recollection or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection.''% 8 \footnote{12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at~3.} We again requested an in-person interview, limited to certain topics, advising the President's counsel that ``[t]his is the President's opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of the evidence we have gathered.''% 9 @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ \subsection{Introductory Note} We viewed the written answers to be inadequate. But at that point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial evidence for our report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation, with resulting delay in finishing our investigation, against the anticipated benefits for our investigation and report. -As explained in Volume~II, Section II.B., we determined that the substantial quantity of information we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent and credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation. +As explained in \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.2}{Volume~II, Section~II.B}, we determined that the substantial quantity of information we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent and credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation. \hr @@ -68,19 +67,19 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \item When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the discussion. -\item Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr.\ and Rob Goldstone. -In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr.\ had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June~3, 2016, and June~9, 2016. +\item Attached to this document as Exhibit~A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr.\ and Rob Goldstone. +In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit~A, Donald Trump, Jr.\ had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June~3, 2016, and June~9, 2016. \begin{enumerate}[i.] \item Did Mr.~Trump, Jr.\ or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). -\item When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? +\item When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit~A? \item When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy? -\item Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took that action. +\item Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit~A? If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took that action. \end{enumerate} @@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Organization Moscow Project} \begin{enumerate}[a.] -\item In October 2015, a ``Letter of Intent,'' a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ``Trump Moscow project''). +\item In October 2015, a ``Letter of Intent,'' a copy of which is attached as Exhibit~B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ``Trump Moscow project''). \begin{enumerate}[i.] @@ -231,7 +230,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Organization Moscow Project} \end{enumerate} -\item In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: ``To the best of my knowledge, Mr.~Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.'' +\item In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit~C, Michael Cohen stated: ``To the best of my knowledge, Mr.~Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.'' Describe all discussions you had with Mr.~Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). \item Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the Trump Moscow project? @@ -255,7 +254,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaig \begin{enumerate}[a.] -\item Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? +\item Prior to mid-August~2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr.~Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role. @@ -366,19 +365,19 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \item When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the discussion. -\item Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr.\ and Rob Goldstone. -In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr.\ had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June~3, 2016, and June~9, 2016. +\item Attached to this document as Exhibit~A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr.\ and Rob Goldstone. +In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit~A, Donald Trump, Jr.\ had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June~3, 2016, and June~9, 2016. \begin{enumerate}[i.] \item Did Mr.~Trump, Jr.\ or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). -\item When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? +\item When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit~A? \item When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy? -\item Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took that action. +\item Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit~A? If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took that action. \end{enumerate} @@ -463,7 +462,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} I remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening. At this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June~9, 2016. -My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place. +My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June~9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place. It was more than two years ago, at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily. \paragraph*{Response to Question I, Part (e)} @@ -484,7 +483,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} In general, I expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs.~Clinton's failed policies, the Clintons' use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton Foundation, Mrs.~Clinton's improper use of a private server for State Department business, the destruction of 33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs.~Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the office of President. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign documents already produced to you reflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for the speech I expected to give ``probably'' on the Monday following my June~7, 2016 comments. -These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer. +These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the book \textit{Clinton Cash} by Peter Schweizer. The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June~12, 2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically to national security and terrorism than to the Clintons. @@ -633,7 +632,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Organization Moscow Project} \begin{enumerate}[a.] -\item In October 2015, a ``Letter of Intent,'' a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ``Trump Moscow project''). +\item In October 2015, a ``Letter of Intent,'' a copy of which is attached as Exhibit~B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ``Trump Moscow project''). \begin{enumerate}[i.] @@ -645,7 +644,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Organization Moscow Project} \end{enumerate} -\item In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: ``To the best of my knowledge, Mr.~Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.'' +\item In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit~C, Michael Cohen stated: ``To the best of my knowledge, Mr.~Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.'' Describe all discussions you had with Mr.~Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). \item Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the Trump Moscow project? @@ -669,7 +668,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Organization Moscow Project} Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project in Moscow. As I recall, Mr.~Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have done in the past in a variety of locations. -I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your questions as Exhibit B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world. +I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your questions as Exhibit~B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world. I had few conversations with Mr.~Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were not memorable. @@ -687,7 +686,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaig \begin{enumerate}[a.] -\item Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? +\item Prior to mid-August~2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role. @@ -770,3 +769,5 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transit \begin{figure}[hp] \includegraphics[width=6in]{images/appendix-c-signature.png}% \end{figure} + +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/appendix/appendix-d.tex b/src/appendix/appendix-d.tex index 4c66f7a..167660d 100644 --- a/src/appendix/appendix-d.tex +++ b/src/appendix/appendix-d.tex @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ \end{center} -\newpage +\cleardoublepage This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel's Office, as well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed. @@ -19,21 +19,20 @@ \subsection{Transfers} The Special Counsel's Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain matters assigned to the Office by the Acting Attorney General have not fully concluded as of the date of this report. -After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI\null. +After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice and the~FBI\null. Those transfers include: \begin{enumerate}[1.] -\item \underline{United States~v.\ Bijan Rafiekian and Kamil Ekim Alptekin} - -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia} +\item \myuline{United States~v.\ Bijan Rafiekian and Kamil Ekim Alptekin} +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia}\hfil\break (Awaiting trial) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other things, possible criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregistered agent for the Government of Turkey. -See August~2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller,~III\null. +\textit{See} August~2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller,~III\null. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin because they ``may have been jointly involved'' with Flynn in FARA-related crimes. -See October~20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. +\textit{See} October~20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. On December~1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States. As part of that plea, Flynn agreed to a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) documents he filed on March~7, 2017 ``contained materially false statements and omissions.'' @@ -42,54 +41,47 @@ \subsection{Transfers} The Special Counsel's Office determined the referral was appropriate because the investigation of Flynn had been completed, and that investigation had provided the rationale for the Office's investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. At NSD's request, the Eastern District of Virginia continued the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. - \item \underline{United States~v.\ Michael Flynn} - -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ Michael Flynn} +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia}\hfil\break (Awaiting sentencing) \item \underline{United States~v.\ Richard Gates} -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} - +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia}\hfil\break (Awaiting sentencing) - \item \underline{United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et al.} (Russian Social Media Campaign) + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et~al.} (Russian Social Media Campaign) \textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} -\textit{National Security Division} - +\textit{National Security Division}\hfil\break (Post-indictment, pre-arrest \& pre-trial% 1 \footnote{One defendant, Concord Management \& Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel and is in pre-trial litigation.} ) \item \underline{United States~v.\ Konstantin Kilimnik} -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} - +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia}\hfil\break (Post-indictment, pre-arrest) \item \underline{United States~v.\ Paul Manafort} \textit{U.S., Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia} - +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia}\hfil\break (Post-conviction) - \item \underline{United States~v.\ Viktor Netyksho, et al.} (Russian Hacking Operations) + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ Viktor Netyksho, et~al.} (Russian Hacking Operations) \textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania} -\textit{National Security Division} - +\textit{National Security Division}\hfil\break (Post-indictment, pre-arrest) \item \underline{United States~v.\ William Samuel Patten} -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} - +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia}\hfil\break (Awaiting sentencing) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of Patten's conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office. @@ -97,12 +89,11 @@ \subsection{Transfers} \item \underline{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} -\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} - +\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}\hfil\break (Investigation ongoing) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. -See August~2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller,~III\null. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} +\textit{See} August~2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller,~III\null. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} On October~27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February~22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the payments they received for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. @@ -110,21 +101,19 @@ \subsection{Transfers} \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} On February~23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi-object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were dismissed.% 3 \footnote{Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia. -See Vol.~I, Section IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the transfer decision described here.} +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.8}{Vol.~I, Section~IV.A.8}. The trial and plea happened after the transfer decision described here.} Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel's Office closed the \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} and referred them \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Office based its decision to close those matters on its mandate, the indictments of Manafort, Gates's plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate its resources, among other reasons; \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}. At \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} continued the investigation of those closed matters. - \item \underline{United States~v.\ Roger Stone} - -\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia} + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ Roger Stone} +\textit{U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia}\hfil\break (Awaiting trial) \item \underline{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} -\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} - +\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}\hfil\break (Investigation ongoing) \end{enumerate} @@ -132,7 +121,7 @@ \subsection{Transfers} \subsection{Referrals} During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's jurisdiction established by the Acting Attorney General. -After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI\null. +After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and the~FBI\null. Those referrals, listed alphabetically by subject, are summarized below. \begin{enumerate}[1.] @@ -154,7 +143,7 @@ \subsection{Referrals} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} - \item \underline{Gregory Craig, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher \& Flom LLP} + \item \myuline{Gregory Craig}, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}, \myuline{Skadden, Arps, Slate,}\hfil\break\myuline{Meagher \& Flom LLP} During the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential FARA violations pertaining to \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}, Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher \& Flom LLP (Skadden), and their work on behalf of the government of Ukraine. @@ -209,16 +198,18 @@ \subsection{Completed Prosecutions} \begin{enumerate}[1.] - \item \underline{United States~v.\ George Papadopoulos} + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ George Papadopoulos} Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (December~7, 2018) - \item \underline{United States~v.\ Alexander Zwaan} + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ Alex van der Zwaan} Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June~4, 2018) - \item \underline{United States~v.\ Richard Pinedo} + \item \myuline{United States~v.\ Richard Pinedo} Post-conviction, Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release date May~13, 2019) \end{enumerate} + +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/common/includes.tex b/src/common/includes.tex index f3c1f8d..48eb830 100644 --- a/src/common/includes.tex +++ b/src/common/includes.tex @@ -21,8 +21,11 @@ \renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt} \setlength{\headheight}{20pt} -% support Cyrillic -% \usepackage{fontenc} +% support Cyrillic; with fallback font Computer Modern Cyrillic +% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/816/cyrillic-in-latex +\usepackage[T2A,T1]{fontenc} +\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} +\usepackage[russian,english]{babel} % \usepackage{polyglossia} % \setmainlanguage{english} % \setotherlanguage{russian} @@ -30,39 +33,32 @@ % \setmainfont[Ligatures=TeX]{Times} % \newfontfamily\cyrillicfont{Times}[Script=Cyrillic] -% no hyphenation -\hyphenchar\font=-1 - % censorship tools \usepackage{censor} \def\censordot{.} -% \blacksquare for censored headings -\usepackage{amssymb} - % enumerate with Roman numerals \usepackage{enumerate} % horizontal rule \newcommand{\hr}{\begin{center} \line(1,0){50} \end{center}} -% table of contents is clickable -\usepackage{hyperref} -\hypersetup{ - colorlinks, - citecolor=black, - filecolor=black, - linkcolor=black, - urlcolor=black -} +% allow breaks at explicit hyphens in extremely-long-urls +\usepackage[hyphens]{url} % table of contents items are dotted \usepackage{tocloft} \renewcommand{\cftsecleader}{\cftdotfill{\cftdotsep}} -% \setlength{\cftsecindent}{0pt} -% \setlength{\cftsubsecindent}{0pt} -% \setlength{\cftsubsubsecindent}{0pt} -% \setlength{\cftparaindent}{0pt} +\cftsetpnumwidth{2em} +\cftsetrmarg{2.55em plus 1fil} +\cftsetindents{section}{0pt}{2em} +\cftsetindents{subsection}{2em}{1.55em} +\cftsetindents{subsubsection}{3.55em}{1.55em} +\cftsetindents{paragraph}{5.1em}{1.55em} +\cftsetindents{subparagraph}{6.65em}{1.55em} + +% tables of contents for each chapter +\usepackage{etoc} % watermark \usepackage{xcolor} @@ -70,8 +66,17 @@ % \usepackage[printwatermark]{xwatermark} % \newwatermark[allpages,color=red!20,angle=45,scale=1,xpos=0,ypos=0]{Draft} -% strikeout text +% strikeout and underline text; https://alexwlchan.net/2017/10/latex-underlines/ \usepackage[normalem]{ulem} +\usepackage{contour} + +\setlength{\ULdepth}{1.8pt} +\contourlength{0.8pt} + +\newcommand{\myuline}[1]{% + \uline{\phantom{#1}}% + \llap{\contour{white}{#1}}% +} % wrap text around figures \usepackage{wrapfig} @@ -85,6 +90,26 @@ % invisible section heading \newcommand\invisiblesection[1]{% \refstepcounter{section}% - \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\protect\numberline{\thesection}#1}% + \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{#1}%\protect\numberline{\thesection}#1}% \sectionmark{#1}} +% verbatim stuff in footnotes +\usepackage{fancyvrb} +\DefineShortVerb{\|} + +% try alternative font +\usepackage{kpfonts} +\usepackage{microtype} + +% always load hyperref last +\usepackage{hyperref} +\hypersetup{ + colorlinks, + citecolor=black, + filecolor=black, + linkcolor=black, + urlcolor=black +} + +% a little help for unusual names +\hyphenation{Anti-trust Counter-intelligence Counter-terrorism Mana-fort Wiki-Leaks} diff --git a/src/complete/appendices.tex b/src/complete/appendices.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c2037b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/complete/appendices.tex @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +\chapter*{Appendices} +\label{chap:appendices} +\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{\nameref{chap:appendices}} +\setcounter{chapter}{3} +\setcounter{section}{0} +\setcounter{footnote}{0} +\etocsetnexttocdepth{subparagraph} % local TOC goes down to subparagraphs +\vspace{-1cm} % adjust for empty header +\localtableofcontents +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/complete/chapter-1.tex b/src/complete/chapter-1.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f06c36 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/complete/chapter-1.tex @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +\chapter*{Volume I} +\label{chap:volume-1} +\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{\nameref{chap:volume-1}} +\setcounter{chapter}{1} +\setcounter{section}{0} +\setcounter{footnote}{0} +\etocsetnexttocdepth{subparagraph} % local TOC goes down to subparagraphs +\vspace{-1cm} % adjust for empty header +\localtableofcontents +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/complete/chapter-2.tex b/src/complete/chapter-2.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be5e6d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/complete/chapter-2.tex @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +\chapter*{Volume II} +\label{chap:volume-2} +\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{\nameref{chap:volume-2}} +\setcounter{chapter}{2} +\setcounter{section}{0} +\setcounter{footnote}{0} +\etocsetnexttocdepth{subparagraph} % local TOC goes down to subparagraphs +\vspace{-1cm} % adjust for empty header +\localtableofcontents +\cleardoublepage diff --git a/src/complete/main.tex b/src/complete/main.tex index ec88326..28a9bd2 100644 --- a/src/complete/main.tex +++ b/src/complete/main.tex @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ \documentclass[12pt]{book} \include{includes} +\include{saveverb} \title{Open Source Edition of the Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election Volume: Complete Report} \author{Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller,~III} @@ -10,9 +11,9 @@ \include{title} -\include{table-of-contents} +\include{table-of-contents} % overview TOC, down to sections -\chapter{Volume I} +\include{chapter-1} \include{introduction-1} @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ \chapter{Volume I} \include{decisions} -\chapter{Volume II} +\include{chapter-2} \include{introduction-2} @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ \chapter{Volume II} \include{conclusion} -\chapter{Appendix} +\include{appendices} \include{appendix-a} diff --git a/src/complete/saveverb.tex b/src/complete/saveverb.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..faa0914 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/complete/saveverb.tex @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +% active measures +\SaveVerb{TENGOP}|@TEN_GOP| +\SaveVerb{DJT}|@realDonaldTrump| +\SaveVerb{MAGA}|#makeAmericagreatagain| +\SaveVerb{TNGOP}|#tngop| +\SaveVerb{TENNESSEE}|#tennessee| +\SaveVerb{GOP}|#g0p| +\SaveVerb{HCFP}|#HillaryClintonForPrison2016| +\SaveVerb{NOHILL}|#nohillary2016| +\SaveVerb{MNUS}|@MissouriNewsUS| +\SaveVerb{MFT}|@march_for_trump| +\SaveVerb{JENNABRAMS}|@Jenn_Abrams| +\SaveVerb{jennabrams}|@jenn_abrams| +\SaveVerb{PAMELA}|@Pamela_Moore13| +\SaveVerb{NYV}|#NewYorkValues| +\SaveVerb{MCFAUL}|@McFaul| +\SaveVerb{ROGER}|@RogerJStoneJr| +\SaveVerb{HANNITY}|@seanhannity| +\SaveVerb{MFJ}|@mflynnJR| +\SaveVerb{JOSHMILTON}|joshmilton024@gmail.com| +\SaveVerb{BEINGPATRIOTIC}|beingpatriotic@gmail.com| +\SaveVerb{ROBOTCL}|robot@craigslist.org| +\SaveVerb{DJTJ}|@DonaldJTrumpJr| +\SaveVerb{VOTERFRAUD}|#VoterFraud| +\SaveVerb{DRAINTS}|#DrainTheSwamp| +\SaveVerb{MAGAhat}|#MAGAhat| +\SaveVerb{voted}|#voted| +\SaveVerb{ElectionDay}|#ElectionDay| +\SaveVerb{ERICTRUMP}|@EricTrump| +\SaveVerb{debatenight}|#debatenight| +\SaveVerb{TrumpB}|#TrumpB| +\SaveVerb{KellyannePolls}|@KellyannePolls| +\SaveVerb{hillarysemail}|#hillarysemail| +\SaveVerb{hillaryemail}|#hillary[s]email| +\SaveVerb{WeinerGate}|#WeinerGate| +\SaveVerb{parscale}|@parscale| +\SaveVerb{FridayFeeling}|#FridayFeeling| +\SaveVerb{GenFlynn}|@GenFlynn| +\SaveVerb{mikepence}|@mike_pence| +\SaveVerb{10gop}|@10_gop| +\SaveVerb{dtcom}|@donaldtrump.com| +\SaveVerb{K4T}|#KIDS4TRUMP| +\SaveVerb{America1st}|@America_1st_| + +% hacking and dumping +\SaveVerb{CEX}|CEX.io| +\SaveVerb{DCLeaks}|DCLeaks.com| +\SaveVerb{dcleaks}|dcleaks.com| +\SaveVerb{atdcleaks}|@dcleaks_| +\SaveVerb{electionleaks}|electionleaks.com| +\SaveVerb{tco}|https://t.co/QTVKUjQcOx| +\SaveVerb{pass}|KvFsg%*14@gPgu&| +\SaveVerb{smiley}|;)| +\SaveVerb{democratsorg}|democrats.org| +\SaveVerb{hillaryclintoncom}|hillaryclinton.com| +\SaveVerb{dncorg}|dnc.org| +\SaveVerb{dcccorg}|dccc.org| +\SaveVerb{rarexe}|rar.exe| +\SaveVerb{dcleaksproject}|dcleaksproject@gmail.com| +\SaveVerb{guccifer20}|guccifer20@aol.fr| +\SaveVerb{atWikiLeaks}|@WikiLeaks| +\SaveVerb{guccifer2}|@guccifer_2| +\SaveVerb{Guccifer2}|@Guccifer_2| +\SaveVerb{guccifer20mailcom}|guccifer20@mail.com| +\SaveVerb{wkdnclink1}|wk dnc link1.txt.gpg| +\SaveVerb{wikimail}|wiki_mail.txt.gpg| +\SaveVerb{PutinTrumporg}|PutinTrump.org| +\SaveVerb{putintrumporg}|putintrump.org| +\SaveVerb{atJasonFishbein}|@JasonFishbein| +\SaveVerb{atjabber}|@jabber.cryptoparty.is| +\SaveVerb{wlsearchtk}|wlsearch.tk| + +% russian links +\SaveVerb{politicocom}|politico.com| +\SaveVerb{russianembassyorg}|embassy@russianembassy.org| +\SaveVerb{katrinyana}|katrin@yana.kiev.ua| +\SaveVerb{Trump2016ru}|Trump2016.ru| +\SaveVerb{DonaldTrump2016ru}|DonaldTrump2016.ru| +\SaveVerb{PrpeskovaATprpressgofru}|Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru| +\SaveVerb{PrpeskovaATprpressgovru}|Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru| +\SaveVerb{prpeskovaATprpressgofru}|pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru| +\SaveVerb{prpeskovaATprpressgovru}|pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru| +\SaveVerb{infoATprpressgovru}|info@prpress.gov.ru| +\SaveVerb{atFoxNews}|@FoxNews| diff --git a/src/complete/table-of-contents.tex b/src/complete/table-of-contents.tex index 2944aaf..27437a8 100644 --- a/src/complete/table-of-contents.tex +++ b/src/complete/table-of-contents.tex @@ -2,9 +2,19 @@ \renewcommand*{\contentsname}{Table of Contents} +\etocsettocdepth{section} +% the main TOC goes down to sections + \pagenumbering{roman} \tableofcontents -\newpage +\cleardoublepage \pagenumbering{arabic} \sloppy + +\renewcommand*{\contentsname}{} + +% redefine the headings of the TOCs to use \section* rather than \chapter* +\etocarticlestyle + +\hypersetup{pageanchor=true} diff --git a/src/complete/title.tex b/src/complete/title.tex index 5734640..e5e1443 100644 --- a/src/complete/title.tex +++ b/src/complete/title.tex @@ -1,18 +1,22 @@ +\hypersetup{pageanchor=false} + \thispagestyle{empty} \begin{center} \Huge Open Source Edition \\ of the \\ -Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election +Report On The Investigation Into \\ +Russian Interference In The \\ +2016 Presidential Election \vspace{10 mm} \large Complete Report:\\ -Volume I\\ -Volume II\\ -Appendix +\hyperref[chap:volume-1]{Volume I}\\ +\hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume II}\\ +\hyperref[chap:appendices]{Appendices} \vspace{10 mm} @@ -46,4 +50,4 @@ \end{center} -\newpage +\newpage\null\thispagestyle{empty}\newpage diff --git a/src/volume-1/active-measures.tex b/src/volume-1/active-measures.tex index 403799c..0e50a8e 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/active-measures.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/active-measures.tex @@ -1,16 +1,17 @@ \section{Russian ``Active Measures'' Social Media Campaign} +\markboth{Russian ``Active Measures'' Social Media Campaign}{Russian ``Active Measures'' Social Media Campaign} -The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering (collectively "Concord").% 2 +The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering (collectively ``Concord'').% 2 \footnote{The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures operations targeting the United States. -Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports, and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI.} +Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports, and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and~FBI.} The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.% 3 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit} -see also SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). +\textit{see also} SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains additional law enforcement sensitive information.} -These operations constituted "active measures" (активные мероприятия), a term that typically refers to operations conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.% 4 -\footnote{As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18~U.S.C. \S~371. -See Volume~I, Section V.A, \textit{infra}; Indictment, United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et al., 1 :18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb.~16, 2018), Doc.~1 ("Internet Research Agency Indictment").} +These operations constituted ``active measures'' (\foreignlanguage{russian}{активные мероприятия}), a term that typically refers to operations conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.% 4 +\footnote{As discussed in \hyperlink{section.1.5}{Part V} below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18~U.S.C. \S~371. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.1}{Volume~I, Section V.A}, \textit{infra}; Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et~al.}, 1 :18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb.~16, 2018), Doc.~1 (``\textit{Internet Research Agency} Indictment'').} The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014. Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages designed to attract U.S. audiences. @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ \section{Russian ``Active Measures'' Social Media Campaign} By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the staging of political rallies.% 5 -\footnote{Internet Research Agency Indictment \S\S~52, 54, 55(a), 56,~74; \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} +\footnote{\textit{Internet Research Agency} Indictment \S\S~52, 54, 55(a), 56,~74; \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation. By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S. persons through their social media accounts. @@ -30,19 +31,19 @@ \section{Russian ``Active Measures'' Social Media Campaign} IRA-controlled Twitter accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testified that Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000 posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as 126 million persons through its Facebook accounts.% 6 -\footnote{Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong.~13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) -("We estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's 80,000 posts over the two years. +\footnote{\textit{Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence}, 115th Cong.~13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) +(``We estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's 80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from the Russian operation. -Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period."). +Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period.''). The Facebook representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately 120,000 pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via Instagram.} -In January 2018, Twitter announced that it had identified 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4 million people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.% 7 +In January 2018, Twitter announced that it had identified 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4~million people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.% 7 \footnote{Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan.~31, 2018).} \subsection{Structure of the Internet Research Agency} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 8 -\footnote{See SM-2230634, serial 92.} +\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2230634, serial 92.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 9 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 10 @@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ \subsection{Structure of the Internet Research Agency} The organization quickly grew. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 11 -\footnote{See SM-2230634, serial 86 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} +\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2230634, serial 86 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 12 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} @@ -60,13 +61,13 @@ \subsection{Structure of the Internet Research Agency} Two individuals headed the IRA's management: its general director, Mikhail Bystrov, and its executive director, Mikhail Burchik. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 14 -\footnote{See, e.g., SM-2230634, serials 9, 113 \&~180 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, SM-2230634, serials 9, 113 \&~180 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 15 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} As early as spring of 2014, the IRA began to hide its funding and activities. \blackout{Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.}% 16 -\footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor.} See SM-2230634, serials 131 \& 204.} +\footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor.} \textit{See} SM-2230634, serials 131 \& 204.} The IRA's U.S. operations are part of a larger set of interlocking operations known as ``Project Lakhta,'' \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 17 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} @@ -79,13 +80,13 @@ \subsection{Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin} Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} Prigozhin was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in December 2016,% 19 -\footnote{U.S. Treasury Department, "Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine" (Dec.~20, 2016).} +\footnote{U.S. Treasury Department, ``Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine'' (Dec.~20, 2016).} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 20 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 21 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} Numerous media sources have reported on Prigozhin's ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public photographs.% 22 -\footnote{See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as "Putin's Cook", New York Times (Feb.~16, 2018).} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Neil MacFarquhar, \textit{Yevgeniy Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ``Putin's Cook''}, New York Times (Feb.~16, 2018).} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 23 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} @@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ \subsection{Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 24 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 25 -\footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} see also SM-2230634, serial 113 \blackout{HOM}} +\footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} \textit{see also} SM-2230634, serial 113 \blackout{HOM}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} @@ -110,17 +111,17 @@ \subsection{Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 28 -\footnote{The term "troll" refers to internet users---in this context, paid operatives---who post inflammatory or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites. } +\footnote{The term ``troll'' refers to internet users---in this context, paid operatives---who post inflammatory or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites. } \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} IRA employees were aware that Prigozhin was involved in the IRA's U.S. operations, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 29 -\footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum.} See SM-2230634, serials 131 \& 204.} +\footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum.} \textit{See} SM-2230634, serials 131 \& 204.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 30 -\footnote{See SM-2230634, serial 156.} -In May~2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators of Facebook groups, recruited U.S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read "Happy 55th Birthday Dear Boss," as an homage to Prigozhin (whose 55th birthday was on June~1, 2016).% 31 -\footnote{Internet Research Agency Indictment \P~12(b); \textit{see also} 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) \& \blackout{Personal Privacy: Lorem ipsum}} +\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2230634, serial 156.} +In May~2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators of Facebook groups, recruited U.S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read ``Happy 55th Birthday Dear Boss,'' as an homage to Prigozhin (whose 55th birthday was on June~1, 2016).% 31 +\footnote{\textit{Internet Research Agency} Indictment \P~12(b); \textit{see also} 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) \& \blackout{Personal Privacy: Lorem ipsum}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 32 -\footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} see also SM-2230634, serial 189. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}.} +\footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} \textit{see also} SM-2230634, serial 189. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.} @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ \subsection{The IRA Targets U.S. Elections} \subsubsection{The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations as Early as 2014} The IRA's U.S. operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and forums. -By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a single general department, known internally as the ``Translator'' (переводчик) department. +By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a single general department, known internally as the ``Translator'' (\foreignlanguage{russian}{переводчик}) department. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} IRA subdivided the Translator Department into different responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to graphics and IT\null. @@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ \subsubsection{The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations as Early as 2014} IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States, while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party.% 38 -\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2230634, serials 150 \& 172} +\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2230634, serials 150 \& 172 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} Ultimately, two IRA employees---Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova---received visas and entered the United States on June~4, 2014. Prior to traveling, Krylova and Bogacheva compiled itineraries and instructions for the trip. @@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ \subsubsection{The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations as Early as 2014} \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts} Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on different U.S. social media platforms. -The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the social media accounts as "specialists."% 42 +The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the social media accounts as ``specialists.''% 42 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} Starting as early as 2014, the IRA's U.S. operations included social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.% 43 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} @@ -193,21 +194,21 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts} Facebook ID 100013640043337 (Lakisha Richardson).} By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. -For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, \@TEN\_GOP, purported to be connected to the Tennessee Republican Party.% 46 +For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, \UseVerb{TENGOP}, purported to be connected to the Tennessee Republican Party.% 46 \footnote{The account claimed to be the ``Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans'' and made posts that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party. -\textit{See, e.g.}, \@TEN\_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet (``Tennessee GOP backs \@realDonaldTrump period \#makeAmericagreatagain \#tngop \#tennessee \#g0p'').} +\textit{See, e.g.}, \UseVerb{TENGOP}, 4/3/16 Tweet (``Tennessee GOP backs \UseVerb{DJT} period \UseVerb{MAGA} \UseVerb{TNGOP} \UseVerb{TENNESSEE} \UseVerb{GOP}'').} More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti-immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protesters, and other U.S. social and political activists. The IRA closely monitored the activity of its social media accounts. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.}% 47 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor}% 48 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., SM-2230634 serial 131 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, SM-2230634 serial 131 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.} By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to support for the Trump Campaign and opposition to candidate Clinton.% 49 -\footnote{``The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her presidential campaign. +\footnote{The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton's record as Secretary of State and promoted various critiques of her candidacy. The IRA also used other techniques. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} @@ -216,7 +217,7 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts} \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} -The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued through 2016. In \blackout{HOM} 2016 internal \blackout{HOM} reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group ``Secured Borders,'' the author criticized the "lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton" and reminded the Facebook specialist "it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton."% 51 +The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued through 2016. In \blackout{HOM} 2016 internal \blackout{HOM} reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group ``Secured Borders,'' the author criticized the ``lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton'' and reminded the Facebook specialist ``it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton.''% 51 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} IRA employees also acknowledged that their work focused on influencing the U.S. presidential election. @@ -243,10 +244,10 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Facebook} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 54 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} -The IRA Facebook groups active during the 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative groups (with names such as "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and "Tea Party News"), purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and "Don't Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United Muslims of America"). +The IRA Facebook groups active during the 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative groups (with names such as ``Being Patriotic,'' ``Stop All Immigrants,'' ``Secured Borders,'' and ``Tea Party News''), purported Black social justice groups (``Black Matters,'' ``Blacktivist,'' and ``Don't Shoot Us''), LGBTQ groups (``LGBT United''), and religious groups (``United Muslims of America''). Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. -For example, on May~31, 2016, the operational account "Matt Skiber" began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook groups asking them to help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."% 55 +For example, on May~31, 2016, the operational account ``Matt Skiber'' began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook groups asking them to help plan a ``pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower.''% 55 \footnote{5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID \blackout{Personal Privacy}. 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID \blackout{Personal Privacy}} @@ -256,22 +257,22 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Facebook} During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA (discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton Campaign. -For example, on March~18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God lets this liar enter the White House as a president -- that day would be a real national tragedy."% 57 +For example, on March~18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, ``If one day God lets this liar enter the White House as a president -- that day would be a real national tragedy.''% 57 \footnote{3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575.} -Similarly, on April~6, 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account "Black Matters" calling for a "flashmob" of U.S. persons to "take a photo with \#HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or \#nohillary2016."% 58 +Similarly, on April~6, 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account ``Black Matters'' calling for a ``flashmob'' of U.S. persons to ``take a photo with \UseVerb{HCFP} or \UseVerb{NOHILL}.''% 58 \footnote{4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319.} IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few exceptions, negative.% 59 \footnote{\textit{See} SM-2230634, serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger set provided by Facebook).} IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was purchased on April~19, 2016. -The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea Party News" asking U.S. persons to help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters" by uploading photos with the hashtag "\#KIDS4TRUMP."% 60 +The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account ``Tea Party News'' asking U.S. persons to help them ``make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters'' by uploading photos with the hashtag `` \UseVerb{K4T}.''% 60 \footnote{4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235.} -In subsequent months, the IRA purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders." +In subsequent months, the IRA purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the Facebook groups ``Being Patriotic,'' ``Stop All Invaders,'' and ``Secured Borders.'' Collectively, the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons. Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. -For example, at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's "United Muslims of America" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the "Don't Shoot Us" Facebook group had over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic" Facebook group had over 200,000 followers, and the "Secured Borders" Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.% 61 +For example, at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's ``United Muslims of America'' Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the ``Don't Shoot Us'' Facebook group had over 250,000 followers, the ``Being Patriotic'' Facebook group had over 200,000 followers, and the ``Secured Borders'' Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.% 61 \footnote{\textit{See} Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID 1157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Being Patriotic); @@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Facebook} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} -According to Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126 million people."% 62 +According to Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and ``may have reached an estimated 126 million people.''% 62 \footnote{\textit{Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election}, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong.~13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook).} \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Twitter} @@ -304,10 +305,10 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Twitter} The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with U.S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging). The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the election. -Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included \@TEN\_GOP (described above); \@jenn\_abrams (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); \@Pamela\_Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); and \@America\_1st\_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers).% 67 -\footnote{Other individualized accounts included \@MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800 followers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).} -In May~2016, the IRA created the Twitter account \@march\_for\_trump, which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below).% 68 -\footnote{\textit{See} \@march\_for\_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account).} +Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included \UseVerb{TENGOP} (described above); \UseVerb{jennabrams} (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); \UseVerb{PAMELA} (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); and \UseVerb{America1st} (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers).% 67 +\footnote{Other individualized accounts included \UseVerb{MNUS} (an account with 3,800 followers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).} +In May~2016, the IRA created the Twitter account \UseVerb{MFT}, which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below).% 68 +\footnote{\textit{See} \UseVerb{MFT}, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account).} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.} @@ -321,19 +322,19 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Twitter} \footnote{For example, one IRA account tweeted, ``To those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all about money.'' The tweet received over 40,000 responses. -\@Jenn\_Abrams 4/24/17 (2:37~p.m.) Tweet.} +\UseVerb{JENNABRAMS} 4/24/17 (2:37~p.m.) Tweet.} U.S. media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled accounts and attributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons.% 71 \footnote{Josephine Lukito \& Chris Wells, \textit{Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for Partisan Opinion: Study}, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar.~8, 2018); -\textit{see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain \#NewYorkValues to Ted Cruz}, Washington Post (Jan.~15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); +\textit{see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain} \UseVerb{NYV} \textit{to Ted Cruz}, Washington Post (Jan.~15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); \textit{People Are Slamming the CIA for Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump}, U.S. News \& World Report (Dec.~12, 2016).} Similarly, numerous high-profile U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul,% 72 -\footnote{\@McFaul 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by \@Jenn\_Abrams).} Roger Stone,% 73 -\footnote{\@RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting \@Pamela\_Moore13); -\@RogerJStoneJr 4/26/16 Tweet (same).} +\footnote{\UseVerb{MCFAUL} 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by \UseVerb{JENNABRAMS}).} Roger Stone,% 73 +\footnote{\UseVerb{ROGER} 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting \UseVerb{PAMELA}); +\UseVerb{ROGER} 4/26/16 Tweet (same).} Sean Hannity,% 74 -\footnote{\@seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting \@Pamela\_Moore13).} -and Michael Flynn Jr.,% 75 -\footnote{\@mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet (``RT \@Jenn\_Abrams: This is what happens when you add the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs\dots'').} +\footnote{\UseVerb{HANNITY} 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting \UseVerb{PAMELA}).} +and Michael Flynn~Jr.,% 75 +\footnote{\UseVerb{MFJ} 6/22/17 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{JENNABRAMS}: This is what happens when you add the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs\dots'').} retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA-controlled accounts. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA tweets (discussed below). @@ -355,12 +356,11 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Through Twitter} \end{quote} In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the IRA\null.% 79 -\footnote{Eli Rosenberg, \textit{Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians}. -Some Signs Show the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan.~19, 2019).} -According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8.4\% of which were election-related."% 80 +\footnote{Eli Rosenberg, \textit{Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs Show the Problem Continues}, Washington Post (Jan.~19, 2019).} +According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, ``approximately 8.4\% of which were election-related.''% 80 \footnote{Twitter, ``Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election'' (updated Jan.~31, 2018). Twitter also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election.} -Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.% 81 +Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4~million people who Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.% 81 \footnote{Twitter, ``Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election'' (updated Jan.~31, 2018).} \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies} @@ -372,12 +372,12 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies} In most cases, the IRA account operator would tell the U.S. person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict or because they were somewhere else in the United States.% 82 \footnote{8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to \blackout{Personal Privacy}} The IRA then further promoted the event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator.% 83 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 7/21/16 Email, joshmilton024\@gmail.com to \blackout{Personal Privacy}; -7/21/16 Email, joshmilton024\@gmail.com to \blackout{Personal Privacy}} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 7/21/16 Email, \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}; +7/21/16 Email, \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}} After the event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA's social media accounts.% 84 -\footnote{\@march\_for\_trump 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower).} +\footnote{\UseVerb{MFT} 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower).} -The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA\null. The earliest evidence of a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015.% 85 +The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA\null. The earliest evidence of a rally was a ``confederate rally'' in November 2015.% 85 \footnote{Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post (``Good evening buds! Well I am planning to organize a confederate rally [\dots] in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people to attend.'').} The IRA continued to organize rallies even after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. @@ -404,8 +404,8 @@ \subsubsection{U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies} \footnote{The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts. \textit{See, e.g.}, Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being Patriotic); -Twitter Account \@march\_for\_trump; -beingpatriotic\@gmail.com. +Twitter Account \UseVerb{MFT}; +\UseVerb{BEINGPATRIOTIC}. (Rallies were organized in New York on June~25, 2016; Florida on August~20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October~2, 2016.)} Many of the same IRA employees who oversaw the IRA's social media accounts also conducted the day-to-day recruiting for political rallies inside the United States. @@ -425,23 +425,23 @@ \subsubsection{Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons} IRA employees frequently used \blackout{Investigative Technique} Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S. persons from across the political spectrum. -For example, the IRA targeted the family of \blackout{Personal Privacy: Lorem ipsum} and a number of black social justice activists while posing as a grassroots group called "Black Matters US\null."% 89 +For example, the IRA targeted the family of \blackout{Personal Privacy: Lorem ipsum} and a number of black social justice activists while posing as a grassroots group called ``Black Matters US\null.''% 89 \footnote{3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID \blackout{Personal Privacy} \& ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks).} -In February 2017, the persona "Black Fist" (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by Black Fist. +In February 2017, the persona ``Black Fist'' (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote IRA-generated content,% 90 \footnote{8/19/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to \blackout{Personal Privacy}} as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).% 91 -\footnote{12/8/16 Email, robot\@craigslist.org to beingpatriotic\@gmail.com (confirming Craigslist advertisement} +\footnote{12/8/16 Email, \UseVerb{ROBOTCL} to \UseVerb{BEINGPATRIOTIC} (confirming Craigslist advertisement).} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 92 -\footnote{8/18--19/16 Twitter DMs, \@march\_for\_trump \& \blackout{Personal Privacy}} +\footnote{8/18--19/16 Twitter DMs, \UseVerb{MFT} \& \blackout{Personal Privacy}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 93 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 11/11--27/16 Facebook Messages, ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) \& ID \blackout{Personal Privacy} (arranging to pay for plane tickets and for a bull horn). } \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 94 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 9/10/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) \& ID \blackout{Personal Privacy} (discussing payment for rally supplies); -8/18/16 Twitter DM, \@march\_for\_trump to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (discussing payment for construction materials).} +8/18/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{MFT} to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (discussing payment for construction materials).} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} as the IRA's online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S. persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked (with tasks ranging from organizing rallies to taking pictures with certain political messages). \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 95 @@ -458,51 +458,52 @@ \subsubsection{Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign} \paragraph{Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials} -Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion" targeted by the IRA were various members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. +Among the U.S. ``leaders of public opinion'' targeted by the IRA were various members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA\null. -\begin{wrapfigure}{r}{2.1in} - \vspace{-20pt} - \begin{center} - \includegraphics[width=2in]{images/p-34-trump-facebook.png}% - \end{center} - \vspace{-20pt} - \caption*{Screenshot of Trump Facebook Account (from Matt Skiber)} - \vspace{-10pt} - \label{fig:trump-facebook} -\end{wrapfigure} - \begin{itemize} - \item Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account \@TEN\_GOP were cited or retweeted by multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump~Jr.,% 96 - \footnote{See, e.g, \@DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet (``RT \@TEN\_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. - Police investigating \#VoterFraud. \#DrainTheSwamp.''); - \@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet (``RT \@TEN\_GOP: BREAKING: \#VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.''); - \@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet (``RT \@TEN\_GOP:This vet passed away last month before he could vote for Trump. - Here he is in his \#MAGAhat. - \#voted \#ElectionDay.''). Trump~Jr.\ retweeted additional \@TEN\_GOPcontent subsequent to the election.} + \item Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account \UseVerb{TENGOP} were cited or retweeted by multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump~Jr.,% 96 + \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, \UseVerb{DJTJ} 10/26/16 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{TENGOP}: BREAKING Thousands of names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. + Police investigating \UseVerb{VOTERFRAUD}. \UseVerb{DRAINTS}.''); + \UseVerb{DJTJ} 11/2/16 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{TENGOP}: BREAKING: \UseVerb{VOTERFRAUD} by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.''); + \UseVerb{DJTJ} 11/8/16 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{TENGOP}:This vet passed away last month before he could vote for Trump. + Here he is in his \UseVerb{MAGAhat}. + \UseVerb{voted} \UseVerb{ElectionDay}.''). + Trump~Jr.\ retweeted additional \UseVerb{TENGOP} content subsequent to the election.} Eric Trump,% 97 - \footnote{\@EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet (``RT \@TEN\_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption \& \#VoterFraud \#debatenight \#TrumpB'').} + \footnote{\UseVerb{ERICTRUMP} 10/20/16 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{TENGOP}: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption \& \UseVerb{VOTERFRAUD} \UseVerb{debatenight} \UseVerb{TrumpB}'').} Kellyanne Conway,% 98 - \footnote{\@KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet (``RT \@TEN\_GOP: Mother of jailed sailor: `Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on Classified info' \#hillarysemail \#WeinerGate.'').} + \footnote{\UseVerb{KellyannePolls} 11/6/16 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{TENGOP}: Mother of jailed sailor: `Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on Classified info' \UseVerb{hillarysemail} \UseVerb{WeinerGate}.'').} Brad Parscale,% 99 - \footnote{\@parscale 10/15/16 Tweet (``Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: `TellTheTruth!' RT if you are also done w/biased Media! \#FridayFeeling'').} + \footnote{\UseVerb{parscale} 10/15/16 Tweet (``Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: `TellTheTruth!' RT if you are also done w/biased Media! \UseVerb{FridayFeeling}'').} and Michael T. Flynn.% 100 - \footnote{\@GenFlynn 11/7/16 (retweeting \@TEN\_GOP post that included in part ``\@realDonaldTrump \& \@mike\_pence will be our next POTUS \& VPOTUS.'').} + \footnote{\UseVerb{GenFlynn} 11/7/16 (retweeting \UseVerb{TENGOP} post that included in part ``\UseVerb{DJT} \& \UseVerb{mikepence} will be our next POTUS \& VPOTUS.'').} These posts included allegations of voter fraud,% 101 - \footnote{\@TEN\_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet (``North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of 110!!'').} + \footnote{\UseVerb{TENGOP} 10/11/16 Tweet (``North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of 110!!'').} as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled classified information.% 102 - \footnote{\@TEN\_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet (``Mother of jailed sailor: `Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on classified info \#hillaryemail \#WeinerGate.'{}'').} - \item A November~7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled Twitter account \@Pamela\_Moore13 was retweeted by Donald J. Trump~Jr.% 103 - \footnote{\@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/7/16 Tweet (``RT \@Pamela\_Moore13: Detroit residents speak out against the failed policies of Obama, Hillary \& democrats\dots.'').} - \item On September~19, 2017, President Trump's personal account \@realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from the IRA-controlled account \@10\_gop (the backup account of \@TEN\_GOP, which had already been deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: "We love you, Mr.~President!"% 104 - \footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7:33~p.m.) Tweet (``THANK YOU for your support Miami! My team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you -- and there is no question -- TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!"} + \footnote{\UseVerb{TENGOP} 11/6/16 Tweet (``Mother of jailed sailor: `Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on classified info['] \UseVerb{hillaryemail} \UseVerb{WeinerGate}.'\thinspace'').} + \item A November~7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled Twitter account \UseVerb{PAMELA} was retweeted by Donald J. Trump~Jr.% 103 + \footnote{\UseVerb{DJTJ} 11/7/16 Tweet (``RT \UseVerb{PAMELA}: Detroit residents speak out against the failed policies of Obama, Hillary \& democrats\dots.'').} + \item On September~19, 2017, President Trump's personal account \UseVerb{DJT} responded to a tweet from the IRA-controlled account \UseVerb{10gop} (the backup account of \UseVerb{TENGOP}, which had already been deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: ``We love you, Mr.~President!''% 104 + \footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 9/19/17 (7:33~p.m.) Tweet (``THANK YOU for your support Miami! My team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you -- and there is no question -- TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!''} \end{itemize} IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump Campaign and, later, Trump Administration officials to their tweets. -For example, on August~23, 2016, the IRA-controlled persona "Matt Skiber" Facebook account sent a message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that "Mr.~Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is great!"% 105 +For example, on August~23, 2016, the IRA-controlled persona ``Matt Skiber'' Facebook account sent a message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that ``Mr.~Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is great!''% 105 \footnote{8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to \blackout{Personal Privacy}} The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate Trump's Facebook account, which included a post about the August~20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA\null. +\begin{wrapfigure}{r}{2.1in} + \vspace{-20pt} + \begin{center} + \includegraphics[width=2in]{images/p-34-trump-facebook.png}% + \end{center} + \vspace{-20pt} + \caption*{Screenshot of Trump Facebook Account (from Matt Skiber)} + \vspace{-10pt} + \label{fig:trump-facebook} +\end{wrapfigure} + \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 106 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} @@ -511,16 +512,16 @@ \subsubsection{Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign} Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political activists working on behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's contacts included requests for signs and other materials to use at rallies,% 107 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.,} 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024\@gmail.com to \blackout{Personal Privacy}\@donaldtrump.com (asking for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); -8/18/16 Email, joshmilton024\@gmail.com to \blackout{Personal Privacy}\@donaldtrump.com (asking for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); -8/12/16 Email, joshmilton024\@gmail.com to \blackout{Personal Privacy}\@donaldtrump.com (asking for ``contact phone numbers for Trump Campaign affiliates'' in various Florida cities and signs). +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 8/16/16 Email, \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}\UseVerb{dtcom} (asking for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); +8/18/16 Email, \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}\UseVerb{dtcom} (asking for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); +8/12/16 Email, \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}\UseVerb{dtcom} (asking for ``contact phone numbers for Trump Campaign affiliates'' in various Florida cities and signs). } as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate logistics.% 108 -\footnote{8/15/16 Email, \blackout{Personal Privacy} to joshmilton024\@gmail.com (asking to add to locations to the ``Florida Goes Trump,'' list); -8/16/16 Email, to \blackout{Personal Privacy} to joshmilton024\@gmail.com (volunteering to send an email blast to followers).} +\footnote{8/15/16 Email, \blackout{Personal Privacy} to \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} (asking to add to locations to the ``Florida Goes Trump,'' list); +8/16/16 Email, to \blackout{Personal Privacy} to \UseVerb{JOSHMILTON} (volunteering to send an email blast to followers).} While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identified evidence that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals. \hr -In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election through the "active measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. -As explained further in Volume~I, Section V.A, \textit{infra}, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections. +In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election through the ``active measures'' social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. +As explained further in \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.1}{Volume~I, Section V.A}, \textit{infra}, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections. diff --git a/src/volume-1/decisions.tex b/src/volume-1/decisions.tex index 537d8a8..ca2af48 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/decisions.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/decisions.tex @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ \section{Prosecution and Declination Decisions} +\markboth{Prosecution and Declination Decisions}{Prosecution and Declination Decisions} -The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office ``to prosecute federal crimes arising from [its] investigation'' of the matters assigned to it. +\hyperlink{section.3.1}{The Appointment Order} authorized the Special Counsel's Office ``to prosecute federal crimes arising from [its] investigation'' of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction for such an offense. -Justice Manual \S~9-27.220 (2018). +Justice Manual \S~9-27.220~(2018). Where the answer to those questions was yes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. \textit{Id.} @@ -48,12 +49,12 @@ \subsubsection{Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy} As of this writing, all 12 defendants remain at large. The \textit{Netyksho} indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with others to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere in the election. -\textit{Netyksho Indictment}~\P~2. +\textit{Netyksho} Indictment~\P~2. The indictment also describes how, in staging the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer~2.0 persona to disseminate documents through WikiLeaks. On July~22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC\null. -\textit{Netyksho Indictment} \P~48. +\textit{Netyksho} Indictment~\P~48. In addition, on October~7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. -\textit{Netyksho Indictment} \P~49. +\textit{Netyksho} Indictment~\P~49. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -61,15 +62,16 @@ \subsubsection{Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} -\paragraph{Charging Decision As to [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: Harm to Ongoing Matter]} +\paragraph{Charging Decision As to [\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} + \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}%1278 \footnote{The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18~U.S.C. \S\S~2314 and~2315. -The statutes comprising the NSPA cover ``goods, wares, or merchandise,'' and lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in \textit{Dowling~v.\ United States}, 473~U.S. 207 (1985). +The statutes comprising the NSPA cover ``goods, wares, or merchandise,'' and lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in \textit{Dowling~v.\ United States}, 473~U.S. 207~(1985). \textit{See United States~v.\ Yijia Zhang}, 995F, Supp.~2d 340, 344--48 (E.D. Pa.~2014) (collecting cases). One of those post-\textit{Dowling} decisions---\textit{United States~v.\ Brown}, 925~F.2d 1301 (10th~Cir.~1991)---specifically held that the NSPA does not reach ``a computer program in source code form,'' even though that code was stored in tangible items (\textit{i.e.}, a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). \textit{Id.}~at~1302--03. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18~U.S.C. \S~1030(a)(2) that ``would ensure that the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical items [is] protected.'' -S. Rep.~104-357, at~7 (1996). +S. Rep.~104-357, at~7~(1996). That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute ``goods, wares, or merchandise'' within the meaning of the NSPA.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -90,11 +92,12 @@ \subsubsection{Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} -\subsubsection{Potential Section 1030 Violation By [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: Personal Privacy]} +\subsubsection{Potential Section 1030 Violation By [\protect\censor{Personal Privacy}]} + \blackout{Personal Privacy} \blackout{Personal Privacy} -See \textit{United States~v.\ Willis}, 476~F.3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th~Cir.~2007) (explaining that the 1986 amendments to Section~1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach ``intentional acts of unauthorized access---rather than mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones'') (quoting S. Rep.~99-432, at~5 (1986)). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Willis}, 476~F.3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th~Cir.~2007) (explaining that the 1986 amendments to Section~1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach ``intentional acts of unauthorized access---rather than mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones'') (quoting S.~Rep.~99-432, at~5~(1986)). In addition, the computer \blackout{Personal Privacy} likely qualifies as a ``protected'' one under the statute, which reaches ``effectively all computers with Internet access.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Nosal}, 676~F.3d 854, 859 (9th~Cir.~2012) (en banc). \blackout{Personal Privacy} @@ -104,9 +107,9 @@ \subsubsection{Potential Section 1030 Violation By [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl Justice Manual \S~9-27.230. \blackout{Personal Privacy} \subsection{Russian Government Outreach and Contacts} -As explained in Section~IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government. +As explained in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous links (\textit{i.e.}, contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The Office evaluated the contacts under several sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate in the United States. -After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section~IV above---with the exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine. +After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} above---with the exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine. One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals---the June~9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising derogatory information on Hillary Clinton---implicates an additional body of law: campaign finance statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As explained below, the Office evaluated those questions in connection with the June~9 meeting \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}. @@ -116,22 +119,22 @@ \subsection{Russian Government Outreach and Contacts} \subsubsection{Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion} As an initial matter, this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of ``collusion,'' but through the lens of conspiracy law. -In so doing, the Office recognized that the word ``collud[e]'' appears in the Acting Attorney General's August~2, 2017 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in public reporting; and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, \textit{e.g., Brooke Group~v.\ Brown \& Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 509~U.S. 209, 227 (1993). +In so doing, the Office recognized that the word ``collud[e]'' appears in the Acting Attorney General's August~2, 2017 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in public reporting; and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, \textit{see, e.g., Brooke Group~v.\ Brown \& Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 509~U.S. 209, 227~(1993). But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the U.S. Code; nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the contrary, even as defined in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as that crime is set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute, 18~U.S.C. \S~371. -See \textit{Black's Law Dictionary} 321 (10th ed.~2014) (collusion is ``[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law''); 1~Alexander Burrill, \textit{A Law Dictionary and Glossary} 311 (1871) (``An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object.''); 1 \textit{Bouvier's Law Dictionary} 352 (1897) (``An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.''). +\textit{See Black's Law Dictionary} 321 (10th ed.~2014) (collusion is ``[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law''); 1~Alexander Burrill, \textit{A Law Dictionary and Glossary} 311 (1871) (``An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object.''); 1 \textit{Bouvier's Law Dictionary} 352 (1897) (``An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.''). For that reason, this Office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term ``collusion.'' -The Office considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy---either under statutes that have their own conspiracy language (e.g., 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1349, 1951(a)), or under the general conspiracy statute (18~U.S.C. \S~371). -The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume~I, Section~IV, \textit{supra}, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law---including foreign-influence and campaign-finance laws, both of which are discussed further below. +The Office considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy---either under statutes that have their own conspiracy language (\textit{e.g.}, 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1349, 1951(a)), or under the general conspiracy statute (18~U.S.C. \S~371). +The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV}, \textit{supra}, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law---including foreign-influence and campaign-finance laws, both of which are discussed further below. The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either under a specific statute or under Section~371's offenses clause. The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under Section~371's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. -See \textit{Dennis~v.\ United States}, 384~U.S. 855, 861 (1966); \textit{Hammerschmidt~v.\ United States}, 2605~U.S. 182, 188 (1924); see also \textit{United States~v.\ Concord Mgmt. \& Consulting LLC}, 347~F. Supp.~3d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2018). +\textit{See Dennis~v.\ United States}, 384~U.S. 855, 861~(1966); \textit{Hammerschmidt~v.\ United States}, 2605~U.S. 182, 188~(1924); \textit{see also United States~v.\ Concord Mgmt.\ \& Consulting LLC}, 347~F. Supp.~3d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officials---or between such officials and Russia-linked individuals---to interfere with or obstruct a lawful function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. -And, as discussed in Volume~I, Section V.A, \textit{supra}, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the Office charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume~I, Section~II, \textit{supra}. -Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section~IV above. +And, as discussed in \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.1}{Volume~I, Section V.A}, \textit{supra}, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the Office charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in \hyperlink{section.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~II}, \textit{supra}. +Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} above. \subsubsection{Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18~U.S.C. \S~951)} The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government. @@ -139,7 +142,7 @@ \subsubsection{Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18~U.S.C \paragraph{Governing Law} Under 18~U.S.C. \S~951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant must act on behalf of a foreign government (as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities), the acts need not involve espionage; rather, acts of any type suffice for liability. -See \textit{United States~v.\ Duran}, 596~F.3d 1283, 1293--94 (11th~Cir.~2010); \textit{United States~v.\ Latchin}, 554~F.3d 709, 715 (7th~Cir.~2009); \textit{United States~v.\ Dumeisi}, 424~F.3d 566, 581 (7th~Cir.~2005). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Duran}, 596~F.3d 1283, 1293--94 (11th~Cir.~2010); \textit{United States~v.\ Latchin}, 554~F.3d 709, 715 (7th~Cir.~2009); \textit{United States~v.\ Dumeisi}, 424~F.3d 566, 581 (7th~Cir.~2005). An ``agent of a foreign government'' is an ``individual'' who ``agrees to operate'' in the United States ``subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official.'' 18~U.S.C. \S~951(d). The crime defined by Section~951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States as an unregistered foreign-government agent. @@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ \subsubsection{Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18~U.S.C \footnote{\textit{Gates} Superseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~204; -Gates Plea Agreement; +\textit{Gates} Plea Agreement; Statement of Offense, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~206; Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept.~14, 2018), Doc.~422; Statement of Offense, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept.~14, 2018), Doc.~423.} @@ -200,12 +203,12 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} \paragraph{Overview Of Governing Law} ``[T]he United States has a compelling interest \dots\ in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.'' -\textit{Bluman~v.\ FEC}, 800~F. Supp.~2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., for three-judge court), \textit{aff'd}, 565~U.S. 1104 (2012). +\textit{Bluman~v.\ FEC}, 800~F. Supp.~2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (Kavanaugh,~J., for three-judge court), \textit{aff'd}, 565~U.S. 1104~(2012). To that end, federal campaign finance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations, expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections, and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As relevant here, foreign nationals may not make---and no one may ``solicit, accept, or receive'' from them---``a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value'' or ``an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election.'' 52~U.S.C. \S~30121 (a)(1)(A), (a)(2).%1283 \footnote{Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions, 52~U.S.C. \S~30116(a), and prohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52~U.S.C. \S~30118(a); -see Citizens United~v.\ FEC, 558~U.S. 310, 320 (2010). +\textit{see Citizens United~v.\ FEC}, 558~U.S. 310, 320~(2010). Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved possible electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicable provision.} The term ``contribution,'' which is used throughout the campaign-finance law, ``includes'' ``any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.'' 52~U.S.C. \S~30101(8)(A)(i). @@ -223,16 +226,16 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} The statute defines ``foreign national'' by reference to FARA and the Immigration and Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52~U.S.C. \S~30121(b) (cross-referencing 22~U.S.C. \S~611(b)(1)--(3) and 8~U.S.C. \S~1101(a)(20), (22)). -That definition yields five, sometimes overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities relevant for present purposes---namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S., entities located outside of the U.S. +That definition yields five, sometimes overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities relevant for present purposes---namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S., entities located outside of the~U.S. A ``knowing[] and willful[]'' violation involving an aggregate of \$25,000 or more in a calendar year is a felony. -52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1)(A)(i); \textit{see Bluman}, 800~F. Supp.~2d at~292 (noting that a willful violation will require some ``proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law''); \textit{United States~v.\ Danielczyk}, 917~F. Supp.~2d 573, 577 (E.D. Va.~2013) (applying willfulness standard drawn from \textit{Bryan~v.\ United States}, 524~U.S. 184, 191--92 (1998)); \textit{see also Wagner~v.\ FEC}, 793~F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C.~Cir.~2015) (en banc) (same). +52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1)(A)(i); \textit{see Bluman}, 800~F. Supp.~2d at~292 (noting that a willful violation will require some ``proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law''); \textit{United States~v.\ Danielczyk}, 917~F. Supp.~2d 573, 577 (E.D. Va.~2013) (applying willfulness standard drawn from \textit{Bryan~v.\ United States}, 524~U.S. 184, 191--92~(1998)); \textit{see also Wagner~v.\ FEC}, 793~F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C.~Cir.~2015) (en banc) (same). A ``knowing[] and willful[]'' violation involving an aggregate of \$2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than \$25,000, is a misdemeanor. 52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1)(A)(ii). \paragraph{Application to June~9 Trump Tower Meeting} -The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in connection with the June~9 meeting described in Volume~I, Section IV.A.5, \textit{supra}. +The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in connection with the June~9 meeting described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.5}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.5}, \textit{supra}. The Office concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent (``knowing'' and ``willful''), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information, criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that ``the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.'' Justice Manual \S~9-27.220. @@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June~9 meeting anticipating the receipt of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources. The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracy to violate the foreign contributions ban, in violation of 18~U.S.C. \S~371; the solicitation of an illegal foreign source contribution; or the acceptance or receipt of ``an express or implied promise to make a [foreign-source] contribution,'' both in violation of 52~U.S.C. \S~30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). -There are reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a ``thing of value'' within the meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals acted ``willfully,'' i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct; and, second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, see 52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1)(A)G). +There are reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a ``thing of value'' within the meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals acted ``willfully,'' \textit{i.e.}, with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct; and, second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, \textit{see} 52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1)(A)G). \subparagraph{Thing-of-Value Element} A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign ``documents and information'' of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. @@ -259,7 +262,7 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} 52~U.S.C. \S~30101(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The phrases ``thing of value'' and ``anything of value'' are broad and inclusive enough to encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these phrases serve as ``term[s] of art'' that are construed ``broad[ly].'' -\textit{United States~v.\ Nilsen}, 967~F.2d 539, 542 (11th~Cir.~1992) (per curiam) (``thing of value'' includes ``both tangibles and intangibles''); \textit{see also, e.g.}, 18~U.S.C. \S\S~201(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); \textit{id.} \S~641 (theft of government property). +\textit{United States~v.\ Nilsen}, 967~F.2d 539, 542 (11th~Cir.~1992) (per curiam) (``thing of value'' includes ``both tangibles and intangibles''); \textit{see also, e.g.}, 18~U.S.C. \S\S~201(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); \textit{id.}~\S~641 (theft of government property). For example, the term ``thing of value'' encompasses law enforcement reports that would reveal the identity of informants, \textit{United States~v.\ Girard}, 601~F.2d 69, 71 (2d~Cir.~1979); classified materials, \textit{United States~v.\ Fowler}, 932~F.2d 306, 310 (4th~Cir.~1991); confidential information about a competitive bid, \textit{United States~v.\ Matzkin}, 14~F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th~Cir.~1994); secret grand jury information, \textit{United States~v.\ Jeter}, 775~F.2d 670, 680 (6th~Cir.~1985); and information about a witness's whereabouts, \textit{United States~v.\ Sheker}, 618~F.2d 607, 609 (9th~Cir.~1980) (per curiam). And in the public corruption context, ``\thinspace`thing of value' is defined broadly to include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Renzi}, 769~F.3d 731, 744 (9th~Cir.~2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). @@ -277,7 +280,7 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} Political campaigns frequently conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things of value. At the same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount to a contribution under campaign-finance law. -Such an interpretation could have implications beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52~U.S.C. \S~30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign contributions), and raise First Amendment questions. +Such an interpretation could have implications beyond the foreign-source ban, \textit{see} 52~U.S.C. \S~30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign contributions), and raise First Amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult where the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It is uncertain how courts would resolve those issues. @@ -292,26 +295,28 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the June~9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful. The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar with the foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context. The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or efforts at concealment at the time of the June~9 meeting. -While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent disclosure of the nature of the June~9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a showing of scienter, \textit{see} Volume~II, Section II.G, \textit{infra}, that concealment occurred more than a year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June~9 meeting, and may reflect an intention to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. +While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent disclosure of the nature of the June~9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a showing of scienter, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.7}{Volume~II, Section~II.G}, \textit{infra}, that concealment occurred more than a year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June~9 meeting, and may reflect an intention to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. Additionally, in light of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving ``documents and information'' of the sort offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump~Jr.\ could mount a factual defense that he did not believe his response to the offer and the June~9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his less direct involvement in arranging the June~9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues. \subparagraph{Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information} The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised documents and information exceeds the \$2,000 threshold for a criminal violation, as well as the \$25,000 threshold for felony punishment. -See 52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1). +\textit{See} 52~U.S.C. \S~30109(d)(1). The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions---such as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost or the cost of distribution---would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting. Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement, \textit{see, e.g., United States~v.\ Tombrello}, 666~F.2d 485, 489 (11th~Cir.~1982), Goldstone's description of the offered material here was quite general. -His suggestion of the information's value---i.e., that it would ``incriminate Hillary'' and ``would be very useful to [Trump~Jr.'s] father''---was nonspecific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. +His suggestion of the information's value---\textit{i.e.}, that it would ``incriminate Hillary'' and ``would be very useful to [Trump~Jr.'s] father''---was nonspecific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be delivered could be reflected in Trump~Jr.'s response (``\textit{if it's what you say} I love it'') (emphasis added). Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the Office decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump~Jr.\ or other campaign officials for the events culminating in the June~9 meeting. -\paragraph{Application to [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: HOM]} +\paragraph{Application to [\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} + \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} -\subparagraph{Questions Over [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: Harm to Ongoing Matter]} +\subparagraph{Questions Over [\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} + \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -327,7 +332,8 @@ \subsubsection{Campaign Finance} Finally, the First Amendment could pose constraints on a prosecution. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} -\subparagraph{Analysis [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: HOM]} +\subparagraph{Analysis [\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} + \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -343,7 +349,7 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to government investigators is 18~U.S.C. \S~1001. As relevant here, under Section 1001(a)(2), it is a crime to knowingly and willfully ``make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation'' ``in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive \dots\ branch of the Government.'' An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch's jurisdiction. -\textit{United States~v.\ Rodgers}, 466~U.S. 475, 479 (1984). +\textit{United States~v.\ Rodgers}, 466~U.S. 475, 479~(1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative branch actions---\textit{viz.}, administrative matters and ``investigation[s] or review[s]'' conducted by a congressional committee or subcommittee. 18~U.S.C. \S~1001(c)(1) and~(2); \textit{see United States~v.\ Pickett}, 353~F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.~Cir.~2004). @@ -352,7 +358,7 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} In the D.C. Circuit, the government must prove that the statement was actually false; a statement that is misleading but ``literally true'' does not satisfy Section 1001(a)(2). \textit{See United States~v.\ Milton}, 8~F.3d 39, 45 (D.C.~Cir.~1993); \textit{United States~v.\ Dale}, 991~F.2d 819, 832--33 \& n.22 (D.C.~Cir.~1993). For that false statement to qualify as ``material,'' it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Gaudin}, 515~U.S. 506, 509 (1995); \textit{United States~v.\ Moore}, 612~F.3d 698, 701 (D.C.~Cir.~2010). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Gaudin}, 515~U.S. 506, 509~(1995); \textit{United States~v.\ Moore}, 612~F.3d 698, 701 (D.C.~Cir.~2010). \textit{Perjury}. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. @@ -360,11 +366,11 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} The government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under Section~1623(a): the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant's testimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concerned matters that were material to the grand jury investigation; and the false testimony was knowingly given. \textit{United States~v.\ Bridges}, 717~F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C.~Cir.~1983). The general perjury statute, 18~U.S.C. \S~1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, except that it requires that the witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy ``strict common-law requirements for establishing falsity.'' -\textit{See Dunn~v.\ United States}, 442~U.S. 100, 106 \& n.6 (1979) (explaining ``the two-witness rule'' and the corroboration that it demands). +\textit{See Dunn~v.\ United States}, 442~U.S. 100, 106 \& n.6~(1979) (explaining ``the two-witness rule'' and the corroboration that it demands). \textit{Obstruction of Justice}. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes pertinent to this Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and criminal (\textit{i.e.}, corrupt) intent. -A detailed discussion of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in Volume~II of the report. +A detailed discussion of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in \hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II} of the report. \paragraph{Application to Certain Individuals} @@ -407,7 +413,7 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} On October~7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea agreement. On September~7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a \$9,500 fine, and 200 hours of community service. -\subparagraph{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: Personal Privacy]} +\subparagraph{[\protect\censor{Personal Privacy}]} \blackout{Grand Jury} \blackout{Grand Jury} @@ -420,10 +426,10 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions. That statement was false. On December~29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint. -Flynn made the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about what to communicate to Kislyak. +Flynn made the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about what to communicate to~Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. -On December~31, 2016, Flynn in fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. +On December~31, 2016, Flynn in fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the call to relay the substance of his conversation with~Kislyak. \textit{See Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3. Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations Security Council on December~21, 2016. @@ -441,7 +447,7 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} \textit{Id.}~\P~5. Based on the totality of that conduct, the Office decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18~U.S.C. \S~1001(a). On December~1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing. -\textit{See id}.; Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael T. Flynn}, No.~1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.~1, 2017), Doc.~3. +\textit{See id.}; Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael T. Flynn}, No.~1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.~1, 2017), Doc.~3. Flynn is awaiting sentencing. \subparagraph{Michael Cohen} @@ -463,7 +469,7 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's two-page statement was false and misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of Trump traveling there---both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey Lewandowski. -Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov---in particular, that he received an email reply and had a follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016. +Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov---in particular, that he received an email reply and had a follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January~2016. \textit{Cohen} Information \P~7. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and admitted that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the links between the project and Trump (who by this time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process, in the hopes of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations. \textit{Id.} @@ -475,7 +481,8 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} On December~7, 2018, this Office submitted a letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into account in sentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern District prosecution. On December~12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of imprisonment on the false-statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence imposed on the other counts. -\subparagraph{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: HOM]} +\subparagraph{[\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} + \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -485,7 +492,7 @@ \subsubsection{False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} \subparagraph{Jeff Sessions} -As set forth in Volume~I, Section IV.A.6, \textit{supra}, the investigation established that, while a U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July 2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016. +As set forth in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.6}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.6}, \textit{supra}, the investigation established that, while a U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July 2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016. The investigation also established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, and that it is possible that they met briefly at that reception. The Office considered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney General. In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had ``been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have -- did not have communications with the Russians.'' diff --git a/src/volume-1/executive-summary.tex b/src/volume-1/executive-summary.tex index 1429d58..e89ec24 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/executive-summary.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/executive-summary.tex @@ -11,12 +11,12 @@ \subsection*{Russian Social Media Campaign} In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering mission with instructions \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} -The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed "information warfare." +The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed ``information warfare.'' The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and~2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA\null. -Section~II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media campaign. +\hyperlink{section.1.2}{Section~II} of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media campaign. \subsection*{Russian Hacking Operations} @@ -26,14 +26,14 @@ \subsection*{Russian Hacking Operations} In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. -Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer~2.0." +Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June~2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas ``DCLeaks'' and ``Guccifer~2.0.'' The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks. -The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their potential to damage candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet} forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton. +The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (``Trump Campaign'' or ``Campaign'') showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their potential to damage candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet} forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton. WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server used by Clinton when she was Secretary of State (he later said that he was speaking sarcastically). \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta's stolen emails on October~7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump. -Section~III of this Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. +\hyperlink{section.1.3}{Section~III} of this Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved U.S.--Russian relations. -Section~IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order. +\hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order. \textbf{2015}. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. @@ -51,15 +51,15 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} \textbf{Spring 2016}. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016. -Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. +Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had ``dirt'' on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. One week later, in the first week of May~2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place. \textbf{Summer 2016}. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. -On June~9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump~Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary." -The materials were offered to Trump~Jr.\ as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump." +On June~9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump~Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing the meeting had described as ``official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary.'' +The materials were offered to Trump~Jr.\ as ``part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump.'' The written communications setting up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer's presentation did not provide such information. Days after the June~9 meeting, on June~14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. @@ -72,12 +72,12 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the DNC\null. On July~22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. -Within days, there was public reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC\null. +Within days, there was public reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had ``high confidence'' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC\null. And within a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May~2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July~31, 2016, based on the foreign government reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Separately, on August~2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. -Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). +Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a ``backdoor'' way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting. @@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} On October~7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in the presidential election. -That same day, October~7, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement "that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations." -Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, "are intended to interfere with the US election process." +That same day, October~7, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement ``that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations.'' +Those ``thefts'' and the ``disclosures'' of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, ``are intended to interfere with the US election process.'' \textbf{Post-2016 Election}. Immediately after the November~8 election, Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new administration. @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} On December~29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. -Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)." +Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, ``Great move on delay (by V.~Putin).'' The next day, on December~31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result of Flynn's request. \hr @@ -112,39 +112,38 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign} On January~6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment---drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security Agency---that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton's. A declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day. -Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees---the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)---announced that they would conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the election. +Between mid-January~2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees---the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)---announced that they would conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the election. Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI's investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March~20, 2017, in open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated: \begin{quote} -I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts. -\dots\ +I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts\dots. As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed. \end{quote} -The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May~9, 2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director---an action which is analyzed in Volume~II of the report. +The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May~9, 2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director---an action which is analyzed in \hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II} of the report. On May~17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within the scope of 28~C.F.R. \S~600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the investigation. President Trump reacted negatively to the Special Counsel's appointment. He told advisors that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it, including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. -Those and related actions are described and analyzed in Volume~II of the report. +Those and related actions are described and analyzed in \hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II} of the report. \hr \subsection*{The Special Counsel's Charging Decisions} -In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume~I of the report, the Office determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. -See Justice Manual \S~9-27.000 et seq.\ (2018). +In reaching the charging decisions described in \hyperref[chap:volume-1]{Volume~I} of the report, the Office determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. +\textit{See} Justice Manual \S~9-27.000 \textit{et seq.}~(2018). The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if so, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. -See Justice Manual \S~9-27.220. +\textit{See} Justice Manual \S~9-27.220. -Section~V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions, which contain three main components. +\hyperlink{section.1.5}{Section~V} of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions, which contain three main components. First, the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election---the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations---violated U.S. criminal law. -Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See \textit{United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et al.}, No.~18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). +Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. \textit{See United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et~al.}, No.~18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws, the federal computer-intrusion statute, and they have been so charged. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Netyksho, et al.}, No.~18-cr-215 (D.D.C.). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Netyksho, et~al.}, No.~18-cr-215 (D.D.C.). \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} \blackout{Personal Privacy: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} @@ -158,7 +157,7 @@ \subsection*{The Special Counsel's Charging Decisions} Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian election interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false-statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. -George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. +George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about, \textit{inter alia}, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Moscow project. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} And in February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine. @@ -173,7 +172,7 @@ \subsection*{The Special Counsel's Charging Decisions} The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office's judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other witnesses and information---such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be members of the media---in light of internal Department of Justice policies. -See, e.g., Justice Manual \S\S~9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or "taint") team. +\textit{See, e.g.}, Justice Manual \S\S~9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or ``taint'') team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well---numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United States. diff --git a/src/volume-1/hacking-dumping.tex b/src/volume-1/hacking-dumping.tex index c049de9..3fd2245 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/hacking-dumping.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/hacking-dumping.tex @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ \section{Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations} +\markboth{Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations}{Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations} Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, employees, and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign chairman John Podesta. Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks.% 109 -\footnote{As discussed in Section~V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of +\footnote{As discussed in \hyperlink{section.1.5}{Section~V} below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1030 and~371. -See Volume~I, Section V.B, \textit{infra}; +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.2}{Volume~I, Section V.B}, \textit{infra}; Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Netyksho}, No.~1:18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July~13, 2018), Doc.~1 (``\textit{Netyksho} Indictment'').} -The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents through online personas, "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer~2.0," and later through the organization WikiLeaks. +The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents through online personas, ``DCLeaks'' and ``Guccifer~2.0,'' and later through the organization WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign. The Trump Campaign showed interest in the WikiLeaks releases and, in the summer and fall of 2016, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.} @@ -21,19 +22,18 @@ \subsection{GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign} \subsubsection{GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign} Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and~74455.% 110 -\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment 1.} +\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~1.} Military Unit 26165 is a GRU cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States.% 111 \footnote{Separate from this Office's indictment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport associations. \textit{United States~v.\ Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets}, No.~18-263 (W.D. Pa.).} The unit was sub-divided into departments with different specialties. -One department, for example, developed specialized malicious software "malware", while another department conducted large-scale spearphishing campaigns.% 112 +One department, for example, developed specialized malicious software ``malware'', while another department conducted large-scale spearphishing campaigns.% 112 \footnote{A spearphishing email is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. \textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~10.} \blackout{Investigative Technique} a bitcoin mining operation to secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations.% 113 \footnote{Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems. -\blackout{Investigative Technique} kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX.io. -To make purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source -of funds. +\blackout{Investigative Technique} kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform \UseVerb{CEX}. +To make purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source of funds. \textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~62.} Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber operations. @@ -41,16 +41,16 @@ \subsubsection{GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign} Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology related to the administration of U.S. elections.% 114 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~69.} -Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the DCCC and DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign:% 115 +Beginning in mid-March~2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the DCCC and DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign:% 115 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~9.} \begin{itemize} - \item Unit 26165 used \blackout{Investigative Technique} to learn about \blackout{Investigative Technique} different Democratic websites, including democrats.org, hillaryclinton.com, dnc.org, and dccc.org. + \item Unit 26165 used \blackout{Investigative Technique} to learn about \blackout{Investigative Technique} different Democratic websites, including \UseVerb{democratsorg}, \UseVerb{hillaryclintoncom}, \UseVerb{dncorg}, and \UseVerb{dcccorg}. \blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access to these networks, indicating that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of opportunity but rather the result of targeting.% 116 \footnote{\textit{See} SM-2589105, serials 144 \& 495.} \item GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. - Between March~10, 2016 and March~15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email accounts at hillaryclinton.com. - Starting on March~15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of dnc.org email accounts.% 117 + Between March~10, 2016 and March~15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email accounts at \UseVerb{hillaryclintoncom}. + Starting on March~15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of \UseVerb{dncorg} email accounts.% 117 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} \end{itemize} @@ -73,14 +73,14 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks} between the DCCC and DNC networks.% 121 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique} SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5.} Between April~18, 2016 and June~8, 2016, Unit 26165 compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mail server and shared file server.% 122 -\footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique} M-2589105-HACK, serial 5.} +\footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique} [S]M-2589105-HACK, serial 5.} \paragraph{Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks} Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized malware,% 123 \footnote{``Malware'' is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to allow a third party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer's user or operator.} -known as "X-Agent" and "X-Tunnel"; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and rar.exe, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. -X-Agent was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather other data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operating systems).% 124 +known as ``X-Agent'' and ``X-Tunnel''; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and \UseVerb{rarexe}, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. +X-Agent was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather other data about the infected computers (\textit{e.g.}, file directories, operating systems).% 124 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} X-Tunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable of large-scale data transfers.% 125 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} @@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks} To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted malware.% 126 \footnote{In connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks, dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers located all over the world. -The investigation identified rental agreements and payments for computers located in, \textit{inter}, \blackout{Investigative Technique} all of which were used in the operations targeting the U.S. election.} -The first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as "middle servers," sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. -The middle servers, in turn, relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled computers, labeled internally by the GRU as an "AMS Panel." +The investigation identified rental agreements and payments for computers located in, \textit{inter alia}, \blackout{Investigative Technique} all of which were used in the operations targeting the U.S. election.} +The first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as ``middle servers,'' sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. +The middle servers, in turn, relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled computers, labeled internally by the GRU as an ``AMS Panel.'' The AMS Panel \blackout{Investigative Technique} served as a nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware's operations on the DNC/DCCC networks.% 127 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~25.} @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks} The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were captured as GRU officers monitored DCCC and DNC employees' work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June 2016. -Data captured in these key logging sessions included passwords, internal communications between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information. +Data captured in these keylogging sessions included passwords, internal communications between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information. \paragraph{Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks} @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks} \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~27--29; \blackout{Investigative Technique}} The GRU began stealing DCCC data shortly after it gained access to the network. -On April~14, 2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU officers downloaded rar.exe onto the DCCC's document server. -The following day, the GRU searched one compromised DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included "Hillary," "DNC," "Cruz," and "Trump."% 131 +On April~14, 2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU officers downloaded \UseVerb{rarexe} onto the DCCC's document server. +The following day, the GRU searched one compromised DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included ``Hillary,'' ``DNC,'' ``Cruz,'' and ``Trump.''% 131 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} On April~25, 2016, the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents from folders on the DCCC's shared file server that pertained to the 2016 election.% 132 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} @@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks} \textit{See} SM-2589105-GJ, serial 649. As part of its investigation, the FBI later received images of DNC servers and copies of relevant traffic logs. \textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P\P~28--29.} During these connections, Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later released by WikiLeaks in July~2016.% 136 -\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment J 29. +\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May~25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server. -\textit{Netyksho} Indictment J 45.} +\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~45.} \subsection{Dissemination of the Hacked Materials} @@ -143,23 +143,23 @@ \subsection{Dissemination of the Hacked Materials} \subsubsection{DCLeaks} -The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April~19, 2016, when Unit 26165 registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant.% 137 +The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April~19, 2016, when Unit 26165 registered the domain \UseVerb{dcleaks} through a service that anonymized the registrant.% 137 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~35. -Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com, the same actors attempted to register the website electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service. +Approximately a week before the registration of \UseVerb{dcleaks}, the same actors attempted to register the website \UseVerb{electionleaks} using the same domain registration service. \blackout{Investigative Technique}} Unit 26165 paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined.% 138 \footnote{\textit{See} SM-2589105, serial 181; \textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~21(a).} -The dcleaks.com landing page pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. -Other dcleaks.com pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the sender, recipient, and date of the email). +The \UseVerb{dcleaks} landing page pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. +Other \UseVerb{dcleaks} pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releases, pages were sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public. -Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.com, including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. +Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website \UseVerb{dcleaks}, including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks victims included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign employee, and four other campaign volunteers.% 139 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} -The GRU released through dcleaks.com thousands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and information.% 140 -\footnote{See, e.g., Internet Archive, ``https://dcleaks.com/'' (archive date Nov.~10, 2016). +The GRU released through \UseVerb{dcleaks} thousands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and information.% 140 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Internet Archive, ``\url{https://dcleaks.com/}'' (archive date Nov.~10, 2016). Additionally, DCLeaks released documents relating to \blackout{Personal Privacy}, emails belonging to \blackout{Personal Privacy}, and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name ``The United States Republican Party''). ``The United States Republican Party'' portfolio contained approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs, campaigns, state parties, and businesses dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same Tennessee-based web-hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. @@ -168,27 +168,27 @@ \subsubsection{DCLeaks} GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily used to promote releases of materials.% 141 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~38.} The Facebook page was administered through a small number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.% 142 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan).} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan).} -GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account \@dcleaks\_, and the email account dcleaksproject\@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and other U.S. persons. -GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com website that had not yet become public. +GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account \UseVerb{atdcleaks}, and the email account \UseVerb{dcleaksproject} to communicate privately with reporters and other U.S. persons. +GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the \UseVerb{dcleaks} website that had not yet become public. For example, on July~14, 2016, GRU officers operating under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S. reporter via the Facebook account.% 143 -\footnote{7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID [Personal Privacy]} -Similarly, on September~14, 2016, GRU officers sent reporters Twitter direct messages from \@dcleaks\_, with a password to another non-public part of the dcleaks.com website.% 144 -\footnote{See, e.g., 9/14/16 Twitter DM, \@dcleaks\_ to \blackout{Personal Privacy}; -9/14/16 Twitter DM, \@dcleaks\_ to \blackout{Personal Privacy}. -The messages read: "Hi https://t.co/QTVKUjQcOx pass: KvFsg\%*14\@gPgu\& enjoy ;)."} +\footnote{7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID\blackout{Personal Privacyr}} +Similarly, on September~14, 2016, GRU officers sent reporters Twitter direct messages from \UseVerb{atdcleaks}, with a password to another non-public part of the \UseVerb{dcleaks} website.% 144 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 9/14/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atdcleaks} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}; +9/14/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atdcleaks} to \blackout{Personal Privacy}. +The messages read: ``Hi \UseVerb{tco} pass: \UseVerb{pass} enjoy \UseVerb{smiley}.''} -The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017. +The \UseVerb{DCLeaks} website remained operational and public until March~2017. \subsubsection{Guccifer 2.0} On June~14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC network and suspected theft of DNC documents. -In the statements, the cyber-response team alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as "Fancy Bear") were responsible for the breach.% 145 +In the statements, the cyber-response team alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as ``Fancy Bear'') were responsible for the breach.% 145 \footnote{Dmitri Alperovitch, \textit{Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee}, CrowdStrike Blog (June~14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June~15, 2016 post by Guccifer~2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.} Apparently in response to that announcement, on June~15, 2016, GRU officers using the persona Guccifer~2.0 created a WordPress blog. -In the hours leading up to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English, including "some hundred sheets," "illuminati," and "worldwide known." +In the hours leading up to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English, including ``some hundred sheets,'' ``illuminati,'' and ``worldwide known.'' Approximately two hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer~2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases that the GRU officers had searched for that day.% 146 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P\P~41--42.} @@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ \subsubsection{Guccifer 2.0} October~4, 2016; and October~18, 2016.} Released documents included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and fundraising documents. -Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states (e.g., Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. +Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states (\textit{e.g.}, Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer~2.0 persona to release documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. -Specifically, on June~27, 2016, Guccifer~2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide "exclusive access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff."% 148 -\footnote{6/27/16 Email, guccifer20\@aol.fr to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (subject ``leaked emails''); \blackout{Investigative Technique}} -The GRU later sent the reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.% 149 -\footnote{6/27/16 Email, guccifer20\@aol.fr to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (subject ``leaked emails''); \blackout{Investigative Technique}; -\textit{see also} 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20\@aol.fr to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (subject ``leaked emails''); \blackout{Investigative Technique} (claiming DCLeaks was a ``Wikileaks sub project'').} +Specifically, on June~27, 2016, Guccifer~2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide ``exclusive access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff.''% 148 +\footnote{6/27/16 Email, \UseVerb{guccifer20} to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (subject ``leaked emails''); \blackout{Investigative Technique}} +The GRU later sent the reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the \UseVerb{dcleaks} website that contained an archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.% 149 +\footnote{6/27/16 Email, \UseVerb{guccifer20} to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (subject ``leaked emails''); \blackout{Investigative Technique}; +\textit{see also} 6/27/16 Email, \UseVerb{guccifer20} to \blackout{Personal Privacy} (subject ``leaked emails''); \blackout{Investigative Technique} (claiming DCLeaks was a ``Wikileaks sub project'').} That the Guccifer~2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of people.% 150 \footnote{Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer~2.0 were operated by the same organization, the Guccifer~2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a ``Wikileaks sub project'' and that Guccifer~2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with ``closed access'' to give reporters a preview of them. } @@ -231,10 +231,10 @@ \subsubsection{Guccifer 2.0} The GRU was also in contact through the Guccifer~2.0 persona with \blackout{HOM: Lorem} a former Trump Campaign member \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 154 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} In early August 2016, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} Twitter's suspension of the Guccifer~2.0 Twitter account. -After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer~2.0 wrote \blackout{HOM} a private message, "thank u for writing back \dots\ do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?" -On August~17, 2016, the GRU added, "please tell me if i can help u anyhow \dots\ it would be a great pleasure to me." -On September~9, 2016, the GRU---again posing as Guccifer~2.0---referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked \blackout{HOM} "what do u think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign." -\blackout{HOM} responded, "pretty standard."% 155 +After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer~2.0 wrote \blackout{HOM} a private message, ``thank u for writing back \dots\ do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?'' +On August~17, 2016, the GRU added, ``please tell me if i can help u anyhow \dots\ it would be a great pleasure to me.'' +On September~9, 2016, the GRU---again posing as Guccifer~2.0---referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked \blackout{HOM} ``what do u think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign.'' +\blackout{HOM} responded, ``pretty standard.''% 155 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} The investigation did not identify evidence of other communications between \blackout{HOM} and Guccifer~2.0. @@ -246,46 +246,46 @@ \subsubsection{Use of WikiLeaks} \paragraph{WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign} WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents. -In November 2015, Assange wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better for GOP to win\dots. +In November 2015, Assange wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that ``[w]e believe it would be much better for GOP to win\dots. Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst qualities\dots. With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities., dems+media+neoliberals will be mute\dots. -She's a bright, well connected, sadisitic sociopath."% 156 -\footnote{11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, \@WikiLeaks et al. +She's a bright, well connected, sadisitic [sic] sociopath.''% 156 +\footnote{11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} et~al. Assange also wrote that, ``GOP will generate a lot oposition [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do the same thing, but co-opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence hillary has greater freedom to start wars than the GOP and has the will to do so.'' \textit{Id.}} In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation.% 157 -\footnote{WikiLeaks, ``Hillary Clinton Email Archive,'' \textit{available at} https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/.} +\footnote{WikiLeaks, ``Hillary Clinton Email Archive,'' \textit{available at} \url{https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/}.} While designing the archive, one WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate: \begin{quote} -[W]e want this repository to become "the place" to search for background on hillary's plotting at the state department during 2009--2013\dots. +[W]e want this repository to become ``the place'' to search for background on hillary's plotting at the state department during 2009--2013\dots. Firstly because its useful and will annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks.% 158 -\footnote{3/14/16 Twitter DM, \@WikiLeaks to \blackout{Personal Privacy} -Less than two weeks earlier, the same account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton ``in whitehouse with her bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees.'' 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, \@WikiLeaks et al.} +\footnote{3/14/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} to \blackout{Personal Privacy} +Less than two weeks earlier, the same account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton ``in whitehouse with her bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees.'' 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} et~al.} \end{quote} \paragraph{WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks} -Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in June 2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible coordination in the future release of stolen emails. -On June~14, 2016, \@dcleaks\_ sent a direct message to \@WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's emails. +Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through \UseVerb{dcleaks} in June 2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible coordination in the future release of stolen emails. +On June~14, 2016, \UseVerb{atdcleaks} sent a direct message to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}, noting, ``You announced your organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in particular, her financial documents. Let's do it together. What do you think about publishing our info at the same moment? -Thank you."% 159 -\footnote{6/14/16 Twitter DM, \@dcleaks\_ to \@WikiLeaks.} +Thank you.''% 159 +\footnote{6/14/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atdcleaks} to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} \blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.} Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona Guccifer~2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC\null. -On June~22, 2016, seven days after Guccifer~2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer~2.0 Twitter account and suggest that Guccifer~2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing."% 160 -\footnote{Netyksho Indictment \P~47(a).} +On June~22, 2016, seven days after Guccifer~2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer~2.0 Twitter account and suggest that Guccifer~2.0 ``[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing.''% 160 +\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~47(a).} -On July~6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer~2.0 through Twitter's private messaging function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] days prefable [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind her after." -The Guccifer~2.0 persona responded, "ok \dots\ i see." -WikiLeaks also explained, "we think trump has only a 25\% chance of winning against hillary \dots\ so conflict between bernie and hillary is interesting."% 161 -\footnote{7/6/16 Twitter DMs, \@WikiLeaks \& \@guccifer\_2.} +On July~6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer~2.0 through Twitter's private messaging function, writing, ``if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] days prefable [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind her after.'' +The Guccifer~2.0 persona responded, ``ok \dots\ i see.'' +WikiLeaks also explained, ``we think trump has only a 25\% chance of winning against hillary \dots\ so conflict between bernie and hillary is interesting.''% 161 +\footnote{7/6/16 Twitter DMs, \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} \& \UseVerb{guccifer2}.} \paragraph{The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks} @@ -297,60 +297,60 @@ \subsubsection{Use of WikiLeaks} \blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation}% 162 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} -On July~14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer~2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an email bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new attempt."% 163 +On July~14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer~2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an email bearing the subject ``big archive'' and the message ``a new attempt.''% 163 \footnote{This was not the GRU's first attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June~29, 2016, the GRU used a Guccifer~2.0 email account to send a large encrypted file to a WikiLeaks email account. -6/29/16 Email, guccifer20\@mail.com +6/29/16 Email, \UseVerb{guccifer20mailcom} \blackout{Investigative Technique} (The email appears to have been undelivered.)} -The email contained an encrypted attachment with the name "wk dnc link1.txt.gpg."% 164 +The email contained an encrypted attachment with the name ``\UseVerb{wkdnclink1}.''% 164 \footnote{\textit{See} SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis).} Using the Guccifer~2.0 Twitter account, GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it.% 165 -\footnote{6/27/16 Twitter DM, \@Guccifer\_2 to \@WikiLeaks.} -On July~18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Guccifer~2.0 account that it had "the 1 Gb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents "this week."% 166 -\footnote{7/18/16 Twitter DM, \@Guccifer\_2 \& \@WikiLeaks.} +\footnote{6/27/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{Guccifer2} to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} +On July~18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Guccifer~2.0 account that it had ``the 1 Gb or so archive'' and would make a release of the stolen documents ``this week.''% 166 +\footnote{7/18/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{Guccifer2} \& \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} On July~22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC computer networks.% 167 -\footnote{``DNC Email Archive,'' WikiLeaks (Jul.~22, 2016), \textit{available at} https://wikileaks.org/dnc-emails.} +\footnote{``DNC Email Archive,'' WikiLeaks (Jul.~22, 2016), \textit{available at} \url{https://wikileaks.org/dnc-emails}.} The Democratic National Convention began three days later. Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona DCLeaks. -On September~15, 2016, \@dcleaks wrote to \@WikiLeaks, "hi there! +On September~15, 2016, \UseVerb{atdcleaks} wrote to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}, ``hi there! I'm from DC Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via your secured chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. -You won't be disappointed, I promise."% 168 -\footnote{9/15/16 Twitter DM, \@dcleaks\_ to \@WikiLeaks.} -The WikiLeaks account responded, "Hi there," without further elaboration. -The \@dcleaks\_ account did not respond immediately. +You won't be disappointed, I promise.''% 168 +\footnote{9/15/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atdcleaks} to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} +The WikiLeaks account responded, ``Hi there,'' without further elaboration. +The \UseVerb{atdcleaks} account did not respond immediately. -The same day, the Twitter account \@guccifer\_2 sent \@dcleaks\_ a direct message, which is the first known contact between the personas.% 169 -\footnote{9/15/16 Twitter DM, \@guccifer\_2 to \@dcleaks\_.} +The same day, the Twitter account \UseVerb{guccifer2} sent \UseVerb{atdcleaks} a direct message, which is the first known contact between the personas.% 169 +\footnote{9/15/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{guccifer2} to \UseVerb{atdcleaks}.} During subsequent communications, the Guccifer~2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails.% 170 -\footnote{See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; -9/15/16 Twitter DM, \@Guccifer\_2 \& \@WikiLeaks.} +\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; +9/15/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{Guccifer2} \& \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen Podesta emails show a creation date of September~19, 2016.% 171 -\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2284941, serials 63 \% 64 \blackout{Investigative Technique}} +\footnote{\textit{See} SM-2284941, serials 63 \& 64 \blackout{Investigative Technique}} Based on information about Assange's computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for the DNC emails).% 172 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}. At the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a downloaded file's creation date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still September~19, 2016. -See SM-2284941, serial 62 \blackout{Investigative Technique}} +\textit{See} SM-2284941, serial 62 \blackout{Investigative Technique}} The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of October~2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by WikiLeaks on its site.% 173 \footnote{When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer system appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new creation date. -See SM-2284941, serials 63 \& 64.} +\textit{See} SM-2284941, serials 63 \& 64.} Beginning on September~20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in a brief exchange. -On September~22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject\@gmail.com sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject "Submission" and the message "Hi from DCLeaks." -The email contained a PGP-encrypted message with the filename "wiki\_mail.txt.gpg."% 174 -\footnote{\textit{See} 9/22/16 Email, dcleaksproject\@gmail.com \blackout{Investigative Technique}} +On September~22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account \UseVerb{dcleaksproject} sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject ``Submission'' and the message ``Hi from DCLeaks.'' +The email contained a PGP-encrypted message with the filename ``\UseVerb{wikimail}.''% 174 +\footnote{\textit{See} 9/22/16 Email, \UseVerb{dcleaksproject} \blackout{Investigative Technique}} \blackout{Investigative Technique} The email, however, bears a number of similarities to the July~14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer~2.0 persona to give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. -On September~22, 2016 (the same day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account \@dcleaks sent a single message to \@WikiLeaks with the string of characters \blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} +On September~22, 2016 (the same day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account \UseVerb{atdcleaks} sent a single message to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} with the string of characters \blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified Andrew M{\"u}ller-Maguhn as a WikiLeaks associate who may have assisted with the transfer of these stolen documents to WikiLeaks.% 175 -\footnote{Bilen Nakashimaet al., 4 \textit{German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks}, Washington Post (Jan.~17, 2018).} +\footnote{Ellen Nakashima et~al., \textit{A German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks}, Washington Post (Jan.~17, 2018).} \blackout{Investigative Technique: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 176 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} @@ -372,29 +372,29 @@ \subsubsection{Use of WikiLeaks} Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails. -On August~9, 2016, the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a US\$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich."% 180 -\footnote{\@WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet.} -Likewise, on August~25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in Seth Rich's killer?" and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to alleged Wikileaks sources." -The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting, "I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered." -Assange replied, "If there's someone who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. -But it is a very serious matter \dots\ that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us."% 181 +On August~9, 2016, the \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} Twitter account posted: ``ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a US\$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich.''% 180 +\footnote{\UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} 8/9/16 Tweet.} +Likewise, on August~25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, ``Why are you so interested in Seth Rich's killer?'' and responded, ``We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to alleged Wikileaks sources.'' +The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting, ``I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered.'' +Assange replied, ``If there's someone who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. +But it is a very serious matter \dots\ that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us.''% 181 \footnote{\textit{See Assange: ``Murdered DNC Staffer Was `Potential' WikiLeaks Source,''} Fox News (Aug.~25, 2016) (containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly).} After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. -According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside job," and purported to have "physical proof' that Russians did not give materials to Assange.% 182 -\footnote{MI. Raju \& Z. Cohen, \textit{4 GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange}, CNN (May~23, 2018).} +According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an ``inside job,'' and purported to have ``physical proof\thinspace'' that Russians did not give materials to Assange.% 182 +\footnote{M.~Raju \& Z.~Cohen, \textit{A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange}, CNN (May~23, 2018).} -\subsubsection{Additional GRU Cyber Operations} +\subsection{Additional GRU Cyber Operations} While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer~2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states. -\paragraph{Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims} +\subsubsection{Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims} -On July~27 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's personal office \blackout{Personal Privacy}. -Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. -I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."% 183 -\footnote{``Donald Trump on Russian \& Missing Hillary Clinton Emails,'' YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted 7/27/16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU (starting at~0:41).} -The "30,000 emails" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State. +On July~27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's personal office \blackout{Personal Privacy}. +Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that included the following: ``Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. +I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.''% 183 +\footnote{``Donald Trump on Russian \& Missing Hillary Clinton Emails,'' YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted 7/27/16, \textit{available at} \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU} (starting at~0:41).} +The ``30,000 emails'' were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State. Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain \blackout{Personal Privacy} including an email account belonging to Clinton aide \blackout{Personal Privacy.} @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections} In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.% 186 -\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~69} +\footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~69.} The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.% 187 \footnote{\textit{Netyksho} Indictment \P~69; \blackout{Investigative Technique}} The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ \subsubsection{Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections} The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity. By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. -GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).% 188 +GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as ``SQL injection,'' by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).% 188 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,% 189 @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ \subsection{Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials} The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of hacked materials throughout the summer and fall of 2016. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.} -\subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$ Harm to Ongoing Matter]} +\subsubsection{[\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} \paragraph{Background} @@ -461,21 +461,21 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 193 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.} -On June~12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"% 194 +On June~12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to ``have emails relating to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,''% 194 \footnote{\textit{See} Mahita Gajanan, \textit{Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic Convention}, Time (July~27, 2016) (quoting the June~12, 2016 television interview).} but provided no additional context. In debriefings with the Office, former campaign chairman Rick Gates said that, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 195 \footnote{In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (\textit{i.e.}, tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. -Superseding Criminal Information, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~195 (``Gates Superseding Criminal Information''); -Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23,2018), Doc.~205 (``\textit{Gates} Plea Agreement''). +Superseding Criminal Information, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~195 (``\textit{Gates} Superseding Criminal Information''); +Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~205 (``\textit{Gates} Plea Agreement''). Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.} Gates recalled candidate Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found.% 196 \footnote{Gates 10/25/18 302, at~1--2.} Paul Manafort, who would later become campaign chairman, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 197 -\footnote{\label{fnOneNineSeven}As explained further in Volume~I, Section IV.A.8, \textit{infra}, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. +\footnote{\label{fnOneNineSeven}As explained further in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.8}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8}, \textit{infra}, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value; @@ -521,14 +521,14 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 210 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} -\paragraph{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: Harm to Ongoing Matter]} +\paragraph{[\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 211 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} Corsi is an author who holds a doctorate in political science.% 212 -\footnote{Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. +\footnote{Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book \textit{Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry}. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United States. -Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with Trump on the phone Intelsat six occasions. +Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with Trump on the phone on at least six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at~3.} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.}% 213 \footnote{Corsi 10/31/18 302, at~2; @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl \blackout{Grand Jury: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco labor is nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.} According to Malloch, Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi wished to interview. -Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the "orbit" of U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them. +Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the ``orbit'' of U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them. Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect Corsi with Assange.% 218 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange or WikiLeaks, stating that he did not pursue the request to contact Assange because he believed he had no @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} Malloch stated to investigators that beginning in or about August 2016, he and Corsi had multiple FaceTime discussions about WikiLeaks \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum} had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. -In one conversation in or around August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was coming, after which "we" were going to be in the driver's seat.% 221 +In one conversation in or around August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was coming, after which ``we'' were going to be in the driver's seat.% 221 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 222 @@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl \paragraph{WikiLeaks's October~7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails} -On October~7, 2016, four days after the Assange press conference \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit}, the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely affect the Campaign.% 239 +On October~7, 2016, four days after the Assange press conference \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit}, the Washington Post published an \textit{Access Hollywood} video that captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely affect the Campaign.% 239 \footnote{Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women.} Less than an hour after the video's publication, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta. @@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl (Separate travel records show that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi at one point stated that after WikiLeaks's release of stolen emails on October~7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at~6.} -Corsi claimed that the pressure was enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.% 245 +Corsi claimed that the pressure was enormous and recalled telling the conference call the \textit{Access Hollywood} tape was coming.% 245 \footnote{During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets.} Corsi stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they did.% 246 @@ -637,29 +637,29 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 250 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} \blackout{Grand Jury} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} -However, the phone records themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the Access Hollywood story, and the Office has not otherwise been able to identify the substance of the conversation. +However, the phone records themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the \textit{Access Hollywood} story, and the Office has not otherwise been able to identify the substance of the conversation. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.}% 251 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} \blackout{Grand Jury} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} \blackout{Grand Jury} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}} However, the Office has not identified any conference call participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October~7, 2016 after a conversation with Corsi. -\paragraph{Donald Trump~Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks} +\paragraph{Donald Trump~Jr.\ Interaction with WikiLeaks} Donald Trump~Jr.\ had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the campaign period. -On September~20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and dangerous" ties to Russia, PutinTrump.org.% 252 -\footnote{9/20/16 Twitter DM, \@JasonFishbein to \@WikiLeaks; -see JFO0587 (9/21/16 Messages, \blackout{Personal Privacy}\@jabber.cryptoparty.is \& \blackout{Personal Privacy}\@jabber.cryptoparty.is; +On September~20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's ``unprecedented and dangerous'' ties to Russia, \UseVerb{PutinTrumporg}.% 252 +\footnote{9/20/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atJasonFishbein} to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}; +see JFO0587 (9/21/16 Messages, \blackout{Personal Privacy}\UseVerb{atjabber} \& \blackout{Personal Privacy}\UseVerb{atjabber}; Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at~4. When interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the participants discussed U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password that Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks.} -WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: '"Let's bomb Iraq' -Progress for America PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump' putintrump.org." -Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump~Jr., "A PAC run anti-Trump site putintrump.org is about to launch. +WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: ``\thinspace`Let's bomb Iraq' +Progress for America PAC to launch `\UseVerb{PutinTrumporg}' at 9:30am. Oops pw is `putintrump' \UseVerb{putintrumporg}.'' +Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump~Jr., ``A PAC run anti-Trump site \UseVerb{putintrumporg} is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC\null. We have guessed the password. -It is 'putintrump.' -See 'About' for who is behind it. -Any comments ?"% 253 -\footnote{9/20/16 Twitter DM, \@WikiLeaks to \@DonaldJTrumpJr.} +It is `putintrump.' +See `About' for who is behind it. +Any comments?''% 253 +\footnote{9/20/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} to \UseVerb{DJTJ}.} Several hours later, Trump~Jr.\ emailed a variety of senior campaign staff: @@ -670,26 +670,26 @@ \subsubsection{[$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow them and it is a DM\null. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.% 254 -\footnote{TRUMPORG\_28\_000629--33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Conway et al.\ (subject ``Wikileaks'')).} +\footnote{TRUMPORG\_28\_000629--33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Conway et~al.\ (subject ``Wikileaks'')).} \end{quote} -Trump~Jr.\ attached a screenshot of the "About" page for the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. +Trump~Jr.\ attached a screenshot of the ``About'' page for the unlaunched site \UseVerb{PutinTrumporg}. The next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump~Jr.\ sent a direct message to WikiLeaks: -"Off the record, I don't know who that is but I'll ask around. Thanks."% 255 -\footnote{9/21/16 Twitter DM, \@DonaldJTrumpJr to \@WikiLeaks.} +``Off the record, I don't know who that is but I'll ask around. Thanks.''% 255 +\footnote{9/21/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{DJTJ} to \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} -On October~3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump~Jr., asking "you guys" to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target Julian Assange. -Trump~Jr.\ responded that he already "had done so," and asked, "what's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"% 256 -\footnote{10/3/16 Twitter DMs, \@DonaldJTrumpJr \& \@WikiLeaks.} +On October~3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump~Jr., asking ``you guys'' to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target Julian Assange. +Trump~Jr.\ responded that he already ``had done so,'' and asked, ``what's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?''% 256 +\footnote{10/3/16 Twitter DMs, \UseVerb{DJTJ} \& \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks}.} WikiLeaks did not respond. -On October~12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was "great to see you and your dad talking about our publications. -Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us wlsearch.tk."% 257 +On October~12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was ``great to see you and your dad talking about our publications. +Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us \UseVerb{wlsearchtk}.''% 257 \footnote{At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents.} -WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked emails and stated, "we just released Podesta emails Part~4."% 258 -\footnote{10/12/16 Twitter DM, \@WikiLeaks to \@DonaldJTrumpJr.} -Two days later, Trump~Jr.\ publicly tweeted the wlsearch.tk link.% 259 -\footnote{\@DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34~a.m.) Tweet.} +WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in ``digging through'' leaked emails and stated, ``we just released Podesta emails Part~4.''% 258 +\footnote{10/12/16 Twitter DM, \UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} to \UseVerb{DJTJ}.} +Two days later, Trump~Jr.\ publicly tweeted the \UseVerb{wlsearchtk} link.% 259 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJTJ} 10/14/16 (6:34~a.m.) Tweet.} \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} @@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} \paragraph{Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails} -After candidate Trump stated on July~27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would "find the 30,000 emails that are missing," Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the deleted Clinton emails.% 264 +After candidate Trump stated on July~27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would ``find the 30,000 emails that are missing,'' Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the deleted Clinton emails.% 264 \footnote{Flynn 4/25/18 302, at~5--6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at~1--3.} Michael Flynn---who would later serve as National Security Advisor in the Trump Administration---recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails.% 265 @@ -745,33 +745,33 @@ \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request, as early as December 2015.% 268 \footnote{Szobocsan 3/29/17 302, at~1.} -On December~3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails, stating, "Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you. +On December~3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails, stating, ``Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which 1.~Were classified and 2.~Were purloined by our enemies. -That would demonstrate what needs to be demonstrated."% 269 +That would demonstrate what needs to be demonstrated.''% 269 \footnote{19/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith.} -Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the "Clinton email server was, in all likelihood, breached long ago," and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services could "re-assemble the server's email content."% 270 +Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the ``Clinton email server was, in all likelihood, breached long ago,'' and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services could ``re-assemble the server's email content.''% 270 \footnote{12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith (attachment).} The proposal called for a three-phase approach. The first two phases consisted of open-source analysis. -The third phase consisted of checking with certain intelligence sources "that have access through liaison work with various foreign services" to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. -The proposal noted, "Even if a single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it would be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]" -Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and wrote, "we can discuss to whom it should be referred."% 271 +The third phase consisted of checking with certain intelligence sources ``that have access through liaison work with various foreign services'' to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. +The proposal noted, ``Even if a single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it would be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]'' +Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and wrote, ``we can discuss to whom it should be referred.''% 271 \footnote{12/3/15 Email, Smith to Szobocsan \& Safron.} -On December~16, 2015, Smith informed Ledeen that he declined to participate in her "initiative." +On December~16, 2015, Smith informed Ledeen that he declined to participate in her ``initiative.'' According to one of Smith's business associates, Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that time.% 272 \footnote{Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at~1.} Just weeks after Trump's July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails, however, Smith tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of dollars, and recruited security experts and business associates. -Smith made claims to others involved in the effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers with "ties and affiliations to Russia" who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were coordinated with the Trump Campaign.% 273 +Smith made claims to others involved in the effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers with ``ties and affiliations to Russia'' who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were coordinated with the Trump Campaign.% 273 \footnote{8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith.} -On August~28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject "Sec.~Clinton's unsecured private email server" to an undisclosed list of recipients, including Campaign co-chairman Sam Clovis. -The email stated that Smith was "[j]ust finishing two days of sensitive meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. +On August~28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject ``Sec.~Clinton's unsecured private email server'' to an undisclosed list of recipients, including Campaign co-chairman Sam Clovis. +The email stated that Smith was ``[j]ust finishing two days of sensitive meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the Clinton's home-based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and private mercenaries. -Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election."% 274 +Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election.''% 274 \footnote{8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith.} On September~2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton emails.% 275 @@ -784,22 +784,22 @@ \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for and authenticate the emails.% 278 \footnote{Tait 8/22/17 302, at~3; York 7/12/17 302, at~1--2; York 11/22/17 302, at~1.} -In early September 2016, as part of his recruitment and fundraising effort, Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was "in coordination" with the Trump Campaign, "to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization."% 279 +In early September 2016, as part of his recruitment and fundraising effort, Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was ``in coordination'' with the Trump Campaign, ``to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization.''% 279 \footnote{York 7/13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research, LLC, ``Clinton Email Reconnaissance Initiative,'' Sept.~9, 2016).} The document listed multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Flynn, Clovis, Bannon, and Kellyanne Conway.% 280 -\footnote{The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under ``Independent Groups/Organizations/Individuals,'' and described him as an ``established author and writer from the right on President Obama and Sec.~Clinton.''} +\footnote{The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under ``Independent Groups/Organi-zations/Individuals,'' and described him as an ``established author and writer from the right on President Obama and Sec.~Clinton.''} The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least Flynn and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,% 281 -\footnote{Flynn 11/29/17 302, at~7--8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.; -8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith (bee: Clovis et al.).} +\footnote{Flynn 11/29/17 302, at~7--8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et~al.; +8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith (bcc: Clovis et~al.).} but the Office did not identify evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith's efforts. In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their respective efforts. -Ledeen wrote to Smith, "wondering if you had some more detailed reports or memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we last visited\dots. -We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only.'"% 282 +Ledeen wrote to Smith, ``wondering if you had some more detailed reports or memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we last visited\dots. +We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you `your eyes only.'\thinspace''% 282 \footnote{9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to Smith.} -Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark web") that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. +Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the ``dark web'') that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that the emails were not authentic.% 283 @@ -808,9 +808,9 @@ \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on Smith's computer had creation dates of October~2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer. -(It appears the creation date was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume~I, Section III.B.3.c, \textit{supra}.% 284 +(It appears the creation date was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in \hyperlink{paragraph.1.3.2.3.3}{Volume~I, Section~III.B.3.c}, \textit{supra}.% 284 \footnote{The forensic analysis of Smith's computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple operating system that would have preserved that October~2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded (no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). -\textit{See} Volume~I, Section III.B.3.c, \textit{supra}. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{paragraph.1.3.2.3.3}{Volume~I, Section~III.B.3.c}, \textit{supra}. The Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith's computer from WikiLeaks's site using the same Apple operating system on Smith's computer; both files were successfully downloaded and retained the October~2, 2016 creation date. \textit{See} SM-2284941, serial 62. @@ -818,17 +818,17 @@ \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their release by WikiLeaks. Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton's deleted emails until shortly before the election. -For example, on October~28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a "tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and that WikiLeaks "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November~8."% 285 +For example, on October~28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a ``tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days,'' and that WikiLeaks ``has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November~8.''% 285 \footnote{10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith.} -An attachment to the email claimed that WikiLeaks would release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November~1st." +An attachment to the email claimed that WikiLeaks would release ``All 33k deleted Emails'' by ``November~1st.'' No emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released. Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian hackers. -For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties with "ties and affiliations to Russia."% 286 -\footnote{286} +For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties with ``ties and affiliations to Russia.''% 286 +\footnote{8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith.} The investigation did not identify evidence that any such meetings occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such connection.% 287 -\footnote{287} +\footnote{Safron 3/20/18 302, at~3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at~6.} The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained the deleted Clinton emails. \hr @@ -836,5 +836,5 @@ \subsubsection{Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials} In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC\null. The GRU then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and disseminated that data through fictitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer~2.0) and later through WikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trump Campaign displayed interest in the WikiLeaks releases, and that \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.} -As explained in Volume~I, Section V.B, \textit{infra}, the evidence was sufficient to support computer-intrusion (and other) charges against GRU officers for their role in election-related hacking. +As explained in \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.2}{Volume~I, Section V.B}, \textit{infra}, the evidence was sufficient to support computer-intrusion (and other) charges against GRU officers for their role in election-related hacking. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco labor is nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.} diff --git a/src/volume-1/introduction.tex b/src/volume-1/introduction.tex index 8600085..3f32154 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/introduction.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/introduction.tex @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume I} \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\nameref{sec:introduction-1}} \markboth{Introduction to Volume I}{Introduction to Volume I} -This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28~C.F.R. \S~600.8(c), which states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he \dots\ shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached." +This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28~C.F.R. \S~600.8(c), which states that, ``[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he \dots\ shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.'' The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. @@ -14,16 +14,16 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume I} Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July~31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities. -That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government "directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political organizations," and, "[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process." +That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government ``directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political organizations,'' and, ``[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process.'' After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were examining Russia's interference in the election. Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May~2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller,~III\null. -The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. +\hyperlink{section.3.1}{The order appointing the Special Counsel} authorized him to investigate ``the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,'' including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. -First, a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. -Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. -The investigation also identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. +First, \hyperlink{section.1.2}{a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign} that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. +Second, \hyperlink{section.1.3}{a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations} against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. +The investigation also identified \hyperlink{section.1.4}{numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign}. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. \hr @@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume I} In other instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts. -In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of "collusion." -In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collud[e]" was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. +In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of ``collusion.'' +In so doing, the Office recognized that the word ``collud[e]'' was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those reasons, the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. -In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign "coordinat[ed]"---a term that appears in the appointment order---with Russian election interference activities. -Like collusion, "coordination" does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. +In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign ``coordinat[ed]''---a term that appears in the appointment order---with Russian election interference activities. +Like collusion, ``coordination'' does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood coordination to require an agreement---tacit or express---between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's actions or interests. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. @@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume I} The report on our investigation consists of two volumes: -\textit{Volume~I} describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. -Section~I describes the scope of the investigation. -Sections~II and~III describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. -Section~IV describes links between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. -Section~V sets forth the Special Counsel's charging decisions. +\hyperref[chap:volume-1]{\textit{Volume~I}} describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. +\hyperlink{section.1.1}{Section~I} describes the scope of the investigation. +\hyperlink{section.1.2}{Sections~II} and~\hyperlink{section.1.3}{III} describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. +\hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} describes links between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. +\hyperlink{section.1.5}{Section~V} sets forth the Special Counsel's charging decisions. -\textit{Volume~II} addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel's investigation. -Volume~II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation. +\hyperref[chap:volume-2]{\textit{Volume~II}} addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel's investigation. +\hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II} separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation. diff --git a/src/volume-1/investigation.tex b/src/volume-1/investigation.tex index 744ddaf..7b5f78f 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/investigation.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/investigation.tex @@ -1,53 +1,54 @@ \section{The Special Counsel's Investigation} +\markboth{The Special Counsel's Investigation}{The Special Counsel's Investigation} -On May~17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein---then serving as Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General Jeff Sessions on March~2, 2016---appointed the Special Counsel "to investigate Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters." -Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen., Order No.~3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May~17, 2017 ("Appointment Order"). -Relying on "the authority vested" in the Acting Attorney General, "including 28~U.S.C. \S\S~509, 510, and~515," the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel "in order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election." Appointment Order (introduction). -"The Special Counsel," the Order stated, "is authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March~20, 2017," including: +On May~17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein---then serving as Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General Jeff Sessions on March~2, 2016---appointed the Special Counsel ``to investigate Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters.'' +Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen., \hyperlink{section.3.1}{Order No.~3915-2017}, \textit{Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters}, May~17, 2017 (``Appointment Order''). +Relying on ``the authority vested'' in the Acting Attorney General, ``including 28~U.S.C. \S\S~509, 510, and~515,'' the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel ``in order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.'' Appointment Order (introduction). +``The Special Counsel,'' the Order stated, ``is authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March~20, 2017,'' including: -\begin{enumerate}[i] +\begin{enumerate}[(i)] \item any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and \item any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and \item any other matters within the scope of 28~C.F.R. \S~600.4(a). \end{enumerate} -Appointment Order \P~(b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel "the authority to investigate and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." 28~C.F.R. \S~600.4(a). -The authority to investigate "any matters that arose \dots\ directly from the investigation," Appointment Order \P~(b)(ii), covers similar crimes that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special Counsel's appointment. -"If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate," the Order further provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters." \textit{Id.}~\P~(c). -Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable "Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title~28 of the Code of Federal Regulations." \textit{Id.}~\P~(d). +Appointment Order \P~(b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel ``the authority to investigate and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.'' 28~C.F.R. \S~600.4(a). +The authority to investigate ``any matters that arose \dots\ directly from the investigation,'' Appointment Order \P~(b)(ii), covers similar crimes that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special Counsel's appointment. +``If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate,'' the Order further provided, ``the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters.'' \textit{Id.}~\P~(c). +Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable ``Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title~28 of the Code of Federal Regulations.'' \textit{Id.}~\P~(d). The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. -A memorandum dated August~2, 2017, explained that the Appointment Order had been "worded categorically in order to permit its public release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals." -It then confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate allegations that three Trump campaign officials---Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George Papadopoulos---"committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election." +A memorandum dated August~2, 2017, explained that the Appointment Order had been ``worded categorically in order to permit its public release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals.'' +It then confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate allegations that three Trump campaign officials---Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George Papadopoulos---``committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.'' The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate certain other matters, including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former National Security Advisor to President Trump. On October~20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the Special Counsel's investigative authority as to several individuals and entities. -First, "as part of a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate "the pertinent activities of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates, \xblackout{Personal Privacy}, Roger Stone, and \xblackout{Personal Privacy}" "Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals," the memorandum stressed, "does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has committed a crime." -Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate "leads relate[d] to Cohen's establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities." -Third, the memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities who were possibly engaged in "jointly undertaken activity" with existing subjects of the investigation, including Paul Manafort. -Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into "allegations that [then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]" and confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate that matter. +First, ``as part of a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,'' the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate ``the pertinent activities of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates, \xblackout{Personal Privacy}, Roger Stone, and \xblackout{Personal Privacy}\thinspace\thinspace'' ``Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals,'' the memorandum stressed, ``does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has committed a crime.'' +Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate ``leads relate[d] to Cohen's establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC to, \textit{inter alia}, receive funds from Russian-backed entities.'' +Third, the memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities who were possibly engaged in ``jointly undertaken activity'' with existing subjects of the investigation, including Paul Manafort. +Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into ``allegations that [then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]'' and confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate that matter. -The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority "to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." 28~C.F.R. \S~600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia investigation, and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution). +The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority ``to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.'' 28~C.F.R. \S~600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia investigation, and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution). There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of the investigation in May~2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment regarding what to investigate and did not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals and entities. The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated with the Office's work remain ongoing. -After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components of the Department of Justice and FBI\null. -Appendix D lists those transfers. +After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components of the Department of Justice and~FBI\null. +\hyperlink{section.3.4}{Appendix~D} lists those transfers. Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. -See United States~v.\ Manafort, 312~F. Supp.~3d 60, 79--83 (D.D.C. 2018); United States~v.\ Manafort, 321~F. Supp.~3d 640, 650--655 (E.D. Va.~2018). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Manafort}, 312~F. Supp.~3d 60, 79--83 (D.D.C. 2018); \textit{United States~v.\ Manafort}, 321~F. Supp.~3d 640, 650--655 (E.D. Va.~2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General. -After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI\null. -Appendix D summarizes those referrals. +After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the~FBI\null. +\hyperlink{section.3.4}{Appendix~D} summarizes those referrals. \hr -To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys---five of whom joined the Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice components. +To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19~attorneys---five of whom joined the Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice components. These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the Department's Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget, finance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation. -Those "assigned" FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.% 1 +Those ``assigned'' FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.% 1 \footnote{FBI personnel assigned to the Special Counsel's Office were required to adhere to all applicable federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on FBI-related matters for the Office, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI legal supervision, not the Special Counsel's supervision.} diff --git a/src/volume-1/russian-links-to-trump.tex b/src/volume-1/russian-links-to-trump.tex index 3ed2243..2e61705 100644 --- a/src/volume-1/russian-links-to-trump.tex +++ b/src/volume-1/russian-links-to-trump.tex @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ \section{Russian Government Links to and Contacts with The Trump Campaign} +\markboth{Russian Government Links to and Contacts with The Trump Campaign}{Russian Government Links to and Contacts with The Trump Campaign} -The Office identified multiple contacts---"links," in the words of the Appointment Order---between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. +The Office identified multiple contacts---``links,'' in the words of the Appointment Order---between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available information, the investigation did not establish such coordination. @@ -11,19 +12,19 @@ \section{Russian Government Links to and Contacts with The Trump Campaign} \subsection{Campaign Period (September 2015--November~8, 2016)} Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015.% 288 -\footnote{For example, on August~18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview. +\footnote{For example, on August~18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper \textit{Vzglyad}, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. -One day earlier, the publication's founder (and former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites---Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016.ru. +One day earlier, the publication's founder (and former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites---\UseVerb{Trump2016ru} and \UseVerb{DonaldTrump2016ru}. No interview took place.} -Because Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period---the Trump Tower Moscow project, see Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1, \textit{infra}---led to or involved coordination of election assistance. +Because Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period---the Trump Tower Moscow project, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1}, \textit{infra}---led to or involved coordination of election assistance. Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, when Trump was moving toward---and eventually becoming---the Republican nominee for President. -As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period: outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume~I, Sections~IV.A.2 \& IV.A.3); -dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its government (Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4); -a meeting at Trump Tower between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part of Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume~I, Section~IV.A.5); -events at the Republican National Convention (Volume~I, Section~IV.A.6); -post-Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States (Volume~I, Section~IV.A.7); -and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8). +As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period: outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that Russia had ``dirt'' on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.2}{Volume~I, Sections~IV.A.2} \& \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.3}{IV.A.3}); +dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its government (\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4}); +a meeting at Trump Tower between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was ``part of Russia and its government's support for [Trump]'' (\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.5}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.5}); +events at the Republican National Convention (\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.6}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.6}); +post-Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States (\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.7}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.7}); +and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.8}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8}). \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} @@ -33,46 +34,46 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \footnote{\textit{See, e.g., Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.~151--52 (Sept.~7, 2017) (discussing licensing deals of specific projects).} Between at least 2013 and~2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. -The project, commonly referred to as a "Trump Tower Moscow" or "Trump Moscow" project, anticipated a combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. +The project, commonly referred to as a ``Trump Tower Moscow'' or ``Trump Moscow'' project, anticipated a combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization.% 290 -\footnote{As noted in Volume~I, Section~III.D.l, \textit{supra}, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow project. -See Information \P~7(a), \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.~29, 2018), Doc.~2 ("\textit{Cohen} Information").} +\footnote{As noted in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.4.1}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1}, \textit{supra}, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow project. +\textit{See} Information \P~7(a), \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.~29, 2018), Doc.~2 (``\textit{Cohen} Information'').} -\paragraph{Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013--2014)} +\paragraph{Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group~(2013--2014)} The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.% 291 -\footnote{\textit{See Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.~13 (Sept.~7, 2017) ("Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr.~Agalarov's company, Crocus Group, began preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow."). +\footnote{\textit{See Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.~13 (Sept.~7, 2017) (``Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr.~Agalarov's company, Crocus Group, began preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow.''). As has been widely reported, the Miss Universe pageant---which Trump co-owned at the time---was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended.} -Donald J. Trump~Jr.\ served as the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras Agalarov) and Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,% 292 -\footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~2, 4--6; \blackout{Grand Jury} OSC-KAV\_00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze \& E. Agalarov).} +Donald J. Trump~Jr.\ served as the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras Agalarov) and Irakli ``Ike'' Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,% 292 +\footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~2, 4--6; \blackout{Grand Jury} OSC-KAV\_00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze \& E.~Agalarov).} with the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone.% 293 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump~Jr.\ negotiated and signed preliminary terms of an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project.% 294 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -On December~23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization received a flat 3.5\% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.% 295 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze \& E. Agalarov).} +On December~23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization received a flat 3.5\%~commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.% 295 +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze \& E.~Agalarov).} The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014.% 296 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., OSC-KAV\_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump~Jr.\ \& E. Agalarov); OSC-KAV\_01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump~Jr.\ et al.).} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, OSC-KAV\_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump~Jr.\ \& E.~Agalarov); OSC-KAV\_01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump~Jr.\ et~al.).} From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group discussed development plans for the Moscow project. -Some time before January~24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been the site of the Miss Universe pageant.% 297 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, OSC-KAV\_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about specifications); OSC-KAV\_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump~Jr.\ et al.).} +Some time before January~24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called ``Crocus City,'' which had also been the site of the Miss Universe pageant.% 297 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, OSC-KAV\_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et~al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about specifications); OSC-KAV\_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump~Jr.\ et~al.).} In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.% 298 -\footnote{See OSC-KA V 00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. Agalarov to Ivanka Trump~Jr.\ \& Kaveladze); Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01~a.m} \blackout{Investigative Technique} -From March 2014 through July 2014, the groups discussed "design standards" and other architectural elements.% 299 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, OSC-KAV\_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump~Jr.\ et al.; OSC-KAV\_00799 (6/10/14 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze et al.); OSC-KAV\_00817 (6/16/14 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze et al.).} -For example, in July 2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the "demographics of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area, the development of neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building.% 300 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.).} +\footnote{\textit{See} OSC-KA V 00631 (2/5/14 Email, E.~Agalarov to Ivanka Trump~Jr.\ \& Kaveladze); Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01~a.m) \blackout{Investigative Technique}} +From March 2014 through July 2014, the groups discussed ``design standards'' and other architectural elements.% 299 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, OSC-KAV\_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump~Jr.\ et~al.[)]; OSC-KAV\_00799 (6/10/14 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze et~al.); OSC-KAV\_00817 (6/16/14 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kaveladze et~al.).} +For example, in July 2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the ``demographics of these prospective buyers'' in the Crocus City area, the development of neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building.% 300 +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et~al.).} In August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded tower being built in Crocus City.% 301 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.).} +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et~al.).} Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group.% 302 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00903 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee \& Kaveladze (noting last response was on August~26, 2014)); OSC-KAV\_00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea \& McGee (suggesting silence "proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project")); OSC-KAV\_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)).} +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_00903 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee \& Kaveladze (noting last response was on August~26, 2014)); OSC-KAV\_00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea \& McGee (suggesting silence ``proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project'')); OSC-KAV\_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et~al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)[].} Communications between the two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the last communication is dated November~24, 2014.% 303 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_01140 (11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.).} +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_01140 (11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et~al.).} The project appears not to have developed past the planning stage, and no construction occurred. \paragraph{Communications with I.C.~Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)} @@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} Sater later contacted Rozov and proposed that I.C.~Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I.C.~Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own. Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another employee of I.C.~Expert.% 309 \footnote{Rozov 1/25/18 302, at~1; -\textit{see also} 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al.\ (sending letter of intent).} +\textit{see also} 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et~al.\ (sending letter of intent).} Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I.C.~Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with I.C.~Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization. @@ -114,15 +115,15 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.% 314 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~12; \textit{see also} Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at~1.} -On September~22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding "I look forward to your reply about this spectacular project in Moscow." -Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate and wrote, "[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian Government and Mr.~Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention."% 315 +On September~22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding ``I look forward to your reply about this spectacular project in Moscow.'' +Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate and wrote, ``[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian Government and Mr.~Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention.''% 315 \footnote{9/22/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze.} -On September~24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed "[l]etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org," explaining that "[w]e need to send this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and will pledge his support."% 316 +On September~24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed ``[l]etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org,'' explaining that ``[w]e need to send this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and will pledge his support.''% 316 \footnote{9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.} -In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a "symbol of stronger economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore United States and the Russian Federation."% 317 +In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a ``symbol of stronger economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore United States and the Russian Federation.''% 317 \footnote{9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.} -On September~27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with "Global Development Group LLC," which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze.% 318 +On September~27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with ``Global Development Group LLC,'' which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze.% 318 \footnote{9/27/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.} Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the proposal and instead continued to work with I.C.~Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater.% 319 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~12.} @@ -132,10 +133,10 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \subparagraph{Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization} Between approximately October~13, 2015 and November~2, 2015, the Trump Organization (through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C.~Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI) for a Trump Moscow property. -The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov on behalf of I.C.~Expert, was "intended to facilitate further discussions" in order to "attempt to enter into a mutually acceptable agreement" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow.% 320 +The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov on behalf of I.C.~Expert, was ``intended to facilitate further discussions'' in order to ``attempt to enter into a mutually acceptable agreement'' related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow.% 320 \footnote{11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et~al.\ (attachment) (hereinafter ``LOI''); \textit{see also} 10/13/15 Email, Sater to Cohen \& Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent).} -The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, and called for"[a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums," as well as "[o]ne first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel rooms."% 321 +The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, and called for ``[a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums,'' as well as ``[o]ne first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel rooms.''% 321 \footnote{LOI, p.~2.} For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump Organization would receive between 1\% and 5\% of all condominium sales,% 322 \footnote{The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5\% of all gross sales up to \$100~million; @@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \footnote{LOI, Schedule 2.} For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 3\% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4\% thereafter, plus a separate incentive fee of 20\% of operating profit.% 324 \footnote{LOI, Schedule 1.} -Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would receive a \$4 million "up-front fee" prior to groundbreaking.% 325 +Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would receive a \$4 million ``up-front fee'' prior to groundbreaking.% 325 \footnote{LOI, Schedule 2.} Under these terms, the Trump Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming significant liabilities or financing commitments.% 326 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~3.} @@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \begin{quote} Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin only wants to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. -"Business, politics, whatever it all is the same for someone who knows how to deal" +``Business, politics, whatever it all is the same for someone who knows how to deal'' I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference. If he says it we own this election. America's most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald is a good guy to negotiate\dots. @@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} According to Cohen, he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump Moscow project with him. -However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant "infomercial" for Trump-branded properties.% 329 +However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant ``infomercial'' for Trump-branded properties.% 329 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~3--4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at~15.} \subparagraph{Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia} @@ -194,27 +195,27 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact.% 331 \footnote{Sater 12/15/17 302, at~3--4.} In early negotiations with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. -On October~12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote to Cohen that "all we need is Putin on board and we are golden," and that a "meeting with Putin and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of October]."% 332 +On October~12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote to Cohen that ``all we need is Putin on board and we are golden,'' and that a ``meeting with Putin and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of October].''% 332 \footnote{10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07~a.m.).} \blackout{Grand Jury} this meeting was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian government.% 333 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed Ivanka Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov's assistance to the Trump Campaign.% 334 \footnote{Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as ``Lana E. Alexander,'' which said in part, ``If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you'll see who he is close to and that he has done Putin's political campaigns.'' -11/16/15 Email, Erchova to I. Trump.} +11/16/15 Email, Erchova to I.~Trump.} Klokov was at that time Director of External Communications for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.% 335 -\footnote{11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen.} +\footnote{11/16/15 Email, I.~Trump to Cohen.} He told the Office that, after receiving this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly) that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter.% 336 \footnote{Cohen 8/7/18 302, at~17. During his interviews with the Office, Cohen still appeared to believe that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above.} Between November~18 and~19, 2015, Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call and exchanged several emails. -Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a "trusted person" who could offer the Campaign "political synergy" and "synergy on a government level," Klokov recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary. -Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the candidate and an individual Klokov described as "our person of interest."% 337 +Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a ``trusted person'' who could offer the Campaign ``political synergy'' and ``synergy on a government level,'' Klokov recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary. +Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the candidate and an individual Klokov described as ``our person of interest.''% 337 \footnote{11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51~a.m.).} -In an email to the Office, Erchova later identified the "person of interest" as Russian President Vladimir Putin.% 338 +In an email to the Office, Erchova later identified the ``person of interest'' as Russian President Vladimir Putin.% 338 \footnote{In July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which she wrote that ``[a]t the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact Ivanka Trump \dots\ and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials.'' 7/27/18 Email, Erchova to Special Counsel's Office. The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump ``land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin.'' @@ -223,30 +224,30 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} The Office did not receive any reply.} In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local developers. -Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump---including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin---would need to be "in conjunction with the development and an official visit" with the Trump Organization receiving a formal invitation to visit.% 339 +Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump---including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin---would need to be ``in conjunction with the development and an official visit'' with the Trump Organization receiving a formal invitation to visit.% 339 \footnote{11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15~a.m.).} -(Klokov had written previously that "the visit [by candidate Trump to Russia] has to be informal.")% 340 +(Klokov had written previously that ``the visit [by candidate Trump to Russia] has to be informal.'')% 340 \footnote{11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51~a.m.).} -Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over a possible meeting between Trump and "the person of interest" from any existing business track.% 341 +Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over a possible meeting between Trump and ``the person of interest'' from any existing business track.% 341 \footnote{11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51~a.m.) (``I would suggest separating your negotiations and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be completely different, having the most important support.'').} -Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have "phenomenal" impact "in a business dimension" and that the "person of interest['s]" "most important support" could have significant ramifications for the "level of projects and their capacity." -Klokov concluded by telling Cohen that there was "no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of interest."% 342 +Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have ``phenomenal'' impact ``in a business dimension'' and that the ``person of interest['s]'' ``most important support'' could have significant ramifications for the ``level of projects and their capacity.'' +Klokov concluded by telling Cohen that there was ``no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of interest.''% 342 \footnote{11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40~a.m.).} -Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet."% 343 +Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that ``[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet.''% 343 \footnote{11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56~p.m.).} This email appears to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov's initial offer of assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government.% 344 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~12.} By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. -Cohen told Sater that he was "setting up the meeting myself."% 345 +Cohen told Sater that he was ``setting up the meeting myself.''% 345 \footnote{FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17~p.m.)).} On January~11, 2016, Cohen emailed the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff. -Cohen erroneously used the email address "Pr\_peskova\@prpress.gof.ru" instead of "Pr\_peskova@prpress.gov.ru," so the email apparently did not go through.% 346 -\footnote{1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr\_peskova\@prpress.gof.ru (9:12~a.m.).} -On January~14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address (info\@prpress.gov.ru) with the following message: +Cohen erroneously used the email address ``\UseVerb{PrpeskovaATprpressgofru}'' instead of ``\UseVerb{PrpeskovaATprpressgovru},'' so the email apparently did not go through.% 346 +\footnote{1/11/16 Email, Cohen to \UseVerb{prpeskovaATprpressgofru} (9:12~a.m.).} +On January~14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address (\UseVerb{infoATprpressgovru}) with the following message: \begin{quote} Dear Mr.~Peskov, @@ -256,24 +257,24 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance. I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon.% 347 -\footnote{1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info\@prpress.gov.ru (9:21~a.m.).} +\footnote{1/14/16 Email, Cohen to \UseVerb{infoATprpressgovru} (9:21~a.m.).} \end{quote} -Two days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr\_peskova\@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak with Sergei Ivanov.% 348 -\footnote{1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr\_peskova\@prpress.gov.ru (10:28~a.m.).} +Two days later, Cohen sent an email to \UseVerb{PrpeskovaATprpressgovru}, repeating his request to speak with Sergei Ivanov.% 348 +\footnote{1/16/16 Email, Cohen to \UseVerb{prpeskovaATprpressgovru} (10:28~a.m.).} Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016.% 349 \footnote{\textit{Cohen} Information \P\P~4,~7. -Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume~II\null. -\textit{See} Vol.~II, Section~II.K.3, \textit{infra}.} +Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in \hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II}\null. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.2.11.3}{Vol.~II, Section~II.K.3}, \textit{infra}.} On January~20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had been trying to reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided.% 350 \footnote{1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5:57~a.m.) (``Mr.~Cohen[,] I can't get through to both your phones. Pls, call me.'').} -Shortly after receiving Poliakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes.% 351 +Shortly after receiving Poliakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20~minutes.% 351 \footnote{Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January~20, 2016 between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen \blackout{Grand Jury} After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. @@ -284,16 +285,16 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~2--3.} Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other representative of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct follow-up. -However, the day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat \dots\ It's about Putin they called today."% 353 +However, the day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to ``[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat \dots\ It's about Putin they called today.''% 353 \footnote{FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen).} Sater then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project,% 354 \footnote{The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater, working at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing. FS00008 (12/31/15 Text Messages, Sater \& Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found \textit{infra}.} -along with a note to "[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me."% 355 +along with a note to ``[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me.''% 355 \footnote{FSO0011 (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44~p.m.)); 1/21/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (6:49~p.m.).} -After a further round of edits, on January~25, 2016, Sater sent Cohen an invitation---signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ---to travel to "Moscow for a working visit" about the "prospects of development and the construction business in Russia," "the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower," and "the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr.~Donald Trump."% 356 +After a further round of edits, on January~25, 2016, Sater sent Cohen an invitation---signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ---to travel to ``Moscow for a working visit'' about the ``prospects of development and the construction business in Russia,'' ``the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower,'' and ``the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr.~Donald Trump.''% 356 \footnote{1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01~p.m.) (attachment).} According to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project.% 357 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~6--7.} @@ -305,7 +306,7 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015, Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to Russia for meetings.% 358 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41~p.m.) +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41~p.m.) (``Please scan and send me a copy of your passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'').} On December~19, 2015, Sater wrote: @@ -316,15 +317,15 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \blackout{Grand Jury} Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused in Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to U.S. government sanctions, -\textit{see Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications}, Office of Foreign Assets Control (Dec.~22, 2015), \textit{available at} https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx. +\textit{see Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications}, Office of Foreign Assets Control (Dec.~22, 2015), \textit{available at} \url{https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx}. Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker and Gene Shustar. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Rizzo, et al.}, 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.~6, 2003).} +\textit{See United States~v.\ Rizzo, et~al.}, 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.~6, 2003).} He needs a copy of your and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations \& Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue invite, so they are inviting commercially/business. VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite \& have visa issued.% 360 \footnote{12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50~a.m.); -FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen, (10:53~a.m.).} +FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen, (10:53~a.m.)[)].} \end{quote} In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport.% 361 @@ -337,7 +338,7 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} FS00004 (12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen \& Sater).} Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in connection with the Trump Moscow project. -On April~20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, "[t]he People wanted to know when you are coming?"% 364 +On April~20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, ``[t]he People wanted to know when you are coming?''% 364 \footnote{FS00014 (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06~p.m.)).} On May~4, 2016, Sater followed up: @@ -351,11 +352,11 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \footnote{FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38~p.m.)).} \end{quote} -Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. -Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention."% 366 +Cohen responded, ``My trip before Cleveland. +Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention.''% 366 \footnote{FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03~p.m.)).} -The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum ("Forum"), an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. +The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St.~Petersburg International Economic Forum (``Forum''), an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum.% 367 \footnote{Sater 12/15/17 302, at~4.} On May~5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen: @@ -369,10 +370,10 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} \footnote{FS00016 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen (6:26 \& 6:27~a.m.)).} \end{quote} -The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen wrote back, "[w]orks for me."% 369 +The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen wrote back, ``[w]orks for me.''% 369 \footnote{FS00016 (5/6/16 Text Messages, Cohen \& Sater).} -On June~9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for the Forum, adding, "Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well."% 370 +On June~9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for the Forum, adding, ``Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well.''% 370 \footnote{FS00018 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater \& Cohen).} On June~13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum.% 371 \footnote{6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (2:10~p.m.).} @@ -400,22 +401,22 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St.~Petersburg International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma---a contact of Ivanka Trump's from the fashion industry---first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.% 377 \footnote{12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57~a.m.) (attachments); -TRUMPORG\_16\_000057 (1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff (9:18~a.m.)).} -On January~14, 2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to participate in the highly prestigious" Forum event, but that he would "have to decline" the invitation given his "very grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential candidate.% 378 +TRUMPORG\_16\_000057 (1/7/16 Email, I.~Trump to Graff (9:18~a.m.)).} +On January~14, 2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was ``honored to be asked to participate in the highly prestigious'' Forum event, but that he would ``have to decline'' the invitation given his ``very grueling and full travel schedule'' as a presidential candidate.% 378 \footnote{1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira.} -Graff asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff "send a formal note to the Deputy Prime Minister" declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be "great."% 379 +Graff asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff ``send a formal note to the Deputy Prime Minister'' declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be ``great.''% 379 \footnote{1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff.} It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers from President Trump,% 380 -\footnote{As explained in Volume~II and Appendix C, on September~17, 2018, the Office sent written questions to the President's counsel. +\footnote{As explained in \hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II} and \hyperlink{section.3.3}{Appendix~C}, on September~17, 2018, the Office sent written questions to the President's counsel. On November~20, 2018, the President provided written answers to those questions through counsel.} Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on March~17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St.~Petersburg.% 381 \footnote{Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~17 (Response to Question~IV, Part~(e)) (``[D]ocuments show that Ms.~Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation.'').} Two weeks later, on March~31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump's signature a two-paragraph letter declining the invitation.% 382 \footnote{Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~17 (Response to Question~IV, Part~(e)); \textit{see also} TRUMPORG\_16\_000134 (unsigned letter dated March~31, 2016).} -The letter stated that Trump's "schedule has become extremely demanding" because of the presidential campaign, that he "already ha[d] several commitments in the United States" for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise "would have gladly given every consideration to attending such an important event."% 383 +The letter stated that Trump's ``schedule has become extremely demanding'' because of the presidential campaign, that he ``already ha[d] several commitments in the United States'' for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise ``would have gladly given every consideration to attending such an important event.''% 383 \footnote{TRUMPORG\_16\_000134 (unsigned letter).} Graff forwarded the letter to another executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead for Trump to sign.% 384 \footnote{TRUMPORG\_16000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graff to Macchia).} @@ -423,13 +424,13 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman---a New York-based investment banker---began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting with candidate Trump. According to Foresman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the Forum.% 385 \footnote{Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~3--4.} -Foresman first emailed Graff on March~31, 2016, following a phone introduction brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show The Apprentice). -In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early "private channel" between Vladimir Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an "approach" he had received from "senior Kremlin officials" about the candidate. -Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, Corey Lewandowski, or "another relevant person" to discuss this and other "concrete things" Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over "unsecure email."% 386 +Foresman first emailed Graff on March~31, 2016, following a phone introduction brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show \textit{The Apprentice}). +In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early ``private channel'' between Vladimir Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an ``approach'' he had received from ``senior Kremlin officials'' about the candidate. +Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, Corey Lewandowski, or ``another relevant person'' to discuss this and other ``concrete things'' Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over ``unsecure email.''% 386 \footnote{\textit{See} TRUMPORG\_16\_00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); -\textit{see also} Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~3--4,} +\textit{see also} Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~3--4.} On April~4, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman's meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant to Trump.% 387 -\footnote{\textit{See} TRUMPORG\_16\_00136(4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia).} +\footnote{\textit{See} TRUMPORG\_16\_00136 (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia).} With no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff---first on April~26 and again on April~30, 2016.% 388 \footnote{\textit{See} TRUMPORG\_16\_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); @@ -437,14 +438,14 @@ \subsubsection{Trump Tower Moscow Project} Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April~26 email (as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski.% 389 \footnote{\textit{See} TRUMPORG\_16\_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG\_16\_00137 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski).} -On May~2, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman's April~30 email---which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump~Jr.\ or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that "should be conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts"---to policy advisor Stephen Miller.% 390 -\footnote{TRUMPORG\_16\_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); -\textit{see also} TRUMPORG\_16\_00143 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman).} +On May~2, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman's April~30 email---which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump~Jr.\ or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that ``should be conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts''---to policy advisor Stephen Miller.% 390 +\footnote{TRUMPORG\_16\_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S.~Miller); +\textit{see also} TRUMPORG\_16\_00143 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S.~Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman).} No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration.% 391 -\footnote{Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume~I, Section~IV.B.3, \textit{infra}.} -When interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific "approach" from "senior Kremlin officials" noted in his March~31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to Roscongress. -According to Foresman, the "concrete things" he referenced in the same email were a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest Institute). +\footnote{Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.2.3}{Volume~I, Section~IV.B.3}, \textit{infra}.} +When interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific ``approach'' from ``senior Kremlin officials'' noted in his March~31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to Roscongress. +According to Foresman, the ``concrete things'' he referenced in the same email were a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest Institute). Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out.% 392 \footnote{Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~4.} @@ -457,10 +458,10 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March 2016 to early October 2016.% 394 \footnote{Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall of 2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in a January 2017 FBI interview about, \textit{inter alia}, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18~U.S.C. \S~1001(a).} -In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow, that the Russian government had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. +In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow, that the Russian government had obtained ``dirt'' on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. One week later, on May~6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to candidate Clinton. -Papadopoulos shared information about Russian "dirt" with people outside of the Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official. +Papadopoulos shared information about Russian ``dirt'' with people outside of the Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official. Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never came to pass. @@ -476,8 +477,8 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016.% 398 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~2; 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris.} -At that time, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP), which billed itself as a "unique institution \dots\ comprising high-level professional international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of international law."% 399 -\footnote{London Centre of International Law Practice, at https://www.lcilp.org/ (via web.archive.org).} +At that time, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP), which billed itself as a ``unique institution \dots\ comprising high-level professional international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of international law.''% 399 +\footnote{London Centre of International Law Practice, at \url{https://www.lcilp.org/} (via \url{web.archive.org}).} Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.% 400 \footnote{2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris.} In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join LCILP and arrived in London to begin work.% 401 @@ -509,37 +510,37 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} \paragraph{Initial Russia-Related Contacts} Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP.% 411 -\footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~2--3; Papadopoulos Statement of Offense \P~5.} +\footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~2--3; \textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~5.} The purpose of the trip was to meet officials affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian government official.% 412 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~2--3; -Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., \textit{Joseph Mifsud: more questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia}, The Guardian (Oct.~31, 2017) (``Link Campus University \dots\ is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti.'').} +Stephanie Kirchgaessner et~al., \textit{Joseph Mifsud: more questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia}, The Guardian (Oct.~31, 2017) (``Link Campus University \dots\ is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti.'').} During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud. Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy in London, England.% 413 -\footnote{Papadopoulos Statement of Offense \P~5.} +\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~5.} Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him.% 414 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~3.} Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among his contacts was \blackout{Investigative Technique},% 415 -\footnote{\textit{see, e.g.} \blackout{Investigative Technique}. +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.} \blackout{Investigative Technique}. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matters}} -a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media campaign (see Volume~I, Section~II, \textit{supra}). +a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media campaign (\textit{see} \hyperlink{section.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~II}, \textit{supra}). In January and February 2016, Mifsud and \blackout{Investigative Technique} discussed \blackout{Investigative Technique} possibly meeting in Russia. The investigation did not identify evidence of them meeting. -Later, in the spring of 2016, \blackout{Investigative Technique} was also in contact \blackout{Investigative Technique} that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations (see Volume~I, Section~III.B.1, \textit{supra}). +Later, in the spring of 2016, \blackout{Investigative Technique} was also in contact \blackout{Investigative Technique} that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations (\textit{see} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.2.1}{Volume~I, Section~III.B.1}, \textit{supra}). According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met in Rome.% 416 -\footnote{Papadopoulos Statement of Offense \P~5.} +\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~5.} After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign, however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.% 417 -\footnote{Papadopoulos Statement of Offense \P~5.} +\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~5.} The two discussed Mifsud's European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government.% 418 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at~2.} Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.% 419 -\footnote{Papadopoulos Statement of Offense \P~5.} +\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~5.} On March~17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London.% 420 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~2.} -Four days later, candidate Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as "an oil and energy consultant" and an "[e]xcellent guy."% 421 +Four days later, candidate Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as ``an oil and energy consultant'' and an ``[e]xcellent guy.''% 421 \footnote{Phillip Rucker \& Robert Costa, \textit{Trump Questions Need for NATO, Outlines Noninterventionist Foreign Policy}, Washington Post (Mar.~21, 2016).} On March~24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London.% 422 @@ -554,10 +555,10 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} During the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers.% 425 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~3.} Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that did not occur.% 426 -\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~8 n.1} +\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~8 n.1.} -Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was "Meeting with Russian leadership -- including Putin."% 427 -\footnote{3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21~a.m.).} +Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was ``Meeting with Russian leadership -- including Putin.''% 427 +\footnote{3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et~al. (8:48:21~a.m.).} The message stated in pertinent part: \begin{quote} @@ -566,10 +567,10 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} As noted above, the woman he met was not Putin's niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassador did not also serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister.} The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S.--Russia ties under President Trump. -They are keen to host us in a "neutral" city, or directly in Moscow. +They are keen to host us in a ``neutral'' city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with us and Mr.~Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving forward with this very important issue.% 429 -\footnote{3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al.\ (8:48:21~a.m.).} +\footnote{3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et~al.\ (8:48:21~a.m.).} \end{quote} Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign's approach toward Russia---from one of engaging with Russia through the NATO framework and taking a strong stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine, \blackout{Grand Jury}% 430 @@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} More thoughts later today. Great work.% 431 -\footnote{3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et al.\ (8:55:04~a.m.).} +\footnote{3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et~al.\ (8:55:04~a.m.).} \end{quote} \paragraph{March~31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting} @@ -600,7 +601,7 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~4.} Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting, Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other. -As reflected in the photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between the two, two seats to Sessions's left: +As reflected in the photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between the two, two seats to Sessions's left[.] \begin{figure}[t] \vspace{-20pt} @@ -620,14 +621,14 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help arrange that meeting.% 437 \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~9; \textit{see} Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~14; Carafano 9/12/17 302, at~2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at~1.} -Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon---who told investigators in an interview that he had a "crystal clear" recollection of the meeting---have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting with Putin.% 438 +Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and Campaign advisor J.D.~Gordon---who told investigators in an interview that he had a ``crystal clear'' recollection of the meeting---have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting with Putin.% 438 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~4--5; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at~4--5.} Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of his efforts to arrange a meeting.% 439 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at~3.} Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions generally opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or the strength of the opposition he expressed.% 440 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~17; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at~5; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at~1; Carafano 9/12/17 302, at~2.} -\paragraph{George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton Emails} +\paragraph{George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has ``Dirt'' in the Form of Clinton Emails} Whatever Sessions's precise words at the March~31 meeting, Papadopoulos did not understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.% 441 @@ -637,37 +638,37 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek Russia contacts through Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya.% 443 \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P\P~10--15.} -For example, within a week of her initial March~24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message---which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud---addressing Papadopoulos's "wish to engage with the Russian Federation."% 444 +For example, within a week of her initial March~24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message---which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud---addressing Papadopoulos's ``wish to engage with the Russian Federation.''% 444 \footnote{3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3:39~a.m. and 5:36~a.m.).} When Papadopoulos learned from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another meeting.% 445 \footnote{4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59~p.m.).} -Polonskaya responded the next day that she was "back in St. Petersburg" but "would be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries" and "to meet [him] again."% 446 +Polonskaya responded the next day that she was ``back in St.~Petersburg'' but ``would be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries'' and ``to meet [him] again.''% 446 \footnote{4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:11:24~a.m.).} -Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought "a good step" would be to introduce him to "the Russian Ambassador in London," and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, "or anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia."% 447 +Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought ``a good step'' would be to introduce him to ``the Russian Ambassador in London,'' and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, ``or anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia.''% 447 \footnote{4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21:56~a.m.).} Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April~11, 2016. -He wrote, "This is already been agreed. +He wrote, ``This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. -We will talk tomorrow."% 448 +We will talk tomorrow.''% 448 \footnote{4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11:43:53).} The two bodies referenced by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative assembly,% 449 -\footnote{Papadopoulos Statement of Offense \P~10(c).} -while "Valdai" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that "is close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment."% 450 +\footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~10(c).} +while ``Valdai'' refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that ``is close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment.''% 450 \footnote{Anton Troianovski, \textit{Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to U.S. Nuclear Stance}, Washington Post (Feb.~10, 2018).} -Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he would see him "tomorrow."% 451 +Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he would see him ``tomorrow.''% 451 \footnote{4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11:51:53~a.m.).} -For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had "already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request," that "we are all very excited [about] the possibility of a good relationship with Mr.~Trump," and that "[t]he Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced."% 452 +For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had ``already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request,'' that ``we are all very excited [about] the possibility of a good relationship with Mr.~Trump,'' and that ``[t]he Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced.''% 452 \footnote{4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06~a.m.).} -Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other "tomorrow" referenced a meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April~12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in London. +Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other ``tomorrow'' referenced a meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April~12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office,% 453 \footnote{Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at~7.} and records from Papadopoulos's UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the meeting took place.% 454 \footnote{4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39~a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document); 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos \& Obaid (10:28:20~a.m.); Papadopoulos Internet Search History (Apr.~11, 2016 10:56:49~p.m.) (search for ``andaz hotel liverpool street''); 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud \& Papadopoulos.} Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow.% 455 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (8:04:54~a.m.).} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (8:04:54~a.m.).} On April~18, 2016, while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).% 456 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~5.} Mifsud had described Timofeev as having connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),% 457 @@ -678,11 +679,11 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} In July 2016, he connected with Yuriy Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov, publicly identified as a counselor with the MFA\null. And on September~16, 2016, he connected with Sergei Nalobin, also identified as an MFA official. \textit{See} Papadopoulos LinkedIn Connections \blackout{Investigative Technique}} -Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting "the groundwork" for a "potential" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.% 459 +Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting ``the groundwork'' for a ``potential'' meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.% 459 \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~11.} Papadopoulos told the Office that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being monitored or supervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line.% 460 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~5; Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at~10.} -Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April~25, 2016 email that he had just spoken "to Igor Ivanov[,] the President of RIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia," and conveyed Ivanov's advice about how best to arrange a "Moscow visit."% 461 +Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April~25, 2016 email that he had just spoken ``to Igor Ivanov[,] the President of RIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia,'' and conveyed Ivanov's advice about how best to arrange a ``Moscow visit.''% 461 \footnote{4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (8:16:35~a.m.).} After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April~25, 2016.% 462 @@ -691,8 +692,8 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud \& Papadopoulos.} During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow. -Mifsud also said that, on the trip, he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton. -As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the form of "emails of Clinton," and that they "have thousands of emails."% 464 +Mifsud also said that, on the trip, he learned that the Russians had obtained ``dirt'' on candidate Hillary Clinton. +As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the ``dirt'' was in the form of ``emails of Clinton,'' and that they ``have thousands of emails.''% 464 \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~14.} On May~6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.% 465 \footnote{\label{fnFourSixFive}This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. @@ -703,31 +704,31 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} \paragraph{Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign} While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts. -On April~25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr.~Trump to meet him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."% 466 -\footnote{4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8:12:44~p.m.).} -On April~27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that "some interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."% 467 -\footnote{4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58~p.m.).} -The same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right. "% 468 +On April~25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that ``[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr.~Trump to meet him when he is ready,'' and that ``[t]he advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in `neutral' cities.''% 466 +\footnote{4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S.~Miller (8:12:44~p.m.).} +On April~27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that ``some interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right.''% 467 +\footnote{4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S.~Miller (6:55:58~p.m.).} +The same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had ``been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right.''% 468 \footnote{4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14~p.m.).} Papadopoulos's Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued throughout the spring and summer of 2016. -On May~4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski whether that was "something we want to move forward with."% 469 +On May~4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski whether that was ``something we want to move forward with.''% 469 \footnote{5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49~a.m.).} -The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email "Russia update."% 470 +The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email ``Russia update.''% 470 \footnote{5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21~p.m.).} -He included the same email in a May~21, 2016 message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort, under the subject line "Request from Russia to meet Mr.~Trump," stating that "Russia has been eager to meet Mr.~Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me to discuss."% 471 +He included the same email in a May~21, 2016 message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort, under the subject line ``Request from Russia to meet Mr.~Trump,'' stating that ``Russia has been eager to meet Mr.~Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me to discuss.''% 471 \footnote{5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30:14~p.m.).} -Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including Papadopoulos, and stated: "Let[']s discuss. +Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including Papadopoulos, and stated: ``Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is not doing these trips. -It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send any signal."% 472 +It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send any signal.''% 472 \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~19 n.2.} -On June~1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ed] to have a call about this topic" and whether "we were following up with it."% 473 +On June~1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski ``want[ed] to have a call about this topic'' and whether ``we were following up with it.''% 473 \footnote{6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18~p.m.).} -After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis because he was "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MFA" was asking him "if Mr.~Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."% 474 +After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to ``connect with'' Clovis because he was ``running point,'' Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that ``the Russian MFA'' was asking him ``if Mr.~Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point.''% 474 \footnote{6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03~p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14~p.m.).} -Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it and what message I should send (or to ignore)."% 475 +Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he ``[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it and what message I should send (or to ignore).''% 475 \footnote{6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14~p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump--Putin meeting. First, on May~15, 2016, David Klein---a distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt---emailed Clovis about a potential Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. @@ -740,9 +741,9 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} \footnote{\textit{Papadopoulos} Statement of Offense \P~21(a).} Papadopoulos sent one more email to Lewandowski on June~19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager.% 477 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -The email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr.~Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend meetings.% 478 +The email stated that ``[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs'' had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr.~Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend meetings.% 478 \footnote{6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11~p.m.).} -Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip off the record if it's in the interest of Mr.~Trump and the campaign to meet specific people."% 479 +Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was ``willing to make the trip off the record if it's in the interest of Mr.~Trump and the campaign to meet specific people.''% 479 \footnote{6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11~p.m.).} Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an off-the-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos's other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.% 480 @@ -774,14 +775,14 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July~11, 2016 email in which Phares suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat,% 485 \footnote{7/11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos.} -and a July~12 message in the same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees "are very nervous about Russia. So be aware."% 486 +and a July~12 message in the same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees ``are very nervous about Russia. So be aware.''% 486 \footnote{7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29).} -Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares and Clovis as other "participants" in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy.% 487 +Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares and Clovis as other ``participants'' in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy.% 487 \footnote{7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18).} Finally, Papadopoulos's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a journal that he kept at the time.% 488 \footnote{Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at~3.} -Those notes, which are reprinted in part below, appear to refer to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the "office of Putin," and suggest that Phares, Clovis, and Papadopoulos ("Walid/Sam me") would attend without the official backing of the Campaign ("no official letter/no message from Trump").% 489 +Those notes, which are reprinted in part below, appear to refer to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the ``office of Putin,'' and suggest that Phares, Clovis, and Papadopoulos (``Walid/Sam me'') would attend without the official backing of the Campaign (``no official letter/no message from Trump'').% 489 \footnote{Papadopoulos declined to assist in deciphering his notes, telling investigators that he could not read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at~21. The notes, however, appear to read as listed in the column to the left of the image above.} @@ -801,7 +802,7 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} September: Have an exploratory meeting \sout{to} or lose. -In September---if allowed they will blast Mr.~Trump. +In September -- if allowed they will blast Mr.~Trump. We want the meeting in London/England @@ -827,26 +828,26 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} \end{quote} Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel. -On August~15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple foreign governments, "even Russia[]," for "closed door workshops/consultations abroad," and asked whether there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos "to go on that trip."% 490 +On August~15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple foreign governments, ``even Russia[],'' for ``closed door workshops/consultations abroad,'' and asked whether there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos ``to go on that trip.''% 490 \footnote{8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (11:59:07~a.m.).} -Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not "travel before the election" but that he "would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible."% 491 -\footnote{8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01:45~p.m.)} +Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not ``travel before the election'' but that he ``would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible.''% 491 +\footnote{8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01:45~p.m.).} Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax generated adverse publicity.% 492 \footnote{\textit{George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little More Than to Turn Russia Towards China}, Interfax (Sept.~30, 2016).} -\paragraph{Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt"} +\paragraph{Trump Campaign Knowledge of ``Dirt''} Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaign---specifically, the then-Greek foreign minister---about Russia's obtaining Clinton-related emails.% 493 \footnote{Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at~14--15; Def.~Sent.~Mem., United States~v.\ George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug.~31, 2018), Doc.~45.} In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with Mifsud in late April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.% 494 -\footnote{\textit{See} footnote \ref{fnFourSixFive} of Volume~I, Section~IV.A.2.d, \textit{supra}.} -(This conversation occurred after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, see Volume~I, Sections~III.A \&~III.B, \textit{supra}.) +\footnote{\textit{See} footnote \ref{fnFourSixFive} of \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.1.2.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.2.d}, \textit{supra}.} +(This conversation occurred after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsection.1.3.1}{Volume~I, Sections~III.A} \&~\hyperlink{subsection.1.3.2}{III.B}, \textit{supra}.) Such disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign official about the emails. -When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos's sharing the information that Russia had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. -Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that Papadopoulos thought "they have her emails."% 495 +When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos's sharing the information that Russia had obtained ``dirt'' on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. +Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that Papadopoulos thought ``they have her emails.''% 495 \footnote{Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at~5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at~5; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at~2.} @@ -870,7 +871,7 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via LinkedIn on July~15, 2016, shortly after Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis.% 500 \footnote{7/15/16 LinkedIn Message, Millian to Papadopoulos.} -Millian, an American citizen who is a native of Belarus, introduced himself "as president of [the] New York-based Russian American Chamber of Commerce," and claimed that through that position he had "insider knowledge and direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics."% 501 +Millian, an American citizen who is a native of Belarus, introduced himself ``as president of [the] New York-based Russian American Chamber of Commerce,'' and claimed that through that position he had ``insider knowledge and direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics.''% 501 \footnote{7/15/16 LinkedIn Message, Millian to Papadopoulos.} Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether he had heard of Millian.% 502 \footnote{7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23~p.m.); @@ -889,17 +890,17 @@ \subsubsection{George Papadopoulos} 8/3/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos \& Millian (4:07:37~a.m. \& 1:11:58~p.m.).} Papadopoulos ultimately did not attend either conference. -On July~31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted "by some leaders of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr.~Trump," and to ask whether he should "put you in touch with their group (US--Russia chamber of commerce)."% 507 +On July~31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted ``by some leaders of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr.~Trump,'' and to ask whether he should ``put you in touch with their group (US--Russia chamber of commerce).''% 507 \footnote{7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk (12:29:59~p.m.).} -Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos "for taking the initiative," but asked him to "hold off with outreach to Russian-Americans" because "too many articles" had already portrayed the Campaign, then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "being pro-Russian."% 508 +Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos ``for taking the initiative,'' but asked him to ``hold off with outreach to Russian-Americans'' because ``too many articles'' had already portrayed the Campaign, then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as ``being pro-Russian.''% 508 \footnote{7/31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos (21:54:52).} -On August~23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he would "share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign."% 509 +On August~23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he would ``share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign.''% 509 \footnote{8/23/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36~a.m.).} Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter.% 510 \footnote{Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at~2.} -On November~9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian "billionaires who are not under sanctions."% 511 +On November~9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian ``billionaires who are not under sanctions.''% 511 \footnote{11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05~p.m.).} The meeting took place on November~14, 2016, at the Trump Hotel and Tower in Chicago.% 512 \footnote{11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1:32:11~a.m.).} @@ -947,16 +948,16 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page.% 525 -\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}; Complaint \P\P~22, 24, 32, United States~v.\ Buryakov, 1:15-mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.~23, 2015), Doc.~1 ``\textit{Buryakov} Complaint'').} +\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}; Complaint \P\P~22, 24, 32, \textit{United States~v.\ Buryakov}, 1:15-mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.~23, 2015), Doc.~1 ``\textit{Buryakov} Complaint'').} Podobnyy met Page at an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him.% 526 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint \P~34.} Podobnyy and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business.% 527 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint \P~34.} In a recorded conversation on April~8, 2013, Podobnyy told another intelligence officer that Page was interested in business opportunities in Russia.% 528 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint \P~32.} -In Podobnyy's words, Page "got hooked on Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could \dots\ rise up. Maybe he can\dots. [I]t's obvious that he wants to earn lots of money."% 529 +In Podobnyy's words, Page ``got hooked on Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could \dots\ rise up. Maybe he can\dots. [I]t's obvious that he wants to earn lots of money.''% 529 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint.} -Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by "feed[ing] him empty promises" that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page.% 530 +Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by ``feed[ing] him empty promises'' that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page.% 530 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint.} Podobnyy told the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them.% 531 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint.} @@ -965,19 +966,19 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{\textit{See Buryakov} Complaint; \textit{see also} Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Buryakov}, 1:15-cr-73 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.~9, 2015), Doc.~10; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -The criminal complaint detailed Podobnyy's interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as "Male-1."% 533 +The criminal complaint detailed Podobnyy's interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as ``\hbox{Male-1}.''% 533 \footnote{\textit{Buryakov} Complaint \P\P~32--34; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Based on the criminal complaint's description of the interactions, Page was aware that he was the individual described as "Male-1."% 534 +Based on the criminal complaint's description of the interactions, Page was aware that he was the individual described as ``\hbox{Male-1}.''% 534 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -Page later spoke with a Russian government official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would understand he was "Male-1" from the Podobnyy complaint. % 535 +Page later spoke with a Russian government official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would understand he was ``\hbox{Male-1}'' from the Podobnyy complaint. % 535 \footnote{Page 3/16/17 302, at~4; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Page told the official that he "didn't do anything" +Page told the official that he ``didn't do anything'' \blackout{Grand Jury}% 536 \footnote{Page 3/16/17 302, at~4; \blackout{Grand Jury}} In interviews with the FBI before the Office's opening, Page acknowledged that he understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel.% 537 -\footnote{Page 3/30/17 302, at~6; Page 3/31/17 302, at~1} -Page told investigating agents that "the more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country."% 538 +\footnote{Page 3/30/17 302, at~6; Page 3/31/17 302, at~1.} +Page told investigating agents that ``the more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country.''% 538 \footnote{Page 3/31/17 302, at~1.} \paragraph{Origins of and Early Campaign Work} @@ -987,16 +988,16 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} Page told the Office that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate Trump improve relations with Russia.% 540 \footnote{Page 3/10/17 302, at~2.} To that end, Page emailed Campaign officials offering his thoughts on U.S.--Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.% 541 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.; -3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a ``President's Daily Brief'' prepared by Page that discussed the ``severe degradation of U.S.--Russia relations following Washington's meddling'' in Ukraine); \blackout{Grand Jury}} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et~al.; +3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a ``President's Daily Brief\thinspace'' prepared by Page that discussed the ``severe degradation of U.S.--Russia relations following Washington's meddling'' in Ukraine); \blackout{Grand Jury}} In communications with Campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior Russian governmental officials. -For example, on January~30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior Campaign officials stating that he had "spent the past week in Europe and ha[d] been in discussions with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin" who recognized that Trump could have a "game-changing effect \dots\ in bringing the end of the new Cold War."% 542 -\footnote{1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.} -The email stated that "[t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts," Page believed that "a direct meeting in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arranged."% 543 -\footnote{1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.} +For example, on January~30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior Campaign officials stating that he had ``spent the past week in Europe and ha[d] been in discussions with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin'' who recognized that Trump could have a ``game-changing effect \dots\ in bringing the end of the new Cold War.''% 542 +\footnote{1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et~al.} +The email stated that ``[t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts,'' Page believed that ``a direct meeting in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arranged.''% 543 +\footnote{1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et~al.} Page closed the email by criticizing U.S. sanctions on Russia.% 544 -\footnote{1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.} +\footnote{1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et~al.} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 545 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1005,11 +1006,11 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} Over the next several months, Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign officials. For example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel,% 547 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -see Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4, \textit{infra}. +\textit{see} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4}, \textit{infra}. In May~2016, Page prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck, North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver the speech.% 548 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis expressed appreciation for Page's work and praised his work to other Campaign officials.% 549 -\footnote{\textit{See}, e.g., 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et~al.\ +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et~al.\ (forwarding notes prepared by Page and stating, ``I wanted to let you know the type of work some of our advisors are capable of.'').} \paragraph{Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow} @@ -1023,21 +1024,21 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at~4--5; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at~3.} Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page's and assistant professor at the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign.% 553 -\footnote{\textit{See} Y, Weber 6/1/17 302, at~4; +\footnote{\textit{See} Y[.]~Weber 6/1/17 302, at~4; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at~3.} Denis Klimentov, an employee of NES, said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in the Trump Campaign in March 2016, the excitement was palpable.% 554 -\footnote{De, Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at~2.} +\footnote{De[.]~Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at~2.} Weber recalled that in summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow, and he felt that bringing a member of the Campaign to the school would be beneficial.% 555 \footnote{S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at~3.} Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from Trump Campaign officials to make the trip to Russia.% 556 \footnote{\textit{See} 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et~al.\ (referring to submission of a ``campaign advisor request form'').} -On May~16, 2016, while that request was still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.% 557 -\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}; 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al.} -On June~19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate that NES "would love to have Mr.~Trump speak at this annual celebration" in Page's place.% 558 -\footnote{6/19/16 Email, Page to Gordon et al.} -Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, "If you want to do this, it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr.~Trump will not be able to attend.% 559 +On May~16, 2016, while that request was still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, J.D.~Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.% 557 +\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}; 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et~al.} +On June~19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate that NES ``would love to have Mr.~Trump speak at this annual celebration'' in Page's place.% 558 +\footnote{6/19/16 Email, Page to Gordon et~al.} +Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, ``If you want to do this, it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr.~Trump will not be able to attend.% 559 \footnote{6/19/16 Email, Lewandowski to Page et~al.} In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. @@ -1047,25 +1048,25 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated).} Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to draw the Russian government's attention to Page's visit in Moscow.% 562 \footnote{7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated).} -His message to Zakharova continued: "Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy. +His message to Zakharova continued: ``Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman; he used to work in Russia\dots. -If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him."% 563 +If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him.''% 563 \footnote{7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated).} Dmitri Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page's visit to see if Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials.% 564 \footnote{De.~Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at~1--2.} The following day, Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov--Zakharova email thread. -Peskov wrote, "I have read about [Page]. +Peskov wrote, ``I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main one. -So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin."% 565 +So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin.''% 565 \footnote{7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated).} On July~7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES.% 566 \footnote{Page 3/10/17 302, at~3.} -In the speech, Page criticized the U.S. government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that "Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change."% 567 -\footnote{See Carter W. Page, \textit{The Lecture of Trump's Advisor Carter Page in Moscow}, YouTube Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July~7, 2016, -available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\_continue=28\&v=1CYF29saA9w. +In the speech, Page criticized the U.S. government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that ``Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change.''% 567 +\footnote{\textit{See} Carter W. Page, \textit{The Lecture of Trump's Advisor Carter Page in Moscow}, YouTube Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July~7, 2016, +\textit{available at} \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\_continue=28\&v=1CYF29saA9w}. Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides from the speech. -See Carter Page, ``The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential,'' Speech at National Economic Speech (July~7, 2016).} % XXX: New Economic School +\textit{See} Carter Page, ``The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential,'' Speech at N[ew] Economic S[chool] (July~7, 2016).} On July~8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement.% 568 \footnote{Page 3/10/17 302, at~3.} After Page delivered his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on Russia had hurt the NES\null.% 569 @@ -1079,7 +1080,7 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{Page 3/10/17 302, at~3; Page 3/30/17 302, at~3; Page 3/31/17 302, at~2.} -Page stated that he and Baranov talked about "immaterial non-public" information.% 573 +Page stated that he and Baranov talked about ``immaterial non-public'' information.% 573 \footnote{Page 3/30/17 302, at~3.} Page believed he and Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.% 574 \footnote{Page 3/30/17 302, at~9. \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1090,7 +1091,7 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} Page 3/30/17 302, at~7; Page 3/31/17 302, at~2.} -On July~8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and stated he would send "a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here."% 577 +On July~8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and stated he would send ``a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here.''% 577 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} 7/8/16 Email, Page to Dahl \& Gordon.} On July~9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part: @@ -1106,7 +1107,7 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 580 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -\blackout{Grand Jury}% 591 +\blackout{Grand Jury}% 581 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 582 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1117,7 +1118,7 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National Convention in Cleveland.% 583 \footnote{Page 3/10/17 302, at~4; Page 3/16/17 302, at~3.} -While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in Volume~I, Section~IV.A.6.a, \textit{infra}.% 584 +While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.1.6.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.6.a}, \textit{infra}.% 584 \footnote{Page 3/10/17 302, at~4; Page 3/16/17 302, at~3.} Page later emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kislyak was very worried about candidate Clinton's world views.% 585 @@ -1127,33 +1128,33 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. -The Campaign responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an "informal foreign policy advisor" who did "not speak for Mr.~Trump or the campaign."% 587 +The Campaign responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an ``informal foreign policy advisor'' who did ``not speak for Mr.~Trump or the campaign.''% 587 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Steven Mufson \& Tom Hamburger, \textit{Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties}, Washington Post (Aug.~5, 2016).} On September~23, 2016, Yahoo!\ News reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible Trump Administration.% 588 \footnote{Michael Isikoff, \textit{U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin}, Yahoo!\ News (Sept.~23, 2016).} -A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo!\ News that Page had "no role" in the Campaign and that the Campaign was "not aware of any of his activities, past or present."% 589 +A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo!\ News that Page had ``no role'' in the Campaign and that the Campaign was ``not aware of any of his activities, past or present.''% 589 \footnote{Michael Isikoff, \textit{U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin}, Yahoo!\ News (Sept.~23, 2016); -see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway \& Bannon (instructing that inquiries about Page should be answered with ``[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. +\textit{see also} 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway \& Bannon (instructing that inquiries about Page should be answered with ``[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has had no role or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and he now officially has been removed from all lists etc.'').} On September~24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign.% 590 \footnote{Page 3/16/17 302, at~2; -\textit{see, e.g.}, 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon \& S. Miller (discussing plans to remove Page from the campaign).} +\textit{see, e.g.}, 9/23/16 Email, J.~Miller to Bannon \& S.~Miller (discussing plans to remove Page from the campaign).} Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a position in the Trump Administration.% 591 -\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}, ``Transition Online Form,'' 11/14/16 (\blackout{Grand Jury})} -On November~14, 2016, he submitted an application to the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with "top world leaders" and "effectively responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas."% 592 +\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}, ``Transition Online Form,'' 11/14/16 \blackout{Grand Jury}} +On November~14, 2016, he submitted an application to the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with ``top world leaders'' and ``effectively responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas.''% 592 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} ``Transition Online Form,'' 11/14/16 \blackout{Grand Jury}} Page received no response from the Transition Team. When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one Russian government official. -That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth in Volume~I, Section~IV.B.6, \textit{infra}. +That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.2.6}{Volume~I, Section~IV.B.6}, \textit{infra}. \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. -In April 2016, candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event hosted by the National Interest, a publication affiliated with CNI\null. +In April 2016, candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event hosted by the \textit{National Interest}, a publication affiliated with CNI\null. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in relation to Sessions's confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia. Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. @@ -1163,16 +1164,15 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew out of a center founded by former President Richard Nixon.% 593 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~1--2.} -CNI describes itself "as a voice for strategic realism in U.S. foreign policy," and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.% 594 -\footnote{\textit{About the Center}, CNI, available at https://cftni.org/about/.} +CNI describes itself ``as a voice for strategic realism in U.S. foreign policy,'' and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the \textit{National Interest}.% 594 +\footnote{\textit{About the Center}, CNI, \textit{available at} \url{https://cftni.org/about/}.} CNI is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on national security and foreign policy issues.% 595 -\footnote{Advisory Counsel, CNI, available at -https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/; +\footnote{\textit{Advisory Counsel}, CNI, \textit{available at} \url{https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/}; Simes 3/8/18 302, at~3--4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~4; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~16.} -Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National Interest.% 596 +Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the \textit{National Interest}.% 596 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~2.} Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early 1970s, and joined CNI's predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.% 597 \footnote{ Simes 3/8/18 302, at~1--2; @@ -1180,16 +1180,16 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government officials,% 598 \footnote{Simes 3/27/18 302, at~10--15.} as does CNI collectively. -As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie Corporation in 2015, CNI has "unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among Washington think tanks,"% 599 +As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie Corporation in 2015, CNI has ``unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among Washington think tanks,''% 599 \footnote{C00011656 (\textit{Rethinking U.S.--Russia Relations}, CNI (Apr.~18, 2015)).} -in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called "Track 11" diplomatic efforts.% 600 +in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called ``Track~II'' diplomatic efforts.% 600 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~5; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~29--30; Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at~3.} On March~14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.% 601 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~6; -CO0006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12~p.m.); +CO0006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12~p.m.)[)]; \textit{cf.}~Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at~1 (Kissinger was CNI's ``Honorary Chairman of the Board''); Boyd 1/24/18 302, at~2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at~5.} @@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March~24, 2016 telephone call,% 605 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~6--7.} three days after Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short notice.% 606 -\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} \textit{see} Volume~I, Section~IV.A.2, \textit{supra}.} +\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.2}, \textit{supra}.} On March~31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Kushner's New York office.% 607 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~7--9.} During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent with Trump's voice.% 608 @@ -1213,9 +1213,9 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} \textit{see also} Boyd 1/24/18 302, at~2.} Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign regarding the Campaign's foreign policy positions. -For example, on June~17, 2016, Simes sent J.D. Gordon an email with a "memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting" and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. -The memorandum proposed building a "small and carefully selected group of experts" to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating under the assumption "that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign policy issues." -The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a "new beginning with Russia."% 610 +For example, on June~17, 2016, Simes sent J.D.~Gordon an email with a ``memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting'' and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. +The memorandum proposed building a ``small and carefully selected group of experts'' to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating under the assumption ``that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign policy issues.'' +The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a ``new beginning with Russia.''% 610 \footnote{C00008187 (6/17/16 Email, Simes to Gordon (3:35:45~p.m.)).} \paragraph{National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel} @@ -1227,9 +1227,9 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} C00008923 (4/6/16 Email, Simes to Burt (2:22:28~p.m.)); Burt 2/9/18 302, at~7.} -In mid-April 2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared.% 613 +In mid-April~2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared.% 613 \footnote{C00008551 (4/17/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (2:44:25~p.m.)); -C00006759 (4/14/16 Email Kushner to Simes \& S. Miller (12:30~p.m.)).} +C00006759 (4/14/16 Email Kushner to Simes \& S.~Miller (12:30~p.m.)).} Simes sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt.% 614 \footnote{Burt 2/9/18 302, at~7; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~7--8.} @@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~7--8.} -After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNI's hosting the speech could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club.% 617 +After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNI's hosting the speech could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the \textit{National Interest}, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club.% 617 \footnote{Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at~12; CO00003834--43 (4/22/16 Email, Simes to Boyd et~al.\ (8:47~a.m.)).} @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} \footnote{Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~12--13.} Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI's invitees to the speech itself and then choosing a subset for the reception.% 621 \footnote{Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~12.} -CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and Kislyak.% 622 +CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and~Kislyak.% 622 \footnote{C00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (4:53:45~p.m.)).} The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to the speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump.% 623 @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, but thought it clear that Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time.% 627 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~21.} Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre-speech reception. -The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner recalled Kislyak saying, "we like what your candidate is saying \dots\ it's refreshing."% 628 +The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner recalled Kislyak saying, ``we like what your candidate is saying \dots\ it's refreshing.''% 628 \footnote{Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~4.} Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time.% 629 @@ -1278,13 +1278,13 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Julia Ioffe, \textit{Why Did Jeff Sessions Really Meet With Sergey Kislyak}, The Atlantic (June~13, 2017).} Sessions stated to investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation.% 630 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22.} -Nor did anyone else affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception.% 631 +Nor did anyone else affiliated with CNI or the \textit{National Interest} specifically recall a conversation or meeting between Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception.% 631 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~21; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~14, 21; Boyd 1/24/18 302, at~3--4; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at~6; \textit{Statement Regarding President Trump's April~27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the Center for the National Interest}, CNI (Mar.~8, 2017).} -It appears that, if a conversation occurred at the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange between Kushner and Kislyak. +It appears that, if a conversation occurred at the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange between Kushner and~Kislyak. The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,% 632 @@ -1303,15 +1303,15 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~17.} Sessions attended a pre-dinner reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event.% 636 \footnote{Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~17; -C00004779--80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders \& Hagberg (9:30:12~a.m.); -C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et al.\ (2:02:32~a.m.).} +C00004779--80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders \& Hagberg (9:30:12~a.m.)[)]; +C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et~al.\ (2:02:32~a.m.)[)].} A seating chart prepared by Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event.% 637 -\footnote{C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al.\ (2:02:32~a.m.).} +\footnote{C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et~al.\ (2:02:32~a.m.)[)].} Sessions, however, did not remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner.% 638 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22.} Although CNI board member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner,% 639 \footnote{Boyd 1/24/18 302, at~4.} -Simes, Saunders, and Jacob Heilbrunn---editor of the National Interest---all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May~23 event.% 640 +Simes, Saunders, and Jacob Heilbrunn---editor of the \textit{National Interest}---all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May~23 event.% 640 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~23; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~18; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at~7.} @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at~5.} But the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia.% 645 \footnote{Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~20.} -Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing "nation-building" and violent extremism with Sessions.% 646 +Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing ``nation-building'' and violent extremism with Sessions.% 646 \footnote{Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at~6.} In addition, Sessions asked Saunders (of CNI) to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton's foreign policy shortcomings and another on Egypt.% 647 \footnote{Saunders 2/15/18 302, at~19--20.} @@ -1367,18 +1367,18 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~12; C00007269 (8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et~al.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15~p.m.)).} -In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a "Russia Policy Memo" laying out "what Mr.~Trump may want to say about Russia."% 654 -\footnote{€00007981--84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21~p.m.)). +In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a ``Russia Policy Memo'' laying out ``what Mr.~Trump may want to say about Russia.''% 654 +\footnote{C00007981--84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21~p.m.)). The memorandum recommended ``downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time'' and suggested that ``some tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws.'' The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian related questions in the framework of ``how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national interests'' and that a Trump Administration ``not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.'' The memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including questions about Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea.} -In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned "a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton" and the Russian government, "parts of [which]" (according to Simes) had even been "discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency."% 655 +In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned ``a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton'' and the Russian government, ``parts of [which]'' (according to Simes) had even been ``discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency.''% 655 \footnote{C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21~p.m.)).} -Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates, with the note "suggestion only."% 656 -\footnote{DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al.\ (11:30:13~a.m.)).} +Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates, with the note ``suggestion only.''% 656 +\footnote{DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S.~Miller et~al.\ (11:30:13~a.m.)).} Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.% 657 \footnote{DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15~p.m.)).} -(Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner). +(Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner[.])[] During the August~17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information that he had promised.% 658 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~29--30; @@ -1391,10 +1391,10 @@ \subsubsection{Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest} Simes claimed that he had received this information from former CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Russians.% 660 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~30.} -Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, "old news."% 661 +Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, ``old news.''% 661 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at~6.} -When interviewed by the Office, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes information that could be "operationalized" for the Trump Campaign.% 662 +When interviewed by the Office, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes information that could be ``operationalized'' for the Trump Campaign.% 662 \footnote{Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~12.} Despite Kushner's reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.% 663 \footnote{Simes 3/8/18 302, at~30.} @@ -1403,12 +1403,12 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} On June~9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump~Jr.\ in an email from Robert Goldstone, at the request of his then-client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer Aras Agalarov. -Goldstone relayed to Trump~Jr.\ that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia \dots\ offered to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump." -Trump~Jr.\ immediately responded that "if it's what you say I love it," and arranged the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls. +Goldstone relayed to Trump~Jr.\ that the ``Crown prosecutor of Russia \dots\ offered to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia'' as ``part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump.'' +Trump~Jr.\ immediately responded that ``if it's what you say I love it,'' and arranged the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls. Trump~Jr.\ invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump~Jr.\ may have told candidate Trump about an upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to Russia. -According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting---or its Russian connection-before it occurred. +According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting---or its Russian connection---before it occurred. The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of the Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika.% 664 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at~4.} -Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and that---as discussed above, Volume~I, Section~IV.A.I, \textit{supra}---worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a potential Trump Moscow real-estate project.% 665 +Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and that---as discussed above, \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1}, \textit{supra}---worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a potential Trump Moscow real-estate project.% 665 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at~2--3; \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1432,8 +1432,8 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \blackout{Grand Jury} Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~5--6; 4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone.} For example, in April 2016, Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten note.% 667 -\footnote{RG000033--34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment).} -Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign, passed on "congratulations" for winning in the primary and---according to one email drafted by Goldstone---an "offer" of his "support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with reference to U.S./Russian relations."% 668 +\footnote{RG000033--34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment)[)].} +Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign, passed on ``congratulations'' for winning in the primary and---according to one email drafted by Goldstone---an ``offer'' of his ``support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with reference to U.S./Russian relations.''% 668 \footnote{DJTJROO008 (2/29/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.\ et~al.); \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} TRUMPORG\_18\_001013 (6/24/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG\_18\_001014 (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart); TRUMPORG\_18\_001018 (6/26/13 Email, Graff to Goldstone); -TRUMPORG\_18\_001022 (6/27/13 Email, Graff to L. Kelly); +TRUMPORG\_18\_001022 (6/27/13 Email, Graff to L.~Kelly); TRUMPORG\_18\_001333 (9/12/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart); MU000004289 (7/27/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart).} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 672 @@ -1479,24 +1479,24 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Maria Tsvetkova \& Jack Stubbs, \textit{Moscow Lawyer Who Met Trump~Jr.\ Had Russian Spy Agency As Client}, Reuters (July~21, 2017); Andrew E. Kramer \& Sharon LaFraniere, \textit{Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On}, New York Times (Apr.~27, 2018).} She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax specialist who exposed a fraud and later died in a Russian prison.% 679 -\footnote{\textit{See} Pub.\ L. No.~112-208 \S\S~402, 404(a)(1), 126 Stat.~1502, 1502--1506. +\footnote{\textit{See} Pub.\ L.~No.~112-208 \S\S~402, 404(a)(1), 126 Stat.~1502, 1502--1506. Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund manager in Russia. Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian officials, and Magnitsky was charged with helping Browder embezzle money. After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress to pass the Magnitsky Act. \textit{See, e.g}, Andrew E. Kramer, \textit{Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case, Russia Accuses Nemesis of Murder}, New York Times (Oct.~22, 2017); Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov.~20, 2017), Exhibits at~1--4; Rosie Gray, \textit{Bill Browder's Testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee}, The Atlantic (July~25, 2017).} -Putin called the statute "a purely political, unfriendly act," and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S. officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.% 680 +Putin called the statute ``a purely political, unfriendly act,'' and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S. officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.% 680 \footnote{Rilen Barry, \textit{Russia Bars 18 Americans After Sanctions by US}, New York Times (Apr.~13, 2013); Tom Porter, \textit{Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They've Been Targets of Russian Assassination and Kidnapping Bids}, Newsweek (July~16, 2017).} Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsyv,% 681 \footnote{Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov.~20, 2017), at~21.} the son of Russian businessman Peter Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon Holdings Ltd., which was a defendant in a civil-forfeiture action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky.% 682 -\footnote{\textit{See} Veselnitskaya Decl., \textit{United States~v.\ Prevezon Holdings}, Ltd., No.~13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.); +\footnote{\textit{See} Veselnitskaya Decl., \textit{United States~v.\ Prevezon Holdings, Ltd.}, No.~13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.); \textit{see Prevezon Holdings}, Second Amended Complaint; \textit{Prevezon Holdings}, Mem.\ and Order; \textit{Prevezon Holdings}, Deposition of Oleg Lurie.} -She also appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in Moscow offering "confidential information" from "the Prosecutor General of Russia" about "interactions between certain political forces in our two countries."% 683 +She also appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in Moscow offering ``confidential information'' from ``the Prosecutor General of Russia'' about ``interactions between certain political forces in our two countries.''% 683 \footnote{\textit{See} Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at~1--2 \& 1A (undated one-page document given to congressional delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the Russian legal system. \textit{See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation} (1992, amended 2004).} @@ -1504,44 +1504,44 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Shortly after his June~3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump~Jr.% 684 \footnote{RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.); DJTJRO0446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Donald Trump~Jr.); -\@DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet.} +\UseVerb{DJTJ} 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet.} The email stated: \begin{quote} Good morning -Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very Interesting. +Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very interesting. -The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered lo provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. +The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. -This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump---helped along by Aras and Emin. +This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump -- helped along by Aras and Emin. What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly? -I can also send this Info to your father via Rhona, but it Is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first. +I can also send this info to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first. Best Rob Goldstone \end{quote} -Within minutes of this email, Trump~Jr.\ responded, emailing back: "Thanks Rob I appreciate that. +Within minutes of this email, Trump~Jr.\ responded, emailing back: ``Thanks Rob I appreciate that. I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. -Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back?"% 685 +Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back?''% 685 \footnote{DJTJROO446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Goldstone); -\@DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJTJ} 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Goldstone).} -Goldstone conveyed Trump~Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing that Trump~Jr.\ "wants to speak personally on the issue."% 686 +Goldstone conveyed Trump~Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing that Trump~Jr.\ ``wants to speak personally on the issue.''% 686 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} RG000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone \& Trump~Jr.).} -On June~6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was "[a]ny news," and Goldstone explained that Trump~Jr.\ was likely still traveling for the "final elections \dots\ where [T]rump will be 'crowned' the official nominee."% 687 -\footnote{RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); -RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to A. Agalarov).} -On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump~Jr.\ and asked when Trump~Jr.\ was "free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info."% 688 +On June~6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was ``[a]ny news,'' and Goldstone explained that Trump~Jr.\ was likely still traveling for the ``final elections \dots\ where [T]rump will be `crowned' the official nominee.''% 687 +\footnote{RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A.~Agalarov to Goldstone); +RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to A.~Agalarov).} +On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump~Jr.\ and asked when Trump~Jr.\ was ``free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info.''% 688 \footnote{RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.).} -Trump~Jr.\ asked if they could "speak now," and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump~Jr.\ and Emin Agalarov.% 689 +Trump~Jr.\ asked if they could ``speak now,'' and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump~Jr.\ and Emin Agalarov.% 689 \footnote{DJTJRO0445 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump~Jr.); RG000065--67 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump~Jr.); \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1552,7 +1552,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Also on June~6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.% 691 \footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~6; \blackout{Grand Jury}} Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras Agalarov.% 692 -\footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~1--2. +\footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~1--2; \blackout{Grand Jury} Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at~2--3; \blackout{Grand Jury}} Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June~6, 2016, Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. @@ -1561,14 +1561,14 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \subparagraph{Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign} -On June~7, Goldstone emailed Trump~Jr.\ and said that "Emin asked that I schedule a meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."% 694 +On June~7, Goldstone emailed Trump~Jr.\ and said that ``Emin asked that I schedule a meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow.''% 694 \footnote{DJTJROO467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.); -\@DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJTJ} 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.); \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Trump~Jr.\ replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner, and Trump~Jr.\ would likely attend.% 695 +Trump~Jr.\ replied that Manafort (identified as the ``campaign boss''), Jared Kushner, and Trump~Jr.\ would likely attend.% 695 \footnote{DJTJROO469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Goldstone); -\@DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJTJ} 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; RG000071 (6/7/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Goldstone); OSC-KAV\_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1576,7 +1576,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \footnote{Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at~7; \blackout{Grand Jury}} Kaveladze \blackout{Grand Jury} -"puzzled" by the list of attendees and that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey "negative information on Hillary Clinton."% 697 +``puzzled'' by the list of attendees and that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey ``negative information on Hillary Clinton.''% 697 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} \textit{see} Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~7; OSC-KAV\_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze).} Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that.% 698 @@ -1584,12 +1584,12 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Early on June~8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00~p.m. meeting the following day with Trump~Jr.% 699 \footnote{NOSC0000007--08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas).} -Later that day, Trump~Jr.\ forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line "FW: Russia---Clinton---private and confidential," adding a note that the "[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."% 700 +Later that day, Trump~Jr.\ forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line ``FW: Russia -- Clinton---private and confidential,'' adding a note that the ``[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices.''% 700 \footnote{NOSC00000039--42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kushner \& Manafort); DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Kushner \& Manafort).} -Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the "[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now."% 701 +Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the ``[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now.''% 701 \footnote{NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas).} -Manafort responded, "See you then. P."% 702 +Manafort responded, ``See you then.~P.''% 702 \footnote{6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump~Jr.} Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office that in the days before June~9, 2016 Trump~Jr.\ announced at a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation.% 703 @@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Gates believed that Trump~Jr.\ said the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.% 704 \footnote{Gates 1/30/18 302, at~7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. -See Neil MacFarquhar, \textit{A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?}, New York Times (July~16, 2017).} +\textit{See} Neil MacFarquhar, \textit{A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?}, New York Times (July~16, 2017).} Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump~Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.% 705 \footnote{Gates 3/1/18 302, at~3--4.} @@ -1624,26 +1624,26 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump~Jr.% 712 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~3--4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~10.} -President Trump has stated to this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of learning at the time" that his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton."% 713 +President Trump has stated to this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has ``no recollection of learning at the time'' that his son, Manafort, or ``Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton.''% 713 \footnote{Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~8 (Response to Question~I, Parts~(a)--(c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous knowledge of the June~9 meeting. On June~7, 2016 Trump announced his intention to give ``a major speech'' ``probably Monday of next week''---which would have been June~13---about ``all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons.'' \textit{See, e.g.}, Phillip Bump, \textit{What we know about the Trump Tower meeting}, Washington Post (Aug.~7, 2018). -Following the June~9 meeting, Trump changed the subjects planned speech to national security. +Following the June~9 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned speech to national security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the anticipated June~9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting on June~12, could well have caused the change. -The President's written answers to our questions state that the speech's focus was altered ``[i]n light of'' the Pulse nightclub shooting. -See Written Responses, \textit{supra}. +The President's written answers to our questions state that the speech's focus was altered ``[i]n light of\thinspace'' the Pulse nightclub shooting. +\textit{See} Written Responses, \textit{supra}. As for the original topic of the June~13 speech, Trump has said that ``he expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons,'' and that the draft of the speech prepared by Campaign staff ``was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the book \textit{Clinton Cash} by Peter Schweizer.'' Written Responses, \textit{supra}. In a later June~22 speech, Trump did speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the \textit{Clinton Cash} book. -\textit{See Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election}, politico.com (June~22, 2016).} +\textit{See Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election}, \UseVerb{politicocom} (June~22, 2016).} \paragraph{The Events of June~9, 2016} \subparagraph{Arrangements for the Meeting} -Veselnitskaya was in New York on June~9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon civil forfeiture litigation.% 714 +Veselnitskaya was in New York on June~9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the \textit{Prevezon} civil forfeiture litigation.% 714 \footnote{Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov.~20, 2017) at~41, 42; Alison Frankel, \textit{How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into U.S. for Trump Tower Meeting?} Reuters, (Nov.~6, 2017); Michael Kranish et~al., \textit{Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump~Jr.\ Has Long History Fighting Sanctions}, Washington Post (July~11, 2017); @@ -1655,9 +1655,9 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \blackout{Grand Jury} and when she learned that he was in New York, invited him to lunch.% 715 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation.% 716 -\footnote{Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at~4--6. \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska [in the] Prevezon case, also attended the lunch.% 717 +Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked on the \textit{Prevezon} litigation.% 716 +\footnote{Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at~4--6; \blackout{Grand Jury}} +Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska with Magnitsky-related lobbying and the \textit{Prevezon} case, also attended the lunch.% 717 \footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~7; \blackout{Grand Jury}; Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at~2, 4; @@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} The Office spoke to every participant except Veselnitskaya and Trump~Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntarily interviewed by the Office \blackout{Grand Jury} -The meeting lasted approximately 20 minutes.% 723 +The meeting lasted approximately 20~minutes.% 723 \footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at~4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at~9.} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 724 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} According to Akhmetshin, Trump~Jr.\ asked follow-up questions about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton Campaign, but Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States.% 729 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}; Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at~12.} -Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump~Jr.\ asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became aggravated and asked "[w]hat are we doing here?"% 730 +Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump~Jr.\ asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became aggravated and asked ``[w]hat are we doing here?''% 730 \footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~8; \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1718,32 +1718,22 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \footnote{Manafort's notes state: \begin{quote} -Bill Browder - -Offshore---Cyprus - -133m shares - -Companies - -Not invest---loan - -Value in Cyprus as inter - -Illici - -Active sponsors of RNC - -Browder hired Joanna Glover - -Tied into Cheney - +Bill Browder \\ +Offshore -- Cyprus \\ +133m shares \\ +Companies \\ +Not invest -- loan \\ +Value in Cyprus as inter \\ +Illici \\ +Active sponsors of RNC \\ +Browder hired Joanna Glover \\ +Tied into Cheney \\ Russian adoption by American families \end{quote} PJM-SJC-00000001--02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee).} -At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating "waste of time," followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that they call him to give him an excuse to leave.% 735 +At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating ``waste of time,'' followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that they call him to give him an excuse to leave.% 735 \footnote{NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~9; Vargas 4/4/18 302, at~7; @@ -1758,19 +1748,19 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials.% 737 \footnote{\textit{Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump~Jr.\ Info on Clinton}, NBC News (July~11, 2017).} -Veselnitskaya's November 2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June~9 meeting was not to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but rather to have "a private meeting with Donald Trump~Jr.---a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress."% 738 +Veselnitskaya's November 2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June~9 meeting was not to connect with ``the Trump Campaign'' but rather to have ``a private meeting with Donald Trump~Jr.---a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress.''% 738 \footnote{\textit{Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary}, 115th Cong.~10 (Nov.~20, 2017).} In other words, Veselnitskaya claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however, recalled any reference to Congress during the meeting. -Veselnitskaya also maintained that she "attended the meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv," the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but she did not "introduce [her]self in this capacity."% 739 +Veselnitskaya also maintained that she ``attended the meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv,'' the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but she did not ``introduce [her]self in this capacity.''% 739 \footnote{\textit{Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary}, 115th Cong.~10 (Nov.~20, 2017).} -In a July 2017 television interview, Trump~Jr.\ stated that while he had no way to gauge the reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, if "someone has information on our opponent \dots\ maybe this is something. -I should hear them out."% 740 +In a July 2017 television interview, Trump~Jr.\ stated that while he had no way to gauge the reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, if ``someone has information on our opponent \dots\ maybe this is something. +I should hear them out.''% 740 \footnote{Sean Hannity, \textit{Transcript---Donald Trump~Jr}, Fox News (July~11, 2017).} -Trump~Jr.\ further stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say."% 741 +Trump~Jr.\ further stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he should ``listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say.''% 741 \footnote{\textit{Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.~16 (Sept.~7, 2017).} -Depending on what, if any, information was provided, Trump~Jr.\ stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration."% 742 +Depending on what, if any, information was provided, Trump~Jr.\ stated he could then ``consult with counsel to make an informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration.''% 742 \footnote{\textit{Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.~16--17 (Sept.~7, 2017).} After the June~9 meeting, Goldstone apologized to Trump~Jr.% 743 @@ -1782,32 +1772,32 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 745 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}; The week after the June~9 meeting, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced the Russian hack of the DNC\null. -See Volume~I, Section~III.B.2, \textit{supra}. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.2.2}{Volume~I, Section~III.B.2}, \textit{supra}. \blackout{Grand Jury} (and one text message shows) that, shortly after the DNC announcement, Goldstone made comments connecting the DNC hacking announcement to the June~9 meeting. -\blackout{Grand Jury}; OSC-KAV\_00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov \& Kaveladze (10:09~a.m.)). +\blackout{Grand Jury}; OSC-KAV\_00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.~Agalarov \& Kaveladze (10:09~a.m.)). The investigation did not identify evidence connecting the events of June~9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation. -OSC-KAV\_00029--30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov).} +OSC-KAV\_00029--30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.~Agalarov).} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 746 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze to report in after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras Agalarov called him.% 747 \footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze \blackout{Grand Jury}} -With Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was not with lawyers and they were "preaching to the wrong crowd."% 748 +With Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was not with lawyers and they were ``preaching to the wrong crowd.''% 748 \footnote{Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at~8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze \blackout{Grand Jury}. -On June~14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June~9 meeting had gone, and Kaveladze responded, "meeting was boring. -The Russians did not have any bad info on Hilary." -OSC-KAV\_00257 (6/14/16 Email, I. Kaveladze to A. Kaveladze; \blackout{Grand Jury}).} +On June~14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June~9 meeting had gone, and Kaveladze responded, ``meeting was boring. +The Russians did not have any bad info on Hilary [sic].'' +OSC-KAV\_00257 (6/14/16 Email, I.~Kaveladze to A.~Kaveladze; \blackout{Grand Jury}).} \paragraph{Post-June~9 Events} Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the Magnitsky Act.% 749 \footnote{Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at~11; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -On November~23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another meeting "with T people" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on June~9.% 750 +On November~23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another meeting ``with T people'' and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on June~9.% 750 \footnote{OSC-KAV\_00138 1/23/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that "Mr.~A," which Goldstone understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.% 751 +Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that ``Mr.~A,'' which Goldstone understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.% 751 \footnote{RG000196 (11/26--29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone \& Kaveladze); \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Goldstone emailed the document to Rhona Graff, saying that "Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. -If needed, a lawyer representing the case is in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team."% 752 +Goldstone emailed the document to Rhona Graff, saying that ``Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. +If needed, a lawyer representing the case is in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team.''% 752 \footnote{Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at~11; \blackout{Grand Jury}; 57700118 (11/28/16 Email, Goldstone to Graff).} According to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but Goldstone did not make the request.% 753 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1817,30 +1807,30 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} On approximately June~2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization, about his participation in the June~9 meeting.% 755 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's name to Garten, identifying her as the "woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting from Moscow."% 756 +The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's name to Garten, identifying her as the ``woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting from Moscow.''% 756 \footnote{RG000256 (6/2/17 Email, Goldstone to Garten).} Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel for Trump~Jr.).% 757 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -On June~27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject "Trump attorneys" and stated that he was "interviewed by attorneys" about the June~9 meeting who were "concerned because it links Don Jr.\ to officials from Russia---which he has always denied meeting."% 758 -\footnote{RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov)} -Goldstone stressed that he "did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible meeting."% 759 -\footnote{RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov). \blackout{Grand Jury}} +On June~27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject ``Trump attorneys'' and stated that he was ``interviewed by attorneys'' about the June~9 meeting who were ``concerned because it links Don Jr.\ to officials from Russia---which he has always denied meeting.''% 758 +\footnote{RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E.~Agalarov).} +Goldstone stressed that he ``did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible meeting.''% 759 +\footnote{RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E.~Agalarov). \blackout{Grand Jury}} Emin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze.% 760 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_01190 (6/27/17 Text Message, E. Agalarov to Kaveladze).} +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_01190 (6/27/17 Text Message, E.~Agalarov to Kaveladze).} The June~9 meeting became public in July 2017. -In a July~9, 2017 text message to Emin Agalarov, Goldstone wrote "I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,"% 761 -\footnote{RG000286--87 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E. Agalarov \& Goldstone); \blackout{Grand Jury}} -and "[i]f contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of it."% 762 +In a July~9, 2017 text message to Emin Agalarov, Goldstone wrote ``I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,''% 761 +\footnote{RG000286--87 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E.~Agalarov \& Goldstone); \blackout{Grand Jury}} +and ``[i]f contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of it.''% 762 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} -Goldstone added, "FBI now investigating," and "I hope this favor was worth for your dad---it could blow up."% 763 +Goldstone added, ``FBI now investigating,'' and ``I hope this favor was worth for your dad---it could blow up.''% 763 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique} \blackout{Grand Jury}} -On July~12, 2017 Emin Agalarov c[ommented] to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, "never listens" to him and that their relationship with "mr T has been thrown down the drain."% 764 -\footnote{OSC-KAV\_01197 (7/11--12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze \& E. Agalarov); \blackout{Grand Jury}} -The next month, Goldstone commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June~9 meeting had generated, stating that his "reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do."% 765 +On July~12, 2017 Emin Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, ``never listens'' to him and that their relationship with ``mr T has been thrown down the drain.''% 764 +\footnote{OSC-KAV\_01197 (7/11--12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze \& E.~Agalarov); \blackout{Grand Jury}} +The next month, Goldstone commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June~9 meeting had generated, stating that his ``reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do.''% 765 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} -Goldstone added, "I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. -So am painted as some mysterious link to Putin."% 766 +Goldstone added, ``I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. +So am painted as some mysterious link to Putin.''% 766 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} After public reporting on the June~9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump Organization again reached out to participants. @@ -1849,7 +1839,7 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} \begin{quote} As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have read by Donald Trump~Jr.\ are 100\% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time and Don was never told Ms.~Veselnitskaya's name prior to the meeting. -Ms.~Veselnitskaya mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted 20 to 30 minutes at most. +Ms.~Veselnitskaya mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted 20 to 30~minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the meeting.% 767 \footnote{7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas \& Garten.} \end{quote} @@ -1858,8 +1848,8 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} the statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was \blackout{Grand Jury}% 768 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been asked "by [his] client in Moscow---Emin Agalarov---to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump~Jr. -The lawyer had apparently stated that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr.~Trump~Jr.\ might find interesting."% 769 +He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been asked ``by [his] client in Moscow---Emin Agalarov---to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump~Jr. +The lawyer had apparently stated that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr.~Trump~Jr.\ might find interesting.''% 769 \footnote{7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas \& Garten.} Goldstone never released either statement.% 770 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -1874,22 +1864,22 @@ \subsubsection{June~9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower} The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya's answers but, in hindsight, recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.% 774 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -Volume~II, Section~11.G, \textit{infra}, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump~Jr., and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June~9 meeting. +\hyperlink{subsection.2.2.7}{Volume~II, Section~II.G}, \textit{infra}, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump~Jr., and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June~9 meeting. \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief and non-substantive. -During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention, J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing "lethal" assistance to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. -Gordon requested that platform committee personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only "appropriate" assistance be provided to Ukraine. -The original sponsor of the "lethal" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her (the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to dilute the language. +During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention, J.D.~Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing ``lethal'' assistance to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. +Gordon requested that platform committee personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only ``appropriate'' assistance be provided to Ukraine. +The original sponsor of the ``lethal'' assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her (the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine. -\paragraph{Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC} +\paragraph{Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D.~Gordon the Week of the RNC} -In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or "Convention").% 775 +In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or ``Convention'').% 775 \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22; Allan Smith, \textit{We Now Know More About why Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention}, Business Insider (Mar.~2, 2017).} @@ -1903,7 +1893,7 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22.} In his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with Russia.% 778 \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~9.} -During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have been asked by Kislyak.% 779 +During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have been asked by~Kislyak.% 779 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at~3.} When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet the speakers.% 780 @@ -1913,7 +1903,7 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~9.} Sessions separately spoke with between six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak.% 782 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at~3; -\textit{see also} Volume~I, Section~1V.A.4.b, \textit{supra} (explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception held on April~26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel).} +\textit{see also} \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.1.4.2}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4.b}, \textit{supra} (explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception held on April~26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel).} Although Sessions stated during interviews with the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said some things about U.S.--Russia relations.% 783 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~22.} @@ -1923,7 +1913,7 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~9--10.} They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump Campaign advisor Carter Page.% 786 \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~10; -\textit{see also} Volume~I, Section~IV.A.3.d, \textit{supra} (explaining that Page acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event). +\textit{see also} \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.1.3.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.3.d}, \textit{supra} (explaining that Page acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event). } As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant what he said in his speech about improving U.S.--Russia relations.% 787 \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~9--10.} @@ -1944,7 +1934,7 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings.% 792 \footnote{Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at~4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at~7--8.} -He told the Office that he directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.% 793 +He told the Office that he directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D.~Gordon, to take a hands-off approach and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.% 793 \footnote{Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at~4; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~10.} @@ -1952,7 +1942,7 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} \footnote{DENMAN 000001--02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021--22; Denman 12/4/17 302, at~1; Denman 6/7/17 302, at~2.} -The amendment described Russia's "ongoing military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "support" for "maintaining (and, if warranted, increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored" and for "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater coordination with NATO on defense planning."% 795 +The amendment described Russia's ``ongoing military aggression'' in Ukraine and announced ``support'' for ``maintaining (and, if warranted, increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored'' and for ``providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater coordination with NATO on defense planning.''% 795 \footnote{DENMAN 000001--02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021--22.} Gordon reviewed the proposed platform changes, including Denman's.% 796 \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~10--11.} @@ -1970,31 +1960,31 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} \footnote{Denman 6/7/17 302, at~2; Denman 12/4/17 302, at~2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at~11--12; -see Hoff 5/26/17 302, at~2.} -Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing "lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine."% 801 +\textit{see} Hoff 5/26/17 302, at~2.} +Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing ``lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine.''% 801 \footnote{Denman 6/7/17 302, at~3.} Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's views.% 802 \footnote{M. Miller 10/25/17 302, at~3.} -According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they had to clear the language and that Gordon was "talking to New York."% 803 +According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they had to clear the language and that Gordon was ``talking to New York.''% 803 \footnote{Denman 12/4/17 302, at~2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at~2.} -Denman told others that she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike "lethal defense weapons" from the proposal but that she refused.% 804 +Denman told others that she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike ``lethal defens[iv]e weapons'' from the proposal but that she refused.% 804 \footnote{Hoff 5/26/17 302, at~2.} -Demnan recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.% 805 +Denman recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.% 805 \footnote{Denman 6/7/17 302, at~2--3, 3--4; Denman 12/4/17 302, at~2.} Gordon denied having told Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter.% 806 \footnote{Gordon 2/14/19 302, at~7.} Gordon's phone records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls directly to a number associated with Trump.% 807 -\footnote{Call Records of J.D. Gordon \blackout{Grand Jury}. +\footnote{Call Records of J.D.~Gordon \blackout{Grand Jury}. Gordon stated to the Office that his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302, at~7.} And according to the President's written answers to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the platform amendment.% 808 \footnote{Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~17 (Response to Question~IV, Part~(f)).} Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in the proposed amendment. -Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation ("appropriate assistance").% 809 +Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation (``appropriate assistance'').% 809 \footnote{Gordon 2/14/19 302, at~6--7; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at~11--12; \textit{see} Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~11.} @@ -2003,20 +1993,20 @@ \subsubsection{Events at the Republican National Convention} Mashburn stated that Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that the Campaign should not intervene.% 811 \footnote{Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at~4.} -When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee changed the amendment by striking the "lethal defense weapons" language and replacing it with "appropriate assistance."% 812 +When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee changed the amendment by striking the ``lethal defens[iv]e weapons'' language and replacing it with ``appropriate assistance.''% 812 \footnote{Hoff 5/26/17 302, at~2--3; -see Denman 12/4/17 302, at~2--3; +\textit{see} Denman 12/4/17 302, at~2--3; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~11.} -Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with "appropriate assistance."% 813 +Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with ``appropriate assistance.''% 813 \footnote{Gordon 8/29/17 302, at~11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at~12.} -The subcommittee accordingly approved Denman's amendment but with the term "appropriate assistance."% 814 +The subcommittee accordingly approved Denman's amendment but with the term ``appropriate assistance.''% 814 \footnote{Hoff 5/26/17 302, at~2--3.} Gordon stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the Campaign.% 815 \footnote{Gordon 2/14/19 302, at~6.} Sam Clovis, the Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor, stated he was surprised by the change and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance.% 816 \footnote{Clovis 10/3/17 302, at~10--11.} -Mashburn stated that when he saw the word "appropriate assistance," he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn's directive not to intervene.% 817 +Mashburn stated that when he saw the word ``appropriate assistance,'' he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn's directive not to intervene.% 817 \footnote{Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at~4.} \subsubsection{Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak} @@ -2024,20 +2014,20 @@ \subsubsection{Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak} Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio---among them Sessions and Gordon---in the weeks after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination between the Campaign and the Russian government. -\paragraph{Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence} +\paragraph{Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D.~Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence} -On August~3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States wrote to Gordon "[o]n behalf of" Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon "to have breakfast/tea with the Ambassador at his residence" in Washington, D.C. the following week.% 818 -\footnote{DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [embassy\@russianembassy.org] to Gordon).} +On August~3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States wrote to Gordon ``[o]n behalf of\thinspace'' Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon ``to have breakfast/tea with the Ambassador at his residence'' in Washington, D.C. the following week.% 818 +\footnote{DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [\UseVerb{russianembassyorg}] to Gordon).} Gordon responded five days later to decline the invitation. -He wrote, "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing for the first debate with HRC\null. +He wrote, ``[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing for the first debate with HRC\null. Hope to take a raincheck for another time when things quiet down a bit. -Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador."% 819 -\footnote{DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to embassy\@russianembassy.org).} +Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador.''% 819 +\footnote{DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to \UseVerb{russianembassyorg}).} The investigation did not identify evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements to meet (or met) with Kislyak after this email. \paragraph{Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak} -Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions's Senate office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak.% 820 +Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions's Senate office about setting up a meeting with~Kislyak.% 820 \footnote{Luff 1/30/18 302, at~5.} At the time, Sessions was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity.% 821 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~23--24; @@ -2055,7 +2045,7 @@ \subsubsection{Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak} \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at~5--6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at~4--5 (stating he could not remember if election was discussed).} -The meeting lasted less than 30 minutes.% 826 +The meeting lasted less than 30~minutes.% 826 \footnote{Luff 1/30/18 302, at~6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at~5.} Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile-defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova.% 827 @@ -2064,7 +2054,7 @@ \subsubsection{Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak} Kislyak offered explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc countries that border Russia.% 828 \footnote{Luff 1/30/18 302, at~6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at~4--5.} -Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as "an interesting campaign,"% 829 +Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as ``an interesting campaign,''% 829 \footnote{Landrum 2/27/18 302, at~5.} and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign.% 830 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~23. @@ -2079,12 +2069,12 @@ \subsubsection{Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak} \footnote{Luff 1/30/18 302, at~5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at~4.} Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak extended the invitation. -After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the one-on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an "old school KGB guy."% 833 +After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the one-on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an ``old school KGB guy.''% 833 \footnote{Luff 1/30/18 302, at~5.} Neither Luff nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election.% 834 \footnote{Luff 1/30/18 302, at~6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at~4--5.} -Sessions and Landrum recalled that, after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak.% 835 +Sessions and Landrum recalled that, after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and~Kislyak.% 835 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~23.} According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama.% 836 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~23.} @@ -2105,8 +2095,8 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee,% 839 -\footnote{As noted in Volume~I, Section~III.D.1.b, \textit{supra}, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. -He has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also Transcript at~16, United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~13, 2019), Doc.~514 (``Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript'') (court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one instance).} +\footnote{As noted in \hyperlink{paragraph.1.3.4.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1.b}, \textit{supra}, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. +He has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. \textit{See also} Transcript at~16, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~13, 2019), Doc.~514 (``\textit{Manafort} 2/13/19 Transcript'') (court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one instance).} to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign---including internal polling data, although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign. @@ -2114,12 +2104,12 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August~2, 2016, in New York City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was then living in Russia. -The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. -Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing the view---which Manafort later said he shared---that the plan's success would require U.S. support to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a very minor 'wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trump]."% 840 +The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a ``backdoor'' means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. +Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing the view---which Manafort later said he shared---that the plan's success would require U.S. support to succeed: ``all that is required to start the process is a very minor `wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trump].''% 840 \footnote{The email was drafted in Kilimnik's DMP email account (in English) \blackout{Investigative Technique}} -The email also stated that if Manafort were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia "at the very top level." +The email also stated that if Manafort were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia ``at the very top level.'' -Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August~2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. +Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August~2, December 2016 (the Kilimnik email described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about the plan in written questions.% 841 \footnote{According to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~16--17 (Response to Question~IV, Part~(d)).} @@ -2128,11 +2118,11 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement.% 842 \footnote{Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The judge presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report refers at times to Manafort's statements, it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible.} -The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's purpose in sharing with Kilimnik during the campaign period. +The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's purpose in sharing internal polling data with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort \blackout{Grand Jury} -did not see a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. -As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"---a reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits. +did not see a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would be ``good for business'' and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. +As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a ``disagreement''---a reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort's credibility and our limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the time of the August~2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts. @@ -2147,16 +2137,16 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir Putin.% 843 \footnote{Dinchuk et~al., \textit{Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China}, Reuters (June~8, 2018).} -A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on "the Putin Government."% 844 +A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on ``the Putin Government.''% 844 \footnote{6/23/05 Memo, Manafort \& Davis to Deripaska \& Rothchild.} -Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.% 845 +Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as ``political risk insurance,'' and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.% 845 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~7.} Manafort's company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Deripaska as well.% 846 \footnote{Manafort 9/20/18 302, at~2--5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005--2015; Manafort Loans from Wire Transfers, 2005--2015.} -In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis. +In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners L.P. (``Pericles''), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.% 847 \footnote{Gates 3/12/18 302, at~5.} Deripaska was the sole investor.% 848 @@ -2164,7 +2154,7 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.% 849 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~9.} In particular, when the fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. -Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."% 850 +Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had ``dried up.''% 850 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~6.} According to Gates, various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute.% 851 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~9--10.} @@ -2203,11 +2193,11 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} a Russian national who previously served in the defense attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.% 858 \footnote{Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.} -Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian "spy."% 859 +Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian ``spy.''% 859 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~5.} The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.% 860 \footnote{The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings. -E.g., Gov't Opp.\ to Mot.\ to Modify, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec.~4, 2017), Doc.~73, at~2 (``\textit{Manafort} (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp.\ to Mot.\ to Modify'').} +\textit{E.g.}, Gov't Opp.\ to Mot.\ to Modify, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec.~4, 2017), Doc.~73, at~2 (``\textit{Manafort} (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp.\ to Mot.\ to Modify'').} Several pieces of the Office's evidence---including witness interviews and emails obtained through court-authorized search warrants---support that assessment: \begin{itemize} @@ -2215,9 +2205,9 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \item Kilimnik was born on April~27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union, and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.% 861 \footnote{12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S., Department of State.} Sam Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,% 862 -\footnote{Tn August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian election interference. -Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ W. Samuel Patten}, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug.~31, 2018), Doc.~6; -Statement of Offense, \textit{United States~v.\ W. Samuel Patten}, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug.~31, 2018), Doc.~7.} +\footnote{In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian election interference. +Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ W.~Samuel Patten}, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug.~31, 2018), Doc.~6; +Statement of Offense, \textit{United States~v.\ W.~Samuel Patten}, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug.~31, 2018), Doc.~7.} stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment.% 863 \footnote{Patten 5/22/18 302, at~5--6.} @@ -2237,7 +2227,7 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \footnote{Hawker 1/9/18 302, at~13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker \& Tulukbaev.} - \item Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, and Alexander van der Zwaan,% 869 + \item Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a ``spy,'' a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, and Alexander van der Zwaan,% 869 \footnote{van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Alex van der Zwaan}, 1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb.~20, 2018), Doc.~8.} an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.% 870 @@ -2254,8 +2244,8 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \subparagraph{Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign} Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August~19, 2016. -On March~29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's "Convention Manager."% 871 -\footnote{\textit{Press Release---Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort}, The American Presidency Project---U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar.~29, 2016).} +On March~29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's ``Convention Manager.''% 871 +\footnote{\textit{Press Release---Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort}, The American Presidency Project -- U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar.~29, 2016).} On May~19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy campaign chairman.% 872 \footnote{Gates 1/29/18 302, at~8; Meghan Keneally, \textit{Timeline of Manafort's role in the Trump Campaign}, ABC News (Oct.~20, 2017).} @@ -2297,18 +2287,18 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} The memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump Campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March~30, 2016, Gates emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for translation and dissemination.% 881 \footnote{3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.} -Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April~11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" the media coverage of his new role.% 882 +Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April~11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown ``our friends'' the media coverage of his new role.% 882 \footnote{4/11/16 Email, Manafort \& Kilimnik.} -Kilimnik replied, "Absolutely. -Every article." -Manafort further asked: "How do we use to get whole. -Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation seen?" -Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."% 883 +Kilimnik replied, ``Absolutely. +Every article.'' +Manafort further asked: ``How do we use to get whole. +Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation seen?'' +Kilimnik wrote back the same day, ``Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD.''% 883 \footnote{4/11/16 Email, Manafort \& Kilimnik.} -Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately \$2 million he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine.% 884 +Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be ``good for business'' and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately \$2 million he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine.% 884 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~10.} -Gates also explained to the Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against Manafort.% 885 +Gates also explained to the Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help ``confirm'' that Deripaska had dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against Manafort.% 885 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~11; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at~2.} Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways as well.% 886 @@ -2319,11 +2309,11 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May~2016 to send Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn, could share it with Ukrainian oligarchs.% 888 \footnote{Gates 1/31/18 302, at~17; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at~2. -In later interview with the Office, Gates stated that Manafort directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May~7, 2016 meeting between Manafort and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8.b.iii, \textit{infra}. +In a later interview with the Office, Gates stated that Manafort directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May~7, 2016 meeting between Manafort and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in \hyperlink{subparagraph.1.4.1.8.2.3}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8.b.iii}, \textit{infra}. Gates 11/7/18 302, at~3.} Gates understood that the information would also be shared with Deripaska, \blackout{Grand Jury}.% 889 -\footnote{Gates 9/27/18 302, Part 11, at~2; \blackout{Grand Jury}} +\footnote{Gates 9/27/18 302, Part~II, at~2; \blackout{Grand Jury}} Gates reported to the Office that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information, but Gates thought it was a way to showcase Manafort's work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the Trump Campaign ended.% 890 \footnote{Gates 2/12/18 302, at~10; Gates 1/31/18 302, at~17.} @@ -2341,8 +2331,8 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 894 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} \blackout{Grand Jury} -with multiple emails that Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016. -Those emails referenced "internal polling," described the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's role in it, and assessed Trump's prospects for victory.% 895 +with multiple emails that Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of~2016. +Those emails referenced ``internal polling,'' described the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's role in it, and assessed Trump's prospects for victory.% 895 \footnote{8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Schultz; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Marson; @@ -2356,11 +2346,11 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates's account. -For example, in response to a July~7, 2016, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort's failed Deripaska-backed investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue with our friend."% 897 +For example, in response to a July~7, 2016, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort's failed Deripaska-backed investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on ``this issue with our friend.''% 897 \footnote{7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.} -Gates stated that "our friend" likely referred to Deripaska,% 898 +Gates stated that ``our friend'' likely referred to Deripaska,% 898 \footnote{Gates 2/2/18 302, at~13.} -and Manafort told the Office that the "issue" (and "our biggest interest," as stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska--Pericles issue.% 899 +and Manafort told the Office that the ``issue'' (and ``our biggest interest,'' as stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska--Pericles issue.% 899 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~6.} Kilimnik replied: @@ -2372,7 +2362,7 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \footnote{7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort.} \end{quote} -Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to Deripaska, "that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate."% 901 +Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's ``boss,'' a reference to Deripaska, ``that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate.''% 901 \footnote{7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302, at~13.} Manafort has alleged to the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example: why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate.% 902 @@ -2411,10 +2401,10 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City on the evening of August~2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July~28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.% 912 -\footnote{7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin\@yana.kiev.ua (2:17:34~a.m.).} +\footnote{7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to \UseVerb{katrinyana} (2:17:34~a.m.).} The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.% 913 \footnote{7/99/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51~a.m.).} -In an email with a subject line "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote: +In an email with a subject line ``Black Caviar,'' Kilimnik wrote: \begin{quote} I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. @@ -2425,22 +2415,22 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \footnote{7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51~a.m.).} \end{quote} -Manafort identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as Yanukovych. +Manafort identified ``the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar'' as Yanukovych. He explained that, in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election. Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately \$30,000 to \$40,000.% 915 \footnote{Manafort 9/12/18 302, at~3.} -Manafort's identification of Yanukovych as "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow---where Yanukovych resided---when Kilimnik wrote "I met today with a guy," and with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik referred to Yanukovych as "BG," +Manafort's identification of Yanukovych as ``the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar'' is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow---where Yanukovych resided---when Kilimnik wrote ``I met today with a guy,'' and with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik referred to Yanukovych as ``BG,'' \blackout{Grand Jury}% 916 \footnote{7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; \blackout{Investigative Technique}; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July~29 email, "Tuesday [August~2] is best \dots\ Tues or weds in NYC."% 917 +Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July~29 email, ``Tuesday [August~2] is best \dots\ Tues or weds in NYC.''% 917 \footnote{7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.} -Three days later, on July~31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting "because it is a long caviar story to tell."% 918 +Three days later, on July~31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed ``about 2 hours'' for their meeting ``because it is a long caviar story to tell.''% 918 \footnote{7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.} Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August~2 at~7:30~p.m., and he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night.% 919 \footnote{7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.} Documentary evidence---including flight, phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged% 920 -\footnote{920}% TODO: Missing footnote contents +\footnote{Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik \blackout{Grand Jury}; Call Records of Rick Gates \blackout{Grand Jury}; 8/2--3/16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel Receipt.}% ---confirms the dinner took place as planned on August~2.% 921 \footnote{Deripaska's private plane also flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August~2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane were Deripaska's wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confirm that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York.} @@ -2456,7 +2446,7 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \blackout{Grand Jury} 2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, \& Fabrizio, at~3--5.} and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.% 923 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~4; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.% 924 +That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a ``backdoor'' means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.% 924 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would have asked Manafort in the August~2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the plan.% 925 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~4.} @@ -2464,7 +2454,7 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~4.} Manafort said \blackout{Grand Jury} -that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending---years later---an "urgent" request when Yanukovych needed him.% 927 +that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending---years later---an ``urgent'' request when Yanukovych needed him.% 927 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~5; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at~4.} When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on or about December~8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email.% 928 @@ -2478,9 +2468,9 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's plan to win the election.% 930 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~5.} That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal polling data. -According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.% 931 +According to Gates, it also included discussion of ``battleground'' states, which Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.% 931 \footnote{Gates 1/30/18 302, at~3, 5.} -Manafort did not refer explicitly to "battle ground" states in his telling of the August~2 discussion, +Manafort did not refer explicitly to ``battle ground'' states in his telling of the August~2 discussion, \blackout{Grand Jury}% 932 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -2495,19 +2485,19 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \paragraph{Post-Resignation Activities} -Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. +Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August~2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election. Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,% 935 \footnote{Gates 2/12/18 302, at~12.} and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. -For example, on October~21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" and that "Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way---by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."% 936 +For example, on October~21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton ``as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment'' and that ``Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way---by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members.''% 936 \footnote{NOSC00021517--20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).} -Later, in a November~5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was "really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results."% 937 +Later, in a November~5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled ``Securing the Victory,'' Manafort stated that he was ``really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory,'' and that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by ``mov[ing] immediately to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results.''% 937 \footnote{NOSC00021573--75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).} Trump was elected President on November~8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. -Manafort instead preferred to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.% 938 +Manafort instead preferred to stay on the ``outside,'' and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.% 938 \footnote{Manafort 9/12/18 302, at~1, 4--5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at~4.} Manafort appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.% 939 @@ -2525,16 +2515,16 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} Other evidence, however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin---not Manafort's counsel---had arranged the meeting between Manafort and Oganov.% 942 \footnote{Text Message, Manafort \& Kilimnik.} -Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be "not about money or Pericles" but instead "about recreating [the] old friendship"---ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska---"and talking about global politics."% 943 +Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be ``not about money or Pericles'' but instead ``about recreating [the] old friendship''---ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska---``and talking about global politics.''% 943 \footnote{Text Message, Manafort \& Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at~5.} -Manafort also replied by text that he "need[s] this finished before Jan.~20,"% 944 +Manafort also replied by text that he ``need[s] this finished before Jan.~20,''% 944 \footnote{Text Message, Manafort \& Kilimnik.} which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles before the inauguration. On January~15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T. McFarland, who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was formally appointed to that position on January~20, 2017.% 945 \footnote{1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, \& Flynn.} -Manafort's January~15 email to McFarland stated: "I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month."% 946 +Manafort's January~15 email to McFarland stated: ``I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month.''% 946 \footnote{1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, \& Flynn.} Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month.% 947 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~7.} @@ -2552,8 +2542,8 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} In that December~8 email, which Manafort acknowledged having read,% 951 \footnote{Manafort 9/11/18 302, at~6; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Kilimnik wrote, "[a]ll that is required to start the process is a very minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT"---an apparent reference to President-elect Trump---"and a decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process." -Kilimnik assured Manafort, with that authority, he "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia [Yanukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level," and that "DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration."% 952 +Kilimnik wrote, ``[a]ll that is required to start the process is a very minor `wink' (or slight push) from DT''---an apparent reference to President-elect Trump---``and a decision to authorize you to be a `special representative' and manage this process.'' +Kilimnik assured Manafort, with that authority, he ``could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia [Yanukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level,'' and that ``DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration.''% 952 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} As noted above, @@ -2568,9 +2558,9 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} \blackout{Grand Jury} On February~26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from Moscow.% 956 -\footnote{9/21/17 Email, Zatynaikoto Kilimnik.} +\footnote{9/21/17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik.} In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik on his Madrid trip and then---after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was in Madrid at the same time as him---recognized that he met him in Madrid. -Manafort said that Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to Manafort that was being conducted by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau.% 957 +Manafort said that Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called ``black ledger'' payments to Manafort that was being conducted by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau.% 957 \footnote{Manafort 9/13/18 302, at~1.} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 958 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} In resolving whether Manafort breached his cooperation plea agreement by lying to the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about, among other things, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan, including the meeting in Madrid.} @@ -2592,7 +2582,7 @@ \subsubsection{Paul Manafort} (The poll was not solely about Donbas; it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.) The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration. -Kilimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (e.g., U.S. Department of State) into the summer of 2018.% 963 +Kilimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (\textit{e.g.}, U.S. Department of State) into the summer of 2018.% 963 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} \subsection{Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts} @@ -2612,24 +2602,24 @@ \subsubsection{Immediate Post-Election Activity} At approximately 3~a.m.\ on election night, Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was calling from a number with a DC area code.% 964 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~3.} -Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the person, she could make out the words "Putin call."% 965 +Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the person, she could make out the words ``Putin call.''% 965 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~3.} Hicks told the caller to send her an email.% 966 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~3.} -The following morning, on November~9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line, "Message from Putin."% 967 +The following morning, on November~9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line, ``Message from Putin.''% 967 \footnote{NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27~a.m.)).} Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect.% 968 \footnote{NOSC00044381--82 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27~a.m.)).} -In the message, Putin offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he "look[ed] forward to working with [Trump] on leading Russian--American relations out of crisis."% 969 +In the message, Putin offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he ``look[ed] forward to working with [Trump] on leading Russian--American relations out of crisis.''% 969 \footnote{NOSC00044382 (11/9/16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump (Nov.~9, 2016) (translation)).} -Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, "Can you look into this? -Don't want to get duped but don't want to blow off Putin!"% 970 +Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, ``Can you look into this? +Don't want to get duped but don't want to blow off Putin!''% 970 \footnote{NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Hicks to Kushner (10:26~a.m.)).} Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the Russian Ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016.% 971 \footnote{Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, at~4 (Jul.~24, 2017).} -Unable to recall the Russian Ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted previously about Russia, see Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4, \textit{supra}, and asked, "What is the name of Russian ambassador?"% 972 +Unable to recall the Russian Ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted previously about Russia, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4}, \textit{supra}, and asked, ``What is the name of Russian ambassador?''% 972 \footnote{NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (10:28~a.m.)); Statement of Jared Kushner to Congressional Committees, at~4 (Jul.~24, 2017).} Kushner forwarded Simes's response---which identified Kislyak by name---to Hicks.% 973 @@ -2646,16 +2636,16 @@ \subsubsection{Immediate Post-Election Activity} Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank, described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the flurry of Russian activity.% 976 \footnote{Aven provided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer, \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as "oligarchs."% 977 +Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as ``oligarchs.''% 977 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~7.} Aven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election.% 978 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Aven said that he took these meetings seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow through.% 979 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~2--3.} As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vaino.% 980 -\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} and interview with the Office, Aven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (e.g., Official 1, Official 2). -Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's chief of staff, Vaino. -See Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug.~2, 2018) (hard copy on file).} +\footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} and interview with the Office, Aven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (\textit{e.g.}, Official~1, Official~2). +Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official~1 was Putin and Official~2 was Putin's chief of staff, Vaino. +\textit{See} Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug.~2, 2018) (hard copy on file).} According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,% 981 \footnote{At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, Aven was generally aware of the press coverage about Russian interference in the U.S. election. @@ -2678,7 +2668,7 @@ \subsubsection{Immediate Post-Election Activity} \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Aven 8/2/18 302, at~6.} According to Aven, although Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised.% 988 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~4--8; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Aven's efforts are described in Volume~I, Section~IV.B.5, \textit{infra}. +Aven's efforts are described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.2.5}{Volume~I, Section~IV.B.5}, \textit{infra}. \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration} @@ -2695,11 +2685,11 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \paragraph{Background} Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.% 990 -\footnote{Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at https://rdif.ru/Eng\_person\_dmitriev\_kirill/. -See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at https://rdif.ru/Eng\_About/.} -Dmitriev reported directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."% 991 +\footnote{Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, \textit{available at} \url{https://rdif.ru/Eng\_person\_dmitriev\_kirill/}. +\textit{See also} Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, \textit{available at} \url{https://rdif.ru/Eng\_About/}.} +Dmitriev reported directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his ``boss.''% 991 \footnote{Gerson 6/15/18 302, at~1. -See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; +\textit{See also, e.g.}, 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.} RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds.% 992 @@ -2751,7 +2741,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis Prince 4/4/18 302, at~5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~20--21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo.} -Prince and Bannon would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill key national security positions.% 1008 +Prince and Bannon would discuss, \textit{inter alia}, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill key national security positions.% 1008 \footnote{Prince 4/4/18 302, at~5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~21.} Although Prince was not formally affiliated with the transition, Nader @@ -2784,11 +2774,11 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis wrote to Dmitriev, ``Putin has won.''% 1015 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} -Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting with the "key people" in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the "[g]reat results."% 1016 +Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting with the ``key people'' in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the ``[g]reat results.''% 1016 \footnote{11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34~a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at~4.} -He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that "we want to start rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. -We understand all of the sensitivities and are not in a rush."% 1017 +He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that ``we want to start rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. +We understand all of the sensitivities and are not in a rush.''% 1017 \footnote{11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:58~p.m.).} Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign.% 1018 \footnote{Nader 1/22/18 302, at~3.} @@ -2801,7 +2791,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \footnote{11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:08~a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (3:40~p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at~5.} -Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and noted that, if there was "a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp," he ``would love to start building for the future.''% 1021 +Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and noted that, if there was ``a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp,'' he ``would love to start building for the future.''% 1021 \footnote{11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (7:10~p.m.).} Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he (Dmitriev) could meet him.% 1022 \footnote{11/10/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (5:20~a.m.).} @@ -2831,7 +2821,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming Administration officials with Nader in January or February.% 1032 \footnote{12/8/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31~a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at~11.} -Dmitriev sent Nader a list of publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump "in case they [were] helpful."% 1033 +Dmitriev sent Nader a list of publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump ``in case they [were] helpful.''% 1033 \footnote{12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31~a.m.); 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:57~a.m.).} @@ -2850,12 +2840,12 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \blackout{Grand Jury}.% 1037 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} \blackout{Grand Jury} -Nader suggested, in light of Prince's and Dmitriev meet[ing] to discuss issues of mutual concern.% 1038 +Nader suggested, in light of Prince's relationship with Transition Team officials, that Prince and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of mutual concern.% 1038 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} Prince told Nader that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team officials.% 1039 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev, and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met "with some key people within the family and inner circle"---a reference to Prince---and that he had spoken at length and positively about Dmitriev.% 1040 +After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev, and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met ``with some key people within the family and inner circle''---a reference to Prince---and that he had spoken at length and positively about Dmitriev.% 1040 \footnote{1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24~a.m.--5:26~a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at~8--9 @@ -2867,7 +2857,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him to Prince.% 1043 \footnote{1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince.} -Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions "to be used with some additional details for them" (with "them" referring to members of the incoming Administration).% 1044 +Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions ``to be used with some additional details for them'' (with ``them'' referring to members of the incoming Administration).% 1044 \footnote{1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince; \blackout{Grand Jury}} Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving them.% 1045 \footnote{Prince 5/3/18 302, at~1--3.} @@ -2882,7 +2872,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January~7, 2017.% 1050 \footnote{1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince.} -The following day, Nader wrote to Dmitriev that he had a "pleasant surprise" for him, namely that he had arranged for Dmitriev to meet "a Special Guest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince.% 1051 +The following day, Nader wrote to Dmitriev that he had a ``pleasant surprise'' for him, namely that he had arranged for Dmitriev to meet ``a Special Guest'' from ``the New Team,'' referring to Prince.% 1051 \footnote{1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05--6:10~p.m.).} Nader asked Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January~12, 2017, and Dmitriev agreed.% 1052 \footnote{1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader \& Dmitriev (6:10--7:27~p.m.).} @@ -2892,9 +2882,9 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \blackout{Grand Jury} Dmitriev was not enthusiastic about the idea of meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming Administration.% 1054 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -Nader wrote to Dmitriev, "This guy [Prince] is designated by Steve [Bannon] to meet you! +Nader wrote to Dmitriev, ``This guy [Prince] is designated by Steve [Bannon] to meet you! I know him and he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team. -His sister is now a Minister of Education."% 1055 +His sister is now a Minister of Education.''% 1055 \footnote{1/9/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:59~p.m.); Nader 1/19/18 302, at~13; \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -2913,7 +2903,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis Prince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa, with Nader present.% 1060 \footnote{1/11/17 Text Messages, Nader \& Dmitriev (5:18:24--5:37:14~p.m.); \blackout{Grand Jury}} -The initial meeting lasted approximately 30--45 minutes.% 1061 +The initial meeting lasted approximately 30--45~minutes.% 1061 \footnote{Prince 5/3/18 302, at~4; \blackout{Grand Jury}} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 1062 @@ -2945,10 +2935,10 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \footnote{Prince 4/4/18 302, at~10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at~4; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was "off the table."% 1074 +According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was ``off the table.''% 1074 \footnote{Nader 1/22/18 302, at~14; \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Nader wrote to Dmitriev that Prince had "received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately," and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons property.% 1075 +Nader wrote to Dmitriev that Prince had ``received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately,'' and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons property.% 1075 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} 1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev \& Nader (9:13:54--10:24:25~p.m.).} At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not accept any Russian involvement in Libya, because it would make the situation there much worse.% 1076 @@ -3045,11 +3035,11 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.} Gerson replied that he would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the new Administration took power, and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the Senate.% 1103 \footnote{12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.} -Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the "key person or people" were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters.% 1104 +Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the ``key person or people'' were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters.% 1104 \footnote{12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.} Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. -He noted in a text message to Gerson that if Russia was "approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can have Major Breakthroughs quickly."% 1105 +He noted in a text message to Gerson that if Russia was ``approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can have Major Breakthroughs quickly.''% 1105 \footnote{12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev \& Gerson; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at~1.} Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016 about what such a reconciliation plan would include.% 1106 @@ -3057,7 +3047,7 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis Gerson told the Office that the Transition Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his own initiative and as a private citizen.% 1107 \footnote{Gerson 6/15/18 302, at~1.} -On January~9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could "share it with Jared (or somebody else very senior in the team)---so that they know that we are focused from our side on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that."% 1108 +On January~9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could ``share it with Jared (or somebody else very senior in the team)---so that they know that we are focused from our side on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that.''% 1108 \footnote{1/9/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.} Dmitriev also asked Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time with.% 1109 @@ -3068,9 +3058,9 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis On January~16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.--Russia reconciliation that he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (1)~jointly fighting terrorism; (2)~jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; -(3)~developing "win-win" economic and investment initiatives; +(3)~developing ``win-win'' economic and investment initiatives; (4)~maintaining an honest, open, and continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and -(5)~ensuring proper communication and trust by "key people" from each country.% 1111 +(5)~ensuring proper communication and trust by ``key people'' from each country.% 1111 \footnote{1/16/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev \& Gerson.} On January~18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the document to Kushner.% 1112 \footnote{Gerson 6/5/18 302, at~3; @@ -3085,33 +3075,33 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \footnote{Gerson 6/5/18 302, at~3.} Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.% 1116 \footnote{Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~32.} -On January~19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was "a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends. -Please share with them---we believe this is a good foundation to start from."% 1117 +On January~19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was ``a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends. +Please share with them---we believe this is a good foundation to start from.''% 1117 \footnote{1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:11:56~a.m.).} Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering it.% 1118 \footnote{1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at~2.} -On January~26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his "boss"---an apparent reference to Putin---was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal.% 1119 +On January~26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his ``boss''---an apparent reference to Putin---was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal.% 1119 \footnote{1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.} -Dmitriev said, "[w]e do not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. -At the same time, my boss asked me to try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible."% 1120 +Dmitriev said, ``[w]e do not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. +At the same time, my boss asked me to try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible.''% 1120 \footnote{1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.} -He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information was "very confidential."% 1121 +He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information was ``very confidential.''% 1121 \footnote{1/96/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.} -The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his "boss" again yesterday who had "emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication channel to avoid bureaucracy."% 1122 +The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his ``boss'' again yesterday who had ``emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication channel to avoid bureaucracy.''% 1122 \footnote{1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41~p.m.).} -On January~28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted "to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I sent you in the telephone call that will happen at~12 EST,"% 1123 +On January~28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted ``to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I sent you in the telephone call that will happen at~12 EST,''% 1123 \footnote{1/28/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:05:39~a.m.).} an apparent reference to the call scheduled between President Trump and Putin. -Nader replied, "Definitely paper was so submitted to Team by Rick and me. -They took it seriously!"% 1124 +Nader replied, ``Definitely paper was so submitted to Team by Rick and me. +They took it seriously!''% 1124 \footnote{1/28/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (11:11:33~a.m.).} -After the call between President Trump and Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that "the call went very well. -My boss wants me to continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and important."% 1125 +After the call between President Trump and Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that ``the call went very well. +My boss wants me to continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and important.''% 1125 \footnote{1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:06:35~a.m.).} -Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev replied that the document they had drafted together "played an important role."% 1126 +Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev replied that the document they had drafted together ``played an important role.''% 1126 \footnote{1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.} @@ -3122,19 +3112,19 @@ \subsubsection{Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Adminis \subsubsection{Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election} On November~16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.% 1128 -\footnote{\textit{Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees} ("Kushner Stmt."), at~6 (7/24/17) (written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee).} -That same day, Vargas sent Kushner an email with the subject, "MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak\dots."% 1129 +\footnote{\textit{Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees} (``Kushner Stmt.''), at~6 (7/24/17) (written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee).} +That same day, Vargas sent Kushner an email with the subject, ``MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak\dots.''% 1129 \footnote{NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (6:44~p.m.)).} -The text of the email read, "RE: setting up a time to meet w/you on 12/1. LMK how to proceed." -Kushner responded in relevant part, "I think I do this one -- confirm with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy."% 1130 +The text of the email read, ``RE: setting up a time to meet w/you on 12/1. LMK how to proceed.'' +Kushner responded in relevant part, ``I think I do this one -- confirm with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy.''% 1130 \footnote{NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (9:54~p.m.)).} -After reaching out to a colleague of Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was "the best go-to guy for routine matters in the US," while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for "more direct/substantial matters."% 1131 +After reaching out to a colleague of Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was ``the best go-to guy for routine matters in the US,'' while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for ``more direct/substantial matters.''% 1131 \footnote{11/17/16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41~a.m.); Brown 10/13/17 302, at~4; 11/17/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (12:31:18).} -Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, see Volume~I, Section~IV.A.l.d.ii, \textit{supra}, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. -According to Foresman, at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman for his thoughts on Kislyak. +Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subparagraph.1.4.1.1.4.2}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1.d.ii}, \textit{supra}, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. +According to Foresman, at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman for his thoughts on~Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while Kislyak was an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin.% 1132 \footnote{Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~17.} Foresman subsequently traveled to Moscow, inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security advisor.% 1133 @@ -3184,7 +3174,7 @@ \subsubsection{Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov} \footnote{Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~19; Kushner Stmt.\ at~7; DJTFP\_SCO\_01442290 (12/6/16 Email, Berkowitz to \blackout{Personal Privacy}} -Although embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it "important" to "continue the conversation with Mr.~Kushner in person,"% 1149 +Although embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it ``important'' to ``continue the conversation with Mr.~Kushner in person,''% 1149 \footnote{DJTFP\_SCO\_01442290 (12/7/16 Email \blackout{Personal Privacy} to Berkowitz (12:31:39~p.m.)).} Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet instead with Berkowitz once it became apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting. @@ -3221,10 +3211,10 @@ \subsubsection{Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov} ) In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in Kushner's capacity as CEO of Kushner Companies for the purpose of discussing business, rather than as part of a diplomatic effort. -In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with Kushner as part of a series of "roadshow meetings" with "representatives of major US banks and business circles," which included "negotiations" and discussion of the "most promising business lines and sectors."% 1160 +In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with Kushner as part of a series of ``roadshow meetings'' with ``representatives of major US banks and business circles,'' which included ``negotiations'' and discussion of the ``most promising business lines and sectors.''% 1160 \footnote{Patrick Reevell \& Matthew Mosk, \textit{Russian Banker Sergey Gorkov Brushes off Questions About Meeting with Jared Kushner}, ABC News (June~1, 2017).} -Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume~l, Sections~IV.A.I and IV.B.3, \textit{supra}, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner.% 1161 +Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Sections~IV.A.1} and~\hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.2.3}{IV.B.3}, \textit{supra}, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner.% 1161 \footnote{Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~14--15.} According to Foresman, Gorkov and Tsekhomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss post-election issues with U.S. financial institutions, that their trip was sanctioned by Putin, and that they would be reporting back to Putin upon their return.% 1162 \footnote{Foresman 10/17/18 302, at~15--16.} @@ -3232,7 +3222,7 @@ \subsubsection{Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov} The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused on business (as VEB's public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting. -Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, "Hi, please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"% 1163 +Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, ``Hi, please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!''% 1163 \footnote{AKIN\_GUMP\_BERKOWITZ\_0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (9:56~a.m.)).} Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts.% 1164 \footnote{AKIN\_GUMP\_BERKOWITZ\_0000011--15 (12/19/16--2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko \& Berkowitz).} @@ -3243,7 +3233,7 @@ \subsubsection{Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov} \subsubsection{Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team} -In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume~I, Section~IV.B.1.b, \textit{supra}, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate "all-hands" oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen.% 1167 +In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.2.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~IV.B.1.b}, \textit{supra}, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate ``all-hands'' oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen.% 1167 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~7; \blackout{Grand Jury}} As in Aven's one-on-one meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions.% 1168 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -3252,7 +3242,7 @@ \subsubsection{Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team} Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L1), another company headed by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank.% 1169 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Aven 8/2/18 302, at~6.} -Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Ll was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries.% 1170 +Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his primary roles with Alfa-Bank and L1 was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries.% 1170 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury} Aven 8/2/18 302, at~6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at~2.} @@ -3263,7 +3253,7 @@ \subsubsection{Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team} Although Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven's request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven.% 1173 \footnote{Burt 2/9/18 302, at~4.} -Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4, \textit{supra}),% 1174 +Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.4}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4}, \textit{supra}),% 1174 \footnote{Burt 2/9/18 302, at~5.} decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven's request, recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner.% 1175 \footnote{Burt 2/9/18 302, at~3.} @@ -3294,13 +3284,13 @@ \subsubsection{Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team} \footnote{12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23~p.m.).} \end{quote} -According to Burt, the "very influential person" referenced in his email was Simes, and the reference to a "trusted third party" was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. -"Project~A" was a term that Burt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential election.% 1182 +According to Burt, the ``very influential person'' referenced in his email was Simes, and the reference to a ``trusted third party'' was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. +``Project~A'' was a term that Burt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential election.% 1182 \footnote{Burt 2/9/18 302, at~3.} -According to Burt, his report that there was "interest" in a communications channel reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt acknowledged that he added some "hype" to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed.% 1183 +According to Burt, his report that there was ``interest'' in a communications channel reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt acknowledged that he added some ``hype'' to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed.% 1183 \footnote{Burt 2/9/18 302, at~3--4.} -Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying "Thank you. All clear."% 1184 +Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying ``Thank you. All clear.''% 1184 \footnote{12/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22~p.m.).} According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue.% 1185 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~7.} @@ -3319,7 +3309,7 @@ \subsubsection{Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team} Putin continued to inquire about Aven's efforts to connect to the Trump Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings.% 1191 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI\null.% 1192 +Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the~FBI\null.% 1192 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~8.} As part of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration.% 1193 \footnote{Aven 8/2/18 302, at~8; \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -3337,12 +3327,12 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich} \blackout{Grand Jury}% 1196 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort's associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump. -In a December~8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, "Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine."% 1197 +In a December~8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, ``Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine.''% 1197 \footnote{\blackout{Investigative Technique}} On December~9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej Krickovic.% 1198 \footnote{Page 3/16/17 302, at~3; -Page 3/30/17 302, at~8} +Page 3/30/17 302, at~8.} Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page.% 1199 \footnote{Weber 7/28/17 302, at~4; Page 3/16/17 302, at~3; @@ -3369,12 +3359,12 @@ \subsubsection{Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich} \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team's primary conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian government's reaction to the United States's imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the 2016 election.% 1207 -\footnote{As discussed further in Volume~I, Section~V.C.4, \textit{infra}, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \S~1001, about these communications with Ambassador Kislyak. +\footnote{As discussed further in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.5.3.4}{Volume~I, Section~V.C.4}, \textit{infra}, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \S~1001, about these communications with Ambassador Kislyak. Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael T. Flynn}, No.~1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.~1, 2017), Doc.~3. Flynn's plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and~2018.} Despite Kushner's conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside the Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn's relationship with Kislyak on both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland, his incoming deputy, to prepare for his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior members of the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. -Although transition officials at Mar-a-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. +Although transition officials at Mar-a-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to~Kislyak. Flynn asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December~29, 2016, and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request. \paragraph{United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements} @@ -3397,7 +3387,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at~3; 12/22/16 Email, Kushner to Flynn; -12/22/16 Email, McFarland to \blackout{Personal Privacy} et al.} +12/22/16 Email, McFarland to \blackout{Personal Privacy} et~al.} Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December~22, Flynn called Kislyak.% 1214 \footnote{Flynn 11/16/17 302, at~13; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn \blackout{Grand Jury}} @@ -3415,7 +3405,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian government through Kislyak.% 1219 \footnote{Flynn 11/16/17 302, at~12--14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at~3; -12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushner et al.} +12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushner et~al.} When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it.% 1220 \footnote{\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(g).} The resolution later passed 14--0, with the United States abstaining.% 1221 @@ -3443,11 +3433,11 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3.} Although the details and timing of sanctions were unknown on December~28, 2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory measures from the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming.% 1227 \footnote{Christine Wang, \textit{US to announce new sanctions against Russia in response to election hacking}, CNBC (Dec.~28, 2016).} -When asked about imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election, President-Elect Trump told the media, "I think we ought to get on with our lives."% 1228 +When asked about imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election, President-Elect Trump told the media, ``I think we ought to get on with our lives.''% 1228 \footnote{John Wagner, \textit{Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: ``Get on with our lives''}, Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016).} Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. -On the evening of December~28, 2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, "can you kindly call me back at your convenience."% 1229 +On the evening of December~28, 2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, ``can you kindly call me back at your convenience.''% 1229 \footnote{SF000006 (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn).} Flynn did not respond to the text message that evening. Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn the next morning, at 10:38~a.m., but they did not talk.% 1230 @@ -3457,8 +3447,8 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~2--3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~4--5.} At 1:53~p.m.\ that day, McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about the impact the sanctions would have on the incoming Administration.% 1232 -\footnote{12/29/16 Email, McFarland to O'Brien et al.; -12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.} +\footnote{12/29/16 Email, McFarland to O'Brien et~al.; +12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et~al.} At 2:07~p.m., a Transition Team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions.% 1233 \footnote{SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn).} At 2:29~p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk.% 1234 @@ -3471,20 +3461,20 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~6.} McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.% 1238 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~6.} -At 3:14~p.m., Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, "Time for a call???"% 1239 +At 3:14~p.m., Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, ``Time for a call???''% 1239 \footnote{SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).} -The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded, "Tit for tat w Russia not good. -Russian AMBO reaching out to me today."% 1240 +The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded, ``Tit for tat w Russia not good. +Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.''% 1240 \footnote{SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).} Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.% 1241 \footnote{Flynn 11/20/17 302, at~3.} He first spoke with Michael Ledeen,% 1242 -\footnote{Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate Hillary Clinton's missing emails are described in Volume~I, Section~III.D.2, \textit{supra}.} -a Transition Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes.% 1243 +\footnote{Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate Hillary Clinton's missing emails are described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.4.2}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.2}, \textit{supra}.} +a Transition Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20~minutes.% 1243 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3; Call Records of Michael Ledeen \blackout{Grand Jury}} -Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.% 1244 +Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20~minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.% 1244 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3--4; \textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(c); Call Records of K.T. McFarland \blackout{Grand Jury}; @@ -3494,30 +3484,30 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3--4.} McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.% 1246 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3--4; -Flynn Statement of Offense \P~3(c); +\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(c); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~6--7.} They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand.% 1247 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~6--7.} -Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak.% 1248 -\footnote{Flynn Statement of Offense \P~3(d).} +Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with~Kislyak.% 1248 +\footnote{\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(d).} Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming terrorism conference, and Russia's views about the Middle East.% 1249 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3--4; -Flynn Statement of Offense \P~3(c); +\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(c); 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland.} -With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a "tit for tat," and only respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner.% 1250 +With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a ``tit for tat,'' and only respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner.% 1250 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~1; -Flynn Statement of Offense \P~3(d).} +\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(d).} Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that day. -In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43~p.m., McFarland sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that "Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening."% 1251 -\footnote{12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.} +In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43~p.m., McFarland sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that ``Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening.''% 1251 +\footnote{12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et~al.} Less than an hour later, McFarland briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members were present.% 1252 \footnote{12/29/16 Email, Westerhout to Flaherty; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7.} -During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did "it," meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election.% 1253 +During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did ``it,'' meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election.% 1253 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7.} McFarland said yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.% 1254 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7.} @@ -3532,7 +3522,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7.} Flynn reported on the substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions.% 1259 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~4; -Flynn Statement of Offense \P~3(e).} +\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(e).} According to McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration.% 1260 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7.} McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump.% 1261 @@ -3542,23 +3532,23 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{\textit{Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of Russian diplomats, Moscow, December~20, 2016}, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Dec.~30, 2016 (5:32~a.m.)).} Putin superseded that comment two hours later, releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time.% 1263 \footnote{\textit{Statement of the President of the Russian Federation}, Kremlin, Office of the President (Dec.~30, 2016 (7:15~a.m,)).} -Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)."% 1264 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41~a.m.) Tweet.} +Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, ``Great move on delay (by V.~Putin).''% 1264 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 12/30/16 (11:41~a.m.) Tweet.} Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition Team members.% 1265 \footnote{12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; -12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.} -The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed with Kislyak.% 1266 -\footnote{12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.} +12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et~al.} +The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed with~Kislyak.% 1266 +\footnote{12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et~al.} Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's foreign policy.% 1267 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~4.} On December~31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the request.% 1268 -\footnote{Call Records of Michael T. \blackout{Grand Jury}; +\footnote{Call Records of Michael T. Flynn \blackout{Grand Jury}; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~1; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at~3; -Flynn Statement of Offense \P~3(g).} -Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with Kislyak.% 1269 -\footnote{Call Records of Michael T. \blackout{Grand Jury}; +\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense \P~3(g).} +Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with~Kislyak.% 1269 +\footnote{Call Records of Michael T. Flynn \blackout{Grand Jury}; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~5; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at~3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~10.} @@ -3570,7 +3560,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~10.} Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.% 1273 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~5--6.} -Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak.% 1274 +Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with~Kislyak.% 1274 \footnote{Flynn 11/21/17 302, at~1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at~3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at~5; @@ -3578,7 +3568,7 @@ \subsubsection{Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn} Bannon, for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said that he did not remember discussing sanctions with him.% 1275 \footnote{Bannon 2/12/18 302, at~9.} -Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided in Volume~II of this report. +Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided in \hyperref[chap:volume-2]{Volume~II} of this report. \hr diff --git a/src/volume-2/background-principles.tex b/src/volume-2/background-principles.tex index 47537f7..05e321b 100644 --- a/src/volume-2/background-principles.tex +++ b/src/volume-2/background-principles.tex @@ -1,21 +1,22 @@ \section{Background Legal and Evidentiary Principles} +\markboth{Background Legal and Evidentiary Principles}{Background Legal and Evidentiary Principles} \subsection{Legal Framework of Obstruction Of Justice} -The May~17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this Office with jurisdiction to investigate ``federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.'' +\hyperlink{section.3.1}{The May~17, 2017 Appointment Order} and the Special Counsel regulations provide this Office with jurisdiction to investigate ``federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.'' 28~C.F.R. \S~600.4(a). Because of that description of our jurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. -See Justice Manual \S~9-27.000 et seq.~(2018). +\textit{See} Justice Manual \S~9-27.000 \textit{et seq.}~(2018). Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President. -Those issues are discussed in a later section of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised. See Volume~II, Section III.B, \textit{infra}. +Those issues are discussed in a later section of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised. \textit{See} \hyperlink{subsection.2.3.2}{Volume~II, Section~III.B}, \textit{infra}. Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: (1)~an obstructive act; (2)~a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3)~a corrupt intent. -See, e.g., 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1503, 1505,~1512(c)(2). +\textit{See, e.g.}, 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1503, 1505,~1512(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have been interpreted by the courts. -We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering, see 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to obstruct justice, see 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1503,~1512(c)(2). +We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering, \textit{see} 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to obstruct justice, \textit{see} 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1503,~1512(c)(2). \subsubsection*{Obstructive act.} @@ -23,24 +24,24 @@ \subsubsection*{Obstructive act.} \textit{United States~v.\ Silverman}, 745~F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th~Cir.~1984) (interpreting 18~U.S.C. \S~1503). An ``effort to influence'' a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct justice even if the effort was ``subtle or circuitous'' and ``however cleverly or with whatever cloaking of purpose'' it was made. \textit{United States~v.\ Roe}, 529~F.2d 629, 632 (4th~Cir.~1975); -see also \textit{United States~v.\ Quattrone}, 441~F.3d 153, 173 (2d~Cir.~2006). +\textit{see also United States~v.\ Quattrone}, 441~F.3d 153, 173 (2d~Cir.~2006). The verbs ``\thinspace`obstruct or impede' are broad'' and ``can refer to anything that blocks, makes difficult, or hinders.'' -\textit{Marinello~v.\ United States}, 138~S. Ct.~1101, 1106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). +\textit{Marinello~v.\ United States}, 138~S.~Ct.\ 1101, 1106~(2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. -See \textit{United States~v.\ Cueto}, 151~F.3d 620, 631 (7th~Cir.~1998) (affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for ``litigation related conduct''); \textit{United States~v.\ Cintolo}, 818~F.2d 980, 992 (1st~Cir.~1987) (``any act by any party---whether lawful or unlawful on its face---may abridge \S~1503 if performed with a corrupt motive''). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Cueto}, 151~F.3d 620, 631 (7th~Cir.~1998) (affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for ``litigation related conduct''); \textit{United States~v.\ Cintolo}, 818~F.2d 980, 992 (1st~Cir.~1987) (``any act by any party---whether lawful or unlawful on its face---may abridge \S~1503 if performed with a corrupt motive''). \subsubsection*{Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding.} Obstruction-of-justice law generally requires a nexus, or connection, to an official proceeding. In Section~1503, the nexus must be to pending ``judicial or grand jury proceedings.'' -\textit{United States~v.\ Aguilar}, 515~U.S. 593, 599 (1995). +\textit{United States~v.\ Aguilar}, 515~U.S. 593, 599~(1995). In Section~1505, the nexus can include a connection to a ``pending'' federal agency proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must demonstrate ``a relationship in time, causation, or logic'' between the obstructive act and the proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. -\textit{Id.}~at~599; \textit{see also Arthur Andersen LLP~v.\ United States}, 544~U.S. 696, 707--708 (2005). +\textit{Id.}~at~599; \textit{see also Arthur Andersen LLP~v.\ United States}, 544~U.S. 696, 707--708~(2005). Section~1512(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18~U.S.C. \S~1515(a)(1)(A). -``For purposes of'' Section~1512, ``an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.'' +``For purposes of\thinspace'' Section~1512, ``an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.'' 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(f)(1). Although a proceeding need not already be in progress to trigger liability under Section~1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must be shown. \textit{United States~v.\ Young}, 916~F.3d 368, 386 (4th~Cir.~2019); @@ -66,17 +67,17 @@ \subsubsection*{Corruptly.} The word ``corruptly'' provides the intent element for obstruction of justice and means acting ``knowingly and dishonestly'' or ``with an improper motive.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Richardson}, 676~F.3d 491, 508 (5th~Cir.~2012); \textit{United States~v.\ Gordon}, 710~F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th~Cir.~2013) (to act corruptly means to ``act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct'' the relevant proceeding) (some quotation marks omitted); -see 18~U.S.C. \S~1515(b) (``As used in section 1505, the term `corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another.''); +\textit{see} 18~U.S.C. \S~1515(b) (``As used in section 1505, the term `corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another.''); \textit{see also Arthur Andersen}, 544~U.S. at~705--706 (interpreting ``corruptly'' to mean ``wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil'' and holding that acting ``knowingly \dots\ corruptly'' in 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(b) requires ``consciousness of wrongdoing''). The requisite showing is made when a person acted with an intent to obtain an ``improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.'' -BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed.~1969); +\textsc{Ballentine's Law Dictionary} 276 (3d ed.~1969); \textit{see United States~v.\ Pasha}, 797~F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C.~Cir.~2015); -\textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the ``longstanding and well-accepted meaning''of ``corruptly''). +\textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~616 (Scalia,~J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the ``longstanding and well-accepted meaning'' of ``corruptly''). \subsubsection*{Witness tampering.} A more specific provision in Section~1512 prohibits tampering with a witness. -See 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(b)(1), (3) (making it a crime to ``knowingly use[] intimidation \dots\ or corruptly persuade[] another person,'' or ``engage[] in misleading conduct towards another person,'' with the intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding'' or to ``hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer \dots\ of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense''). +\textit{See} 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(b)(1), (3) (making it a crime to ``knowingly use[] intimidation \dots\ or corruptly persuade[] another person,'' or ``engage[] in misleading conduct towards another person,'' with the intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding'' or to ``hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer \dots\ of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense''). To establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. \textit{United States~v.\ Edlind}, 887~F.3d 166, 174 (4th~Cir.~2018); \textit{United States~v.\ Sparks}, 791~F.3d 1188, 1191--1192 (10th~Cir.~2015); @@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ \subsubsection*{Witness tampering.} \subsubsection*{Attempts and endeavors.} Section 1512(c)(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that constitutes a substantial step towards that goal. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Resendiz-Ponce}, 549~U.S. 102, 106--107 (2007). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Resendiz-Ponce}, 549~U.S. 102, 106--107~(2007). ``[T]he act [must be] substantial, in that it was strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal purpose.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Pratt}, 351~F.3d 131, 135 (4th~Cir.~2003). While ``mere abstract talk'' does not suffice, any ``concrete and specific'' acts that corroborate the defendant's intent can constitute a ``substantial step.'' @@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ \subsection{Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations} \item The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June~9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton. \end{enumerate} -Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional principles (discussed below in Volume~II, Section~III, \textit{infra}), we determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the President. +Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional principles (discussed below in \hyperlink{section.2.3}{Volume~II, Section~III}, \textit{infra}), we determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the President. Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual's actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary evidence in its possession on the relevant events. @@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ \subsection{Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations} Ultimately, while we believed that we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President's testimony, we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such an investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed that based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions, we had sufficient evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President's testimony. -The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in Appendix C, \textit{infra}, in a note that precedes the President's written responses. +The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in \hyperlink{section.3.3}{Appendix~C}, \textit{infra}, in a note that precedes the President's written responses. In assessing the evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. @@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ \subsection{Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations} Circumstantial evidence that illuminates intent may include a pattern of potentially obstructive acts. Fed.~R. Evid.~404(b) (``Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act \dots\ may be admissible \dots\ [to] prov[e] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.''); \textit{see, e.g., United States~v.\ Frankhauser}, 80~F.3d 641, 648--650 (1st~Cir.~1996); \textit{United States~v.\ Arnold}, 773~F.2d 823, 832--834 (7th~Cir.~1985); -Cintolo, 818~F.2d at~1000. +\textit{Cintolo}, 818~F.2d at~1000. Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial evidence. Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in assessing credibility. @@ -181,15 +182,15 @@ \subsection{Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations} whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events about which he testified; whether the witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses; and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. -\textit{See, e.g., First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions} \S~1.06 (2018); -\textit{Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases)} \S~1.08 (2012); -\textit{Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction} \S~3.01 (2012). +\textit{See, e.g., First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions} \S~1.06~(2018); +\textit{Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases)} \S~1.08~(2012); +\textit{Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction} \S~3.01~(2012). In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specific factors in assessing the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes can provide strong corroborating evidence. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Nobles}, 422~U.S. 225, 232 (1975) (the fact that a ``statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report \dots\ would tend strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview''). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Nobles}, 422~U.S. 225, 232~(1975) (the fact that a ``statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report \dots\ would tend strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview''). Similarly, a witness's recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's credibility. -\textit{See Tome~v.\ United States}, 513~U.S. 150, 158 (1995) (``A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive.''). +\textit{See Tome~v.\ United States}, 513~U.S. 150, 158~(1995) (``A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive.''). Finally, a witness's false description of an encounter can imply consciousness of wrongdoing. \textit{See Al-Adahi~v.\ Obama}, 613~F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C.~Cir.~2010) (noting the ``well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence---often strong evidence---of guilt''). We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of our investigation. diff --git a/src/volume-2/conclusion.tex b/src/volume-2/conclusion.tex index d82fa0b..4740e4b 100644 --- a/src/volume-2/conclusion.tex +++ b/src/volume-2/conclusion.tex @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ \section{Conclusion} +\markboth{Conclusion}{Conclusion} Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making traditional prosecutorial judgment. diff --git a/src/volume-2/executive-summary.tex b/src/volume-2/executive-summary.tex index 19d8001..bc234e4 100644 --- a/src/volume-2/executive-summary.tex +++ b/src/volume-2/executive-summary.tex @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ \subsubsection*{The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Tru \subsubsection*{Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn.} -In mid-January 2017, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. +In mid-January~2017, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27, the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President requested Flynn's resignation, the President told an outside advisor, ``Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over.'' The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ \subsubsection*{Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn.} Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said, ``I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go.'' -Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. +Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with~Kislyak. McFarland declined because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel's Office attorney thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. \subsubsection*{The President's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation.} @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ \subsubsection*{The President's termination of Comey.} The President insisted that the termination letter, which was written for public release, state that Comey had informed the President that he was not under investigation. The day of the firing, the White House maintained that Comey's termination resulted from independent recommendations from the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Comey should be discharged for mishandling the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But the President had decided to fire Comey before hearing from the Department of Justice. -The day after firing Comey, the President told Russian officials that he had ``faced great pressure because of Russia,'' which had been ``taken off by Comey's firing. +The day after firing Comey, the President told Russian officials that he had ``faced great pressure because of Russia,'' which had been ``taken off\thinspace'' by Comey's firing. The next day, the President acknowledged in a television interview that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendation and that when he ``decided to just do it,'' he was thinking that ``this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story.'' In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, the President said, ``As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly,'' adding that firing Comey ``might even lengthen out the investigation.'' @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ \subsubsection*{Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence.} In the summer of 2017, the President learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June~9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump~Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as ``part of Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump.'' On several occasions, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. -Before the emails became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump~Jr. by deleting a line that acknowledged that the meeting was with ``an individual who [Trump~Jr.] was told might have information helpful to the campaign'' and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions of Russian children. +Before the emails became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump~Jr.\ by deleting a line that acknowledged that the meeting was with ``an individual who [Trump~Jr.] was told might have information helpful to the campaign'' and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions of Russian children. When the press asked questions about the President's involvement in Trump~Jr.'s statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any role. \subsubsection*{Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation.} @@ -101,11 +101,11 @@ \subsubsection*{Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him t In the same meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle. -\subsubsection*{Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$: HOM]} +\subsubsection*{Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, [\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the President and began cooperating with the government, the President's personal counsel left a message for Flynn's attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn, which he said ``still remains,'' and asking for a ``heads up'' if Flynn knew ``information that implicates the President.'' When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn's actions reflected ``hostility'' towards the President. -During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal, trial was deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. +During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal trial was deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called Manafort ``a brave man'' for refusing to ``break'' and said that ``flipping'' ``almost ought to be outlawed.'' \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ \subsubsection*{Overarching factual issues.} We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about these facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President's conduct. Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-of-justice cases. -First, the investigation concerned the President, and some of his actions, such as firing the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises constitutional issues discussed below. +First, the investigation concerned the President, and some of his actions, such as firing the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article~II authority, which raises constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the President's position as the head of the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses---all of which is relevant to a potential obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ \subsubsection*{Overarching factual issues.} At that point, the President engaged in a second phase of conduct, involving public attacks on the investigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence. -\subsection{Statutory and Constitutional Defenses} +\subsection*{Statutory and Constitutional Defenses} The President's counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts. @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ \subsection{Statutory and Constitutional Defenses} \subsubsection*{Statutory defenses.} Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general approach to interpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here. -See 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3),~1512(c)(2). +\textit{See} 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3),~1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or contemplated official proceedings. No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections 1503 and~1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury, judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they are supplemented by a provision in Section~1512(b) aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime. @@ -158,14 +158,14 @@ \subsubsection*{Constitutional defenses.} As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. -With respect to whether the President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the Constitution, we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice. +With respect to whether the President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article~II of the Constitution, we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice. -Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers. +Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article~II powers. The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including those of courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regardless of their source. We also concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term ``corruptly'' sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. -A preclusion of ``corrupt'' official action does not diminish the President's ability to exercise Article II powers. +A preclusion of ``corrupt'' official action does not diminish the President's ability to exercise Article~II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. diff --git a/src/volume-2/factual-results.tex b/src/volume-2/factual-results.tex index deed48b..2b8ed90 100644 --- a/src/volume-2/factual-results.tex +++ b/src/volume-2/factual-results.tex @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ \section{Factual Results of the Obstruction Investigation} +\markboth{Factual Results of the Obstruction Investigation}{Factual Results of the Obstruction Investigation} This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump responded. @@ -12,56 +13,56 @@ \section{Factual Results of the Obstruction Investigation} We focus on elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has ``jurisdiction \dots\ to investigate \dots\ federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.'' 28~C.F.R. \S~600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and analyzed them within an elements framework---while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimes were committed, for the reasons explained above. -This section also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those defenses are analyzed in Volume~II, Section~III, \textit{infra}. +This section also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those defenses are analyzed in \hyperlink{section.2.3}{Volume~II, Section~III}, \textit{infra}. \subsection{The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump} During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a possible connection between the Trump Campaign and Russia.% 7 \footnote{This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. -Volume~I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media during the campaign.} +\hyperref[chap:volume-1]{Volume~I} of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media during the campaign.} The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement in Russia---even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.% 8 -\footnote{As discussed in Volume~I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.} +\footnote{As discussed in \hyperref[chap:volume-1]{Volume~I}, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.} \subsubsection{Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia} On June~16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the Republican candidate for President.% 9 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/16/15 (11:57~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/16/15 (11:57~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} By early 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia,% 10 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec.~20, 2015) (Trump: "I think it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along"); -\textit{Presidential Candidate Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South Carolina}, C-SPAN (Feb.~15, 2016) ("You want to make a good deal for the country, you want to deal with Russia.").} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec.~20, 2015) (Trump: ``I think it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along.''); +\textit{Presidential Candidate Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South Carolina}, C-SPAN (Feb.~15, 2016) (``You want to make a good deal for the country, you want to deal with Russia.'').} saying he would get along well with Russian President Vladimir Putin,% 11 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360~Degrees}, CNN (July~8, 2015) ("I think I get along with [Putin] fine."); -Andrew Rafferty, \textit{Trump Says He Would "Get Along Very Well" With Putin}, NBC (July~30, 2015), (quoting Trump as saying, "I think T would get along very well with Vladimir Putin.").} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360~Degrees}, CNN (July~8, 2015) (``I think I get along with [Putin] fine.''); +Andrew Rafferty, \textit{Trump Says He Would ``Get Along Very Well'' With Putin}, NBC (July~30, 2015), (quoting Trump as saying, ``I think I would get along very well with Vladimir Putin.'').} questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete,% 12 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, \@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47~a.m.~ET); -\@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:59~a.m.~ET).} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, \UseVerb{DJT} Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47~a.m.~ET); +\UseVerb{DJT} Tweet 3/24/16 (7:59~a.m.~ET).} and praising Putin as a ``strong leader.''% 13 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec.~20, 2015) ("[Putin] is a strong leader. +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec.~20, 2015) (``[Putin] is a strong leader. What am I gonna say, he's a weak leader? -He's making mince meat out of our President."); -\textit{Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia, Ohio}, C-SPAN (Mar.~12, 2016) ("I said [Putin] was a strong leader, which he is. +He's making mince meat out of our President.''); +\textit{Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia, Ohio}, C-SPAN (Mar.~12, 2016) (``I said [Putin] was a strong leader, which he is. I mean, he might be bad, he might be good. -But he's a strong leader.").} +But he's a strong leader.'').} The press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators perceived Trump as favorable to Russia.% 14 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Andrew Osborn, \textit{From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump}, Reuters (Mar.~24, 2016); Robert Zubrin, \textit{Trump: The Kremlin's Candidate}, National Review (Apr.~4, 2016).} Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press reported that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst.% 15 -\footnote{See, e.g., Mark Hosenball \& Steve Holland, \textit{Trump being advised by ex-U.S. Lieutenant General who favors closer Russia ties}, Reuters (Feb.~26, 2016); -Tom Hamburger et al., \textit{Inside Trump's financial ties to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin}, Washington Post (June~17, 2016). -Certain matters pertaining to Flynn are described in Volume~I, Section IV.B.7, \textit{supra}.} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Mark Hosenball \& Steve Holland, \textit{Trump being advised by ex-U.S. Lieutenant General who favors closer Russia ties}, Reuters (Feb.~26, 2016); +Tom Hamburger et~al., \textit{Inside Trump's financial ties to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin}, Washington Post (June~17, 2016). +Certain matters pertaining to Flynn are described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.2.7}{Volume~I, Section~IV.B.7}, \textit{supra}.} The press also reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company,% 16 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Zachary Mider, \textit{Trump's New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin's Gazprom}, Bloomberg (Mar.~30, 2016); Julia Iofee, \textit{Who is Carter Page?}, Politico (Sep.~23, 2016). -Certain matters pertaining to Page are described in Volume~I, Section IV.A.3, \textit{supra}.} +Certain matters pertaining to Page are described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.3}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.3}, \textit{supra}.} and that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the ``Russian-backed former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych.''% 17 \footnote{Tracy Wilkinson, \textit{In a shift, Republican platform doesn't call for arming Ukraine against Russia, spurring outrage}, Los Angeles Times (July~21, 2016); Josh Rogin, \textit{Trump campaign guts GOP's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine}, Washington Post (July~18, 2016).} In addition, the press raised questions during the Republican National Convention about the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican platform's stance on giving ``weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces.''% 18 \footnote{Josh Rogin, \textit{Trump campaign guts GOP's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine}, Washington Post, Opinions (July~18, 2016). -The Republican Platform events are described in Volume~I, Section IV.A.6, \textit{supra}.} +The Republican Platform events are described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.6}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.6}, \textit{supra}.} \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails} On June~14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents.% 19 @@ -79,19 +80,19 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release the hacked material.% 24 \footnote{Gates 4/11/18 302, at~2--3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at~2; -\textit{see also} Volume~I, Section III.D.1, \textit{supra}.} +\textit{see also} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.4.1}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1}, \textit{supra}.} Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the possibility of upcoming releases \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}. Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Trump, recalled hearing \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}.% 25 \footnote{Cohen 8/7/18 302, at~8; -\textit{see also} Volume~I, Section III.D.1, \textit{supra}. +\textit{see also} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.4.1}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1}, \textit{supra}. According to Cohen, after WikiLeaks's subsequent release of stolen DNC emails on July~22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the effect of, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~10. -Cohen's role in the candidate's and later President's activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in Volume~II, Section II.K, \textit{infra}, and in Volume~I, Section IV.A.1, \textit{supra}.} +Cohen's role in the candidate's and later President's activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.11}{Volume~II, Section~II.K}, \textit{infra}, and in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1}, \textit{supra}.} Cohen recalled that Trump responded, ``oh good, alright,'' and \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}.% 26 \footnote{Cohen 8/7/18 302, at~8.} Manafort said that shortly after WikiLeaks's July~22, 2016 release of hacked documents, he spoke to Trump \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that Manafort should \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} keep Trump updated.% 27 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}. -As explained in footnote \ref{fnOneNineSeven} of Volume~I, Section III.D.1.b, \textit{supra}, this Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent.} +As explained in footnote \ref{fnOneNineSeven} of \hyperlink{paragraph.1.3.4.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1.b}, \textit{supra}, this Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent.} Deputy campaign manager Rick Gates said that Manafort was getting pressure about \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} information and that Manafort instructed Gates \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} status updates on upcoming releases.% 28 \footnote{Gates 10/25/18 302, at~4.} Around the same time, Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}, and shortly after the call ended, Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming.% 29 @@ -104,10 +105,10 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump} In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July~22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. -On July~26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was ``dealing with Trump''% 32 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +On July~26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was ``[c]razy'' to suggest that Russia was ``dealing with Trump''% 32 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/26/16 (6:47~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} and that ``[f]or the record,'' he had ``ZERO investments in Russia.''% 33 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/26/16 (6:50~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} In a press conference the next day, July~27, 2016, Trump characterized ``this whole thing with Russia'' as ``a total deflection'' and stated that it was ``far fetched'' and ``ridiculous.''% 34 \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida}, C-SPAN (July~27, 2016).} @@ -116,12 +117,12 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking Trump added, ``Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.''% 36 \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida}, C-SPAN (July~27, 2016). Within five hours of Trump's remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary Clinton for possible hacks. -\textit{See} Volume~I, Section~III, \textit{supra}. -In written answers submitted in this investigation, the President stated that he made the "Russia, if you're listening" statement "in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer." +\textit{See} \hyperlink{section.1.3}{Volume~I, Section~III}, \textit{supra}. +In written answers submitted in this investigation, the President stated that he made the ``Russia, if you're listening'' statement ``in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer.'' Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~13 (Response to Question~II, Part~(d)).} Trump also said that ``there's nothing that I can think of that I'd rather do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now,'' and in response to a question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting sanctions, Trump replied, ``We'll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll be looking.''% 37 \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida}, C-SPAN (July~27, 2016). -In his written answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that "we'll be looking" at Crimea and sanctions "did not communicate any position." +In his written answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that ``we'll be looking'' at Crimea and sanctions ``did not communicate any position.'' Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~17 (Response to Question~IV, Part~(g)).} During the press conference, Trump repeated ``I have nothing to do with Russia'' five times.% 38 @@ -130,12 +131,12 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida}, C-SPAN (July~27, 2016).} He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013 he had been interested in working with Russian companies that ``wanted to put a lot of money into developments in Russia'' but ``it never worked out.''% 40 \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida}, C-SPAN (July~27, 2016).} -He explained, "[f]rankly, I didn't want to do it for a couple of different reasons. +He explained, ``[f]rankly, I didn't want to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer \dots\ that wanted to develop property in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it.''% 41 \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida}, C-SPAN (July~27, 2016).} The Trump Organization, however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow---the Trump Tower Moscow project---from approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and by Trump himself to finalize it.% 42 -\footnote{The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in Volume~I, Section IV.A.1, \textit{supra}, and Volume~II, Section II.K, \textit{infra}.} +\footnote{The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1}, \textit{supra}, and \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.11}{Volume~II, Section~II.K}, \textit{infra}.} Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue.% 43 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~4.} @@ -144,24 +145,24 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking According to Cohen, at around this time, in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign advisors had developed a ``party line'' that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia.% 45 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~3--5. -The formation of the "party line" is described in greater detail in Volume~II, Section II.K, \textit{infra}.} +The formation of the ``party line'' is described in greater detail in \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.11}{Volume~II, Section~II.K}, \textit{infra}.} In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign policy advisor J.D.~Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was ``not optimal'' in view of media reports about Russian interference.% 46 -\footnote{DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories"). -The invitation and Gordon's response are discussed in Volume~I, Section IV.A.7.a, \textit{supra}.} +\footnote{DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov) (stating that ``[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories''). +The invitation and Gordon's response are discussed in \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.1.7.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.7.a}, \textit{supra}.} On August~19, 2016, Manafort was asked to resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to Russian business.% 47 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Amber Phillips, \textit{Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained}, Washington Post (Aug.~19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into [Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine."); +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Amber Phillips, \textit{Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained}, Washington Post (Aug.~19, 2016) (``There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into [Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine.''); Tom Winter \& Ken Dilanian, \textit{Donald Trump Aide Paul Manafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties}, NBC (Aug.~18, 2016). -Relevant events involving Manafort are discussed in Volume~I, Section IV.A.8, \textit{supra}.} +Relevant events involving Manafort are discussed in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.8}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8}, \textit{supra}.} And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in September 2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press that he had played ``no role'' in the Campaign.% 48 \footnote{Michael Isikoff, \textit{U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin}, Yahoo News (Sep.~23, 2016); \textit{see, e.g.}, 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway \& Bannon; -9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon \& S. Miller; +9/23/16 Email, J.~Miller to Bannon \& S.~Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at~2.} On October~7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.% 49 -\footnote{\@WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +\footnote{\UseVerb{atWikiLeaks} 10/7/16 (4:32~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} The same day, the federal government announced that ``the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations.''% 50 \footnote{Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct.~7, 2016).} The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering with the presidential election, and concluded ``that only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities'' based on their ``scope and sensitivity.''% 51 @@ -175,47 +176,47 @@ \subsubsection{The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking \subsubsection{After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election} On November~8, 2016, Trump was elected President. -Two days later, Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's "immediate entourage" during the campaign.% 54 -\footnote{Ivan Nechepurenko, \textit{Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says}, New York Times (Nov.~10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here were contacts" and "I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian representatives"); -Jim Heintz \& Matthew Lee, \textit{Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway}, Associated Press (Nov.~11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array of them supported contacts with Russian representatives").} -In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson, said, "We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign entities before yesterday, when Mr.~Trump spoke with many world leaders."% 55 +Two days later, Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's ``immediate entourage'' during the campaign.% 54 +\footnote{Ivan Nechepurenko, \textit{Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says}, New York Times (Nov.~10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, ``[t]here were contacts'' and ``I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian representatives''); +Jim Heintz \& Matthew Lee, \textit{Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway}, Associated Press (Nov.~11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, ``I don't say that all of them, but a whole array of them supported contacts with Russian representatives'').} +In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson, said, ``We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign entities before yesterday, when Mr.~Trump spoke with many world leaders.''% 55 \footnote{Ivan Nechepurenko, \textit{Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says}, New York Times (Nov.~11, 2016) (quoting Hicks).} Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: -"It never happened. -There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the campaign."% 56 +``It never happened. +There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the campaign.''% 56 \footnote{Jim Heintz \& Matthew Lee, \textit{Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway}, Associated Press (Nov.~10, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably Kushner and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~4.} -On December~10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White House."% 57 +On December~10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had ``concluded that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White House.''% 57 \footnote{Damien Gayle, \textit{CIA concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports}, Guardian (Dec.~10, 2016).} -Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I think it's ridiculous. -I think it's just another excuse."% 58 -\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} -He continued that no one really knew who was responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody. -It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."% 59 -\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} -The President-Elect also said that Democrats were "putting [] out" the story of Russian interference "because they suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics."% 60 -\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} - -On December~18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was "distorted by the Russian intervention" and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been "in touch with the Russians."% 61 -\footnote{David Morgan, \textit{Clinton campaign: It's an 'open question' if Trump team colluded with Russia}, Reuters Business Insider (Dec.~18, 2016).} +Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, ``I think it's ridiculous. +I think it's just another excuse.''% 58 +\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts ``Fox News Sunday,'' Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} +He continued that no one really knew who was responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had ``no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody. +It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place.''% 59 +\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts ``Fox News Sunday,'' Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} +The President-Elect also said that Democrats were ``putting [] out'' the story of Russian interference ``because they suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics.''% 60 +\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts ``Fox News Sunday,'' Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} + +On December~18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was ``distorted by the Russian intervention'' and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been ``in touch with the Russians.''% 61 +\footnote{David Morgan, \textit{Clinton campaign: It's an `open question' if Trump team colluded with Russia}, Reuters Business Insider (Dec.~18, 2016).} The same day, incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's determination that Russia intervened in the election.% 62 -\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} -When asked about any contact or coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, "Even this question is insane. -Of course we didn't interface with the Russians."% 63 -\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} -Priebus added that "this whole thing is a spin job" and said, "the real question is, why the Democrats \dots\ are doing everything they can to delegitimize the outcome of the election?"% 64 -\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} +\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts ``Fox News Sunday,'' Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} +When asked about any contact or coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, ``Even this question is insane. +Of course we didn't interface with the Russians.''% 63 +\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts ``Fox News Sunday,'' Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} +Priebus added that ``this whole thing is a spin job'' and said, ``the real question is, why the Democrats \dots\ are doing everything they can to delegitimize the outcome of the election?''% 64 +\footnote{\textit{Chris Wallace Hosts ``Fox News Sunday,'' Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec.~11, 2016).} On December~29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities.% 65 \footnote{\textit{Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment}, White House (Dec.~29, 2016); -\textit{see also} Missy Ryan et al., \textit{Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference}, Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016). +\textit{see also} Missy Ryan et~al., \textit{Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference}, Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016). } -When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect Trump said, "I think we ought to get on with our lives."% 66 -\footnote{John Wagner, \textit{Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: 'Get on with our lives,'} Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016).} -He then put out a statement that said "It's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things," but indicated that he would meet with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference.% 67 -\footnote{Missy Ryan et al., \textit{Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference}, Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016).} +When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect Trump said, ``I think we ought to get on with our lives.''% 66 +\footnote{John Wagner, \textit{Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: `Get on with our lives,'} Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016).} +He then put out a statement that said ``It's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things,'' but indicated that he would meet with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference.% 67 +\footnote{Missy Ryan et~al., \textit{Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference}, Washington Post (Dec.~29, 2016).} The briefing occurred on January~6, 2017.% 68 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~3.} Following the briefing, the intelligence community released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton's electability.% 69 @@ -223,12 +224,12 @@ \subsubsection{After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Conne The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian government had developed a clear preference for Trump.% 70 \footnote{Office of the Director of National Intelligence, \textit{Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election}, at~1 (Jan.~6, 2017).} -Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia connections under the headline "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia."% 71 -\footnote{Ken Bensinger et al., \textit{These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia}, BuzzFeed (Jan.~10, 2017).} -In a press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release "an absolute disgrace" and said, "I have no dealings with Russia. +Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia connections under the headline ``These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia.''% 71 +\footnote{Ken Bensinger et~al., \textit{These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia}, BuzzFeed (Jan.~10, 2017).} +In a press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release ``an absolute disgrace'' and said, ``I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away\dots. So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. -We could make deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict."% 72 +We could make deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict.''% 72 \footnote{\textit{Donald Trump's News Conference: Full Transcript and Video}, New York Times (Jan.~11, 2017), available at \url{https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html}.} Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.% 73 @@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ \subsubsection{After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Conne Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~2; Gates 4/18/18 302, at~3; \textit{see} Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at~2 (the President believed that the purpose of the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).} -Hicks, for example, said that the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his "Achilles heel" because, even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking away from what he had accomplished.% 74 +Hicks, for example, said that the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his ``Achilles heel'' because, even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking away from what he had accomplished.% 74 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~18.} Sean Spicer, the first White House communications director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his election.% 75 \footnote{Spicer 10/17/17 302, at~6.} @@ -257,10 +258,10 @@ \subsection{The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flyn After the press reported on Flynn's contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated those lies in press interviews. The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters, interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies to the FBI. -On January~26, 2017, Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI. +On January~26, 2017, Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been interviewed by the~FBI. The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James Comey in which he asked for Comey's loyalty. On February~13, 2017, the President asked Flynn to resign. -The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Comey in which he said, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go." +The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Comey in which he said, ``I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go.'' \begin{center} \textbf{Evidence} @@ -271,36 +272,36 @@ \subsubsection{Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on R Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael Flynn as his National Security Advisor.% 78 \footnote{Flynn 11/16/17 302, at~7; \textit{President-Elect Donald J. Trump Selects U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions for Attorney General, Lt.~Gen.\ Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and U.S. Rep.~Mike Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency}, President-Elect Donald J. Trump Press Release (Nov.~18, 2016); -\textit{see also}, e.g., Bryan Bender, \textit{Trump names Mike Flynn national security adviser}, Politico, (Nov.~17, 2016).} +\textit{see also, e.g.}, Bryan Bender, \textit{Trump names Mike Flynn national security adviser}, Politico, (Nov.~17, 2016).} For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with foreign government officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak.% 79 \footnote{Flynn 11/16/17 302, at~8--14; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~3--5.} -On December~29, 2016, as noted in Volume~II, Section II.A.4, \textit{supra}, the Obama Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities.% 80 +On December~29, 2016, as noted in \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.2.1.4}{Volume~II, Section~II.A.4}, \textit{supra}, the Obama Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities.% 80 \footnote{\textit{Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment}, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec.~29, 2016).} That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day.% 81 -\footnote{12/29/16 Email, O'Brien to McFarland et al.; -12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et al.; -12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.; -SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) ("Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today."); +\footnote{12/29/16 Email, O'Brien to McFarland et~al.; +12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et~al.; +12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et~al.; +SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) (``Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.''); Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~2.} Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with the President-Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.% 82 -\footnote{Statement of Offense at~2--3, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael T. Flynn}, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.~1, 2017), Doc.~4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); +\footnote{Statement of Offense at~2--3, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael T. Flynn}, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.~1, 2017), Doc.~4 (\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense); Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3--4; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at~3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~6--7.} -McFarland had spoken with incoming Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak.% 83 +McFarland had spoken with incoming Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with~Kislyak.% 83 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~4--7 (recalling discussions about this issue with Bannon and Priebus).} Based on those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.% 84 -\footnote{Flynn Statement of Offense, at~3; +\footnote{\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense, at~3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~3--4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~6--7.} -At 4:43~p.m.\ that afternoon, McFarland sent an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that "Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening."% 85 -\footnote{12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.} +At 4:43~p.m.\ that afternoon, McFarland sent an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that ``Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening.''% 85 +\footnote{12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et~al.} Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses.% 86 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7.} -Incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions situation could be "cooled down" and not escalated.% 87 +Incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions situation could be ``cooled down'' and not escalated.% 87 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~3.} McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting, someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the Russian Ambassador that evening.% 88 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~7. @@ -320,10 +321,10 @@ \subsubsection{Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on R Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~4.} Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration.% 93 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~8.} -On December~30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead "plan \dots\ further steps to restore Russian--US relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration."% 94 +On December~30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead ``plan \dots\ further steps to restore Russian--US relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration.''% 94 \footnote{\textit{Statement by the President of Russia}, President of Russia (Dec.~30, 2016) 12/30/16.} -Following that announcement, the President-Elect tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)---I always knew he was very smart!"% 95 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (2:41~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Following that announcement, the President-Elect tweeted, ``Great move on delay (by V.~Putin)---I always knew he was very smart!''% 95 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 12/30/16 (2:41~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} On December~31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request.% 96 \footnote{Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~3; @@ -343,16 +344,16 @@ \subsubsection{Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on R \footnote{Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~4--5. Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not remember discussing sanctions with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at~9.} -Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had "stopped the train on Russia's response "to the sanctions.% 101 +Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had ``stopped the train on Russia's response'' to the sanctions.% 101 \footnote{Flynn 11/21/17 302, at~1; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~5.} -On January~3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect about the substance of his calls with Kislyak.% 102 +On January~3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect about the substance of his calls with~Kislyak.% 102 \footnote{Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~6; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~6.} Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate in response to the sanctions.% 103 \footnote{McCord 7/17/17 302, at~2.} -When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's discussion of sanctions with Kislyak.% 104 +When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's discussion of sanctions with~Kislyak.% 104 \footnote{McCord 7/17/17 302, at~2.} Previously, the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn based on his relationship with the Russian government.% 105 \footnote{McCord 7/17/17 302, at~2--3; @@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ \subsubsection{Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on R \subsubsection{President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference Investigations} -On January~6, 2017, as noted in Volume~II, Section II.A.4, \textit{supra}, intelligence officials briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election.% 107 +On January~6, 2017, as noted in \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.2.1.4}{Volume~II, Section~II.A.4}, \textit{supra}, intelligence officials briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election.% 107 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~1--2).} When the briefing concluded, Comey spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally sensitive allegations compiled by Steele.% 108 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~3; @@ -380,10 +381,10 @@ \subsubsection{President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's On January~11, President-Elect Trump called Comey to discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought Comey was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director. Comey 11/15/17 302, at~4; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~90. -("[D]uring that call, he asked me again, 'Hope you're going to stay, you're doing a great job.' And told him that I intended to."). +(``[D]uring that call, he asked me again, `Hope you're going to stay, you're doing a great job.' And told him that I intended to.''). On January~22, at a White House reception honoring law enforcement, the President greeted Comey and said he looked forward to working with him. \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~22. -And as discussed in greater detail in Volume~II, Section II.D, \textit{infra}, on January~27, the President invited Comey to dinner at the White House and said he was glad Comey wanted to stay on as FBI Director.} +And as discussed in greater detail in \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.4}{Volume~II, Section~II.D}, \textit{infra}, on January~27, the President invited Comey to dinner at the White House and said he was glad Comey wanted to stay on as FBI Director.} Comey responded that he intended to continue serving in that role.% 111 \footnote{Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at~1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~3.} @@ -392,9 +393,9 @@ \subsubsection{President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Comey 11/15/17 302, at~3. Comey's briefing included the Steele reporting's unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving conduct when he was a private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant. During the 2016 presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. -On October~30, 2016, Michael Cohen received text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, "Stopped flow of tapes from Russia but not sure if there's anything else. -Just so you know\dots." 10/30/16 Text Message, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. -Rtskhiladze said "tapes" referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. +On October~30, 2016, Michael Cohen received text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, ``Stopped flow of tapes from Russia but not sure if there's anything else. +Just so you know\dots.'' 10/30/16 Text Message, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. +Rtskhiladze said ``tapes'' referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at~12. Cohen said he spoke to Trump about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~13. @@ -403,57 +404,57 @@ \subsubsection{President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Comey recalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive, so Comey decided to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally.% 113 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~3--4; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~2).} -Comey recalled he did not want the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a "J. Edgar Hoover move."% 114 +Comey recalled he did not want the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a ``J.~Edgar Hoover move.''% 114 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~3.} On January~10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-Elect on the Steele reporting,% 115 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Evan Perez et al., \textit{Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to compromise him}, CNN (Jan.~10, 2017; +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Evan Perez et~al., \textit{Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to compromise him}, CNN (Jan.~10, 2017; updated Jan.~12, 2017).} -and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online, stating that the information included "specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives."% 116 -\footnote{Ken Bensinger et al., \textit{These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia}, BuzzFeed News (Jan.~10, 2017).} +and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online, stating that the information included ``specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives.''% 116 +\footnote{Ken Bensinger et~al., \textit{These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia}, BuzzFeed News (Jan.~10, 2017).} The next day, the President-Elect expressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele reports.% 117 -\footnote{See 1/11/17 Email, Clapper to Comey ("He asked if I could put out a statement. -He would prefer of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can't do."); -1/12/17 Email, Comey to Clapper ("He called me at~5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation."); +\footnote{\textit{See} 1/11/17 Email, Clapper to Comey (``He asked if I could put out a statement. +He would prefer of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can't do.''); +1/12/17 Email, Comey to Clapper (``He called me at~5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation.''); Comey 11/15/17 302, at~4--5.} In the following weeks, three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine Russia's interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with Russia.% 118 \footnote{\textit{See 2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts}, CNN (first published Oct.~12, 2017; updated Mar.~1, 2019) (summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations).} -On January~13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any "links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns."% 119 +On January~13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any ``links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns.''% 119 \footnote{\textit{Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities}, SSCI (Jan.~13, 2017).} On January~25, 2017, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) announced that it had been conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the political campaigns.% 120 \footnote{\textit{Joint Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures}, HPSCI (Jan.~25, 2017).} And on February~2, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election.% 121 \footnote{\textit{Joint Statement from Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation into Russian Influence on Democratic Nations' Elections} (Feb.~2, 2017).} -\subsubsection{Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI} +\subsubsection{Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the~FBI} On January~12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions.% 122 \footnote{David Ignatius, \textit{Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?}, Washington Post (Jan.~12, 2017).} -The column questioned whether Flynn had said something to "undercut the U.S. sanctions" and whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act.% 123 +The column questioned whether Flynn had said something to ``undercut the U.S. sanctions'' and whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act.% 123 \footnote{David Ignatius, \textit{Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?}, Washington Post (Jan.~12, 2017). -The Logan Act makes it a crime for "[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he maybe" to "without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States." 18~U.S.C. \S~953.} +The Logan Act makes it a crime for ``[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he maybe'' to ``without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States.'' 18~U.S.C. \S~953.} President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger about it.% 124 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~6.} -Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, "What the hell is this all about?"% 125 +Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, ``What the hell is this all about?''% 125 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~6.} -Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's conversations with Kislyak.% 126 +Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's conversations with~Kislyak.% 126 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~6.} -Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had spoken to the "boss" and said Flynn needed to "kill the story."% 127 +Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had spoken to the ``boss'' and said Flynn needed to ``kill the story.''% 127 \footnote{Flynn 11/21/17 302, at~1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at~6.} Flynn directed McFarland to call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred.% 128 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~12--13.} -McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, "I want to kill the story."% 129 +McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, ``I want to kill the story.''% 129 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~12.} -McFarland made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information, and the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a "Trump official" had denied that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions.% 130 +McFarland made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information, and the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a ``Trump official'' had denied that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions.% 130 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~12--13; McFarland 8/29/17 302, at~8; \textit{see} David Ignatius, \textit{Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?}, Washington Post (Jan.~12, 2017).} -When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with Kislyak.% 131 +When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with~Kislyak.% 131 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~1,~8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~7; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~7--8; @@ -464,13 +465,13 @@ \subsubsection{Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislya S. Miller 8/31/17 302, at~10--11.} In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their conversations with Flynn.% 133 \footnote{\textit{Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence}, CBS (Jan.~15, 2017); -Julie Hirschfield Davis et al., \textit{Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions Were Imposed}, Washington Post (Jan.~13, 2017); +Julie Hirschfield Davis et~al., \textit{Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions Were Imposed}, Washington Post (Jan.~13, 2017); \textit{Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus}, NBC (Jan.~15, 2017).} The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials, who were aware that the statements were not true.% 134 \footnote{Yates 8/15/17 302, at~2--3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at~3--4; -McCabe 8/17/17 302, at~5 (DOJ officials were "really freaked out about it").} +McCabe 8/17/17 302, at~5 (DOJ officials were ``really freaked out about it'').} Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues---who in turn had unwittingly misled the American public---creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied.% 135 \footnote{Yates 8/15/17 302, at~3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at~4.} @@ -485,14 +486,14 @@ \subsubsection{Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislya \footnote{Yates 8/15/17 302, at~4; Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at~5.} -On January~24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI\null.% 139 +On January~24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the~FBI\null.% 139 \footnote{\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense, at~2.} During the interview, which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the Obama Administration.% 140 \footnote{\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense, at~2.} Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those sanctions as a result of Flynn's request.% 141 \footnote{\textit{Flynn} Statement of Offense, at~2. -On December~1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" to federal law enforcement officials. -See Volume~I, Section IV.A.7, \textit{supra}.} +On December~1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully ``make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation'' to federal law enforcement officials. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.7}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.7}, \textit{supra}.} \subsubsection{DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn} @@ -507,7 +508,7 @@ \subsubsection{DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flyn McCord 7/17/17 302, at~6--7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at~4; SCR015\_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).} -Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI\null.% 145 +Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the~FBI\null.% 145 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at~7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at~7; @@ -520,13 +521,13 @@ \subsubsection{DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flyn Burnham 11/3/17 302, at~4.} McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not pinned Flynn down in lies,% 148 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~5.} -but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and his contacts with Kislyak.% 149 +but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and his contacts with~Kislyak.% 149 \footnote{SCR015\_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~6,~8.} That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to discuss concerns about Flynn.% 150 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~6; -SCR015\_000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum re: "Flynn Tick Tock") (on January~26, "McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS"); +SCR015\_000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum re: ``Flynn Tick Tock'') (on January~26, ``McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS''); SCR015\_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).} McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President asked him to repeat it, so he did.% 151 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~6.} @@ -537,7 +538,7 @@ \subsubsection{DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flyn The President instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed that they not discuss it with any other officials.% 154 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~7; SCR015\_000198--99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).} -Priebus recalled that the President was angry with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, "not again, this guy, this stuff."% 155 +Priebus recalled that the President was angry with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, ``not again, this guy, this stuff.''% 155 \footnote{Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn for other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by December 2016. @@ -547,7 +548,7 @@ \subsubsection{DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flyn Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~7 (President Obama's comments sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~8. -Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as "being on thin ice" by early February 2017. +Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as ``being on thin ice'' by early February 2017. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~7,~10.} That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what they thought about FBI Director Comey.% 156 @@ -581,8 +582,8 @@ \subsubsection{McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Yates responded that Department of Justice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the information provided.% 165 \footnote{Yates 8/15/17 302, at~9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at~5; -\textit{see} SCR015\_00199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President) ("Yates was unwilling to confirm or deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not object to the White House taking action against Flynn.").} -McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak.% 166 +\textit{see} SCR015\_00199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President) (``Yates was unwilling to confirm or deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not object to the White House taking action against Flynn.'').} +McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with~Kislyak.% 166 \footnote{Yates 9/15/17 302, at~9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at~5. In accordance with McGahn's request, the Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in early February. @@ -593,7 +594,7 @@ \subsubsection{McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~6; SCR012b\_000001 (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17); \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~2--3).} -Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, "don't talk about Russia, whatever you do," and the President promised he would not talk about Russia at the dinner.% 168 +Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, ``don't talk about Russia, whatever you do,'' and the President promised he would not talk about Russia at the dinner.% 168 \footnote{Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~17.} McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference in law enforcement.% 169 \footnote{\textit{See} McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~9; @@ -618,44 +619,44 @@ \subsubsection{McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4).} Comey responded that the President should think carefully about issuing such an order because it could create a narrative that the FBI was investigating him personally, which was incorrect.% 175 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4).} -Later in the dinner, the President brought up Flynn and said, "the guy has serious judgment issues."% 176 +Later in the dinner, the President brought up Flynn and said, ``the guy has serious judgment issues.''% 176 \footnote{Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at~4; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~7.} Comey did not comment on Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with Flynn.% 177 \footnote{Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at~4; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~7.} -According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, "I need loyalty, I expect loyalty."% 178 +According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, ``I need loyalty, I expect loyalty.''% 178 \footnote{Comey 1/28/18 Memorandum, at~2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~7; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~3).} -Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other topics, but the President returned to the subject of Comey's job at the end of the dinner and repeated, "I need loyalty."% 179 +Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other topics, but the President returned to the subject of Comey's job at the end of the dinner and repeated, ``I need loyalty.''% 179 \footnote{Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at~3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~7; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~3--4).} -Comey responded, "You will always get honesty from me."% 180 +Comey responded, ``You will always get honesty from me.''% 180 \footnote{Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at~3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~7; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4).} -The President said, "That's what I want, honest loyalty."% 181 +The President said, ``That's what I want, honest loyalty.''% 181 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4).} -Comey said, "You will get that from me."% 182 +Comey said, ``You will get that from me.''% 182 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4).} After Comey's account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed that he had asked for Comey's loyalty.% 183 -\footnote{See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, \textit{In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.}, New York Times (May~11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, "[The President] would never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty"); -Ali Vitali, \textit{Trump Never Asked for Comey's Loyalty, President's Personal Lawyer Says}, NBC (June~8, 2017) (quoting the President's personal counsel as saying, "The president also never told Mr.~Comey, 'I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,' in form or substance."); -Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June~9, 2017) ("I hardly know the man. -I'm not going to say 'I want you to pledge allegiance.' +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Michael S. Schmidt, \textit{In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.}, New York Times (May~11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, ``[The President] would never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty''); +Ali Vitali, \textit{Trump Never Asked for Comey's Loyalty, President's Personal Lawyer Says}, NBC (June~8, 2017) (quoting the President's personal counsel as saying, ``The president also never told Mr.~Comey, `I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,' in form or substance.''); +Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June~9, 2017) (``I hardly know the man. +I'm not going to say `I want you to pledge allegiance.' Who would do that? -Who would ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath?"). -In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated that he had never asked for Comey's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, "Who cares?" Spicer 10/16/17 302, at~4. +Who would ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath?''). +In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated that he had never asked for Comey's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, ``Who cares?'' Spicer 10/16/17 302, at~4. The President also told McGahn that he never said what Comey said he had. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~17.} -The President also indicated that he had not invited Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had "asked for the dinner" because "he wanted to stay on."% 184 +The President also indicated that he had not invited Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had ``asked for the dinner'' because ``he wanted to stay on.''% 184 \footnote{\textit{Interview of Donald J. Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017).} But substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account of the dinner invitation and the request for loyalty. -The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President "extend[ed] a dinner invitation" to Comey on January~27.% 185 -\footnote{SCRO12b\_000001 (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Comey in the morning on January~27 and "[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation"). +The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President ``extend[ed] a dinner invitation'' to Comey on January~27.% 185 +\footnote{SCR012b\_000001 (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Comey in the morning o[f] January~27 and ``[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation''). In addition, two witnesses corroborate Comey's account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without Comey having asked for it. Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~17 (the President asked to schedule the January~27 dinner because he did not know much about Comey and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on as FBI Director); Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at~3 (recalling that Comey told him about the President's dinner invitation on the day of the dinner).} @@ -681,18 +682,18 @@ \subsubsection{McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President \subsubsection{Flynn's Resignation} -On February~2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's calls with Kislyak.% 189 +On February~2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's calls with~Kislyak.% 189 \footnote{Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at~1 (documenting 2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).} Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes that could apply to Flynn's conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough information to make a definitive recommendation to the President.% 190 \footnote{Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~6.} Eisenberg and McGahn discussed that Eisenberg's review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act.% 191 -\footnote{Risenberg 11/29/17 302, at~9; +\footnote{Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~9; SCR015\_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).} Because White House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his exposure to prosecution for violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001.% 192 \footnote{Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~9.} -The week of February~6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak.% 193 +The week of February~6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with~Kislyak.% 193 \footnote{Flynn 11/21/17 302, at~2.} Flynn recalled that the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations.% 194 \footnote{Flynn 11/21/17 302, at~2.} @@ -702,10 +703,10 @@ \subsubsection{Flynn's Resignation} \footnote{Flynn 11/21/17 302, at~2--3.} On February~9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with Kislyak the month before the President took office.% 197 -\footnote{Greg Miller et al., \textit{National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador, despite denials, officials say}, Washington Post (Feb.~9, 2017).} +\footnote{Greg Miller et~al., \textit{National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador, despite denials, officials say}, Washington Post (Feb.~9, 2017).} After the publication of that story, Vice President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the content of Flynn's calls.% 198 \footnote{SCR015\_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~12.} -He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak.% 199 +He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's contacts with~Kislyak.% 199 \footnote{SCR015\_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at~11--13; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~10; @@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ \subsubsection{Flynn's Resignation} \footnote{McCabe 8/17/17 302, at~13.} McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because it was a possibility.% 201 \footnote{McCabe 8/17/17 302, at~13.} -Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.% 202 +Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been lying about what he discussed with~Kislyak.% 202 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~10; @@ -738,9 +739,9 @@ \subsubsection{Flynn's Resignation} Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his calls, but he did not think he lied.% 208 \footnote{Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~9.} -The President responded, "Okay. +The President responded, ``Okay. That's fine. -I got it."% 209 +I got it.''% 209 \footnote{Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~9.} On February~13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he had to resign.% 210 @@ -748,40 +749,40 @@ \subsubsection{Flynn's Resignation} Flynn said he wanted to say goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office.% 211 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~10.} -Priebus recalled that the President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, "We'll give you a good recommendation. +Priebus recalled that the President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, ``We'll give you a good recommendation. You're a good guy. -We'll take care of you."% 212 +We'll take care of you.''% 212 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at~10.} Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and distributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted, and the President had determined that the issue with Flynn was one of trust.% 213 -\footnote{SCRO04\_00600 (2/16/17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson).} -Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign "not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President and General Flynn had eroded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change."% 214 +\footnote{SCR004\_00600 (2/16/17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson).} +Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign ``not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President and General Flynn had eroded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change.''% 214 \footnote{Sean Spicer, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Feb.~14, 2017). -After Flynn pleaded guilty to violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001 in December 2017, the President tweeted, "I had to fire General Flynn because he lied to the Vice President and the FBI." -\@realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (12:14~p.m.~ET) Tweet. +After Flynn pleaded guilty to violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001 in December 2017, the President tweeted, ``I had to fire General Flynn because he lied to the Vice President and the~FBI.'' +\UseVerb{DJT} 12/2/17 (12:14~p.m.~ET) Tweet. The next day, the President's personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet. -Maegan Vazquez et al., \textit{Trump's lawyer says he was behind President's tweet about firing Flynn}, CNN (Dec.~3, 2017).} +Maegan Vazquez et~al., \textit{Trump's lawyer says he was behind President's tweet about firing Flynn}, CNN (Dec.~3, 2017).} \subsubsection{The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey} On February~14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at the White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.% 215 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~2--3; -SCRO12b\_000022 (Presidents Daily Diary, 2/14/17).} -According to Christie, at one point during the lunch the President said, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over."% 216 +SCR012b\_000022 (Presidents Daily Diary, 2/14/17).} +According to Christie, at one point during the lunch the President said, ``Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over.''% 216 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3.} -Christie laughed and responded, "No way."% 217 +Christie laughed and responded, ``No way.''% 217 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3.} -He said, "this Russia thing is far from over" and "[w]e'll be here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this."% 218 +He said, ``this Russia thing is far from over'' and ``[w]e'll be here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this.''% 218 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3. -Christie said he thought when the President said "the Russia thing" he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. +Christie said he thought when the President said ``the Russia thing'' he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. Christie thought the more important thing was that there was an investigation. Christie 2/13/19 302, at~4.} -The President said, "[w]hat do you mean? +The President said, ``[w]hat do you mean? Flynn met with the Russians. That was the problem. I fired Flynn. -It's over."% 219 +It's over.''% 219 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3.} Christie recalled responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been investigated, firing Flynn would not end the investigation.% 220 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3.} @@ -789,12 +790,12 @@ \subsubsection{The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey} \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3.} The President asked Christie what he meant, and Christie told the President not to talk about the investigation even if he was frustrated at times.% 222 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3--4.} -Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of Flynn, "like gum on the bottom of your shoe."% 223 +Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of Flynn, ``like gum on the bottom of your shoe.''% 223 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3. Christie also recalled that during the lunch, Flynn called Kushner, who was at the lunch, and complained about what Spicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that day. -Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of, "You know the President respects you. +Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of, ``You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. -I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later." +I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later.'' Kushner looked at the President when he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent. Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3. Flynn recalled getting upset at Spicer's comments in the press conference and calling Kushner to say he did not appreciate the comments. @@ -804,32 +805,32 @@ \subsubsection{The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey} \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~4.} Christie said he was.% 225 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~4.} -The President told Christie to call Comey and tell him that the President "really like[s] him. -Tell him he's part of the team."% 226 +The President told Christie to call Comey and tell him that the President ``really like[s] him. +Tell him he's part of the team.''% 226 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~4--5.} At the end of the lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey.% 227 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~5.} Christie had no intention of complying with the President's request that he contact Comey.% 228 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~5.} -He thought the President's request was "nonsensical" and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of having to receive such a phone call.% 229 +He thought the President's request was ``nonsensical'' and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of having to receive such a phone call.% 229 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~5.} Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass on that message.% 230 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~5.} At 4~p.m.\ that afternoon, the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a homeland security briefing.% 231 -\footnote{SCRO12b\_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17); +\footnote{SCR012b\_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17); Comey 11/15/17 302, at~9.} At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other attendees and stated that he wanted to speak to Comey alone.% 232 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10; -2/14/17 Comey Memorandum, at~1; +[Comey] 2/14/17 [] Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4); -Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~18 (confirming that everyone was shooed out "like Comey said" in his June testimony).} +Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~18 (confirming that everyone was shooed out ``like Comey said'' in his June testimony).} Sessions and senior advisor to the President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other participants left, but the President excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey.% 233 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4). Sessions recalled that the President asked to speak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room; -he described Comey's testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as "pretty accurate." +he described Comey's testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as ``pretty accurate.'' Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Comey to stay behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~24.} @@ -837,32 +838,32 @@ \subsubsection{The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey} \footnote{Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~2; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~18.} -According to Comey's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began the conversation by saying, "I want to talk about Mike Flynn."% 235 +According to Comey's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began the conversation by saying, ``I want to talk about Mike Flynn.''% 235 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~4).} The President stated that Flynn had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he had misled the Vice President.% 236 \footnote{Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~5).} -The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying "he is a good guy and has been through a lot."% 237 +The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying ``he is a good guy and has been through a lot.''% 237 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~2; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~5).} -The President stated, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. +The President stated, ``I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. -I hope you can let this go."% 238 +I hope you can let this go.''% 238 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~5); Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~2. Comey said he was highly confident that the words in quotations in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he knew from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he remembered the words used by the President and wrote them down soon after the meeting. Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10--11.} -Comey agreed that Flynn "is a good guy," but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn.% 239 +Comey agreed that Flynn ``is a good guy,'' but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn.% 239 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at~2.} -Comey testified under oath that he took the President's statement "as a direction" because of the President's position and the circumstances of the one-on-one meeting.% 240 +Comey testified under oath that he took the President's statement ``as a direction'' because of the President's position and the circumstances of the one-on-one meeting.% 240 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~31) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI). -Comey further stated, "I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying, 'I hope' this. -I took it as, this is what he wants me to do." \textit{Id.}; +Comey further stated, ``I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying, `I hope' this. +I took it as, this is what he wants me to do.'' \textit{Id.}; \textit{see also} Comey 11/15/17 302, at~10 (Comey took the statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation).} Shortly after meeting with the President, Comey began drafting a memorandum documenting their conversation.% 241 @@ -885,36 +886,36 @@ \subsubsection{The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey} \subsubsection{The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn} After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification.% 244 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Sean Spicer, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Feb.~14, 2017) (questions from the press included, "if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President, other officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept on for almost three weeks?" and "Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian ambassador]?"). +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Sean Spicer, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Feb.~14, 2017) (questions from the press included, ``if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President, other officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept on for almost three weeks?'' and ``Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian ambassador]?''). Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so early in his term. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~8.} The press also continued to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President's campaign.% 245 -\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Sean Sullivan et al., \textit{Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the 2016 election}, Washington Post (Feb.~14, 2017); +\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Sean Sullivan et~al., \textit{Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the 2016 election}, Washington Post (Feb.~14, 2017); Aaron Blake, \textit{5 times Donald Trump's team denied contact with Russia}, Washington Post (Feb.~15, 2017); Oren Dorell, \textit{Donald Trump's ties to Russia go back 30 years}, USA Today (Feb.~15, 2017); -Pamela Brown et al., \textit{Trump aides were in constant touch with senior Russian officials during campaign}, CNN (Feb.~15, 2017); +Pamela Brown et~al., \textit{Trump aides were in constant touch with senior Russian officials during campaign}, CNN (Feb.~15, 2017); Austin Wright, \textit{Comey briefs senators amid furor over Trump--Russia ties}, Politico (Feb.~17, 2017); Megan Twohey \& Scott Shane, \textit{A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates}, New York Times (Feb.~19, 2017).} -On February~15, 2017, the President told reporters, "General Flynn is a wonderful man. -I think he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media."% 246 +On February~15, 2017, the President told reporters, ``General Flynn is a wonderful man. +I think he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media.''% 246 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Conference, White House (Feb.~15, 2017).} -On February~16, 2017, the President held a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. -And that just wasn't acceptable to me."% 247 +On February~16, 2017, the President held a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn ``didn't tell the Vice President of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. +And that just wasn't acceptable to me.''% 247 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb.~16, 2017).} -The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but "it certainly would have been okay with me if he did. +The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but ``it certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have directed him to do it if I thought he wasn't doing it. -I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job."% 248 +I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job.''% 248 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb.~16, 2017). -The President also said that Flynn's conduct "wasn't wrong---what he did in terms of the information he saw." -The President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did something right."} +The President also said that Flynn's conduct ``wasn't wrong---what he did in terms of the information he saw.'' +The President said that Flynn was just ``doing the job,'' and ``if anything, he did something right.''} In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.% 249 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb.~16, 2017); Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~9.} -The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing to do with Russia. +The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, ``I have nothing to do with Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. -I have no anything."% 250 +I have no anything.''% 250 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb.~16, 2017).} -The President also said he "had nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign.% 251 +The President also said he ``had nothing to do with'' WikiLeaks's publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign.% 251 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb.~16, 2017).} \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak} @@ -928,26 +929,26 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} Priebus said he told the President he would only direct McFarland to write such letter if she were comfortable with it.% 254 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~11.} -Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.% 255 +Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not direct Flynn to talk to~Kislyak.% 255 \footnote{KTMF\_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no to the request.% 256 -\footnote{KTMF\_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) ("I said I did not know whether he did or didn't, but was in Mar-a-Lago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn was on vacation in Caribbean) and I was not aware of any Flynn--Trump, or Trump--Russian phone calls"); +\footnote{KTMF\_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) (``I said I did not know whether he did or didn't, but was in Mar-a-Lago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn was on vacation in Caribbean) and I was not aware of any Flynn--Trump, or Trump--Russian phone calls''); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's request, and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office.% 257 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~11.} McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg.% 258 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} -McFarland told him that she had been fired from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.% 259 +McFarland told him that she had been fired from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with~Kislyak.% 259 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the requested letter.% 260 \footnote{KTMF\_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} -As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous "Memorandum for the Record" that she wrote because she was concerned by the President's request: -"Eisenberg \dots\ thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea---from my side because the email would be awkward. +As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous ``Memorandum for the Record'' that she wrote because she was concerned by the President's request: +``Eisenberg \dots\ thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea---from my side because the email would be awkward. Why would I be emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record? -But it would also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in some way a quid pro quo."% 261 +But it would also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in some way a quid pro quo.''% 261 \footnote{KTMF\_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); \textit{see} McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~17.} Later that evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland's office and told her not to write the email and to forget he even mentioned it.% 262 @@ -963,9 +964,9 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~9--10.} On March~31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President tweeted, -"Mike Flynn should ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media \& Dems, of historic proportion!"% 266 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 3/31/17 (7:04~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\textit{see} Shane Harris at al., \textit{Mike Flynn Offers to Testify in Exchange for Immunity}, Wall Street Journal (Mar.~30, 2017).} +``Mike Flynn should ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media \& Dems, of historic proportion!''% 266 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 3/31/17 (7:04~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\textit{see} Shane Harris et al., \textit{Mike Flynn Offers to Testify in Exchange for Immunity}, Wall Street Journal (Mar.~30, 2017).} In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong.% 267 \footnote{McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~18.} @@ -976,26 +977,26 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a.\qquad\underline{Obstructive act}. -According to Comey's account of his February~14, 2017 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told him, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go\dots. I hope you can let this go." +According to Comey's account of his February~14, 2017 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told him, ``I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go\dots. I hope you can let this go.'' In analyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate, and, if so, whether the President's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal charge. -After Comey's account of the President's request to "let[] Flynn go" became public, the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. -The President told the New York Times that he did not "shoo other people out of the room" when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.% 268 +After Comey's account of the President's request to ``let[] Flynn go'' became public, the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. +The President told the New York Times that he did not ``shoo other people out of the room'' when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.% 268 \footnote{\textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017). Hicks recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind in his office. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~12.} -The President also publicly denied that he had asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go" or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation of Flynn.% 269 +The President also publicly denied that he had asked Comey to ``let[] Flynn go'' or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation of Flynn.% 269 \footnote{In a statement on May~16, 2017, the White House said: -"While the President has repeatedly expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President has never asked Mr.~Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving General Flynn\dots. -This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President and Mr.~Comey." +``While the President has repeatedly expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President has never asked Mr.~Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving General Flynn\dots. +This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President and Mr.~Comey.'' \textit{See} Michael S. Schmidt, \textit{Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation}, New York Times (May~16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); -\@realDonaldTrump 12/3/17 (6:15~a.m.~ET) Tweet ("I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. -Just more Fake News covering another Comey lie!").} +\UseVerb{DJT} 12/3/17 (6:15~a.m.~ET) Tweet (``I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. +Just more Fake News covering another Comey lie!'').} In private, the President denied aspects of Comey's account to White House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey and stated that Flynn was a good guy.% 270 -\footnote{Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and he hoped "everything worked out for him." +\footnote{Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and he hoped ``everything worked out for him.'' Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~19. -McGahn recalled that the President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was "allowed to hope." +McGahn recalled that the President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was ``allowed to hope.'' The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at~8.} Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account. @@ -1005,7 +1006,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St \footnote{Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at~4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at~13--14.} -Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he "let[] Flynn go" under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18~U.S.C. \S~1001. +Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he ``let[] Flynn go'' under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18~U.S.C. \S~1001. Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained consistent over time. Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to occur support Comey's description of the event. @@ -1017,33 +1018,33 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and, in particular, to exclude the Attorney General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey, which is consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General. -Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President having asked him to "let[] Flynn go." +Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President having asked him to ``let[] Flynn go.'' Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to keep the President's statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President's request. Comey also promptly met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney General's chief of staff. A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn. -While the President said he "hope[d]" Comey could "let[] Flynn go," rather than affirmatively directing him to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close the FBI's investigation into Flynn. +While the President said he ``hope[d]'' Comey could ``let[] Flynn go,'' rather than affirmatively directing him to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close the FBI's investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. -Second, because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he "hopes" a subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants. -Indeed, the President repeated a version of "let this go" three times, and Comey testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way Comey reacted at the time. +Second, because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he ``hopes'' a subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants. +Indeed, the President repeated a version of ``let this go'' three times, and Comey testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way Comey reacted at the time. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to a proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to a proceeding}. To establish a nexus to a proceeding, it would be necessary to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the investigation of Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution. At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas had been issued as part of the FBI's investigation into Flynn. But Flynn's lies to the FBI violated federal criminal law, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}, and resulted in Flynn's prosecution for violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001. -By the time the President spoke to Comey about Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had told the same version of events to the FBI\null. +By the time the President spoke to Comey about Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had told the same version of events to the~FBI\null. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's conduct could violate 18~U.S.C. \S~1001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February~10, 2017, they believed that Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been lying. -In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to "let[] Flynn go" suggests his awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution. +In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to ``let[] Flynn go'' suggests his awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn---for example, whether the President was aware of Flynn's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. -In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak. -Flynn told McFarland about the substance of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully "stopped the train on Russia's response" to the sanctions. -It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a "[g]reat move." -And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with Kislyak. +In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to~Kislyak. +Flynn told McFarland about the substance of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully ``stopped the train on Russia's response'' to the sanctions. +It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a ``[g]reat move.'' +And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with~Kislyak. But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn. @@ -1051,16 +1052,16 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St Our investigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn's discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct. -Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would end "the whole Russia thing." +Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would end ``the whole Russia thing.'' Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. -The President paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. +The President paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with~Kislyak. Just hours before meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to the Russia inquiries. -And after Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey that the President liked him and he was part of "the team." -That afternoon, the President cleared the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go." +And after Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey that the President liked him and he was part of ``the team.'' +That afternoon, the President cleared the room and asked Comey to ``let[] Flynn go.'' We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Comey was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. -In public statements the President repeatedly described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President "care[d]" about him and felt bad for him. +In public statements the President repeatedly described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President ``care[d]'' about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior advisors, including Bannon, Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard, but from concern about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in the Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative things about him. @@ -1068,10 +1069,10 @@ \subsubsection{The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness St The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey also is relevant to understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the advice of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend. -At the dinner, the President asked Comey for "loyalty" and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned that Flynn had judgment issues. +At the dinner, the President asked Comey for ``loyalty'' and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's termination---shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation---the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he could again speak to Comey alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Comey contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement activities. -And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go"---a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. +And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Comey to ``let[] Flynn go''---a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern about being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President was trying to have McFarland lie. @@ -1084,9 +1085,9 @@ \subsection{The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI's Russia \end{center} In early March 2017, the President learned that Sessions was considering recusing from the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. -After Sessions announced his recusal on March~2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked Sessions to "unrecuse." +After Sessions announced his recusal on March~2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked Sessions to ``unrecuse.'' On March~20, 2017, Comey publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation. -In the days that followed, the President contacted Comey and other intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to "lift the cloud" of the ongoing investigation. +In the days that followed, the President contacted Comey and other intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to ``lift the cloud'' of the ongoing investigation. \begin{center} \textbf{Evidence} @@ -1098,15 +1099,15 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~1; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~3.} On March~1, 2017, the press reported that, in his January confirmation hearing to become Attorney General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election.% 274 -\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Adam Entous et al., \textit{Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later did not disclose}, Washington Post (Mar.~1, 2017).} +\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Adam Entous et~al., \textit{Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later did not disclose}, Washington Post (Mar.~1, 2017).} Also on March~1, the President called Comey and said he wanted to check in and see how Comey was doing.% 275 \footnote{3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; -SCR012b\_000030 (President's Daily Diary, 3/1/17, reflecting call with Comey at~11:55~a.m.)} -According to an email Comey sent to his chief of staff after the call, the President "talked about Sessions a bit," said that he had heard Comey was "doing great," and said that he hoped Comey would come by to say hello when he was at the White House.% 276 +SCR012b\_000030 (President's Daily Diary, 3/1/17, reflecting call with Comey at~11:55~a.m.).} +According to an email Comey sent to his chief of staff after the call, the President ``talked about Sessions a bit,'' said that he had heard Comey was ``doing great,'' and said that he hoped Comey would come by to say hello when he was at the White House.% 276 \footnote{3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; -\textit{see Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~86) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI) ("[H]e called me one day\dots. [H]e just called to check in and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing.").} -Comey interpreted the call as an effort by the President to "pull [him] in," but he did not perceive the call as an attempt by the President to find out what Comey was doing with the Flynn investigation.% 277 +\textit{see Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~86) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI) (``[H]e called me one day\dots. [H]e just called to check in and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing.'').} +Comey interpreted the call as an effort by the President to ``pull [him] in,'' but he did not perceive the call as an attempt by the President to find out what Comey was doing with the Flynn investigation.% 277 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~17--18.} The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation.% 278 @@ -1115,7 +1116,7 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the presidency and derail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of a Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week.% 279 \footnote{McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~16--17; -\textit{see} SC\_AD\_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) ("Just in the middle of another Russia Fiasco.").} +\textit{see} SC\_AD\_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) (``Just in the middle of another Russia Fiasco.'').} McGahn reached out to Sessions and reported that the President was not happy about the possibility of recusal.% 280 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~3.} Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal.% 281 @@ -1132,15 +1133,15 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} Sessions recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his recusal.% 284 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~3.} -That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse "from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United States."% 285 -\footnote{Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar.~2, 2017) ("During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for President of the United States. -Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United States."). +That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse ``from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United States.''% 285 +\footnote{Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar.~2, 2017) (``During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for President of the United States. +Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United States.''). At the time of Sessions's recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney General and U.S.~Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, became the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the Department of Justice. -\textit{Id.}~("Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice, \dots\ Dana Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from which I have recused myself to the extent they exist."); +\textit{Id.}~(``Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice, \dots\ Dana Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from which I have recused myself to the extent they exist.''); \textit{see} Exec.\ Order No.~13775, 82~Fed.\ Reg.\ 10697 (Feb.~14, 2017).} Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call, given the applicable language in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and decisive.% 286 -\footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~1--2. 28~C.F.R. \S~45.2 provides that "no employee shall participate in a criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with \dots\ [any person or organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution," and defines "political relationship" as "a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof."} -Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was "very thin."% 287 +\footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~1--2. 28~C.F.R. \S~45.2 provides that ``no employee shall participate in a criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with \dots\ [any person or organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution,'' and defines ``political relationship'' as ``a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof.''} +Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was ``very thin.''% 287 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~2.} Sessions got the impression, based on calls he received from White House officials, that the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney General.% 288 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~3.} @@ -1149,18 +1150,18 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} \footnote{Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~11; SC\_AD\_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). It is not clear whether the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his recusal.} -Internal White House Counsel's Office notes from March~2, 2017, state "No contact w/ Sessions" and "No comms/Serious concerns about obstruction."% 290 +Internal White House Counsel's Office notes from March~2, 2017, state ``No contact w/ Sessions'' and ``No comms/Serious concerns about obstruction.''% 290 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). -McGahn said he believed the note "No comms / Serious concerns about obstruction" may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team saying "crazy things" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about obstruction. +McGahn said he believed the note ``No comms / Serious concerns about obstruction'' may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team saying ``crazy things'' and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about obstruction. McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~19. -Donaldson recalled that "No comms" referred to the order that no one should contact Sessions. +Donaldson recalled that ``No comms'' referred to the order that no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~11.} On March~3, the day after Sessions's recusal, McGahn was called into the Oval Office.% 291 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~2.} Other advisors were there, including Priebus and Bannon.% 292 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~2.} -The President opened the conversation by saying, "I don't have a lawyer."% 293 +The President opened the conversation by saying, ``I don't have a lawyer.''% 293 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~2.} The President expressed anger at McGahn about the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney.% 294 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~2. @@ -1178,10 +1179,10 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder as Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had his brother's back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~5. -Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his entire life he needed to have a great lawyer, a "bulldog," and added that Holder had been willing to take a contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama. +Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his entire life he needed to have a great lawyer, a ``bulldog,'' and added that Holder had been willing to take a contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~5.} -The President also pushed back on the DOJ contacts policy, and said words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? -Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?"% 298 +The President also pushed back on the DOJ contacts policy, and said words to the effect of, ``You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? +Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?''% 298 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~3.} Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed at McGahn about how weak Sessions was.% 299 \footnote{Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~5.} @@ -1192,7 +1193,7 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~5; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~3.} -Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that Sessions should "unrecuse" from the Russia investigation.% 302 +Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that Sessions should ``unrecuse'' from the Russia investigation.% 302 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~3--4.} The President contrasted Sessions with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents where Sessions had not.% 303 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~3--4.} @@ -1206,34 +1207,34 @@ \subsubsection{Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation} \textit{see} Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~13.} On March~6, the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it is not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn.% 306 \footnote{Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~14; -\textit{see} SC\_AD\_000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) ("POTUS wants to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations] / Is investigation / No / We know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There's something hot").} +\textit{see} SC\_AD\_000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) (``POTUS wants to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations] / Is investigation / No / We know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There's something hot'').} \subsubsection{FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI} -On March~9, 2017, Comey briefed the "Gang of Eight" congressional leaders about the FBI's investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S. subjects of the investigation.% 307 +On March~9, 2017, Comey briefed the ``Gang of Eight'' congressional leaders about the FBI's investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S. subjects of the investigation.% 307 \footnote{Comey 11/15/17 302, at~13--14; -SNS-Classified-0000140--44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et al.).} -Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn's chief of staff, on March~12, 2017, state, "POTUS in panic/chaos \dots\ Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related to Russia."% 308 +SNS-Classified-0000140--44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et~al.).} +Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn's chief of staff, on March~12, 2017, state, ``POTUS in panic/chaos \dots\ Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related to Russia.''% 308 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~13.} The week after Comey's briefing, the White House Counsel's Office was in contact with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have received information about the status of the FBI investigation.% 309 \footnote{Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~14--15. -On March~16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of "4--5 targets." +On March~16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of ``4--5 targets.'' Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~15. -The "targets" were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as "Flynn (FBI was in---wrapping up) $\longrightarrow$ DOJ looking for phone records"; -"Comey $\longrightarrow$ Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)"; +The ``targets'' were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as ``Flynn (FBI was in---wrapping up) $\longrightarrow$ DOJ looking for phone records''; +``Comey $\longrightarrow$ Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)''; \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} -"Carter Page (\$ game)"; -and "Greek Guy" (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001 for lying to the FBI). +``Carter Page (\$ game)''; +and ``Greek Guy'' (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18~U.S.C. \S~1001 for lying to the~FBI). SC\_AD\_00198 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn both said they believed these were targets of SSCI\null. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~15; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~4. -But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as "targets"; +But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as ``targets''; the notes on their face reference the FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey; and the notes track the background materials prepared by the FBI for Comey's briefing to the Gang of 8 on March~9. -\textit{See} SNS-Classified-0000140--44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et al.); +\textit{See} SNS-Classified-0000140--44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et~al.); \textit{see also} Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had told McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets).} On March~20, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify before HPSCI\null.% 310 @@ -1246,16 +1247,16 @@ \subsubsection{FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia \footnote{Boente 1/31/18 302, at~5; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~16--17.} -In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had "been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts. -As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed."% 313 +In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had ``been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts. +As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.''% 313 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (Mar.~20, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey); Comey 11/15/17 302, at~17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at~5 (confirming that the Department of Justice authorized Comey's remarks).} -Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was "doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining" because the investigation was ongoing and classified---but he observed that he had "taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department of Justice of briefing this Congress's leaders \dots\ in a classified setting in detail about the investigation."% 314 +Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was ``doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining'' because the investigation was ongoing and classified---but he observed that he had ``taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department of Justice of briefing this Congress's leaders \dots\ in a classified setting in detail about the investigation.''% 314 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (Mar.~20, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).} -Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was "under investigation during the campaign" or "under investigation now."% 315 +Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was ``under investigation during the campaign'' or ``under investigation now.''% 315 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (Mar.~20, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~130) (question by Rep.~Swalwell).} -Comey declined to answer, stating, "Please don't over interpret what I've said as---as the chair and ranking know, we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we're doing, but I'm not gonna answer about anybody in this forum."% 316 +Comey declined to answer, stating, ``Please don't over interpret what I've said as---as the chair and ranking know, we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we're doing, but I'm not gonna answer about anybody in this forum.''% 316 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (Mar.~20, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~130) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).} Comey was also asked whether the FBI was investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer.% 317 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (Mar.~20, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~143) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).} @@ -1266,11 +1267,11 @@ \subsubsection{FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia The President had previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information to the media.% 319 \footnote{Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~6--9.} -McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like "his own branch of government."% 320 +McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like ``his own branch of government.''% 320 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~7.} Press reports following Comey's March~20 testimony suggested that the FBI was investigating the President, contrary to what Comey had told the President at the end of the January~6, 2017 intelligence assessment briefing.% 321 -\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Matt Apuzzo et al., \textit{F.B.I. Is Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms}, New York Times (Mar.~20, 2017); +\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Matt Apuzzo et~al., \textit{F.B.I. Is Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms}, New York Times (Mar.~20, 2017); Andy Greenberg, \textit{The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump's Russia Ties Since July}, Wired (Mar.~20, 2017); Julie Borger \& Spencer Ackerman, \textit{Trump--Russia collusion is being investigated by FBI, Comey confirms}, Guardian (Mar.~20, 2017); \textit{see} Comey 1/6/17 Memorandum, at~2.} @@ -1278,11 +1279,11 @@ \subsubsection{FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia \footnote{Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~16--17; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~5--7.} -Notes from the White House Counsel's Office dated March~21, 2017, indicate that the President was "beside himself" over Comey's testimony.% 323 +Notes from the White House Counsel's Office dated March~21, 2017, indicate that the President was ``beside himself\thinspace'' over Comey's testimony.% 323 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00213 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). -The notes from that day also indicate that the President referred to the "Comey bombshell" which "made [him] look like a fool." +The notes from that day also indicate that the President referred to the ``Comey bombshell'' which ``made [him] look like a fool.'' SC\_AD\_00206 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).} -The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was "getting hotter and hotter, get rid?"% 324 +The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was ``getting hotter and hotter, get rid?''% 324 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).} Officials in the White House Counsel's Office became so concerned that the President would fire Comey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director.% 325 \footnote{SCR016\_000002--05 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum). @@ -1330,28 +1331,28 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and asked him to contact Comey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over with, end it, or words to that effect.% 339 \footnote{Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at~2.} -Dempsey said that Coats described the President's comments as falling "somewhere between musing about hating the investigation" and wanting Coats to "do something to stop it."% 340 +Dempsey said that Coats described the President's comments as falling ``somewhere between musing about hating the investigation'' and wanting Coats to ``do something to stop it.''% 340 \footnote{Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at~2--3.} Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get involved with an ongoing FBI investigation.% 341 \footnote{Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at~3.} -Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled that right after Coats's meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask him what he could do to "help with the investigation."% 342 +Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled that right after Coats's meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask him what he could do to ``help with the investigation.''% 342 \footnote{Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at~2.} Another ODNI staffer who had been waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Comey to convince him there was nothing to the Russia investigation.% 343 \footnote{Culver 6/14/17 302, at~2--3.} -On Saturday, March~25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office, the President called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of, "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this."% 344 +On Saturday, March~25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office, the President called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of, ``I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this.''% 344 \footnote{Coats 6/14/17 302, at~4.} Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course.% 345 \footnote{Coats 6/14/17 302, at~4; -Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at~3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked several times what Coats could do to help "get [the investigation] done," and Coats had repeatedly told the President that fastest way to "get it done" was to let it run its course).} -Coats later testified in a congressional hearing that he had "never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and shape---with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship \dots\ to an ongoing investigation."% 346 +Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at~3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked several times what Coats could do to help ``get [the investigation] done,'' and Coats had repeatedly told the President that fastest way to ``get it done'' was to let it run its course).} +Coats later testified in a congressional hearing that he had ``never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and shape---with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship \dots\ to an ongoing investigation.''% 346 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~7, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~25) (testimony by Daniel Coats, Director of National Intelligence).} On March~26, 2017, the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers.% 347 \footnote{Rogers 6/12/17 302, at~3--4.} The President expressed frustration with the Russia investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult.% 348 \footnote{Rogers 6/12/17 302, at~4.} -The President told Rogers "the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia.% 349 +The President told Rogers ``the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up'' his ability to get things done with Russia.% 349 \footnote{Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at~1--2; \textit{see} Rogers 6/12/17 302, at~4.} The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories.% 350 @@ -1365,47 +1366,47 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public But Rogers did not perceive the President's request to be an order, and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia investigation itself.% 353 \footnote{Rogers 6/12/17 302, at~5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at~2.} -Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had "never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or inappropriate" and did "not recall ever feeling pressured to do so."% 354 +Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had ``never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or inappropriate'' and did ``not recall ever feeling pressured to do so.''% 354 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~7, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~20) (testimony by Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency).} In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.% 355 \footnote{Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at~1, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at~2--3.} -On at least two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no collusion with Russia and he hoped press statement to that effect could be issued.% 356 +On at least two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued.% 356 \footnote{Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at~1.} Pompeo recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him.% 357 \footnote{Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at~2.} -Rogers recalled a private conversation with the President in which he "vent[ed]" about the investigation, said he had done nothing wrong, and said something like the "Russia thing has got to go away."% 358 +Rogers recalled a private conversation with the President in which he ``vent[ed]'' about the investigation, said he had done nothing wrong, and said something like the ``Russia thing has got to go away.''% 358 \footnote{Rogers 6/12/17 302, at~6.} Coats recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he finally told the President that Coats's job was to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations.% 359 \footnote{Coats 6/14/17 302, at~3--4.} -\subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia Investigation} +\subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to ``Lift the Cloud'' Created by the Russia Investigation} On the morning of March~30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the Russia investigation.% 360 \footnote{SCR012b\_000044 (President's Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:14--8:24~a.m.); -Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1 ("The President called me on my CMS phone at 8:13~am today\dots. -The call lasted 11 minutes (about 10 minutes when he was connected)."; +Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1 (``The President called me on my CMS phone at 8:13~am today\dots. +The call lasted 11~minutes (about 10~minutes when he was connected).''; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~6).} -According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult."% 361 +According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said ``he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult.''% 361 \footnote{Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this conversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum. \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~6); Comey 11/15/17 302, at~18.} -The President asked Comey what could be done to "lift the cloud."% 362 +The President asked Comey what could be done to ``lift the cloud.''% 362 \footnote{Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~18.} -Comey explained "that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great benefit, if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do our work."% 363 +Comey explained ``that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great benefit, if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do our work.''% 363 \footnote{Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at~18.} Comey also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI was not investigating the President personally.% 364 \footnote{Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~6).} -The President said several times, "We need to get that fact out."% 365 +The President said several times, ``We need to get that fact out.''% 365 \footnote{Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~6).} -The President commented that if there was "some satellite" (which Comey took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, "it would be good to find that out" but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey "would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating him."% 366 +The President commented that if there was ``some satellite'' (which Comey took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, ``it would be good to find that out'' but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey ``would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating him.''% 366 \footnote{Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at~1; \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~6--7).} After the call ended, Comey called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond, and said he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President about the investigation.% 367 @@ -1414,10 +1415,10 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russi \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~7).} On the morning of April~11, 2017, the President called Comey again.% 368 -\footnote{SCR012b\_000053 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27--8:31~a.m.); -Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at~1 ("I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26~am EDT\null. -We spoke for about four minutes.").} -According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was "following up to see if [Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time---getting out that he personally is not under investigation."% 369 +\footnote{SCR012b\_000053 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27~a.m.--8:31~a.m.); +Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at~1 (``I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26~am EDT\null. +We spoke for about four minutes.'').} +According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was ``following up to see if [Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time---getting out that he personally is not under investigation.''% 369 \footnote{Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at~1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. \textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~7).} @@ -1425,14 +1426,14 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russi \footnote{Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at~1.} The President said he would take that step.% 371 \footnote{Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at~1.} -The President then added, "Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know."% 372 +The President then added, ``Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know.''% 372 \footnote{Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at~1. -In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Comey wrote, "His use of these words did not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away from any request of me, but I have recorded it here as it happened."} +In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Comey wrote, ``His use of these words did not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away from any request of me, but I have recorded it here as it happened.''} In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon, the President was asked if it was too late for him to ask Comey to step down; -the President responded, "No, it's not too late, but you know, I have confidence in him. +the President responded, ``No, it's not too late, but you know, I have confidence in him. We'll see what happens. -You know, it's going to be interesting."% 373 -\footnote{Maria Bartiromo, \textit{Interview with President Trump}, Fox Business Network (Apr.~12, 2017); SCR012b\_000054 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30--12:55~p.m.).} +You know, it's going to be interesting.''% 373 +\footnote{Maria Bartiromo, \textit{Interview with President Trump}, Fox Business Network (Apr.~12, 2017); SCR012b\_000054 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30~p.m.--12:55~p.m.).} After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President's comment about Comey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but the President wanted to keep it in, which Hicks thought was unusual.% 374 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~13.} @@ -1445,7 +1446,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russi \textit{see} McGahn 11/30/17 302, at~9; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations). Later in April, the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office that he had called Comey even though he knew they had advised against direct contact. -Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~2 (recalling that the President said, "I know you told me not to, but I called Comey anyway.").} +Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~2 (recalling that the President said, ``I know you told me not to, but I called Comey anyway.'').} The President told McGahn that Comey had indicated the FBI could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department of Justice approved that action.% 377 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~9.} After speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with Boente to relay the President's understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if the Department of Justice cleared it.% 378 @@ -1470,22 +1471,22 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russi a.\qquad\underline{Obstructive act}. The evidence shows that, after Comey's March~20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI's investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches. -Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March~22 Oval Office meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and "stop" the investigation. +Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March~22 Oval Office meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and ``stop'' the investigation. But the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no memory of the specific meeting, but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia, but did not ask him to speak with Comey or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the President during this period were similar in nature. -The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to make a public statement that would "lift the cloud" of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not personally under investigation. +The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to make a public statement that would ``lift the cloud'' of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests, while significant enough that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the investigation. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to a proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to a proceeding}. At the time of the President's outreaches to leaders of the intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI's Russia investigation did not yet involve grand jury proceedings. The outreaches, however, came after and were in response to Comey's March~20, 2017 announcement that the FBI, as a part of its counterintelligence mission, was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. -Comey testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign officials and would "include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed." +Comey testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign officials and would ``include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.'' c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. -As described above, the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigation---and the President affirmatively told Comey that if "some satellite" was involved in Russian election interference "it would be good to find that out." +As described above, the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigation---and the President affirmatively told Comey that if ``some satellite'' was involved in Russian election interference ``it would be good to find that out.'' But the President's intent in trying to prevent Sessions's recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey following Comey's public announcement of the FBI's Russia investigation, is nevertheless relevant to understanding what motivated the President's other actions towards the investigation. The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's implications for his presidency---and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under investigation or had links to Russia. @@ -1493,20 +1494,20 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russi After Sessions recused, the White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents. -The President made statements about being able to direct the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? -Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?" +The President made statements about being able to direct the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, ``You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? +Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?'' -After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation on March~20, 2017, the President was "beside himself" and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. +After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation on March~20, 2017, the President was ``beside himself\thinspace'' and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the President had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the investigation. -On March~30 and April~11, against the advice of White House advisors who had informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to "lift the cloud" of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally under investigation. +On March~30 and April~11, against the advice of White House advisors who had informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to ``lift the cloud'' of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally under investigation. Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true based on Comey's representations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished. Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia. -The President told Coats he "can't do anything with Russia," he told Rogers that "the thing with the Russians" was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult." +The President told Coats he ``can't do anything with Russia,'' he told Rogers that ``the thing with the Russians'' was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that ``he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult.'' \subsection{Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director Comey} @@ -1520,11 +1521,11 @@ \subsection{Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director Two days later, on May~5, 2017, the President told close aides he was going to fire Comey, and on May~9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public that Comey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation. The President decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the Department of Justice, but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that he intended to fire Comey regardless of the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision. -The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister, "I just fired the head of the F.B.I\null. +The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister, ``I just fired the head of the F.B.I\null. He was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off\dots. -I'm not under investigation." +I'm not under investigation.'' \begin{center} \textbf{Evidence} @@ -1538,20 +1539,20 @@ \subsubsection{Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Decline \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~10--11.} The President had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.% 385 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~7, 10--11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to the President for being under investigation); -SC\_AD\_00265 (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) ("P Called Comey---Day we told him not to? 'You are not under investigation' NK/China/Sapping Credibility").} -At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating "[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation] exists," but that he was "not going to say another word about it" until the investigation was completed.% 386 +SC\_AD\_00265 (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) (``P Called Comey---Day we told him not to? `You are not under investigation' NK/China/Sapping Credibility'').} +At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating ``[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation] exists,'' but that he was ``not going to say another word about it'' until the investigation was completed.% 386 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~70) (May~3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Comey). Comey repeated this point several times during his testimony. -\textit{See id}.~at~26 (explaining that he was "not going to say another peep about [the investigation] until we're done"); -\textit{id}.~at~90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about the status of investigation "before the matter is concluded").} -Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had "ruled out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target of th[e] criminal investigation," including whether the FBI had "ruled out the president of the United States."% 387 +\textit{See id.}~at~26 (explaining that he was ``not going to say another peep about [the investigation] until we're done''); +\textit{id.}~at~90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about the status of investigation ``before the matter is concluded'').} +Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had ``ruled out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target of th[e] criminal investigation,'' including whether the FBI had ``ruled out the president of the United States.''% 387 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (May~3, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~87--88) (questions by Sen.~Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).} Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.% 388 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (May~3, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~15) (question by Sen.~Feinstein).} -Comey stated that it made him "mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election," but added that "even in hindsight" he "would make the same decision."% 389 +Comey stated that it made him ``mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election,'' but added that ``even in hindsight'' he ``would make the same decision.''% 389 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (May~3, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~17) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).} -He later repeated that he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had "done the right thing at each turn."% 390 +He later repeated that he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had ``done the right thing at each turn.''% 390 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (May~3, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).} In the afternoon following Comey's testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions, and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.% 391 @@ -1563,18 +1564,18 @@ \subsubsection{Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Decline McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~6.} The President became very upset and directed his anger at Sessions.% 393 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~8--9.} -According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, "This is terrible Jeff. +According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, ``This is terrible Jeff. It's all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. -Obama appointed Holder. T appointed you and you recused yourself. +Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you recused yourself. You left me on an island. -I can't do anything."% 394 +I can't do anything.''% 394 \footnote{Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting and others with the President after the events occurred. Hunt 2/1/17 302, at~2.} The President said that the recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his authority with foreign leaders.% 395 -\footnote{Hunt-000021--22 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) ("I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being investigated."); +\footnote{Hunt-000021--22 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) (``I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being investigated.''); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President that he was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~8.} Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision.% 396 @@ -1588,13 +1589,13 @@ \subsubsection{Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Decline Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May~3 and May~4, 2017.% 399 \footnote{Bannon 2/12/18 302, at~20.} According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: -"He told me three times I'm not under investigation. +``He told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander. I don't know any Russians. -There was no collusion."% 400 +There was no collusion.''% 400 \footnote{Bannon 2/12/18 302, at~20.} -Bannon told the President that he could not fire Comey because "that ship had sailed."% 401 +Bannon told the President that he could not fire Comey because ``that ship had sailed.''% 401 \footnote{Bannon 2/12/18 302, at~20.} Bannon also told the President that firing Comey was not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not fire the FBI\null.% 402 \footnote{Bannon 2/12/18 302, at~20--21; @@ -1609,33 +1610,33 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~5.} The President dictated arguments and specific language for the letter, and Miller took notes.% 405 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~5--6.} -As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter should start, "While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump--Russia relationship---pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American public---including Ds and Rs---have lost faith in you as Director of the FBI."% 406 +As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter should start, ``While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump--Russia relationship -- pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that~I, and I believe the American public -- including Ds and Rs -- have lost faith in you as Director of the~FBI.''% 406 \footnote{S. Miller 5/5/17 Notes, at~1; -\textit{see} S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~8.} +\textit{see} S.~Miller 10/31/17 302, at~8.} Following the dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to support the President's arguments.% 407 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~6.} Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of edits on the draft letter.% 408 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~6--8.} Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about~leaks.% 409 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~7. -Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided, so on Sunday night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the "Comey situation" and there would be an important discussion on Monday. +Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided, so on Sunday night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the ``Comey situation'' and there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~7.} In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open with a reference to him not being under investigation.% 410 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~8.} Miller said he believed that fact was important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such investigation.% 411 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~8.} -According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that Comey had been under a "review period" and did not have assurance from the President that he would be permitted to keep his job.% 412 +According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that Comey had been under a ``review period'' and did not have assurance from the President that he would be permitted to keep his job.% 412 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~10.} The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May~5 dinner: -"Dear Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump--Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated."% 413 +``Dear Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump--Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that~I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated.''% 413 \footnote{SCR013c\_000003--06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).} The four-page letter went on to critique Comey's judgment and conduct, including his May~3 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold leakers accountable.% 414 \footnote{SCR013c\_000003--06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). Kushner said that the termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to fire Comey and was the truest representation of what the President had said during the May~5 dinner. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at~25.} -The letter stated that Comey had "asked [the President] at dinner shortly after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role, and [the President] said that [he] would consider it," but the President had "concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find new leadership for the Bureau---a~leader that restores confidence and trust."% 415 +The letter stated that Comey had ``asked [the President] at dinner shortly after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role, and [the President] said that [he] would consider it,'' but the President had ``concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find new leadership for the Bureau---a~leader that restores confidence and trust.''% 415 \footnote{SCR013c\_000003 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).} In the morning of Monday, May~8, 2017, the President met in the Oval Office with senior advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate Comey.% 416 @@ -1645,9 +1646,9 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~13.} The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion.% 417 -\footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~11 (observing that the President started the meeting by saying, "I'm going to read you a letter. +\footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~11 (observing that the President started the meeting by saying, ``I'm going to read you a letter. Don't talk me out of this. -I've made my decision."); +I've made my decision.''); Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~6 (the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Comey); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~13 (the President did not leave whether or not to fire Comey up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~25; @@ -1661,7 +1662,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~11; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~7. Because of the Attorney General's recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. -\textit{See} 28~U.S.C. \S~508(a) ("In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office').} +\textit{See} 28~U.S.C. \S~508(a) (``In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office'').} McGahn said that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity to find out what they thought about firing Comey.% 420 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~12.} @@ -1669,7 +1670,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} \footnote{Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); -\textit{see} Gauhar-000056--72 (2/11/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) ("Ms.~Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May~16, 2017.").} +\textit{see} Gauhar-000056--72 (2/11/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) (``Ms.~Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May~16, 2017.'').} McGahn said that the President had decided to fire Comey and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views.% 422 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~13; \textit{see} Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).} @@ -1688,11 +1689,11 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} \footnote{Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at~2; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~14; \textit{see} Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).} -The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May~3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was "not right" with Comey.% 427 +The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May~3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was ``not right'' with Comey.% 427 \footnote{Hunt-000026--27 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).} The President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their views.% 428 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~10; -\textit{see} Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("POTUS to AG: What is your rec?").} +\textit{see} Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (``POTUS to AG: What is your rec?'').} Hunt, who was in the room, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously recommended that Comey be replaced.% 429 \footnote{Hunt-000027 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).} McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his concerns about Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation.% 430 @@ -1708,11 +1709,11 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} The President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it first thing the next morning.% 434 \footnote{McCabe 9/26/17 302, at~13; Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at~2; -\textit{see} Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("POTUS tells DAG to write a memo").} +\textit{see} Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (``POTUS tells DAG to write a memo'').} Hunt's notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his recommendation the fact that Comey had refused to confirm that the President was not personally under investigation.% 435 -\footnote{Hunt-000028--29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) ("POTUS asked if Rod's recommendation would include the fact that although Comey talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under investigation. -\dots~So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Comey refuses to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times.").} -According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein's description of his meeting with the President, the President said, "Put the Russia stuff in the memo."% 436 +\footnote{Hunt-000028--29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) (``POTUS asked if Rod's recommendation would include the fact that although Comey talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under investigation. +\dots~So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Comey refuses to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times.'').} +According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein's description of his meeting with the President, the President said, ``Put the Russia stuff in the memo.''% 436 \footnote{Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).} Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his recommendation, so he did not think Russia should be mentioned.% 437 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~10; @@ -1722,26 +1723,26 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} \footnote{Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); McCabe 5/16/17 Memorandum 1; McCabe 9/26/17 302, at~13.} -When Rosenstein left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his own reasons for replacing Comey were "not [the President's] reasons."% 439 +When Rosenstein left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his own reasons for replacing Comey were ``not [the President's] reasons.''% 439 \footnote{Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at~2; -Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("DAG reasons not their reasons [POTUS]"); -Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("1st draft had a recommendation. -Took it out b/c knew decision had already been made.").} +Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (``DAG reasons not their reasons [POTUS]''); +Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (``1st draft had a recommendation. +Took it out b/c knew decision had already been made.'').} -On May~9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending Comey's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled "Restoring Public Confidence in the FBI."% 440 +On May~9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending Comey's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled ``Restoring Public Confidence in the~FBI.''% 440 \footnote{Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at~4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~15; -5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump ("Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the attached memorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI."); -5/9/17 Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, "The way the Director handled the conclusion of the email investigation was wrong. +5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (``Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the attached memorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the~FBI.''); +5/9/17 Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, ``The way the Director handled the conclusion of the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. -Having refused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions.").} +Having refused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions.'').} McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey.% 441 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).} -Notes taken by Donaldson on May~9 reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination letter should "[n]ot [see the] light of day" and that it would be better to offer "[n]o other rationales" for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda.% 442 +Notes taken by Donaldson on May~9 reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination letter should ``[n]ot [see the] light of day'' and that it would be better to offer ``[n]o other rationales'' for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda.% 442 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). -Donaldson also wrote "[i]s this the beginning of the end?" because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the manner in which it was carried out would be the end of the presidency. +Donaldson also wrote ``[i]s this the beginning of the end?'' because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the manner in which it was carried out would be the end of the presidency. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~25.} The President asked Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had informed the President three times that he was not under investigation.% 443 \footnote{S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at~12; @@ -1756,24 +1757,24 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).} McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to the President.% 445 \footnote{Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~10; -Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~15 (providing the view that the President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the "driving animus of the whole thing"); +Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at~15 (providing the view that the President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the ``driving animus of the whole thing''); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at~16 (Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was the line that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under investigation). -According to Hunt's notes, the reference to Comey's statement would indicate that "notwithstanding" Comey's having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the President was terminating Comey. +According to Hunt's notes, the reference to Comey's statement would indicate that ``notwithstanding'' Comey's having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the President was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the President wanted the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated Comey because the President was under investigation. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~15.} Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to resign, but the President refused.% 446 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~25; -\textit{see} SC\_AD\_00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes) ("Resign vs.\ Removal.---POTUS/removal.").} +\textit{see} SC\_AD\_00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes) (``Resign vs.\ Removal.---POTUS/removal.'').} Around the time the President's letter was finalized, Priebus summoned Spicer and the press team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions.% 447 \footnote{Spicer 10/16/17 302, at~9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~16.} To announce Comey's termination, the White House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President.% 448 \footnote{Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~28.} -In full, the statement read: "Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that he has been terminated and removed from office. -President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions."% 449 +In full, the statement read: ``Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that he has been terminated and removed from office. +President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions.''% 449 \footnote{\textit{Statement of the Press Secretary}, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (May~9, 2017).} That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the President at the White House.% 450 @@ -1786,10 +1787,10 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that he was not under investigation.% 452 \footnote{McCabe 9/26/17 302, at~5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1--2.} -The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was part of the "resistance" that had disagreed with Comey's decisions in the Clinton investigation.% 453 +The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was part of the ``resistance'' that had disagreed with Comey's decisions in the Clinton investigation.% 453 \footnote{McCabe 9/26/17 302, at~5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1--2.} -McCabe told the President that he knew Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively about Comey, and that McCabe worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation.% 454 +McCabe told the President that he knew Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively about Comey, and that McCabe worked ``very closely'' with Comey and was part of all the decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation.% 454 \footnote{McCabe 9/26/17 302, at~5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1--2.} @@ -1797,22 +1798,22 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} \footnote{Spicer 10/16/17 302, at~11; Hicks 12/8/17, at~18; Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~2.} -The President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting "killed" in the press over Comey's termination.% 456 +The President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting ``killed'' in the press over Comey's termination.% 456 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~6.} The President asked what he should do.% 457 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~6.} -Christie asked, "Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?", and the President responded, "Yes.% 458 +Christie asked, ``Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?'', and the President responded, ``Yes.''% 458 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~6.} -Christie said that the President should "get Rod out there" and have him defend the decision.% 459 +Christie said that the President should ``get Rod out there'' and have him defend the decision.% 459 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~6.} -The President told Christie that this was a "good idea" and said he was going to call Rosenstein right away.% 460 +The President told Christie that this was a ``good idea'' and said he was going to call Rosenstein right away.% 460 \footnote{Christie 2/13/19 302, at~6.} That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Comey.% 461 \footnote{Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); Page Memorandum, at~3 (recording events of 5/16/17); McCabe 9/26/17 302, at~14.} -Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a "false story."% 462 +Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a ``false story.''% 462 \footnote{Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at~4--5; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).} The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.% 463 @@ -1820,41 +1821,41 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).} Rosenstein responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him, he would tell the truth that Comey's firing was not his idea.% 464 \footnote{Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). -DOJ notes from the week of Comey's firing indicate that Priebus was "screaming" at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press conference, and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not doing it. +DOJ notes from the week of Comey's firing indicate that Priebus was ``screaming'' at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press conference, and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not doing it. Gauhar-000071--72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).} Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being portrayed as the reason for Comey's termination.% 465 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~16--17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at~26--27; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~11.} -In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May~9, 2017, Spicer told reporters, "It was all [Rosenstein]. +In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May~9, 2017, Spicer told reporters, ``It was all [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. -It was a DOJ decision."% 466 +It was a DOJ decision.''% 466 \footnote{Jenna Johnson, \textit{After Trump fired Comey, White House staff scrambled to explain why}, Washington Post (May~10, 2017) (quoting Spicer).} That evening and the next morning, White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the President's decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President received from Rosenstein and Sessions.% 467 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (May~10, 2017); -SCR013\_001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email describing comments on the Comey termination by Vice President Pence).} +SCR013\_001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et~al.) (internal White House email describing comments on the Comey termination by Vice President Pence).} -In the morning on May~10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office.% 468 -\footnote{SCR08\_000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, "Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia"); -SCR08\_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). +In the morning o[f] May~10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office.% 468 +\footnote{SCR08\_000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, ``Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia''); +SCR08\_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et~al.). The meeting had been planned on May~2, 2017, during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the meeting date was confirmed on May~5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for the Comey termination letter to Stephen Miller. -SCR08\_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.).} +SCR08\_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et~al.).} The media subsequently reported that during the May~10 meeting the President brought up his decision the prior day to terminate Comey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: -"I just fired the head of the F.B.I\null. +``I just fired the head of the F.B.I\null. He was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off\dots. -I'm not under investigation."% 469 -\footnote{Matt Apuzzo et al., \textit{Trump Told Russians That Firing "Nut Job" Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation}, New York Times (May~19, 2017).} +I'm not under investigation.''% 469 +\footnote{Matt Apuzzo et~al., \textit{Trump Told Russians That Firing ``Nut Job'' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation}, New York Times (May~19, 2017).} The President never denied making those statements, and the White House did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: -"By grandstanding and politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. +``By grandstanding and politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. -Once again, the real story is that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified information."% 470 +Once again, the real story is that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified information.''% 470 \footnote{SCR08\_002117 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS News)); -\textit{see} Spicer 10/16/17 302, at~13 (noting he would have been told to "clean it up" if the reporting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister was inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting); -Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~19 (recalling that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the President had said similar things about Comey in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May~18, 2017, calling Comey a "nut job" and "crazy").} -Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Comey, "he \textit{is} crazy."% 471 +\textit{see} Spicer 10/16/17 302, at~13 (noting he would have been told to ``clean it up'' if the reporting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister was inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting); +Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~19 (recalling that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the President had said similar things about Comey in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May~18, 2017, calling Comey a ``nut job'' and ``crazy'').} +Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Comey, ``he \textit{is} crazy.''% 471 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~19.} When McGahn asked the President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was fired because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he could get more work done.% 472 \footnote{McGahn 12/12/17 302, at~18.} @@ -1864,9 +1865,9 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1.} According to a memorandum McCabe wrote following the call, the President asked McCabe to come over to the White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to employees.% 474 \footnote{McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1.} -The President said he had received "hundreds" of messages from FBI employees indicating their support for terminating Comey.% 475 +The President said he had received ``hundreds'' of messages from FBI employees indicating their support for terminating Comey.% 475 \footnote{McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1.} -The President also told McCabe that Comey should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington,~D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he had been terminated and that he did not want Comey "in the building again," even to collect his belongings.% 476 +The President also told McCabe that Comey should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington,~D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he had been terminated and that he did not want Comey ``in the building again,'' even to collect his belongings.% 476 \footnote{McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at~1; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at~2. Comey had been visiting the FBI's Los Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated. @@ -1879,18 +1880,18 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} In the afternoon of May~10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the President about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press conference.% 478 \footnote{Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~4; Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (May~10, 2017).} -Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan members of Congress had lost confidence in Comey, "[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of the FBI had lost confidence in their director. -Accordingly, the President accepted the recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position."% 479 +Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan members of Congress had lost confidence in Comey, ``[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of the FBI had lost confidence in their director. +Accordingly, the President accepted the recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position.''% 479 \footnote{Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (May~10, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~4.} -In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to review Comey's performance and that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to come to the President on Monday, May~8 to express his concerns about Comey. -When a reporter indicated that the "vast majority" of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, "Look, we've heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things."% 480 +In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided ``on his own'' to review Comey's performance and that Rosenstein decided ``on his own'' to come to the President on Monday, May~8 to express his concerns about Comey. +When a reporter indicated that the ``vast majority'' of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, ``Look, we've heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things.''% 480 \footnote{Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (May~10, 2017).} Following the press conference, Sanders spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccuracies in her comments.% 481 \footnote{Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~4.} -Sanders told this Office that her reference to hearing from "countless members of the FBI" was a "slip of the tongue."% 482 +Sanders told this Office that her reference to hearing from ``countless members of the FBI'' was a ``slip of the tongue.''% 482 \footnote{Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~4.} -She also recalled that her statement in a separate press interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made "in the heat of the moment" that was not founded on anything.% 483 +She also recalled that her statement in a separate press interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made ``in the heat of the moment'' that was not founded on anything.% 483 \footnote{Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~3.} Also on May~10, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to fire Comey.% 484 @@ -1906,31 +1907,31 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what really happened.% 487 \footnote{Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at~11.} During the interview, the President stated that he had made the decision to fire Comey before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. -The President told Holt, "I was going to fire regardless of recommendation \dots\ [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. -But regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do it."% 488 +The President told Holt, ``I was going to fire regardless of recommendation \dots\ [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. +But regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do it.''% 488 \footnote{\textit{Interview with President Donald Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017) Transcript, at~2.} -The President continued, "And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself---I said, you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. -It's an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won."% 489 +The President continued, ``And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself---I said, you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. +It's an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won.''% 489 \footnote{\textit{Interview with President Donald Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017) Transcript, at~2.} -In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly."% 490 +In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, the President said, ``As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly.''% 490 \footnote{\textit{Interview with President Donald Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017) Transcript, at~3.} -The President added that he realized his termination of Comey "probably maybe will confuse people" with the result that it "might even lengthen out the investigation," but he "ha[d] to do the right thing for the American people" and Comey was "the wrong man for that position."% 491 +The President added that he realized his termination of Comey ``probably maybe will confuse people'' with the result that it ``might even lengthen out the investigation,'' but he ``ha[d] to do the right thing for the American people'' and Comey was ``the wrong man for that position.''% 491 \footnote{\textit{Interview with President Donald Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017) Transcript, at~3.} -The President described Comey as "a showboat" and "a grandstander," said that "[t]he FBI has been in turmoil," and said he wanted "to have a really competent, capable director."% 492 +The President described Comey as ``a showboat'' and ``a grandstander,'' said that ``[t]he FBI has been in turmoil,'' and said he wanted ``to have a really competent, capable director.''% 492 \footnote{\textit{Interview with President Donald Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017) Transcript, at~1, 5.} The President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.% 493 \footnote{\textit{Interview with President Donald Trump}, NBC (May~11, 2017) Transcript, at~7.} -On the evening of May~11, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President tweeted, "Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election."% 494 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 5/11/17 (4:34~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +On the evening of May~11, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President tweeted, ``Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election.''% 494 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 5/11/17 (4:34~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} The same day, the media reported that the President had demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly after being sworn in.% 495 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt, \textit{In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.}, New York Times (May~11, 2017).} -Late in the morning of May~12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the story that there was collusion between the Russians \& Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an excuse for losing the election."% 496 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -The President also tweeted, "James Comey better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!" and "When James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is no collusion, when does it end?"% 497 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:54~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Late in the morning of May~12, 2017, the President tweeted, ``Again, the story that there was collusion between the Russians \& Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an excuse for losing the election.''% 496 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 5/12/17 (7:51~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +The President also tweeted, ``James Comey better hope that there are no `tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!'' and ``When James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is no collusion, when does it end?''% 497 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 5/12/17 (8:26~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 5/12/17 (8:54~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} \begin{center} \textbf{Analysis} @@ -1944,77 +1945,77 @@ \subsubsection{The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey} Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect of interfering with or impeding the investigation---for example, if the termination would have the effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President perceived as more protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that issue include whether the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. -The President fired Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly, calling him a "showboat" and claiming that the FBI was "in turmoil" under his leadership. +The President fired Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly, calling him a ``showboat'' and claiming that the FBI was ``in turmoil'' under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were highly critical of the investigation; -for example, three days after firing Comey, the President referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt" and asked, "when does it end?" +for example, three days after firing Comey, the President referred to the investigation as a ``witch hunt'' and asked, ``when does it end?'' Those actions had the potential to affect a successor director's conduct of the investigation. The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director. -Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but could not fire the FBI\null. -The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired that said, "The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it." +Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but could not fire the~FBI\null. +The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired that said, ``The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it.'' In addition, in his May~11 interview with Lester Holt, the President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Comey that the action might prolong the investigation. -And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even though McCabe told the President he had worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the decisions made in the Clinton investigation. +And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even though McCabe told the President he had worked ``very closely'' with Comey and was part of all the decisions made in the Clinton investigation. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to a proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to a proceeding}. The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Comey. Several facts would be relevant to such as showing. At the time the President fired Comey, a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury subpoenas had been issued. -On March~20, 2017, however, Comey had announced that the FBI was investigating Russia's interference in the election, including "an assessment of whether any crimes were committed." +On March~20, 2017, however, Comey had announced that the FBI was investigating Russia's interference in the election, including ``an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.'' It was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation, was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers---a clear criminal offense. -In addition, at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the President's February~14, 2017 request that Comey "let[] Flynn go." +In addition, at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the President's February~14, 2017 request that Comey ``let[] Flynn go.'' On March~5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn---indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation, to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated. -On March~31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by tweeting that "Mike Flynn should ask for immunity" before he agreed to provide testimony to the FBI or Congress. +On March~31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by tweeting that ``Mike Flynn should ask for immunity'' before he agreed to provide testimony to the FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong, further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President's decision to fire Comey was Comey's unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally under investigation, despite the President's repeated requests that Comey make such an announcement. In the week leading up to Comey's May~3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee testimony, the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the record straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May~3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being investigated. -Comey's refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him isolated and exposed, saying "You left me on an island." +Comey's refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him isolated and exposed, saying ``You left me on an island.'' Two days later, the President told advisors he had decided to fire Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: -"While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump--Russia relationship\dots." -The President later asked Rosenstein to include "Russia" in his memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under investigation. +``While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump--Russia relationship\dots.'' +The President later asked Rosenstein to include ``Russia'' in his memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under investigation. And the President's final termination letter included a sentence, at the President's insistence and against McGahn's advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three separate occasions that he was not under investigation. The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are not similarly supported by the evidence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster cited Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he fired Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed office, and the President had made it clear to both Comey and the President's senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted Comey to stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Comey's handling of the Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Comey. -The President's draft termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the press after Comey's termination that the White House had heard from "countless" FBI agents who had lost confidence in Comey. +The President's draft termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the press after Comey's termination that the White House had heard from ``countless'' FBI agents who had lost confidence in Comey. But the evidence does not support those claims. -The President told Comey at their January~27 dinner that "the people of the FBI really like [him]," no evidence suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything. +The President told Comey at their January~27 dinner that ``the people of the FBI really like [him],'' no evidence suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything. We also considered why it was important to the President that Comey announce publicly that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia. -The President told Comey that the "cloud" of "this Russia business" was making it difficult to run the country. +The President told Comey that the ``cloud'' of ``this Russia business'' was making it difficult to run the country. The President told Sessions and McGahn that foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues. -The President complained to Rogers that "the thing with the Russians [was] messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd -like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this." +The President complained to Rogers that ``the thing with the Russians [was] messing up'' his ability to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, ``I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd +like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this.'' The President also may have viewed Comey as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May~3 testimony that the President was not under investigation. Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an investigation into his campaign. -The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn, the President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Comey he needed Comey's "loyalty." -When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying "Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know." +The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn, the President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Comey he needed Comey's ``loyalty.'' +When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying ``Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know.'' After the President learned of Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents. -The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General "who to investigate." +The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General ``who to investigate.'' In addition, the President had a motive to put the FBI's Russia investigation behind him. -The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in Volume~I, the evidence uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. +The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in \hyperref[chap:volume-1]{Volume~I}, the evidence uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But the evidence does indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise to personal and political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen, was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on the progress of those efforts.% 498 -\footnote{\textit{See} Volume~II, Section II.K.1, \textit{infra}.} +\footnote{\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.2.11.1}{Volume~II, Section~II.K.1}, \textit{infra}.} In addition, some witnesses said that Trump was aware that \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.% 499 -\footnote{\textit{See} Volume~I, Section III.D.1, \textit{supra}.} +\footnote{\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.4.1}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1}, \textit{supra}.} More broadly, multiple witnesses described the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his election.% 500 \footnote{In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in firing Comey was connected to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI's Russian-interference investigation. In particular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S.~Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign-finance offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President. -\textit{See} Volume~II, Section II.K.5, \textit{infra}. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.2.11.5}{Volume~II, Section~II.K.5}, \textit{infra}. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was considering the possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that the President's intent in firing Comey was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light.} Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the press and the public for Comey's termination. @@ -2031,7 +2032,7 @@ \subsection{The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel} The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May~17, 2017, prompting the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President ultimately did not accept. -The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest, but they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the Special Counsel's service. +The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest, but they responded that those claims were ``ridiculous'' and posed no obstacle to the Special Counsel's service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special Counsel's service. On June~14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets criticizing the Special Counsel's investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest. @@ -2045,7 +2046,7 @@ \subsection{The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel} \subsubsection{The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction} On May~17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller,~III as Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose from the investigation.% 501 -\footnote{Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No.~3915-2017, \textit{Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters} (May~17, 2017).} +\footnote{Office of the Deputy Attorney General, \hyperlink{section.3.1}{Order No.~3915-2017}, \textit{Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters} (May~17, 2017).} The President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI Director.% 502 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~18; @@ -2056,26 +2057,26 @@ \subsubsection{The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reacti Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at~4; Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).} -According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, "Oh my God. +According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, ``Oh my God. This is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. -I'm fucked."% 504 +I'm fucked.''% 504 \footnote{Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).} -The President became angry and lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, "How could you let this happen, Jeff?"% 505 +The President became angry and lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, ``How could you let this happen, Jeff?''% 505 \footnote{Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~13--14.} -The President said the position of Attorney General was his most important appointment and that Sessions had "let [him] down," contrasting him to Eric Holder and Robert Kennedy.% 506 +The President said the position of Attorney General was his most important appointment and that Sessions had ``let [him] down,'' contrasting him to Eric Holder and Robert Kennedy.% 506 \footnote{Hunt-000040; \textit{see} Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~14.} -Sessions recalled that the President said to him, "you were supposed to protect me," or words to that effect.% 507 +Sessions recalled that the President said to him, ``you were supposed to protect me,'' or words to that effect.% 507 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~14.} -The President returned to the consequences of the appointment and said, "Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins your presidency. +The President returned to the consequences of the appointment and said, ``Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins your presidency. It takes years and years and I won't be able to do anything. -This is the worst thing that ever happened to me."% 508 +This is the worst thing that ever happened to me.''% 508 \footnote{Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); \textit{see} Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~14. -Early the next morning, the President tweeted, "This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!" -\@realDonaldTrump 5/18/17 (7:52~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Early the next morning, the President tweeted, ``This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!'' +\UseVerb{DJT} 5/18/17 (7:52~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General.% 509 \footnote{Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); @@ -2085,9 +2086,9 @@ \subsubsection{The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reacti Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~14.} Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel's appointment.% 511 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~21.} -Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.% 512 +Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the \textit{Access Hollywood} tape came out during the campaign.% 512 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~21. -The Access Hollywood tape was released on October~7, 2016, as discussed in Volume~I, Section III.D.1, \textit{supra}.} +The \textit{Access Hollywood} tape was released on October~7, 2016, as discussed in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.3.4.1}{Volume~I, Section~III.D.1}, \textit{supra}.} The next day, May~18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that discussed an investigation related to Comey's termination and directed the White House to preserve all relevant documents.% 513 \footnote{McGahn 12/14/17 302, at~9; @@ -2098,7 +2099,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reacti The White House Counsel's Office had previously issued a document hold on February~27, 2017. SCR015\_000171 (2/17/17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Office of the President Staff).} -Also on May~18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, "Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation."% 515 +Also on May~18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, ``Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation.''% 515 \footnote{Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as Attorney General).} Sessions, accompanied by Hunt, brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President.% 516 \footnote{Hunt-000047--49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); @@ -2116,8 +2117,8 @@ \subsubsection{The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reacti When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of Justice.% 521 \footnote{Hunt-000050--51 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).} -Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it would function as a kind of "shock collar" that the President could use any time he wanted; -Priebus said the President had "DOJ by the throat."% 522 +Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it would function as a kind of ``shock collar'' that the President could use any time he wanted; +Priebus said the President had ``DOJ by the throat.''% 522 \footnote{Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~21.} @@ -2130,9 +2131,9 @@ \subsubsection{The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reacti \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~22.} During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the residence.% 526 \footnote{Priebus 10/13/17 302, at~21. -Hunt's notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the President "slapped the desk" and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. +Hunt's notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the President ``slapped the desk'' and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes, undated).} -It was not until May~30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, "Not accepted."% 527 +It was not until May~30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, ``Not accepted.''% 527 \footnote{Hunt-000052--53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the President returned from the Middle East trip, the President took Sessions's letter out of a drawer in the Oval Office and showed it to Porter. @@ -2150,15 +2151,15 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of I The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position shortly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that represented people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia.% 529 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~10. -In October 2011, Mueller resigned his family's membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that "we live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club" and that inquired "whether we would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee," which was paid in 1994. +In October 2011, Mueller resigned his family's membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that ``we live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club'' and that inquired ``whether we would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee,'' which was paid in 1994. 10/12/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. -About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the Muellers' resignation would be effective October~31, 2011, and that they would be "placed on a wait list to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis" in accordance with the club's legal documents. +About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the Muellers' resignation would be effective October~31, 2011, and that they would be ``placed on a wait list to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis'' in accordance with the club's legal documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further contact with the club.} The President's advisors pushed back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts.% 530 \footnote{Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~3; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~13 (confirming that he, Priebus, and McGahn pushed back on the asserted conflicts).} -Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were "ridiculous" and that none of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special Counsel.% 531 +Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were ``ridiculous'' and that none of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special Counsel.% 531 \footnote{Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~12--13.} As for Mueller's interview for FBI Director, Bannon recalled that the White House had invited Mueller to speak to the President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI\null.% 532 \footnote{Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~12.} @@ -2166,7 +2167,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of I \footnote{Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~12.} Bannon also told the President that the law firm position did not amount to a conflict in the legal community.% 534 \footnote{Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~12.} -And Bannon told the President that the golf course dispute did not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was "ridiculous and petty."% 535 +And Bannon told the President that the golf course dispute did not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was ``ridiculous and petty.''% 535 \footnote{Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~13.} The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of interest.% 536 \footnote{Bannon 10/26/18 302, at~12.} @@ -2184,23 +2185,23 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of I Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at~5.} Contemporaneous notes of a May~23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President reflect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest that the President not make such call either.% 540 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes).} -McGahn advised that the President could discuss the issue with his personal attorney but it would "look like still trying to meddle in [the] investigation" and "knocking out Mueller" would be "[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of just[ice]."% 541 +McGahn advised that the President could discuss the issue with his personal attorney but it would ``look like still trying to meddle in [the] investigation'' and ``knocking out Mueller'' would be ``[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of just[ice].''% 541 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes).} -McGahn told the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn."% 542 +McGahn told the President that his ``biggest exposure'' was not his act of firing Comey but his ``other contacts'' and ``calls,'' and his ``ask re: Flynn.''% 542 \footnote{SC\_AD\_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes).} By the time McGahn provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President's request for Comey's loyalty, which the President publicly denied; -his request that Comey "let[] Flynn go," which the President also denied; -and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia, which the President did not deny.% 543 +his request that Comey ``let[] Flynn go,'' which the President also denied; +and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved ``great pressure'' related to Russia, which the President did not deny.% 543 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g}, Michael S. Schmidt, \textit{In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.}, New York Times (May~11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, \textit{Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation}, New York Times (May~16, 2017); -Matt Apuzzo et al., \textit{Trump Told Russians That Firing 'Nut Job' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation}, New York Times (May~19, 2017).} +Matt Apuzzo et~al., \textit{Trump Told Russians That Firing `Nut Job' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation}, New York Times (May~19, 2017).} -On June~8, 2017, Comey testified before Congress about his interactions with the President before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey "let[] Flynn go," and the request that Comey "lift the cloud" over the presidency caused by the ongoing investigation.% 544 +On June~8, 2017, Comey testified before Congress about his interactions with the President before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey ``let[] Flynn go,'' and the request that Comey ``lift the cloud'' over the presidency caused by the ongoing investigation.% 544 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at~5--6). -Comey testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February~14, 2017 meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May~12, 2017, that stated "James Comey better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!," and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter "might prompt the appointment of a special counsel." -\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~55) (testimony by James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI).} +Comey testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February~14, 2017 meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May~12, 2017, that stated ``James Comey better hope that there are no `tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!,'' and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter ``might prompt the appointment of a special counsel.'' +\textit{Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee}, 115th Cong.\ (June~8, 2017) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~55) (testimony by James B. Comey, former Director of the~FBI).} Comey's testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President had obstructed justice.% 545 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Matt Zapotosky, \textit{Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice}, Washington Post (June~8, 2017) ("Legal analysts said Comey's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the president obstructed justice.").} +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Matt Zapotosky, \textit{Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice}, Washington Post (June~8, 2017) (``Legal analysts said Comey's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the president obstructed justice.'').} On June~9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House Counsel's Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence community officials who had allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation.% 546 \footnote{6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel's Office to the White House Counsel's Office. This Office made the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the interviews. @@ -2221,11 +2222,11 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of I \footnote{Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at~6.} Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up like the one that followed the termination of Comey did not happen.% 550 \footnote{Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at~6.} -Later that day, Ruddy stated in a televised interview that the President was "considering perhaps terminating the Special Counsel "based on purported conflicts of interest.% 551 -\footnote{\textit{Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has "real conflicts" as special counsel}, PBS (June~12, 2017); +Later that day, Ruddy stated in a televised interview that the President was ``considering perhaps terminating the Special Counsel'' based on purported conflicts of interest.% 551 +\footnote{\textit{Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has ``real conflicts'' as special counsel}, PBS (June~12, 2017); Michael D. Shear \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing Mueller as Special Counsel}, New York Times (June~12, 2017).} -Ruddy later told another news outlet that "Trump is definitely considering" terminating the Special Counsel and "it's not something that's being dismissed."% 552 -\footnote{Katherine Faulders \& Veronica Stracqualursi, \textit{Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Spicer's 'bizarre' statement doesn't deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing}, ABC (June~13, 2017).} +Ruddy later told another news outlet that ``Trump is definitely considering'' terminating the Special Counsel and ``it's not something that's being dismissed.''% 552 +\footnote{Katherine Faulders \& Veronica Stracqualursi, \textit{Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Spicer's `bizarre' statement doesn't deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing}, ABC (June~13, 2017).} Ruddy's comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President was considering firing the Special Counsel.% 553 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Michael D. Shear \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing Mueller as Special Counsel}, New York Times (June~12, 2017).} @@ -2233,8 +2234,8 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of I \footnote{Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at~6--7.} On June~13, 2017, Sanders asked the President for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special Counsel.% 555 \footnote{Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~6--7.} -The President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that "[w]hile the president has every right to" fire the Special Counsel, "he has no intention to do so."% 556 -\footnote{Glenn Thrush et al., \textit{Trump Stews, Staff Steps In, and Mueller Is Safe for Now}, New York Times (June~13, 2017); +The President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that ``[w]hile the president has every right to'' fire the Special Counsel, ``he has no intention to do so.''% 556 +\footnote{Glenn Thrush et~al., \textit{Trump Stews, Staff Steps In, and Mueller Is Safe for Now}, New York Times (June~13, 2017); \textit{see} Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to the press on Air Force One and the answer she gave is the answer the President told her to give).} Also on June~13, 2017, the President's personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel's Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts.% 557 @@ -2249,14 +2250,14 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of I \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special Counsel Removed} On the evening of June~14, 2017, the Washington Post published an article stating that the Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstruct justice.% 561 -\footnote{Devlin Barrett et al., \textit{Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice, officials say}, Washington Post (June~14, 2017).} +\footnote{Devlin Barrett et~al., \textit{Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice, officials say}, Washington Post (June~14, 2017).} This was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special Counsel's Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report.% 562 -\footnote{CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55~p.m.\ that stated: "WASH POST: MUELLER INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE." CNN, (June~14, 2017, published online at 7:15~p.m.~ET).} +\footnote{CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55~p.m.\ that stated: ``WASH POST: MUELLER INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.'' CNN, (June~14, 2017, published online at 7:15~p.m.~ET).} The Post story stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats and Rogers, about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey's March~20, 2017 testimony; -that the inquiry into obstruction marked "a major turning point" in the investigation; -and that while "Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director James B. Comey starting in January that he was not personally under investigation," "[o]fficials say that changed shortly after Comey's firing."% 563 -\footnote{Devlin Barrett et al., \textit{Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice}, officials say, Washington Post (June~14, 2017).} -That evening, at approximately 10:31~p.m., the President called McGahn on McGahn's personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15 minutes.% 564 +that the inquiry into obstruction marked ``a major turning point'' in the investigation; +and that while ``Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director James B. Comey starting in January that he was not personally under investigation,'' ``[o]fficials say that changed shortly after Comey's firing.''% 563 +\footnote{Devlin Barrett et~al., \textit{Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice, officials say}, Washington Post (June~14, 2017).} +That evening, at approximately 10:31~p.m., the President called McGahn on McGahn's personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15~minutes.% 564 \footnote{SCR026\_000183 (President's Daily Diary, 6/14/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/14/17 with start time 10:31~p.m.\ and end time 10:46~p.m.); Call Records of Don McGahn.} McGahn did not have a clear memory of the call but thought they might have discussed the stories reporting that the President was under investigation.% 565 @@ -2265,19 +2266,19 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob McGahn 2/28/18 302, at~2.} Beginning early the next day, June~15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. -He wrote: "They made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for obstruction of justice on the phony story. -Nice";% 566 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (6:55~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -"You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in American political history---led by some very bad and conflicted people!";% 567 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (7:57~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -and "Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, 'bleached' emails, \& had husband meet w/AG days before she was cleared---\& they talk about obstruction?"% 568 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +He wrote: ``They made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for obstruction of justice on the phony story. +Nice'';% 566 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/15/17 (6:55~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +``You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in American political history---led by some very bad and conflicted people!'';% 567 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/15/17 (7:57~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +and ``Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, `bleached' emails, \& had husband meet w/AG days before she was cleared---\& they talk about obstruction?''% 568 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/15/17 (3:56~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} The next day, June~16, 2017, the President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: -"After 7 months of investigations \& committee hearings about my 'collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been able to show any proof, Sad!";% 569 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -and "I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! -Witch Hunt."% 570 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (9:07~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +``After 7 months of investigations \& committee hearings about my `collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been able to show any proof, Sad!'';% 569 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/16/17 (7:53~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +and ``I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! +Witch Hunt.''% 570 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/16/17 (9:07~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} On Saturday, June~17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed.% 571 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1--2; @@ -2288,7 +2289,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob In interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded him from serving as Special Counsel.% 573 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1--2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at~10. -Phone records show that the President called McGahn in the afternoon on June~17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. +Phone records show that the President called McGahn in the afternoon on June~17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23~minutes. SCR026\_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/17/17 with start time 2:23~p.m.\ and end time 2:46~p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. @@ -2297,28 +2298,28 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob While McGahn was not certain of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with the President in which the President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at~1--3.} -On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, "You gotta do this. -You gotta call Rod."% 574 +On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, ``You gotta do this. +You gotta call Rod.''% 574 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1.} McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could do.% 575 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1.} McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.% 576 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1.} -He and other advisors believed the asserted conflicts were "silly" and "not real," and they had previously communicated that view to the President.% 577 +He and other advisors believed the asserted conflicts were ``silly'' and ``not real,'' and they had previously communicated that view to the President.% 577 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1--2.} McGahn also had made clear to the President that the White House Counsel's Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts.% 578 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1--2.} -McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge Robert Bork and not "Saturday Night Massacre Bork."% 579 +McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge Robert Bork and not ``Saturday Night Massacre Bork.''% 579 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~2.} McGahn considered the President's request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the brakes.% 580 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~2.} -When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct, saying something like, "Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel."% 581 +When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct, saying something like, ``Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel.''% 581 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -McGahn recalled the President telling him "Mueller has to go" and "Call me back when you do it."% 582 +McGahn recalled the President telling him ``Mueller has to go'' and ``Call me back when you do it.''% 582 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~2, 5; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at~3.} -McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by Rosenstein?% 583 +McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by Rosenstein.% 583 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~1--2, 5.} To end the conversation with the President, McGahn left the President with the impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein.% 584 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~2.} @@ -2340,7 +2341,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at~4.} Donaldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and demanded he contact the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something that McGahn did not want to do.% 590 \footnote{Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at~4.} -McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least twice and in one of the calls asked "have you done it?"% 591 +McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least twice and in one of the calls asked ``have you done it?''% 591 \footnote{Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at~4.} McGahn did not tell Donaldson the specifics of the President's request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia investigation.% 592 \footnote{McGahn 2/28/19 302, at~3--4; @@ -2361,7 +2362,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did not tell them the specific details of the President's request. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~7; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at~10.} -Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to "do crazy shit," but he thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know.% 596 +Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to ``do crazy shit,'' but he thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know.% 596 \footnote{Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~7.} Priebus and Bannon both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and remained in his position.% 597 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~3; @@ -2391,57 +2392,57 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob A threshold question is whether the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the Department of Justice's attention. -See Volume~II, Section~III, \textit{infra}. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{section.2.3}{Volume~II, Section~III}, \textit{infra}. Some of the President's specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation. Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed. -First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein not only that conflicts existed but also that "Mueller has to go." +First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein not only that conflicts existed but also that ``Mueller has to go.'' McGahn is a credible witness with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.% 601 \footnote{When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant to share detailed information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. -See McGahn 12/14/17 302 (agent notes).} +\textit{See} McGahn 12/14/17 302 (agent notes).} McGahn spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, making it unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President's request. In response to that request, McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin to the Saturday Night Massacre. -He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President had asked him to "do crazy shit," and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. +He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President had asked him to ``do crazy shit,'' and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of Justice. Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues that already had been raised. -Third, the President's sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a weekend---"You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."---support McGahn's recollection that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. +Third, the President's sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a weekend---``You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod.''---support McGahn's recollection that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecessary to set the process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn. -Finally, the President had discussed "knocking out Mueller" and raised conflicts of interest in a May~23, 2017 call with McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan to remove the Special Counsel. +Finally, the President had discussed ``knocking out Mueller'' and raised conflicts of interest in a May~23, 2017 call with McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June~17, 2017, the President made clear to Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would be necessary to establish a nexus between the President's act of seeking to terminate the Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding. Substantial evidence indicates that by June~17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a grand jury. -On May~23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn." +On May~23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his ``biggest exposure'' was not his act of firing Comey but his ``other contacts'' and ``calls,'' and his ``ask re: Flynn.'' By early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn investigation.% 602 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Evan Perez et al., \textit{CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI's Russia investigation}, CNN (May~9, 2017); +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Evan Perez et~al., \textit{CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI's Russia investigation}, CNN (May~9, 2017); Matt Ford, \textit{Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand Jury}, The Atlantic (June~2, 2017).} On June~9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June~14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for Comey's loyalty; -his request that Comey "let[] Flynn go"; +his request that Comey ``let[] Flynn go''; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; -and his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia. -And on June~16, 2017, the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, "I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!" +and his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved ``great pressure'' related to Russia. +And on June~16, 2017, the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, ``I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!'' c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved the President's conduct---and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction of justice. Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. -As described in Volume~II, Section II.D, \textit{supra}, advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was not personally under investigation. -When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May~17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying "[t]his is the end of my Presidency." -The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying "you were supposed to protect me." +As described in \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.4}{Volume~II, Section~II.D}, \textit{supra}, advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was not personally under investigation. +When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May~17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying ``[t]his is the end of my Presidency.'' +The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying ``you were supposed to protect me.'' On June~14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President to call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed. -By mid-June, the Department of Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him that the claimed conflicts of interest were "silly" and did not provide a basis to remove the Special Counsel. +By mid-June, the Department of Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him that the claimed conflicts of interest were ``silly'' and did not provide a basis to remove the Special Counsel. On June~13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction---spurring the President to write critical tweets about the Special Counsel's investigation. The President called McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David. @@ -2450,7 +2451,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Ob There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the President that the White House Counsel's Office---and McGahn himself---could not be involved in pressing conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he wished to raise conflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims, the President sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel. -And after the media reported on the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in Volume~II, Section~III, \textit{infra}. +And after the media reported on the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in \hyperlink{section.2.3}{Volume~II, Section~III}, \textit{infra}. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the President's awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper. \subsection{The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation} @@ -2471,9 +2472,9 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sess \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~2; SCR026\_000201 (President's Daily Diary, 6/19/17. \blackout{Personal Privacy}} -Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a "devotee" of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was "close."% 604 +Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a ``devotee'' of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was ``close.''% 604 \footnote{Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~7; -Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at~1 (describing Lewandowski as a "comfort to the President" whose loyalty was appreciated). +Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at~1 (describing Lewandowski as a ``comfort to the President'' whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President had meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~7.} @@ -2481,7 +2482,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sess \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~2.} The President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the likelihood of recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.% 606 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~2.} -The President then asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said "write this down."% 607 +The President then asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said ``write this down.''% 607 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~2.} This was the first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly.% 608 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~3.} @@ -2508,7 +2509,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sess Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at~3.} \end{quote} -The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the "most popular guy in the country."% 611 +The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the ``most popular guy in the country.''% 611 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at~4.} Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do.% 612 @@ -2538,7 +2539,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Follows Up with Lewandowski} On July~19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office.% 621 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~5; SCR029b\_000002--03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information).} -In the preceding days, as described in Volume~II, Section II.G, \textit{infra}, emails and other information about the June~9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump~Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. +In the preceding days, as described in \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.7}{Volume~II, Section~II.G}, \textit{infra}, emails and other information about the June~9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump~Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July~19 meeting with Lewandowski, the President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions.% 622 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~5.} Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.% 623 @@ -2546,9 +2547,9 @@ \subsubsection{The President Follows Up with Lewandowski} Lewandowski recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should tell Sessions he was fired.% 624 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions's resignation. -Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, "What can I do? +Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, ``What can I do? I'm not an employee of the administration. -I'm a nobody." +I'm a nobody.'' Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~6.} Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President had dictated to be delivered to Sessions.% 625 @@ -2558,7 +2559,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Follows Up with Lewandowski} Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message was from the President.% 626 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~5; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at~3.} -The message "definitely raised an eyebrow" for Dearborn, and he recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.% 627 +The message ``definitely raised an eyebrow'' for Dearborn, and he recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.% 627 \footnote{Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at~3.} Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him uncomfortable.% 628 \footnote{Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at~3.} @@ -2568,15 +2569,15 @@ \subsubsection{The President Follows Up with Lewandowski} \subsubsection{The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview} Within hours of the President's meeting with Lewandowski on July~19, 2017, the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions's decision to recuse from the Russia investigation.% 630 -\footnote{Peter Baker et al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} -The President said that "Sessions should have never recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the job, and I would have picked somebody else."% 631 -\footnote{Peter Baker et al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} -Sessions's recusal, the President said, was "very unfair to the president. +\footnote{Peter Baker et~al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} +The President said that ``Sessions should have never recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the job, and I would have picked somebody else.''% 631 +\footnote{Peter Baker et~al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} +Sessions's recusal, the President said, was ``very unfair to the president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? -If he would have recused himself before the job, I would have said, 'Thanks, Jeff, but I can't, you know, I'm not going to take you.' -It's extremely unfair, and that's a mild word, to the president."% 632 -\footnote{Deter Baker et al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} -Hicks, who was present for the interview, recalled trying to "throw [herself] between the reporters and [the President]" to stop parts of the interview, but the President "loved the interview."% 633 +If he would have recused himself before the job, I would have said, `Thanks, Jeff, but I can't, you know, I'm not going to take you.' +It's extremely unfair, and that's a mild word, to the president.''% 632 +\footnote{Deter Baker et~al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} +Hicks, who was present for the interview, recalled trying to ``throw [herself] between the reporters and [the President]'' to stop parts of the interview, but the President ``loved the interview.''% 633 \footnote{Hicks 12/8/17 302, at~23.} Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York Times interview.% 634 @@ -2584,7 +2585,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times In Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~6.} Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet with Sessions and joking with her about the idea of firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions would not meet with him.% 635 \footnote{Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at~6.} -As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to do the "right thing" and resign.% 636 +As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to do the ``right thing'' and resign.% 636 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~10. @@ -2596,8 +2597,8 @@ \subsubsection{The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times In \subsubsection{The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation} Three days later, on July~21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.% 638 -\footnote{Adam Entous et al., \textit{Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian ambassador, U.S. intelligence intercepts show}, Washington Post (July~21, 2017). -The underlying events concerning the Sessions--Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume~I, Section IV.A.4.c, \textit{supra}.} +\footnote{Adam Entous et~al., \textit{Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian ambassador, U.S. intelligence intercepts show}, Washington Post (July~21, 2017). +The underlying events concerning the Sessions--Kislyak contacts are discussed in \hyperlink{paragraph.1.4.1.4.3}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.4.c}, \textit{supra}.} That evening, Priebus called Hunt to talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign.% 639 \footnote{Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~23.} Priebus had previously talked to Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and, after speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit.% 640 @@ -2609,26 +2610,26 @@ \subsubsection{The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation} \footnote{Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~23--24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at~1--2.} -Early the following morning, July~22, 2017, the President tweeted, "A new INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G.~Jeff Sessions. -These illegal leaks, like Comey's, must stop!"% 643 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (6:33~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -Approximately one hour later, the President tweeted, "So many people are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many Hillary Clinton or Comey crimes. -33,000 e-mails deleted?"% 644 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:44~a.m.~ET) Tweet. -Three minutes later, the President tweeted, "What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset, big dollar speeches etc." -\@realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Early the following morning, July~22, 2017, the President tweeted, ``A new INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G.~Jeff Sessions. +These illegal leaks, like Comey's, must stop!''% 643 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/22/17 (6:33~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Approximately one hour later, the President tweeted, ``So many people are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many Hillary Clinton or Comey crimes. +33,000 e-mails deleted?''% 644 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/22/17 (7:44~a.m.~ET) Tweet. +Three minutes later, the President tweeted, ``What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset, big dollar speeches etc.'' +\UseVerb{DJT} 7/22/17 (7:47~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} Later that morning, while aboard Marine One on the way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions to resign immediately.% 645 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~13--14.} The President said that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and the negative publicity was not tolerable.% 646 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~4--5; \textit{see} RP\_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).} -According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, the President told Priebus to say that he "need[ed] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately" and that Sessions had "no choice" but "must immediately resign."% 647 +According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, the President told Priebus to say that he ``need[ed] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately'' and that Sessions had ``no choice'' but ``must immediately resign.''% 647 \footnote{RP\_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).} Priebus replied that if they fired Sessions, they would never get a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President, but the President suggested he could make a recess appointment to replace Sessions.% 648 \footnote{Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~5.} -Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem, so he called McGahn and asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was "all wrong."% 649 +Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem, so he called McGahn and asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was ``all wrong.''% 649 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~4--5.} Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President's desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President's hatred of Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation.% 650 @@ -2641,10 +2642,10 @@ \subsubsection{The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation} Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~14.} McGahn and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the President's order to fire Sessions.% 652 \footnote{McGahn 12/14/17 302, at~11; -RP\_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) ("discuss resigning together').} +RP\_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) (``discuss resigning together'').} -That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's resignation, using words to the effect of, "Did you get it? -Are you working on it?"% 653 +That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's resignation, using words to the effect of, ``Did you get it? +Are you working on it?''% 653 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~4.} Priebus said that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, although the President did not directly say so.% 654 @@ -2659,14 +2660,14 @@ \subsubsection{The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation} By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to ask Sessions to resign.% 658 \footnote{Priebus 1/18/18 302, at~15.} Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. -On the morning of Monday, July~24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and called him "beleaguered."% 659 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49~a.m.~ET) Tweet ("So why aren't the Committees and investigators, and of course our beleaguered~A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes \& Russia relations?").} -On July~25, the President tweeted, "Attorney General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-mails \& DNC server) \& Intel leakers!"% 660 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12~a.m.~ET) Tweet. -The President sent another tweet shortly before this one asking "where is the investigation~A.G." -\@realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -The following day, July~26, the President tweeted, "Why didn't A.G.~Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation."% 661 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/26/17 (9:48~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +On the morning of Monday, July~24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and called him ``beleaguered.''% 659 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/24/17 (8:49~a.m.~ET) Tweet (``So why aren't the Committees and investigators, and of course our beleaguered~A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes \& Russia relations?'').} +On July~25, the President tweeted, ``Attorney General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-mails \& DNC server) \& Intel leakers!''% 660 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/25/17 (6:12~a.m.~ET) Tweet. +The President sent another tweet shortly before this one asking ``where is the investigation~A.G.'' +\UseVerb{DJT} 7/25/17 (6:03~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +The following day, July~26, the President tweeted, ``Why didn't A.G.~Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation.''% 661 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/26/17 (9:48~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} According to Hunt, in light of the President's frequent public attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him in his pocket every time he went to the White House.% 662 \footnote{Hunt 2/1/18 302, at~24--25.} @@ -2679,21 +2680,21 @@ \subsubsection{The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation} a.\qquad\underline{Obstructive act}. The President's effort to send Sessions a message through Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. -The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President "shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel" and that Sessions was going to "meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections." -The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew "for a fact" that "there were no Russians involved with the campaign" because he "was there." -The President further directed that Sessions should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation "because he hasn't done anything wrong." -Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to "move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections." +The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President ``shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel'' and that Sessions was going to ``meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections.'' +The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew ``for a fact'' that ``there were no Russians involved with the campaign'' because he ``was there.'' +The President further directed that Sessions should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation ``because he hasn't done anything wrong.'' +Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to ``move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections.'' -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. As described above, by the time of the President's initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June~19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. By the time of the President's follow-up meeting with Lewandowski, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} -See Volume~II, Section II.G, \textit{infra}. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.7}{Volume~II, Section~II.G}, \textit{infra}. To satisfy the nexus requirement, it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort to have Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was intended to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President's and his campaign's conduct. -As previously described, see Volume~II, Section II.B, \textit{supra}, the President knew that the Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. +As previously described, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.2}{Volume~II, Section~II.B}, \textit{supra}, the President knew that the Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice. Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future election interference only. @@ -2704,7 +2705,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation} The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather than rely on official channels, the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. -The President selected a loyal "devotee" outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. +The President selected a loyal ``devotee'' outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testified publicly that there was no cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and redirect the Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly take any action on it. @@ -2720,30 +2721,30 @@ \subsection{The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the Ju \textbf{Overview} \end{center} -By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June~9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump." +By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June~9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary Clinton as ``part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump.'' On multiple occasions in late June and early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails, and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump~Jr.\ describing the meeting as about adoption. -\subsubsection{The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June~9; 2016 Trump Tower Meeting} +\subsubsection{The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June~9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting} -In mid-June 2017---the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a message to Sessions---senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump~Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a Russian attorney."% 663 +In mid-June~2017---the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a message to Sessions---senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump~Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a Russian attorney.''% 663 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at~2.} -As described in Volume~I, Section IV.A.5, \textit{supra}, the emails stated that the "Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part of "Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump."% 664 +As described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.5}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.5}, \textit{supra}, the emails stated that the ``Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia'' had offered ``to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia'' as part of ``Russia and its government's support for Mr.~Trump.''% 664 \footnote{RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump~Jr.); -\@DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -Trump~Jr.responded,"[I]f it's what you say I love it,"% 665 +\UseVerb{DJTJ} 7/11/17 (11:01~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Trump~Jr.\ responded, ``[I]f it's what you say I love it,''% 665 \footnote{RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump~Jr.\ to Goldstone); -\@DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 am. ET) Tweet.} +\UseVerb{DJTJ} 7/11/17 (11:01 am. ET) Tweet.} and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June~9, 2016.% 666 \footnote{Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at~4.} At the meeting, the Russian attorney claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats, and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S.~statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.% 667 -\footnote{\textit{See} Volume~I, Section IV.A.5, \textit{supra} (describing meeting in detail).} +\footnote{\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.5}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.5}, \textit{supra} (describing meeting in detail).} According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this Office, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election.% 668 \footnote{Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.~20, 2018), at~8 (Response to Question~I, Parts~(a) through~(c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June~9 meeting or other events after the election.} -The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called for the production of various information, including, "[a] list and a description of all meetings" between any "individual affiliated with the Trump campaign" and "any individual formally or informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June~16, 2015, and 12~pm on January~20, 2017," and associated records.% 669 +The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called for the production of various information, including, ``[a] list and a description of all meetings'' between any ``individual affiliated with the Trump campaign'' and ``any individual formally or informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June~16, 2015, and 12~pm on January~20, 2017,'' and associated records.% 669 \footnote{DJTFP\_SCO\_PDF\_00000001--02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.).} Trump Organization attorneys became aware of the June~9 meeting no later than the first week of June 2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting to the President's personal counsel.% 670 \footnote{Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at~12; @@ -2785,7 +2786,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclo On June~28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner's attorney's office.% 680 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~1--2.} -She recalled being shocked by the emails because they looked "really bad."% 681 +She recalled being shocked by the emails because they looked ``really bad.''% 681 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~2.} The next day, Hicks spoke privately with the President to mention her concern about the emails, which she understood were soon going to be shared with Congress.% 682 \footnote{Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~8.} @@ -2801,17 +2802,17 @@ \subsubsection{The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclo Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June~9 meeting was not a big deal and was about Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting.% 686 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~9.} -Hicks said she wanted to get in front of the story and have Trump~Jr.\ release the emails as part of an interview with "softball questions."% 687 +Hicks said she wanted to get in front of the story and have Trump~Jr.\ release the emails as part of an interview with ``softball questions.''% 687 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~2--3.} The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the press.% 688 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~2--3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~9.} -Hicks warned the President that the emails were "really bad" and the story would be "massive" when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and said he did not want details.% 689 +Hicks warned the President that the emails were ``really bad'' and the story would be ``massive'' when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and said he did not want details.% 689 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~9.} Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document production was due.% 690 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~3.} -Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President said, "then leave it alone."% 691 +Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President said, ``then leave it alone.''% 691 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~3.} Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner's attorney should give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to, but the President did not think they would be leaked to the press.% 692 \footnote{Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~9.} @@ -2835,13 +2836,13 @@ \subsubsection{The President Directs Trump~Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries Abo Hicks recalled that the President asked her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about Russian adoption.% 699 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~10.} -The President responded, "then just say that."% 700 +The President responded, ``then just say that.''% 700 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~3; \textit{see} Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~10.} On the flight home from the G20 on July~8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about the meeting to be released by Trump~Jr.\ and brought it to the President.% 701 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~4.} -The draft statement began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the meeting: "I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign."% 702 +The draft statement began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the meeting: ``I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign.''% 702 \footnote{Hicks 7/8/17 Notes.} Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be issued because it said too much.% 703 @@ -2855,23 +2856,23 @@ \subsubsection{The President Directs Trump~Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries Abo It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at that time and there was no follow up.% 705 -\footnote{SCRO11a\_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump~Jr.).} +\footnote{SCR011a\_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump~Jr.).} \end{quote} -Hicks's text concluded, "Are you ok with this? Attributed to you."% 706 -\footnote{SCRO11a\_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump~Jr.).} -Trump~Jr.\ responded by text message that he wanted to add the word "primarily" before "discussed" so that the statement would read, "We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children."% 707 -\footnote{SCRO11a\_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} -Trump~Jr.\ texted that he wanted the change because "[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs and some other nonsense which we shot down fast."% 708 -\footnote{SCRO11a\_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} -Hicks texted back, "I think that's right too but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.] -[U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] on that word Be I know it's important and I think the mention of a campaign issue adds something to it in case we have to go further."% 709 -\footnote{SCRO11a\_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} -Trump~Jr.\ responded, "If I don't have it in there it appears as though I'm lying later when they inevitably leak something."% 710 -\footnote{SCRO11a\_000006 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} -Trump~Jr.'s statement---adding the word "primarily" and making other minor additions---was then provided to the New York Times.% 711 +Hicks's text concluded, ``Are you ok with this? Attributed to you.''% 706 +\footnote{SCR011a\_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump~Jr.).} +Trump~Jr.\ responded by text message that he wanted to add the word ``primarily'' before ``discussed'' so that the statement would read, ``We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children.''% 707 +\footnote{SCR011a\_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} +Trump~Jr.\ texted that he wanted the change because ``[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs and some other nonsense which we shot down fast.''% 708 +\footnote{SCR011a\_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} +Hicks texted back, ``I think that's right too but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.] +[U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] on that word Bc I know it's important and I think the mention of a campaign issue adds something to it in case we have to go further.''% 709 +\footnote{SCR011a\_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} +Trump~Jr.\ responded, ``If I don't have it in there it appears as though I'm lying later when they inevitably leak something.''% 710 +\footnote{SCR011a\_000006 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump~Jr.\ to Hicks).} +Trump~Jr.'s statement---adding the word ``primarily'' and making other minor additions---was then provided to the New York Times.% 711 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~6; -\textit{see} Jo Becker et al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017).} +\textit{see} Jo Becker et~al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017).} The full statement provided to the Times stated: \begin{quote} @@ -2879,16 +2880,16 @@ \subsubsection{The President Directs Trump~Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries Abo I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend the meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting with beforehand.% 712 -\footnote{See Jo Becker et al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017).} +\footnote{\textit{See} Jo Becker et~al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017).} \end{quote} -The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion of the Magnitsky Act or U.S.~sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as described in Volume~I, Section IV.A.5, \textit{supra}. +The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion of the Magnitsky Act or U.S.~sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as described in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.5}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.5}, \textit{supra}. A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about the emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June~9 meeting would leak and the White House should be proactive and get in front of the story.% 713 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~6; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at~9--10.} -Hicks recalled again going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June~9 meeting, but he again said no, telling Hicks, "You've given a statement. -We're done."% 714 +Hicks recalled again going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June~9 meeting, but he again said no, telling Hicks, ``You've given a statement. +We're done.''% 714 \footnote{Hicks 12/7/17 302, at~12; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at~10.} @@ -2900,10 +2901,10 @@ \subsubsection{The President Directs Trump~Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries Abo \subsubsection{The Media Reports on the June~9, 2016 Meeting} Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published its story about the June~9, 2016 meeting.% 717 -\footnote{\textit{See} Jo Becker et al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017); +\footnote{\textit{See} Jo Becker et~al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/18 302, at~10.} In addition to the statement from Trump~Jr., the Times story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele reporting.% 718 -\footnote{See Jo Becker et al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017).} +\footnote{\textit{See} Jo Becker et~al., \textit{Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign}, New York Times (July~8, 2017).} Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June~9 meeting to create the appearance of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members.% 719 \footnote{\textit{See Donald Trump~Jr.\ gathered members of campaign for meeting with Russian lawyer before election}, Circa News (July~8, 2017).} Hicks was upset about Corallo's public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not approved the statement.% 720 @@ -2914,51 +2915,48 @@ \subsubsection{The Media Reports on the June~9, 2016 Meeting} \footnote{Corallo 2/15/18 302, at~7.} Corallo told the President the statement had been authorized and further observed that Trump~Jr.'s statement was inaccurate and that a document existed that would contradict it.% 722 \footnote{Corallo 2/15/18 302, at~7.} -Corallo said that he purposely used the term "document" to refer to the emails setting up the June~9 meeting because he did not know what the President knew about the emails.% 723 +Corallo said that he purposely used the term ``document'' to refer to the emails setting up the June~9 meeting because he did not know what the President knew about the emails.% 723 \footnote{Corallo 2/15/18 302, at~7--9.} -Corallo recalled that when he referred to the "document" on the call with the President, Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said "it will never get out."% 724 +Corallo recalled that when he referred to the ``document'' on the call with the President, Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said ``it will never get out.''% 724 \footnote{Corallo 2/15/18 302, at~8.} Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: -"Also mention existence of doc. -Hope says 'only a few people have it. -It will never get out."% 725 +``Also mention existence of doc. +Hope says `only a few people have it. +It will never get out.'\thinspace''% 725 \footnote{Corallo 2/15/18 302, at~8; -Corallo 7/9/17 Notes ("Sunday 9th---Hope calls w/ POTUS on line"). -Corallo said he is "100\% confident" that Hicks said "It will never get out" on the call. +Corallo 7/9/17 Notes (``Sunday 9th---Hope calls w/ POTUS on line''). +Corallo said he is ``100\% confident'' that Hicks said ``It will never get out'' on the call. Corallo 2/15/18 302, at~9.} Hicks later told investigators that she had no memory of making that comment and had always believed the emails would eventually be leaked, but she might have been channeling the President on the phone call because it was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think the emails would leak.% 726 \footnote{Hicks 3/13/18 302, at~9.} -On July~11, 2017, Trump~Jr.\ posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June~9 meeting on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so "[a]fter being told that The Times was about to publish the content of the emails."% 727 -\footnote{\@DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -Jo Becker et al., \textit{Russian Dirt on Clinton? `I Love It,' Donald Trump~Jr.\ Said}, New York Times (July~11, 2017).} -Later that day, the media reported that the President had been personally involved in preparing Trump~Jr.'s initial statement to the New York Times that had claimed the meeting "primarily" concerned "a program about the adoption of Russian children."% 728 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Peter Baker \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to Let the Page Turn}, New York Times (July~11, 2017) (reporting that the President ``signed off'' on Trump~Jr.'s statement).} +On July~11, 2017, Trump~Jr.\ posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June~9 meeting on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so ``[a]fter being told that The Times was about to publish the content of the emails.''% 727 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJTJ} 7/11/17 (11:01~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +Jo Becker et~al., \textit{Russian Dirt on Clinton? `I Love It,' Donald Trump~Jr.\ Said}, New York Times (July~11, 2017).} +Later that day, the media reported that the President had been personally involved in preparing Trump~Jr.'s initial statement to the New York Times that had claimed the meeting ``primarily'' concerned ``a program about the adoption of Russian children.''% 728 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Peter Baker \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to Let the Page Turn}, New York Times (July~11, 2017) (reporting that the President ``signed off\thinspace'' on Trump~Jr.'s statement).} Over the next several days, the President's personal counsel repeatedly and inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump~Jr.'s statement.% 729 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, David Wright, \textit{Trump lawyer: President was aware of "nothing"}, CNN (July~12, 2017) (quoting the President's personal attorney as saying, "I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor was the President."); -\textit{see also} Good Morning America, ABC (July~12, 2017) ("The President didn't sign off on anything\dots. The President wasn't involved in that."); -Meet the Press, NBC (July~16, 2017) ("I do want to be clear---the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement.").} -After consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the media that the President "certainly didn't dictate" the statement, but that "he weighed in, offered suggestions like any father would do."% 730 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, David Wright, \textit{Trump lawyer: President was aware of ``nothing''}, CNN (July~12, 2017) (quoting the President's personal attorney as saying, ``I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor was the President.''); +\textit{see also} Good Morning America, ABC (July~12, 2017) (``The President didn't sign off on anything\dots. The President wasn't involved in that.''); +Meet the Press, NBC (July~16, 2017) (``I do want to be clear---the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement.'').} +After consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the media that the President ``certainly didn't dictate'' the statement, but that ``he weighed in, offered suggestions like any father would do.''% 730 \footnote{Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Aug.~1, 2017); -Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~9 (the President told Sanders he "weighed in, as any father would" and knew she intended to tell the press what he said).} -Several months later, the President's personal counsel stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that "the President dictated a short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, Jr."% 731 +Sanders 7/3/18 302, at~9 (the President told Sanders he ``weighed in, as any father would'' and knew she intended to tell the press what he said).} +Several months later, the President's personal counsel stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that ``the President dictated a short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, Jr.''% 731 \footnote{1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~18.} -The President later told the press that it was "irrelevant" whether he dictated the statement and said, "It's a statement to the New York Times\dots. That's not a statement to a high tribunal of judges."% 732 +The President later told the press that it was ``irrelevant'' whether he dictated the statement and said, ``It's a statement to the New York Times\dots. That's not a statement to a high tribunal of judges.''% 732 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June~15, 2018).} -That's not a statement to a high tribunal of -\begin{quote} On July~12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office \blackout{Grand Jury} Trump~Jr.\ \blackout{Grand Jury} related to the June~9 meeting and those who attended the June~9 meeting.% 733 \footnote{\blackout{Grand Jury}} -\end{quote} On July~19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then met with reporters for the New York Times. -In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times interview, the President addressed the June~9, 2016 meeting and said he "didn't know anything about the meeting "at the time."% 734 -\footnote{Peter Baker et al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} -The President added, "As I've said---most other people, you know, when they call up and say, 'By the way, we have information on your opponent,' I think most politicians---I was just with a lot of people, they said\dots, -'Who wouldn't have taken a meeting like that?"% 735 -\footnote{Peter Baker et al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} +In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times interview, the President addressed the June~9, 2016 meeting and said he ``didn't know anything about the meeting'' at the time.% 734 +\footnote{Peter Baker et~al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} +The President added, ``As I've said---most other people, you know, when they call up and say, `By the way, we have information on your opponent,' I think most politicians---I was just with a lot of people, they said~\dots, +`Who wouldn't have taken a meeting like that?'\thinspace''% 735 +\footnote{Peter Baker et~al., \textit{Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump}, New York Times (July~19, 2017).} \begin{center} \textbf{Analysis} @@ -2968,9 +2966,9 @@ \subsubsection{The Media Reports on the June~9, 2016 Meeting} a.\qquad\underline{Obstructive act}. On at least three occasions between June~29, 2017, and July~9, 2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June~9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. -On June~29, Hicks warned the President that the emails setting up the June~9 meeting were "really bad" and the story would be "massive" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to "leave it alone." +On June~29, Hicks warned the President that the emails setting up the June~9 meeting were ``really bad'' and the story would be ``massive'' when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to ``leave it alone.'' Early on July~8, after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about the June~9 meeting, the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the President usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. -Later that day, the President rejected Trump~Jr.'s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." The President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption (which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). +Later that day, the President rejected Trump~Jr.'s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was with ``an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign.'' The President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption (which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton. Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed at the press. @@ -2982,7 +2980,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Media Reports on the June~9, 2016 Meeting} The only evidence we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the Special Counsel is the conversation on June~29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President acknowledging that Kushner's attorney should provide emails related to the June~9 meeting to whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed with his own lawyers at that time. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. As described above, by the time of the President's attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June~9 meeting, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the President had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the nexus requirement, however, it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings. @@ -2995,7 +2993,7 @@ \subsubsection{The Media Reports on the June~9, 2016 Meeting} And the President dictated a statement to be released by Trump~Jr.\ in response to the first press accounts of the June~9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption. But as described above, the evidence does not establish that the President intended to prevent the Special Counsel's Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June~9 meeting or other information about that meeting. -The statement recorded by Corallo---that the emails "will never get out"---can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be made public if the President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to Congress and the Special Counsel. +The statement recorded by Corallo---that the emails ``will never get out''---can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be made public if the President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to Congress and the Special Counsel. \subsection{The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the Investigation} @@ -3012,12 +3010,12 @@ \subsection{The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Ov \subsubsection{The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal} After returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May~2017, but before the President's July~19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for recusing from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse his recusal. -In particular, at some point after the May~17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel, Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would "unrecuse" himself.% 736 +In particular, at some point after the May~17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel, Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would ``unrecuse'' himself.% 736 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. -\textit{See} Volume~II, Section II.C.1, \textit{supra} (describing President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse). +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.2.3.1}{Volume~II, Section~II.C.1}, \textit{supra} (describing President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse). } -According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the "gist" of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from "all of it," including the Special Counsel's Russia investigation.% 737 +According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the ``gist'' of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from ``all of it,'' including the Special Counsel's Russia investigation.% 737 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~15.} Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton.% 738 \footnote{Sessions 1/17/18 302, at~15.} @@ -3025,7 +3023,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal} In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand.% 739 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at~6.} -Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand was good, tough, and "on the team."% 740 +Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand was good, tough, and ``on the team.''% 740 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at~6.} The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want to be Attorney General one day.% 741 @@ -3036,7 +3034,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal} Because Porter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General.% 742 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at~6.} -Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to "Keep in touch with your friend," in reference to Brand.% 743 +Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to ``Keep in touch with your friend,'' in reference to Brand.% 743 \footnote{SC\_RRP000020 (Porter 7/10/17 Notes).} Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing whether he had spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable with the task.% 744 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~11--12.} @@ -3065,32 +3063,32 @@ \subsubsection{Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigat On October~16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the Department of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the Department should be investigating.% 752 \footnote{Porter 5/8/18 302, at~10.} -According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, "Don't have to tell us, just take [a] look."% 753 +According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, ``Don't have to tell us, just take [a] look.''% 753 \footnote{SC\_RRP000024 (Porter 10/16/17 Notes); \textit{see} Porter 5/8/18 302, at~10.} Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the Department of Justice would comply with that request.% 754 \footnote{Porter 5/8/18 302, at~10.} -Two days later, on October~18, 2017, the President tweeted, "Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. +Two days later, on October~18, 2017, the President tweeted, ``Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed, including Clinton herself. Comey stated under oath that he didn't do this---obviously a fix? -Where is Justice Dept?"% 755 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:21~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:27~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -On October~29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was "ANGER \& UNITY" over a "lack of investigation" of Clinton and "the Comey fix," and concluded: "DO SOMETHING!"% 756 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:02~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:17~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Where is Justice Dept?''% 755 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 10/18/17 (6:21~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 10/18/17 (6:27~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +On October~29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was ``ANGER \& UNITY'' over a ``lack of investigation'' of Clinton and ``the Comey fix,'' and concluded: ``DO SOMETHING!''% 756 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 10/29/17 (9:53~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 10/29/17 (10:02~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 10/29/17 (10:17~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} On December~6, 2017, five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end of a cabinet meeting.% 757 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~5--6; -see SC\_RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) ("12:45pm With the President, Gen.~Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)"); -SC\_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) ("Post-cabinet meeting---POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. +\textit{see} SC\_RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (``12:45pm With the President, Gen.~Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)''); +SC\_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (``Post-cabinet meeting---POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked me to stay. -Also COS Kelly.").} -During that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, the President again suggested that Sessions could "unrecuse," which Porter linked to taking back supervision of the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.% 758 +Also COS Kelly.'').} +During that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, the President again suggested that Sessions could ``unrecuse,'' which Porter linked to taking back supervision of the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.% 758 \footnote{Porter 5/8/18 302, at~12; Porter 4/13/18 302, at~5--6.} -According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, "I don't know if you could un-recuse yourself. +According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, ``I don't know if you could un-recuse yourself. You'd be a hero. Not telling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get involved. @@ -3098,66 +3096,66 @@ \subsubsection{Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigat I don't want to get involved. I'm not going to get involved. I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. -I just want to be treated fairly."% 759 +I just want to be treated fairly.''% 759 \footnote{SC\_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); \textit{see} Porter 4/13/18 302, at~6; Porter 5/8/18 302, at~12.} -According to Porter's notes, Sessions responded, "We are taking steps; whole new leadership team. -Professionals; will operate according to the law."% 760 +According to Porter's notes, Sessions responded, ``We are taking steps; whole new leadership team. +Professionals; will operate according to the law.''% 760 \footnote{SC\_RRP0000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); \textit{see} Porter 4/13/18 302, at~6.} -Sessions also said, "I never saw anything that was improper," which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not fit with the previous discussion about Clinton."% 761 +Sessions also said, ``I never saw anything that was improper,'' which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not fit with the previous discussion about Clinton.% 761 \footnote{SC\_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); Porter 4/13/18 302, at~6.} Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President that he was on the President's team.% 762 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~6--7.} -At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was "too bad" that Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation.% 763 +At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was ``too bad'' that Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation.% 763 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt \& Michael D. Shear, \textit{Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. ``Look Very Bad''}, New York Times (Dec.~28, 2017).} -When asked whether Holder had been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President said, "I don't want to get into loyalty, but I will tell you that, I will say this: Holder protected President Obama. +When asked whether Holder had been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President said, ``I don't want to get into loyalty, but I will tell you that, I will say this: Holder protected President Obama. Totally protected him. When you look at the things that they did, and Holder protected the president. -And I have great respect for that, I'll be honest."% 764 +And I have great respect for that, I'll be honest.''% 764 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt \& Michael D. Shear, \textit{Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. ``Look Very Bad''}, New York Times (Dec.~28, 2017).} -Later in January, the President brought up the idea of replacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to "clean house" at the Department of Justice.% 765 +Later in January, the President brought up the idea of replacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to ``clean house'' at the Department of Justice.% 765 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~14.} -In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on January~27, 2018, Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorney she had in the past with successful win records, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing Sessions as an example.% 766 +In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on January~27, 2018, Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the past with successful win records, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing Sessions as an example.% 766 \footnote{Porter 5/8/18 302, at~15. -Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, "Roy Cohn (14-0) / Jay Goldberg (12-0)." +Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, ``Roy Cohn (14-0) / Jay Goldberg (12-0).'' SC\_RRP000047 (Porter 1/27/18 Notes).} The President raised Sessions's recusal and brought up and criticized the Special Counsel's investigation.% 767 \footnote{Porter 5/8/18 302, at~15--16.} Over the next several months, the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in the Russia investigation despite his recusal.% 768 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, \@realDonaldTrump 2/28/18 (9:34~a.m.~ET) Tweet ("Why is A.G.~Jeff Sessions asking the Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, \UseVerb{DJT} 2/28/18 (9:34~a.m.~ET) Tweet (``Why is A.G.~Jeff Sessions asking the Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. Will take forever, has no prosecutorial power and already late with reports on Comey etc. Isn't the I.G. an Obama guy? Why not use Justice Department lawyers? -DISGRACEFUL!"); -\@realDonaldTrump 4/7/18 (4:52~p.m.~ET) Tweet ("Lawmakers of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, Lynch, McCabe, Clinton Emails and much more. -Slow walking---what is going on? BAD!"); -\@realDonaldTrump 4/22/18 (8:22~a.m.~ET) Tweet (""GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and Hillary Clinton.' \@FoxNews Good luck with that request!"); -\@realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (3:37~p.m.~ET) Tweet ("Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first place!").} -On June~5, 2018, for example, the President tweeted, "The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn't tell me he was going to recuse himself\dots. I would have quickly picked someone else. -So much time and money wasted, so many lives ruined \dots\ and Sessions knew better than most that there was No Collusion!"% 769 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/5/18 (7:31~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -On August~1, 2018, the President tweeted that "Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now."% 770 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +DISGRACEFUL!''); +\UseVerb{DJT} 4/7/18 (4:52~p.m.~ET) Tweet (``Lawmakers of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, Lynch, McCabe, Clinton Emails and much more. +Slow walking---what is going on? BAD!''); +\UseVerb{DJT} 4/22/18 (8:22~a.m.~ET) Tweet (``\thinspace`GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and Hillary Clinton.'\UseVerb{atFoxNews} Good luck with that request!''); +\UseVerb{DJT} 12/16/18 (3:37~p.m.~ET) Tweet (``Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first place!'').} +On June~5, 2018, for example, the President tweeted, ``The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn't tell me he was going to recuse himself\dots. I would have quickly picked someone else. +So much time and money wasted, so many lives ruined \dots\ and Sessions knew better than most that there was No Collusion!''% 769 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/5/18 (7:31~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +On August~1, 2018, the President tweeted that ``Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now.''% 770 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/1/18 (9:24~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} On August~23, 2018, the President publicly criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had not.% 771 \footnote{Fox \& Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug.~23, 2018).} -The President said, "I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice Department, Jeff Sessions."% 772 +The President said, ``I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice Department, Jeff Sessions.''% 772 \footnote{Fox \& Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug.~23, 2018).} -That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, "I took control of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in\dots. -While I am Attorney General, the actions of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations."% 773 +That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, ``I took control of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in\dots. +While I am Attorney General, the actions of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations.''% 773 \footnote{Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement.} -The next day, the President tweeted a response: "'Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations.' -Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into all of the corruption on the 'other side' including deleted Emails, Comey lies \& leaks, Mueller conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse, Christopher Steele \& his phony and corrupt Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by Dems---and so much more. -Open up the papers \& documents without redaction? Come on Jeff, you can do it, the country is waiting!"% 774 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:17~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:28~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +The next day, the President tweeted a response: ``\thinspace`Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations.' +Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into all of the corruption on the `other side' including deleted Emails, Comey lies \& leaks, Mueller conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse, Christopher Steele \& his phony and corrupt Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by Dems---and so much more. +Open up the papers \& documents without redaction? Come on Jeff, you can do it, the country is waiting!''% 774 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/24/18 (6:17~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 8/24/18 (6:28~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} On November~7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney General.% 775 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 11/7/18 (2:44~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 11/7/18 (2:44~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} \begin{center} \textbf{Analysis} @@ -3173,28 +3171,28 @@ \subsubsection{Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigat On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessions recalled the President asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did not take it as a directive. -When the President raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, "Not telling you to do anything\dots. +When the President raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, ``Not telling you to do anything\dots. I'm not going to get involved. I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. -I just want to be treated fairly." +I just want to be treated fairly.'' The duration of the President's efforts---which spanned from March 2017 to August 2018---and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is relevant to assessing whether the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as obstructive acts. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. -As described above, by mid-June 2017, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +As described above, by mid-June~2017, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition, in July 2017, a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August 2017.% 776 -\footnote{Eg., Del Quentin Wilbur \& Byron Tau, \textit{Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington Grand Jury in Russia Probe}, Wall Street Journal (Aug.~3, 2017); -Carol D. Leonnig et al., \textit{Special Counsel Mueller using grand jury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation}, Washington Post (Aug.~3, 2017).} +\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, Del Quentin Wilbur \& Byron Tau, \textit{Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington Grand Jury in Russia Probe}, Wall Street Journal (Aug.~3, 2017); +Carol D. Leonnig et~al., \textit{Special Counsel Mueller using grand jury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation}, Washington Post (Aug.~3, 2017).} Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the obstructive-act element. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President's conduct toward Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. -And in the wake of the disclosures of emails about the June~9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the campaign, see Volume~II, Section II.G, \textit{supra}, it was evident that the investigation into the campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. +And in the wake of the disclosures of emails about the June~9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the campaign, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.7}{Volume~II, Section~II.G}, \textit{supra}, it was evident that the investigation into the campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. The President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President's desire that Sessions take back supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. -The President said in that meeting that he "just want[ed] to be treated fairly," which could reflect his perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. +The President said in that meeting that he ``just want[ed] to be treated fairly,'' which could reflect his perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the Attorney General---a position that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President's actions is that the President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation. @@ -3220,24 +3218,22 @@ \subsubsection{The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Co On January~25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017, the President had ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel.% 777 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit}, New York Times (Jan.~25. 2018).} -According to the article, "[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr.~Mueller was examining a possible obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr.~Mueller had three conflicts of interest that disqualified him from overseeing the investigation."% 778 +According to the article, ``[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr.~Mueller was examining a possible obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr.~Mueller had three conflicts of interest that disqualified him from overseeing the investigation.''% 778 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit}, New York Times (Jan.~25. 2018).} -The article further reported that "[a]fter receiving the president's order to fire Mr.~Mueller, the White House counsel \dots\ refused to ask the Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead."% 779 +The article further reported that ``[a]fter receiving the president's order to fire Mr.~Mueller, the White House counsel \dots\ refused to ask the Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead.''% 779 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit}, New York Times (Jan.~25. 2018).} -The article stated that the president "ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resign rather than carry out the directive."% 780 +The article stated that the president ``ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resign rather than carry out the directive.''% 780 \footnote{Michael S. Schmidt \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit}, New York Times (Jan.~25. 2018).} -After the article was published, the President -refused to ask the -dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, "Fake news, folks. +After the article was published, the President dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, ``Fake news, folks. Fake news. -A typical New York Times fake story."% 781 +A typical New York Times fake story.''% 781 \footnote{Sophie Tatum \& Kara Scannell, \textit{Trump denies he called for Mueller's firing}, CNN (Jan.~26, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt \& Maggie Haberman, \textit{Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit}, New York Times (Jan.~25, 2018).} The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had not told the President directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have the Special Counsel terminated.% 782 -\footnote{The Post article stated, "Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position\dots. +\footnote{The Post article stated, ``Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position\dots. In response, McGahn said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move\dots. -McGahn did not deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave." +McGahn did not deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave.'' Rosalind S. Helderman \& Josh Dawsey, \textit{Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the brink of leaving}, Washington Post (Jan.~26, 2018).} In that respect, the Post story clarified the Times story, which could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the President of his intention to quit, causing the President to back down from the order to have the Special Counsel fired.% 783 \footnote{Rosalind S. Helderman \& Josh Dawsey, \textit{Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the brink of leaving}, Washington Post (Jan.~26, 2018); @@ -3272,7 +3268,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} \footnote{Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb.~4, 2018).} After Priebus's appearance, the President called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press.% 792 \footnote{Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~10.} -The President also told Priebus that the President had "never said any of those things about" the Special Counsel.% 793 +The President also told Priebus that the President had ``never said any of those things about'' the Special Counsel.% 793 \footnote{Priebus 4/3/18 302, at~10.} The next day, on February~5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to Porter.% 794 @@ -3280,29 +3276,29 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the President. Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17. Evidence indicates it was February~5, 2018. -On the back of a pocket card dated February~5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion: "COS: (1) Letter from DM---Never threatened to quit---DJT never told him to fire M." +On the back of a pocket card dated February~5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion: ``COS: (1) Letter from DM---Never threatened to quit---DJT never told him to fire M.'' SC\_RRP000053 (Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February~5. -Porter 4/13/18302, at~17. -But Porter also said that "COS" referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17, and Kelly took notes dated February~5, 2018, that state "POTUS---Don McGahn letter---Mueller + resigning." +Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17. +But Porter also said that ``COS'' referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17, and Kelly took notes dated February~5, 2018, that state ``POTUS---Don McGahn letter---Mueller + resigning.'' WH000017684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). -Kelly said he did not recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have "mused" about having McGahn write a letter. +Kelly said he did not recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have ``mused'' about having McGahn write a letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~3. McGahn recalled that Porter spoke with him about the President's request about two weeks after the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion taking place on or about February~5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~4.} -The President told Porter that the article was "bullshit" and he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel.% 795 +The President told Porter that the article was ``bullshit'' and he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel.% 795 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17.} The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make himself look good.% 796 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17.} The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make clear that the President never directed McGahn to fire the Special Counsel.% 797 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17.} -Porter thought the matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file "for our records" and wanted something beyond a press statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.% 798 +Porter thought the matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file ``for our records'' and wanted something beyond a press statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.% 798 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at~18.} -The President referred to McGahn as a "lying bastard" and said that he wanted a record from him.% 799 +The President referred to McGahn as a ``lying bastard'' and said that he wanted a record from him.% 799 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at~18.} -Porter recalled the President saying something to the effect of, "If he doesn't write a letter, then maybe I'll have to get rid of him.% 800 +Porter recalled the President saying something to the effect of, ``If he doesn't write a letter, then maybe I'll have to get rid of him.''% 800 \footnote{Porter 4/13/18 302, at~17.} Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President's message.% 801 @@ -3337,60 +3333,60 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special Counsel's Office (confirming February~6, 2018 date of call from the President's personal counsel).} -The President began the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times story did not "look good" and McGahn needed to correct it.% 811 +The President began the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times story did not ``look good'' and McGahn needed to correct it.% 811 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2.} -McGahn recalled the President said, "I never said to fire Mueller. -I never said 'fire.' +McGahn recalled the President said, ``I never said to fire Mueller. +I never said `fire.' This story doesn't look good. You need to correct this. -You're the White House counsel."% 812 +You're the White House counsel.''% 812 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2.} In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accurate.% 813 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~4.} -The President asked McGahn, "Did I say the word 'fire'?"% 814 +The President asked McGahn, ``Did I say the word `fire'?''% 814 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2.} -McGahn responded, "What you said is, 'Call Rod [Rosenstein], tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel.'"% 815 +McGahn responded, ``What you said is, `Call Rod [Rosenstein], tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel.'\thinspace''% 815 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -The President responded, "I never said that.'% 816 +The President responded, ``I never said that.''% 816 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do.% 817 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -McGahn told the President he did not understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, "Call Rod. +McGahn told the President he did not understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, ``Call Rod. There are conflicts. -Mueller has to go."% 818 +Mueller has to go.''% 818 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -The President asked McGahn whether he would "do a correction," and McGahn said no.% 819 +The President asked McGahn whether he would ``do a correction,'' and McGahn said no.% 819 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2.} McGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed McGahn was to what happened.% 820 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -Kelly described the meeting as "a little tense."% 821 +Kelly described the meeting as ``a little tense.''% 821 \footnote{Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2.} The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed.% 822 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} McGahn responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by attorney--client privilege.% 823 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -The President then asked, "What about these notes? Why do you take notes? Lawyers don't take notes. -I never had a lawyer who took notes."% 824 +The President then asked, ``What about these notes? Why do you take notes? Lawyers don't take notes. +I never had a lawyer who took notes.''% 824 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5. McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson's notes, which the President thought of as McGahn's notes. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a "real lawyer" and explained that notes create a record and are not a bad thing.% 825 +McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a ``real lawyer'' and explained that notes create a record and are not a bad thing.% 825 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -The President said, "I've had lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. -He did not take notes."% 826 +The President said, ``I've had lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. +He did not take notes.''% 826 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5.} -After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn and the President "did have that conversation" about removing the Special Counsel.% 827 +After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn and the President ``did have that conversation'' about removing the Special Counsel.% 827 \footnote{Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2.} -McGahn recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn had not backed down and would not budge.% 828 +McGahn recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office [meeting] that McGahn had not backed down and would not budge.% 828 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the President after the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at~2. -Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, "Don[:] Mueller discussion in June.---Bannon Priebus---came out okay." +Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, ``Don[:] Mueller discussion in June.---Bannon Priebus---came out okay.'' WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes).} -Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's personal counsel called McGahn's counsel and relayed that the President was "fine" with McGahn.% 829 +Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's personal counsel called McGahn's counsel and relayed that the President was ``fine'' with McGahn.% 829 \footnote{McGahn 3/8/18 302, at~5 (agent note).} \begin{center} @@ -3404,19 +3400,18 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories were published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. -In addition, the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, "I never said to fire Mueller. -I never said 'fire."" +In addition, the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, ``I never said to fire Mueller. +I never said `fire.'\thinspace'' That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own---but different---recollection of the substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them. Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct. -As previously described, see Volume~II, Section~III, \textit{supra}, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and context of the President's directive; +As previously described, \textit{see} \hyperlink{section.2.3}{Volume~II, Section~III}, \textit{supra}, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and context of the President's directive; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department of Justice, and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to McGahn. In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. -When first asked about the New York Times story, the President said, "Fake news, folks. +When first asked about the New York Times story, the President said, ``Fake news, folks. Fake news. -A typical New York Times fake story." And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had used the word "fire," saying, "I never said to fire Mueller. -I never said 'fire'" and "Did I say the word 'fire'?" The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence. +A typical New York Times fake story.'' And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had used the word ``fire,'' saying, ``I never said to fire Mueller. I never said `fire'\thinspace'' and ``Did I say the word `fire'?'' The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence. In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June~17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. @@ -3424,15 +3419,15 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President's order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. -At that point, the President said he might "have to get rid of' McGahn if McGahn did not comply. +At that point, the President said he might ``have to get rid of\thinspace'' McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President's counsel, that the President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. By January 2018, the Special Counsel's use of a grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among other reasons, on January~8, 2018, the Special Counsel's Office provided his counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President.% 830 -\footnote{1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~1--2 ("In our conversation of January~8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of justice"; +\footnote{1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~1--2 (``In our conversation of January~8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of justice''; listing 16 topics).} The President knew that McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel's Office about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel. @@ -3443,12 +3438,11 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown. -But the President's efforts to have McGahn write a letter "for our records" approximately ten days after the stories had come out---well past the typical time to issue a correction for a news story---indicates the President was not focused solely on a press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings arising from it. +But the President's efforts to have McGahn write a letter ``for our records'' approximately ten days after the stories had come out---well past the typical time to issue a correction for a news story---indicates the President was not focused solely on a press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings arising from it. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's conduct towards the investigation. -inquiry. Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. @@ -3457,16 +3451,16 @@ \subsubsection{The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports} Additional evidence of the President's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn's counsel and said that McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's counsel was well aware of McGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account of events despite the President's request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for telling this Office about the June~17, 2017 events. -The President's statements reflect his understanding---and his displeasure---that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice +The President's statements reflect his understanding---and his displeasure---that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice inquiry. -\subsection{The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, $\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare\blacksquare$} +\subsection{The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, \protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}} \begin{center} \textbf{Overview} \end{center} In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation, including Flynn, Manafort, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} and as described in the next section, Cohen. -When Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the President, the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. +When Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the President, the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions would be viewed as reflecting ``hostility'' towards the President. During Manafort's prosecution and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort was being treated unfairly and made it known that Manafort could receive a pardon. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} @@ -3476,19 +3470,19 @@ \subsection{The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, $\blacksquare\black \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn} -As previously noted, see Volume~II, Section II.B, \textit{supra}, the President asked for Flynn's resignation on February~13, 2017. -Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive public comments about Flynn, describing him as a "wonderful man,""a fine person," and a "very good person."% 831 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference}, White House (Feb.~16, 2018) (stating that "Flynn is a fine person" and "I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrong. -If anything, he did something right\dots. You know, he was just doing his job"); -Interview of Donald J. Trump, NBC (May~11, 2017) (stating that Flynn is a "very good person").} +As previously noted, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.2}{Volume~II, Section~II.B}, \textit{supra}, the President asked for Flynn's resignation on February~13, 2017. +Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive public comments about Flynn, describing him as a ``wonderful man,'' ``a fine person,'' and a ``very good person.''% 831 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference}, White House (Feb.~16, 2018) (stating that ``Flynn is a fine person'' and ``I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrong. +If anything, he did something right\dots. You know, he was just doing his job''); +Interview of Donald J. Trump, NBC (May~11, 2017) (stating that Flynn is a ``very good person'').} The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.% 832 \footnote{\textit{See} Priebus 1/18/17 302, at~9--10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him; Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at~18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn 1/19/18 302, at~9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); -Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3 (describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner said, "You know the President respects you. +Christie 2/13/19 302, at~3 (describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner said, ``You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. -I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later," and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment promising a tweet).} +I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later,'' and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment promising a tweet).} In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November~22, 2017, Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.% 833 @@ -3503,7 +3497,7 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn} [I]f \dots\ there's information that implicates the President, then we've got a national security issue, \dots\ so, you know, \dots\ we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of protecting all our interests if we can\dots. [R]emember what we've always said about the President and his feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains\dots.% 835 -\footnote{1 1/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn.} +\footnote{11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn.} \end{quote} On November~23, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the President's personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.% 836 @@ -3523,16 +3517,16 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn} Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael T. Flynn}, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.~1, 2017), Doc.~3.} The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned about what Flynn might tell the Special Counsel.% 842 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea}, C-SPAN (Dec.~2, 2017).} -In response to a question about whether the President still stood behind Flynn, the President responded, "We'll see what happens.% 843 +In response to a question about whether the President still stood behind Flynn, the President responded, ``We'll see what happens.''% 843 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea}, C-SPAN (Dec.~2, 2017).} Over the next several days, the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and indicating he had not been treated fairly.% 844 -\footnote{\textit{See} \@realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (9:06~p.m.~ET) Tweet ("So General Flynn lies to the FBI and his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI holiday 'interrogation' with no swearing in and no recording, lies many times \dots\ and nothing happens to her? -Rigged system, or just a double standard?"); -President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec.~4, 2017) ("Well, I feel badly for General Flynn. +\footnote{\textit{See} \UseVerb{DJT} 12/2/17 (9:06~p.m.~ET) Tweet (``So General Flynn lies to the FBI and his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI holiday `interrogation' with no swearing in and no recording, lies many times \dots\ and nothing happens to her? +Rigged system, or just a double standard?''); +President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec.~4, 2017) (``Well, I feel badly for General Flynn. I feel very badly. He's led a very strong life. -And I feel very badly.").} -On December~15, 2017, the President responded to a press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, "I don't want to talk about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. +And I feel very badly.'').} +On December~15, 2017, the President responded to a press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, ``I don't want to talk about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. We'll see what happens. Let's see. I can say this: When you look at what's gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very angry.''% 845 @@ -3541,25 +3535,25 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn} \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort} On October~27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February~22, 2018, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony counts.% 846 -\footnote{Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.\ and Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Oct.~27, 2017), Doc.~13 ("Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment"); -Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.\ and Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va.\ Feb.~22, 2018), Doc.~9 ("Manafort and Gates E.D. Va.\ Indictment')} +\footnote{Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.\ and Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Oct.~27, 2017), Doc.~13 (``\textit{Manafort and Gates} D.D.C. Indictment''); +Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.\ and Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va.\ Feb.~22, 2018), Doc.~9 (``\textit{Manafort and Gates} E.D. Va.\ Indictment'').} The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 2005 and continued through 2018.% 847 \footnote{\textit{Manafort and Gates} D.D.C. Indictment; \textit{Manafort and Gates} E.D. Va.\ Indictment.} -In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel and they were "going to take care of us."% 848 +In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel and they were ``going to take care of us.''% 848 \footnote{Gates 4/18/18 302, at~4. -In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. +In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (\textit{i.e.}, tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~195; Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Richard W. Gates~III}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~23, 2018), Doc.~205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable.} -Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should "sit tight" and "we'll be taken care of.'% 849 +Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should ``sit tight'' and ``we'll be taken care of.'% 849 \footnote{Gates 4/18/18 302, at~4.} Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and Manafort said no one used that word.% 850 \footnote{Gates 4/18/18 302, at~4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counselor suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafort also said he hoped for a pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President's public comments about pardons. Manafort 10/1/18 302, at~11. -As explained in Volume~I, Section IV.A.8, \textit{supra}, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. +As explained in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.8}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.8}, \textit{supra}, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S.~District Court for the District of Columbia determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury. Order, \textit{United States~v.\ Manafort}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.~13, 2019), Doc.~503.} @@ -3574,41 +3568,41 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort} McGahn 12/14/17 302, at~14.} In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that Manafort was being treated unfairly. -On June~15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, "I feel badly about a lot of them because I think a lot of it is very unfair. -I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 years. +On June~15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, ``I feel badly about a lot of them because I think a lot of it is very unfair. +I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12~years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. -But I feel so---I tell you, I feel little badly about it. -They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago?\dots. -I feel badly for some people, because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don't think it's right."% 853 +But I feel so---I tell you, I feel a little badly about it. +They went back 12~years to get things that he did 12~years ago? \dots\ +I feel badly for some people, because they've gone back 12~years to find things about somebody, and I don't think it's right.''% 853 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June~15, 2018).} -In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President said, "T don't want to talk about that. +In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President said, ``I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that\dots. But look, I do want to see people treated fairly. -That's what it's all about."% 854 +That's what it's all about.''% 854 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June~15, 2018).} -Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and the President tweeted, "Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. +Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and the President tweeted, ``Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others? -Very unfair!"% 855 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 6/15/18 (1:41~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Very unfair!''% 855 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 6/15/18 (1:41~p.m.~ET) Tweet.} Immediately following the revocation of Manafort's bail, the President's personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for Manafort. -Giuliani told the New York Daily News that "[w]hen the whole thing is over, things might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons."% 856 -\footnote{Chris Sommerfeldt, \textit{Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up' with 'presidential pardons' in light of Paul Manafort going to jail}, New York Daily News (June~15, 2018).} -Giuliani also said in an interview that, although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was ongoing, "when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right?"% 857 +Giuliani told the New York Daily News that ``[w]hen the whole thing is over, things might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons.''% 856 +\footnote{Chris Sommerfeldt, \textit{Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe `might get cleaned up' with `presidential pardons' in light of Paul Manafort going to jail}, New York Daily News (June~15, 2018).} +Giuliani also said in an interview that, although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was ongoing, ``when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right?''% 857 \footnote{Sharon LaFraniere, \textit{Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction Charges}, New York Times (June~15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani).} -In a CNN interview two days later, Giuliani said, "I guess I should clarify this once and for all\dots. +In a CNN interview two days later, Giuliani said, ``I guess I should clarify this once and for all\dots. The president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons in this investigation\dots. When it's over, hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains his pardon power. -Nobody is taking that away from him."% 858 +Nobody is taking that away from him.''% 858 \footnote{\textit{State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript}, CNN (June~17, 2018); \textit{see} Karoun Demirjian, \textit{Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller's probe}, Washington Post (June~17, 2018).} -Giuliani rejected the suggestion that his and the President's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were "certainly not intended that way."% 859 +Giuliani rejected the suggestion that his and the President's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were ``certainly not intended that way.''% 859 \footnote{\textit{State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript}, CNN (June~17, 2018).} -Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved in the investigation would not be "excluded from [a pardon], if in fact the president and his advisors come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly."% 860 +Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved in the investigation would not be ``excluded from [a pardon], if in fact the president and his advisors come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly.''% 860 \footnote{\textit{State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript}, CNN (June~17, 2018).} -Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in political investigations but said, "That doesn't mean they're going to happen here. +Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in political investigations but said, ``That doesn't mean they're going to happen here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it\dots. Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned yet.''% 861 \footnote{\textit{State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript}, CNN (June~17, 2018).} @@ -3616,78 +3610,78 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort} On July~31, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia, generating substantial news coverage.% 862 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Katelyn Polantz, \textit{Takeaways from day one of the Paul Manafort trial}, CNN (July~31, 2018); Frank Bruni, \textit{Paul Manafort's Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too}, New York Times Opinion (July~31, 2018); -Rachel Weiner et al., \textit{Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases, home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers}, Washington Post (Aug.~1, 2018).} -The next day, the President tweeted, "This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it continues to stain our country any further. -Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!"% 863 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24~a.m.~ET) Tweet. -Later that day, when Sanders was asked about the President's tweet, she told reporters, "It's not an order. -It's the President's opinion." +Rachel Weiner et~al., \textit{Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases, home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers}, Washington Post (Aug.~1, 2018).} +The next day, the President tweeted, ``This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it continues to stain our country any further. +Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!''% 863 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/1/18 (9:24~a.m.~ET) Tweet. +Later that day, when Sanders was asked about the President's tweet, she told reporters, ``It's not an order. +It's the President's opinion.'' Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Aug.~1, 2018).} -Minutes later, the President tweeted, "Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent and respected political leaders. +Minutes later, the President tweeted, ``Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent and respected political leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn't government tell me that he was under investigation. -These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion---a Hoax!"% 864 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:34~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -Later in the day, the President tweeted, "Looking back on history, who was treated worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy Number One,' or Paul Manafort, political operative \& Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement---although convicted of nothing? -Where is the Russian Collusion?"% 865 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (11:35~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion---a Hoax!''% 864 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/1/18 (9:34~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Later in the day, the President tweeted, ``Looking back on history, who was treated worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and `Public Enemy Number One,' or Paul Manafort, political operative \& Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement---although convicted of nothing? +Where is the Russian Collusion?''% 865 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/1/18 (11:35~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} The President's tweets about the Manafort trial were widely covered by the press.% 866 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Carol D. Leonnig et al., \textit{Trump calls Manafort prosecution "a hoax," says Sessions should stop Mueller investigation "right now"}, Washington Post (Aug.~1, 2018); -Louis Nelson, \textit{Trump claims Manafort case has "nothing to do with collusion"}, Politico (Aug.~1. 2018).} -When asked about the President's tweets, Sanders told the press, "Certainly, the President's been clear. -He thinks Paul Manafort's been treated unfairly."% 867 +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Carol D. Leonnig et~al., \textit{Trump calls Manafort prosecution ``a hoax,'' says Sessions should stop Mueller investigation ``right now''}, Washington Post (Aug.~1, 2018); +Louis Nelson, \textit{Trump claims Manafort case has ``nothing to do with collusion''}, Politico (Aug.~1. 2018).} +When asked about the President's tweets, Sanders told the press, ``Certainly, the President's been clear. +He thinks Paul Manafort's been treated unfairly.''% 867 \footnote{Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Aug.~1, 2018).} On August~16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began. -At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation needed to be "done in the next two or three weeks,"% 868 +At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation needed to be ``done in the next two or three weeks,''% 868 \footnote{Chris Strohm \& Shannon Pettypiece, \textit{Mueller Probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before Midterms, Officials Say}, Bloomberg (Aug.~15, 2018).} and media stories reported that a Manafort acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature.% 869 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g}, Katelyn Polantz et al., \textit{Manafort jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict}, CNN (Aug.~16, 2018); +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g}, Katelyn Polantz et~al., \textit{Manafort jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict}, CNN (Aug.~16, 2018); David Voreacos, \textit{What Mueller's Manafort Case Means for the Trump Battle to Come}, Bloomberg (Aug.~2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello, \textit{What a guilty verdict for Manafort would mean for Trump and Mueller}, Washington Examiner (Aug.~18, 2018).} On August~17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from the South Lawn of the White House. -In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged witch hunt."% 870 -\footnote{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} -When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the President said, "I don't talk about that now. -I don't talk about that."% 871 -\footnote{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} -The President then added, without being asked a further question,"I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at what's going on there. +In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a ``rigged witch hunt.''% 870 +\footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe}, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} +When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the President said, ``I don't talk about that now. +I don't talk about that.''% 871 +\footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe}, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} +The President then added, without being asked a further question,''I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be a very good person. -And I think it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort."% 872 -\footnote{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} +And I think it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort.''% 872 +\footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe}, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} The President did not take further questions.% 873 -\footnote{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} -In response to the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, "Mr.~Manafort really appreciates the support of President Trump."% 874 -\footnote{\textit{Trump calls Manafort "very good person,"} All In with Chris Hayes (Aug.~17, 2018) (transcript); -\textit{Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump's support}, CNN (Aug.~17, 2018) (https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/08/17/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberations-schneider-lead-vpx.cnn).} +\footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe}, C-SPAN (Aug.~17, 2018).} +In response to the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, ``Mr.~Manafort really appreciates the support of President Trump.''% 874 +\footnote{\textit{Trump calls Manafort ``very good person,''} All In with Chris Hayes (Aug.~17, 2018) (transcript); +\textit{Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump's support}, CNN (Aug.~17, 2018) (\url{https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/08/17/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberations-schneider-lead-vpx.cnn}).} On August~21, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. -Also on August~21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance violation that he said had occurred "in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for federal office."% 875 +Also on August~21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance violation that he said had occurred ``in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for federal office.''% 875 \footnote{Transcript at~23, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.~21, 2018), Doc.~7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript).} -The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters, "Paul Manafort's a good man" and "it's a very sad thing that happened."% 876 +The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters, ``Paul Manafort's a good man'' and ``it's a very sad thing that happened.''% 876 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial}, C-SPAN (Aug.~21, 2018).} -The President described the Special Counsel's investigation as "a witch hunt that ends in disgrace."% 877 +The President described the Special Counsel's investigation as ``a witch hunt that ends in disgrace.''% 877 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial}, C-SPAN (Aug.~21, 2018).} -The next day, the President tweeted, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. -'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'---make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' -Such respect for a brave man!"% 878 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +The next day, the President tweeted, ``I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. +`Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to `break'---make up stories in order to get a `deal.' +Such respect for a brave man!''% 878 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/22/18 (9:21~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -In a Fox News interview on August~22, 2018, the President said: "[Cohen] make a better deal when he uses me, like everybody else. +In a Fox News interview on August~22, 2018, the President said: ``[Cohen] makes a better deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so much is he went through that trial---you know they make up stories. People make up stories. -This whole thing about flipping, they call it, I know all about flipping."% 879 +This whole thing about flipping, they call it, I know all about flipping.''% 879 \footnote{\textit{Fox \& Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump}, Fox News (Aug.~23, 2018) (recorded the previous day).} -The President said that flipping was "not fair" and "almost ought to be outlawed."% 880 +The President said that flipping was ``not fair'' and ``almost ought to be outlawed.''% 880 \footnote{\textit{Fox \& Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump}, Fox News (Aug.~23, 2018) (recorded the previous day).} -In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "I have great respect for what he's done, in terms of what he's gone through\dots. -He worked for many, many people many, many years, and I would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does."% 881 +In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, ``I have great respect for what he's done, in terms of what he's gone through\dots. +He worked for many, many people many, many years, and I would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.''% 881 \footnote{\textit{Fox \& Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump}, Fox News (Aug.~23, 2018) (recorded the previous day).} -Giuliani told journalists that the President "really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated" and that he and the President had discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.% 882 -\footnote{Maggie Haberman \& Katie Rogers, \textit{"How Did We End Up Here?" Trump Wonders as the White House Soldiers On}, New York Times (Aug.~22, 2018).} +Giuliani told journalists that the President ``really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated'' and that he and the President had discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.% 882 +\footnote{Maggie Haberman \& Katie Rogers, \textit{``How Did We End Up Here?'' Trump Wonders as the White House Soldiers On}, New York Times (Aug.~22, 2018).} The next day, Giuliani told the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a pardon for Manafort and other aides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until the investigation concluded.% 883 \footnote{Carol D. Leonnig \& Josh Dawsey, \textit{Trump recently sought his lawyers' advice on possibility of pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says}, Washington Post (Aug.~23, 2018).} @@ -3695,16 +3689,16 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort} \footnote{Plea Agreement, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept.~14, 2018), Doc.~422.} Giuliani was reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the President following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort's attorneys regularly briefed the President's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.% 885 \footnote{Karen Freifeld \& Nathan Layne, \textit{Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller interviews}, Reuters (Oct.~22, 2018); -Michael S. Schmidt et al., \textit{Manafort's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump Attorneys on What He Told Mueller}, New York Times (Nov.~27, 2018); +Michael S. Schmidt et~al., \textit{Manafort's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump Attorneys on What He Told Mueller}, New York Times (Nov.~27, 2018); Dana Bash, \textit{Manafort team briefed Giuliani on Mueller meetings}, CNN, Posted 11/28/18, available at \url{https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/11/28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-giuliani-updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn}; -\textit{see} Sean Hannity, \textit{Interview with Rudy Giuliani}, Fox News (Sept.~14, 2018) (Giuliani: "[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign\dots. -Now, I know that because I've been privy to lot of facts I can't repeat.").} +\textit{see} Sean Hannity, \textit{Interview with Rudy Giuliani}, Fox News (Sept.~14, 2018) (Giuliani: ``[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign\dots. +Now, I know that because I've been privy to a lot of facts I can't repeat.'').} On November~26, 2018, the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by lying about multiple subjects.% 886 \footnote{Joint Status Report, \textit{United States~v.\ Paul J. Manafort, Jr.}, (D.D.C Nov.~26, 2018), Doc.~455.} -The next day, Giuliani said that the President had been "upset for weeks" about what he considered to be "the un-American, horrible treatment of Manafort."% 887 +The next day, Giuliani said that the President had been ``upset for weeks'' about what he considered to be ``the un-American, horrible treatment of Manafort.''% 887 \footnote{Stephen Collinson, \textit{Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge}, CNN (Nov.~29, 2018).} -In an interview on November~28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very brave" that Manafort did not "flip": +In an interview on November~28, 2018, the President suggested that it was ``very brave'' that Manafort did not ``flip'': \begin{quote} If you told the truth, you go to jail. @@ -3712,20 +3706,20 @@ \subsubsection{Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort} You flip and you lie and you get---the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people to flip. It's rare that they can't. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi---I don't know Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.% 888 -\footnote{"Corsi" is a reference to Jerome Corsi, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} who was involved in efforts to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea offer from the Special Counsel's Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." +\footnote{``Corsi'' is a reference to Jerome Corsi, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} who was involved in efforts to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea offer from the Special Counsel's Office because he was ``not going to sign a lie.'' Sara Murray \& Eli Watkins, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter} \textit{says he won't agree to plea deal}, CNN (Nov.~26, 2018).} Manafort, Corsi, \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}. It's actually very brave.% 889 \footnote{Marisa Schultz \& Nikki Schwab, \textit{Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility}, New York Post (Nov.~28, 2018). -That same day, the President tweeted: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Dems is viciously telling witnesses to lie about facts \& they will get relief. -This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!" \@realDonaldTrump 11/28/18 (8:39~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +That same day, the President tweeted: ``While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Dems is viciously telling witnesses to lie about facts \& they will get relief. +This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!'' \UseVerb{DJT} 11/28/18 (8:39~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} \end{quote} -In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, "It was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. -Why would I take it off the table?"% 890 +In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, ``It was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. +Why would I take it off the table?''% 890 \footnote{Marisa Schultz \& Nikki Schwab, \textit{New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility}, New York Post (Nov.~28, 2018).} -\subsubsection{[████████: Harm to Ongoing Matter]} +\subsubsection{[\protect\censor{Harm to Ongoing Matter}]} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}% 891 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}} @@ -3781,55 +3775,55 @@ \subsubsection{[████████: Harm to Ongoing Matter]} The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement. With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to cooperate with the government. -When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government, the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn and said "that still remains." +When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government, the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn and said ``that still remains.'' But when Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn's decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues, however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn's counsel. With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President's actions had the potential to influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. -The President and his personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort, while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to "flip" and cooperate with the government. -On June~15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C.~case was considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he "felt badly" for Manafort and stated, "I think a lot of it is very unfair." -And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "I do want to see people treated fairly. -That's what it's all about." Later that day, after Manafort's bail was revoked, the President called it a "tough sentence" that was "Very unfair!" -Two days later, the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation could receive a pardon "if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors \dots\ come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly"'---using language that paralleled how the President had already described the treatment of Manafort. -Those statements, combined with the President's commendation of Manafort for being a "brave man" who "refused to" break'," suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with the government. +The President and his personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort, while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to ``flip'' and cooperate with the government. +On June~15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C.~case was considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he ``felt badly'' for Manafort and stated, ``I think a lot of it is very unfair.'' +And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the President said, ``I do want to see people treated fairly. +That's what it's all about.'' Later that day, after Manafort's bail was revoked, the President called it a ``tough sentence'' that was ``Very unfair!'' +Two days later, the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation could receive a pardon ``if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors \dots\ come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly''---using language that paralleled how the President had already described the treatment of Manafort. +Those statements, combined with the President's commendation of Manafort for being a ``brave man'' who ``refused to `break','' suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators. The President's public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. -On the second day of trial, for example, the President called the prosecution a "terrible situation" and a "hoax" that "continues to stain our country" and referred to Manafort as a "Reagan/Dole darling" who was "serving solitary confinement" even though he was "convicted of nothing." +On the second day of trial, for example, the President called the prosecution a ``terrible situation'' and a ``hoax'' that ``continues to stain our country'' and referred to Manafort as a ``Reagan/Dole darling'' who was ``serving solitary confinement'' even though he was ``convicted of nothing.'' Those statements were widely picked up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and are presumed to follow those instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements or learned about them from others. -And the President's statements during jury deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort" had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. +And the President's statements during jury deliberations that Manafort ``happens to be a very good person'' and that ``it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort'' had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. -The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort, appear to have been connected to pending or anticipated official proceedings involving each individual. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort, \blackout{HOM} appear to have been connected to pending or anticipated official proceedings involving each individual. The President's conduct towards Flynn principally occurred when both were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press reports speculated about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation. And the President's conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal trial. -And the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort "flipping" occurred when it was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings. +And the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort ``flipping'' occurred when it was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. Evidence concerning the President's intent related to Flynn as a potential witness is inconclusive. -As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. -And regardless of what the President's personal counsel communicated, the President continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, stating that Flynn had "led a very strong life" and the President "fe[lt] very badly" about what had happened to him. +As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting ``hostility'' towards the President. +And regardless of what the President's personal counsel communicated, the President continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, stating that Flynn had ``led a very strong life'' and the President ``fe[lt] very badly'' about what had happened to him. Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. -One day after Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the President said that Manafort was "a brave man" for refusing to "break" and that "flipping" "almost ought to be outlawed." -At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort "a good man" and said he had a "wonderful family." -And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President did not respond directly and instead said he had "great respect for what [Manafort]'s done, in terms of what he's gone through." -The President added that "some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does." -In light of the President's counsel's previous statements that the investigations "might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons" and that a pardon would be possible if the President "come[s] to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly," the evidence supports the inference that the President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. +One day after Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the President said that Manafort was ``a brave man'' for refusing to ``break'' and that ``flipping'' ``almost ought to be outlawed.'' +At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort ``a good man'' and said he had a ``wonderful family.'' +And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President did not respond directly and instead said he had ``great respect for what [Manafort]'s done, in terms of what he's gone through.'' +The President added that ``some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.'' +In light of the President's counsel's previous statements that the investigations ``might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons'' and that a pardon would be possible if the President ``come[s] to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly,'' the evidence supports the inference that the President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. We also examined the evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. -By publicly stating on the second day of deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort" right after calling the Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged witch hunt," the President's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a fact finder could infer that the President intended that result. +By publicly stating on the second day of deliberations that Manafort ``happens to be a very good person'' and that ``it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort'' right after calling the Special Counsel's investigation a ``rigged witch hunt,'' the President's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a fact finder could infer that the President intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the President's comments, including that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to influence public opinion. The President's comments also could have been intended to continue sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. -As described above, the President made his comments about Manafort being "a very good person" immediately after declining to answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. +As described above, the President made his comments about Manafort being ``a very good person'' immediately after declining to answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} @@ -3842,13 +3836,13 @@ \subsection{The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen} The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. -After the media began questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a "party line" that publicly distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. +After the media began questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a ``party line'' that publicly distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its Russia investigation. In an attempt to minimize the President's connections to Russia, Cohen submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower Moscow project three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government, and that the project ended in January 2016, before the first Republican caucus or primary. -While working on the congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the statement short and "tight." -After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not "flip" and privately passed messages of support to him. -Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do "something else" to make the investigation end. -But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and suggested his family members had committed crimes. +While working on the congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the statement short and ``tight.'' +After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not ``flip'' and privately passed messages of support to him. +Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do ``something else'' to make the investigation end. +But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a ``rat,'' and suggested his family members had committed crimes. \begin{center} \textbf{Evidence} @@ -3858,20 +3852,20 @@ \subsubsection{Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower The President's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project. -As described in detail in Volume~I, Section IV.A.1, \textit{supra}, from September 2015 until at least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.% 909 +As described in detail in \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1}, \textit{supra}, from September 2015 until at least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.% 909 \footnote{In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception, including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office, he repeated the same lies he told Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at~12--17. But after Cohen pleaded guilty to offenses in the Southern District of New York on August~21, 2018, he met with investigators again and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation. -The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: "Starting with his second meeting with the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign\dots. +The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: ``Starting with his second meeting with the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign\dots. The information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel's Office's] investigation\dots. -The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel's Office], also corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts with Russian officials during the course of the campaign. -"Gov't Sentencing Submission at~4, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.~7, 2018), Doc.~14. -At Cohen's sentencing, our Office further explained that Cohen had "provided valuable information \dots\ while taking care and being careful to note what he knows and what he doesn't know." +The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel's Office], also corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts with Russian officials during the course of the campaign.'' +Gov't Sentencing Submission at~4, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.~7, 2018), Doc.~14. +At Cohen's sentencing, our Office further explained that Cohen had ``provided valuable information \dots\ while taking care and being careful to note what he knows and what he doesn't know.'' Transcript at~19, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.~12, 2018), Doc.~17 (Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript).} The Trump Organization had previously and unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow.% 910 -\footnote{\textit{See} Volume~I, Section IV.A.1, \textit{supra} (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties).} +\footnote{\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.1}{Volume~I, Section~IV.A.1}, \textit{supra} (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties).} According to Cohen, in approximately September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name and brand.% 911 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~1--4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at~15.} @@ -3892,9 +3886,9 @@ \subsubsection{Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~5.} By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with Russian government officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of staff and press secretary.% 918 -\footnote{\textit{See} FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater), TRUMPORG\_MC\_000233 (1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr\_peskova\@prpress.gof.ru); -MDC-H-000690 (1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info\@prpress.gov.ru); -TRUMPORG\_MC\_000235 (1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr\_peskova\@prpress.gov.ru).} +\footnote{\textit{See} FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater), TRUMPORG\_MC\_000233 (1/11/16 Email, Cohen to \UseVerb{prpeskovaATprpressgofru}); +MDC-H-000690 (1/14/16 Email, Cohen to \UseVerb{infoATprpressgovru}); +TRUMPORG\_MC\_000235 (1/16/16 Email, Cohen to \UseVerb{prpeskovaATprpressgovru}).} On January~20, 2016, Cohen received an email response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant, and phone records confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen described the Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward.% 919 \footnote{1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen; Call Records of Michael Cohen. @@ -3904,7 +3898,7 @@ \subsubsection{Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22~a.m.).} Cohen recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards.% 920 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5.} -Cohen told Trump he spoke with a woman he identified as "someone from the Kremlin," and Cohen reported that she was very professional and asked detailed questions about the project.% 921 +Cohen told Trump he spoke with a woman he identified as ``someone from the Kremlin,'' and Cohen reported that she was very professional and asked detailed questions about the project.% 921 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5--6; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at~4.} Cohen recalled telling Trump he wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the Kremlin.% 922 @@ -3912,9 +3906,9 @@ \subsubsection{Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project.% 923 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~5.} -The day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat \dots\ It's about Putin they called today."% 924 +The day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to ``[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat \dots\ It's about Putin they called today.''% 924 \footnote{FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater \& Cohen).} -Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the project and on January~25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow "for a working visit."% 925 +Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the project and on January~25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow ``for a working visit.''% 925 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~5; 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment).} After the outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear back on moving the project forward.% 926 @@ -3928,20 +3922,20 @@ \subsubsection{Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~6.} In March or April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia.% 929 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~4.} -Cohen also recalled briefing Donald Trump~Jr.\ in the spring---a conversation that Cohen said was not "idle chit chat" because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a \$1 billion deal.% 930 +Cohen also recalled briefing Donald Trump~Jr.\ in the spring---a conversation that Cohen said was not ``idle chit chat'' because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a \$1~billion deal.% 930 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~10.} Cohen recalled that around May~2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.% 931 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~7.} At that time, Cohen had received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip.% 932 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~7.} -On May~4, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen, "I had a chat with Moscow. +On May~4, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen, ``I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention\dots. -Obviously the pre meeting trip (you only) can happen any time you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. -I said I would confirm and revert."% 933 +Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen any time you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. +I said I would confirm and revert.''% 933 \footnote{FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen).} -Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. -Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention."% 934 +Cohen responded, ``My trip before Cleveland. +Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention.''% 934 \footnote{FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater).} On May~5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably read to Trump: @@ -3956,28 +3950,28 @@ \subsubsection{Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St.~Petersburg Economic Forum with candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be there.% 936 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~7.} -Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen could "lock and load" on the deal.% 937 +Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen could ``lock and load'' on the deal.% 937 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~7.} In June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St.~Petersburg Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov.% 938 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~7--8.} Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again--off-again if it were revived.% 939 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~8.} -During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found "interesting."% 940 +During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found ``interesting.''% 940 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~2.} At some point that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company had not secured a piece of property for the project.% 941 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said he thought it occurred in June or July 2016. Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~2.} -Trump said that was "too bad," and Cohen did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that.% 942 +Trump said that was ``too bad,'' and Cohen did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that.% 942 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~2.} Cohen said that at no time during the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be abandoned.% 943 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~2.} -\subsubsection{Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia} +\subsubsection{Cohen Determines to Adhere to a ``Party Line'' Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia} -As previously discussed, see Volume~II, Section II.A, \textit{supra}, when questions about possible Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described as the "party line" or "message" to follow for Trump and his senior advisors.% 944 +As previously discussed, \textit{see} \hyperlink{subsection.2.2.1}{Volume~II, Section~II.A}, \textit{supra}, when questions about possible Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described as the ``party line'' or ``message'' to follow for Trump and his senior advisors.% 944 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~9.} @@ -3989,15 +3983,15 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~1--2.} In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media about Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those inquiries came in.% 947 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~3.} -Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow project might not be consistent with the "message" that the President-Elect had no relationship with Russia.% 948 +Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow project might not be consistent with the ``message'' that the President-Elect had no relationship with Russia.% 948 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~4.} -In an effort to "stay on message," Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016.% 949 +In an effort to ``stay on message,'' Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016.% 949 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~5. -The article was published on February~19, 2017, and reported that Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow "as recently as the fall of 2015" but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. -Consistent with Cohen's intended party line message, the article stated, "Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible." +The article was published on February~19, 2017, and reported that Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow ``as recently as the fall of 2015'' but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. +Consistent with Cohen's intended party line message, the article stated, ``Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible.'' Megan Twohey \& Scott Shane, \textit{A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates}, New York Times (Feb.~19, 2017).} -Cohen recalled that this was part of a "script" or talking point she had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.% 950 +Cohen recalled that this was part of a ``script'' or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.% 950 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~5--6.} Cohen said that he discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue.% 951 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~6.} @@ -4025,7 +4019,7 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T Cohen told investigators about his conversations with the President's personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege, including communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege. As a result, most of what Cohen told us about his conversations with the President's personal counsel concerned what Cohen had communicated to the President's personal counsel, and not what was said in response. Cohen described certain statements made by the President's personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section. -Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected those statements because they had knowledge of the scope oft heir joint defense agreement and access to privileged communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. +Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to privileged communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President's personal counsel if he wished to provide information to us about his conversations with Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained from other parties in the JDA\null. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's personal counsel's uncertainty about the provenance of his own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support a claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements Cohen provided in this report. @@ -4039,9 +4033,9 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T and Cohen was told not to worry because the investigations would be over by summer or fall of 2017.% 962 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~8; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~3--4.} -Cohen said that the President's personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the JDA, Cohen was protected, which he would not be if he "went rogue."% 963 +Cohen said that the President's personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the JDA, Cohen was protected, which he would not be if he ``went rogue.''% 963 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~4.} -Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that "the President loves you" and told him that if he stayed on message, the President had his back.% 964 +Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that ``the President loves you'' and told him that if he stayed on message, the President had his back.% 964 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~11; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~2.} @@ -4051,16 +4045,16 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~7.} The final version of the statement contained several false statements about the project.% 966 \footnote{P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)).} -First, although the Trump Organization continued to pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, "The proposal was under consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. +First, although the Trump Organization continued to pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, ``The proposal was under consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be pursued further. -Based on my business determinations, the Trump Organization abandoned the proposal."% 967 +Based on my business determinations, the Trump Organization abandoned the proposal.''% 967 \footnote{P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)).} -Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, "Despite overtures by Mr.~Sater, I never considered asking Mr.~Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal. -I told Mr.~Sater that Mr.~Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a definitive agreement in place."% 968 +Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, ``Despite overtures by Mr.~Sater, I never considered asking Mr.~Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal. +I told Mr.~Sater that Mr.~Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a definitive agreement in place.''% 968 \footnote{P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)).} -Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, "Mr.~Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015."% 969 +Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, ``Mr.~Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.''% 969 \footnote{P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)).} -Fourth, although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January 2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement said that Cohen did "not recall any response to my email [to Peskov], nor any other contacts by me with Mr.~Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal."% 970 +Fourth, although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January 2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement said that Cohen did ``not recall any response to my email [to Peskov], nor any other contacts by me with Mr.~Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal.''% 970 \footnote{P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)).} Cohen's statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA\null.% 971 @@ -4070,14 +4064,14 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T Because of concerns about the common interest privilege, we did not obtain or review all drafts of Cohen's statement. Based on the drafts that were released through this Office's filter process, it appears that the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Cohen's counsel to Cohen).} -Before the statement was finalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, "The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials."% 972 +Before the statement was finalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, ``The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials.''% 972 \footnote{P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen); Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~4.} In the final version of the statement, that line was deleted.% 973 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~4. -A different line stating that Cohen did "not recall any response to my email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr.~Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal" remained in the draft. +A different line stating that Cohen did ``not recall any response to my email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr.~Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal'' remained in the draft. \textit{See} P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)).} -Cohen though the was told that it was a decision of the JDA to take out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.% 974 +Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JDA to take out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.% 974 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~4.} Cohen recalled that he told the President's personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA\null.% 975 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5.} @@ -4092,15 +4086,15 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T Cohen 11/12/18 302, at~5.} When Cohen called the Russian official a second time, she told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that message to Trump.% 979 \footnote{Cohen 11/12/18 302, at~5.} -Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump- Putin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on Sean Hannity's radio show.% 980 +Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump--Putin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on Sean Hannity's radio show.% 980 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~11.} -Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel the "whole story" of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role in it.% 981 +Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel the ``whole story'' of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role in it.% 981 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~2.} Cohen recalled that he and the President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative, and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and should not be included in his statement to Congress.% 982 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~2; \textit{see} Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~11 (recalling that he was told that if he stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back).} -Cohen said that his "agenda" in submitting the statement to Congress with false representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow, with the aim of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations.% 983 +Cohen said that his ``agenda'' in submitting the statement to Congress with false representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow, with the aim of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations.% 983 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~8; Information at~4--5, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.~29, 2018), Doc.~2 (\textit{Cohen} Information).} Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to him by not contradicting anything the President had said.% 984 @@ -4116,74 +4110,74 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T Between August~18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August~28, 2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel almost daily.% 988 \footnote{Cohen 11/12/18 302, at~2--3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5; -Call Records of Michael Cohen (Reflecting three contacts on August~18, 2017 (24 seconds; -5 minutes 25 seconds; -and 10 minutes 58 seconds); -two contacts on August~19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds); -three contacts on August~23 (8 seconds; 20 minutes 33 seconds; -and 5 minutes 8 seconds); -one contact on August~24 (11 minutes 59 seconds); -14 contacts on August~27 (28 seconds; -4 minutes 37 seconds; -1 minute 16 seconds; -1 minutes 35 seconds; -6 minutes 16 seconds; -1 minutes 10 seconds; -3 minutes 5 seconds; -18 minutes 55 seconds; -4 minutes 56 seconds; -11 minutes 6 seconds; -8 seconds; -3 seconds; -2 seconds; -2 seconds).} +Call Records of Michael Cohen (Reflecting three contacts on August~18, 2017 (24~seconds; +5~minutes 25~seconds; +and 10~minutes 58~seconds); +two contacts on August~19 (23~seconds and 24~minutes 26~seconds); +three contacts on August~23 (8~seconds; 20~minutes 33~seconds; +and 5~minutes 8~seconds); +one contact on August~24 (11~minutes 59~seconds); +14~contacts on August~27 (28~seconds; +4~minutes 37~seconds; +1~minute 16~seconds; +1~minutes 35~seconds; +6~minutes 16~seconds; +1~minutes 10~seconds; +3~minutes 5~seconds; +18~minutes 55~seconds; +4~minutes 56~seconds; +11~minutes 6~seconds; +8~seconds; +3~seconds; +2~seconds; +2~seconds).} On August~27, 2017, the day before Cohen submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous contacts by phone, including calls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.% 989 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5; Call Records of Michael Cohen. -(Reflecting 14 contacts on August~27, 2017 (28 seconds; -4 minutes 37 seconds; -1 minute 16 seconds; -1 minutes 35 seconds; -6 minutes 16 seconds; -1 minutes 10 seconds; -3 minutes 5 seconds; -18 minutes 55 seconds; -4 minutes 56 seconds; -11 minutes 6 seconds; -8 seconds; -3 seconds; -2 seconds; -2 seconds)). +(Reflecting 14~contacts on August~27, 2017 (28~seconds; +4~minutes 37~seconds; +1~minute 16~seconds; +1~minutes 35~seconds; +6~minutes 16~seconds; +1~minutes 10~seconds; +3~minutes 5~seconds; +18~minutes 55~seconds; +4~minutes 56~seconds; +11~minutes 6~seconds; +8~seconds; +3~seconds; +2~seconds; +2~seconds)). } Cohen recalled telling the President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement, including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected.% 990 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5.} -Cohen stated that the President's personal counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and "tight" and the matter would soon come to an end.% 991 +Cohen stated that the President's personal counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and ``tight'' and the matter would soon come to an end.% 991 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5. -Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the effect of "so what?" because the deal never happened. +Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the effect of ``so what?'' because the deal never happened. Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5.} -Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said "his client" appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move on.% 992 +Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said ``his client'' appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move on.% 992 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5.} Cohen said he agreed because it was what he was expected to do.% 993 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~5.} After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the President's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing potential privilege concerns.% 994 \footnote{9/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's Office.} -At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a source for a Washington Post story published on August~27, 2017, that reported in depth for the first time that the Trump Organization was "pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow" at the same time as candidate Trump was "running for president in late 2015 and early 2016."% 995 +At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a source for a Washington Post story published on August~27, 2017, that reported in depth for the first time that the Trump Organization was ``pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow'' at the same time as candidate Trump was ``running for president in late 2015 and early 2016.''% 995 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~7; -Carol D. Leonnig et al., \textit{Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president}, Washington Post (Aug.~27, 2017).} -The article reported that "the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said."% 996 -\footnote{Carol D. Leonnig et al., \textit{Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president}, Washington Post (Aug.~27, 2017).} +Carol D. Leonnig et~al., \textit{Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president}, Washington Post (Aug.~27, 2017).} +The article reported that ``the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said.''% 996 +\footnote{Carol D. Leonnig et~al., \textit{Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president}, Washington Post (Aug.~27, 2017).} Cohen recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January 2016.% 997 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~7.} On August~28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow project to Congress.% 998 -\footnote{P-SCO-000009477---9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to SSCI).} +\footnote{P-SCO-000009477--9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to SSCI).} Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.% 999 \footnote{Cohen 11/12/18 302, at~2; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~9.} He recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his testimony.% 1000 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~9.} -On September~19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project "was terminated in January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary."% 1001 +On September~19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project ``was terminated in January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary.''% 1001 \footnote{Cohen 9/18/18 302, at~7; \textit{see, e.g., READ: Michael Cohen's statement to the Senate intelligence committee}, CNN (Sept.~19, 2017).} Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow the same message.% 1002 @@ -4193,96 +4187,96 @@ \subsubsection{Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump T Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~6.} Cohen recalled that on September~20, 2017, after Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President's personal counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had gone out.% 1004 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~6. -Phone records show that the President's personal counsel called Cohen on the morning of September~20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11 minutes, and that they had two more contacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18 minutes. -Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting three contacts on September~20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2 seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds).} +Phone records show that the President's personal counsel called Cohen on the morning of September~20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11~minutes, and that they had two more contacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18~minutes. +Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting three contacts on September~20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11~minutes 3~seconds; 2~seconds; and 18~minutes 38~seconds).} On October~24 and~25, 2017, Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow.% 1005 \footnote{\textit{Cohen} Information, at~4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S.~House of Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct.~24, 2017), at~10--11, 117--119.} Phone records show that Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel immediately after his testimony on both days.% 1006 \footnote{Call Records of Michael Cohen. -(Reflecting two contacts on October~24, 2017 (12 minutes 8 seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October~25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds; and 6 minutes 6 seconds)).} +(Reflecting two contacts on October~24, 2017 (12~minutes 8~seconds and 8~minutes 27~seconds) and three contacts on October~25, 2017 (1~second; 4~minutes 6~seconds; and 6~minutes 6~seconds)).} \subsubsection{The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen} In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a \$130,000 payment during the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had with the President before he ran for office.% 1007 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Michael Rothfeld \& Joe Palazzolo, \textit{Trump Lawyer Arranged \$130,000 Payment for Adult-Film Star's Silence}, Wall Street Journal (Jan.~12, 2018).} -This Office did not investigate Cohen's campaign- period payments to women.% 1008 +This Office did not investigate Cohen's campaign-period payments to women.% 1008 \footnote{The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen's establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC, which Cohen created to facilitate the \$130,000 payment during the campaign, based on evidence that the entity received funds from Russian-backed entities. Cohen's use of Essential Consultants to facilitate the \$130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Office's referral of certain Cohen-related matters to the U.S.~Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.} However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant to the President's and his personal counsel's interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began to cooperate with the government. -On February~13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, "In a private transaction in 2016, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of \$130,000 to [the woman]. -Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the May-Contain-transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or indirectly."% 1009 +On February~13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, ``In a private transaction in 2016, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of \$130,000 to [the woman]. +Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the May-Contain-transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or indirectly.''% 1009 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Mark Berman, \textit{Longtime Trump attorney says he made \$130,000 payment to Stormy Daniels with his money}, Washington Post (Feb.~14, 2018).} -In congressional testimony on February~27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed Cohen to say that the President "was not knowledgeable \dots\ of [Cohen's] actions" in making the payment.% 1010 +In congressional testimony on February~27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed Cohen to say that the President ``was not knowledgeable \dots\ of [Cohen's] actions'' in making the payment.% 1010 \footnote{\textit{Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee}, 116th Cong.\ (Feb.~27, 2019) (CQ Cong.\ Transcripts, at~147--148) (testimony of Michael Cohen). Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five minutes on January~19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January~30, 2018, and that Cohen called Melania Trump's cell phone several times between January~26, 2018, and January~30, 2018. Call Records of Michael Cohen.} -On February~19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's "fixer," Cohen received a text message from the President's personal counsel that stated, "Client says thanks for what you do.''% 1011 +On February~19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's ``fixer,'' Cohen received a text message from the President's personal counsel that stated, ``Client says thanks for what you do.''% 1011 \footnote{9/19/18 Text Message, President's personal counsel to Cohen; -\textit{see} Jim Rutenberg et al., \textit{Tools of Trump's Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation and the Tabloids}, New York Times (Feb.~18, 2018).} +\textit{see} Jim Rutenberg et~al., \textit{Tools of Trump's Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation and the Tabloids}, New York Times (Feb.~18, 2018).} On April~9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S.~Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen's home, hotel room, and office.% 1012 \footnote{Gov't Opp.\ to Def.\ Mot.\ for Temp.\ Restraining Order, \textit{In the Matter of Search Warrants Executed on April~9, 2018}, 18-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.~13, 2018), Doc.~1 -("On April~9, 2018, agents from the New York field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation \dots\ executed search warrants for Michael Cohen's residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, and electronic devices.").} -That day, the President spoke to reporters and said that he had "just heard that they broke into the office of one of my personal attorneys---a good man."% 1013 +(``On April~9, 2018, agents from the New York field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation \dots\ executed search warrants for Michael Cohen's residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, and electronic devices.'').} +That day, the President spoke to reporters and said that he had ``just heard that they broke into the office of one of my personal attorneys---a good man.''% 1013 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House (Apr.~9, 2018).} -The President called the searches "a real disgrace" and said, "It's an attack on our country, in a true sense. -It's an attack on what we all stand for."% 1014 +The President called the searches ``a real disgrace'' and said, ``It's an attack on our country, in a true sense. +It's an attack on what we all stand for.''% 1014 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House (Apr.~9, 2018).} -Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was "an open book," that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to "come out," and that his false statements to Congress were ''a big concern."% 1015 +Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was ``an open book,'' that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to ``come out,'' and that his false statements to Congress were ``a big concern.''% 1015 \footnote{Cohen, 10/17/18 302, at~11.} A few days after the searches, the President called Cohen.% 1016 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~4.} -According to Cohen, the President said he wanted to "check in" and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay strong."% 1017 +According to Cohen, the President said he wanted to ``check in'' and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged Cohen to ``hang in there'' and ``stay strong.''% 1017 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~4.} Cohen also recalled that following the searches he heard from individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President's support for him.% 1018 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~11.} -Cohen recalled that \blackout{Personal Privacy}, a friend of the President's, reached out to say that he was with "the Boss" in Mar-a-Lago and the President had said "he loves you" and not to worry.% 1019 +Cohen recalled that \blackout{Personal Privacy}, a friend of the President's, reached out to say that he was with ``the Boss'' in Mar-a-Lago and the President had said ``he loves you'' and not to worry.% 1019 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~11.} Cohen recalled that \blackout{Personal Privacy} for the Trump Organization, told him, ``the boss loves you.''% 1020 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~11.} -And Cohen said that \blackout{Personal Privacy}, a friend of the President's, told him, "everyone knows the boss has your back."% 1021 +And Cohen said that \blackout{Personal Privacy}, a friend of the President's, told him, ``everyone knows the boss has your back.''% 1021 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~11.} On or about April~17, 2018, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President's personal lawyers.% 1022 \footnote{4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18 redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher \& Citron to Cohen).} -Costello told Cohen that he had a "back channel of communication" to Giuliani, and that Giuliani had said the "channel" was "crucial" and "must be maintained."% 1023 +Costello told Cohen that he had a ``back channel of communication'' to Giuliani, and that Giuliani had said the ``channel'' was ``crucial'' and ``must be maintained.''% 1023 \footnote{4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen.} On April~20, 2018, the New York Times published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment of Cohen.% 1024 -\footnote{See Maggie Haberman et al., \textit{Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump. Maybe Not Anymore.}, New York Times (Apr.~20, 2018).} -The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not "flip": +\footnote{\textit{See} Maggie Haberman et~al., \textit{Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump. Maybe Not Anymore.}, New York Times (Apr.~20, 2018).} +The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not ``flip'': \begin{quote} -The New York Times and a third rate reporter \dots\ are going out of their way to destroy Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will 'flip.' -They use non- existent 'sources' and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a wonderful family. +The New York Times and a third rate reporter \dots\ are going out of their way to destroy Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will `flip.' +They use non-existent `sources' and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a wonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always liked \& respected. Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble, even if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that despite the horrible Witch Hunt and the dishonest media!% 1025 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 4/21/18 (9:10~a.m.~ET) Tweets.} +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 4/21/18 (9:10~a.m.~ET) Tweets.} \end{quote} In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani.% 1026 \footnote{4/91/18 Email, Costello to Cohen.} -Costello told Cohen the conversation was "Very Very Positive[.] You are 'loved' \dots\ they are in our corner\dots. Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places."% 1027 +Costello told Cohen the conversation was ``Very Very Positive[.] You are `loved' \dots\ they are in our corner\dots. Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places.''% 1027 \footnote{4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}} Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of the team.% 1028 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~11.} -At the time, Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump Organization, which he said was important to him.% 1029 +At the time, Cohen[] understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump Organization, which he said was important to him.% 1029 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~10.} Cohen believed he needed the power of the President to take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message.% 1030 \footnote{Cohen 9/12/18 302, at~10.} Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons after the searches of his home and office had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon discussions were occurring at the White House.% 1031 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~7. -At a White House press briefing on April~23, 2018, in response to a question about whether the White House had "close[d] the door one way or the other on the President pardoning Michael Cohen," Sanders said, "It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place. +At a White House press briefing on April~23, 2018, in response to a question about whether the White House had ``close[d] the door one way or the other on the President pardoning Michael Cohen,'' Sanders said, ``It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place. I don't like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. -I would refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don't have anything at this point." +I would refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don't have anything at this point.'' Sarah Sanders, \textit{White House Daily Briefing}, C-SPAN (Apr.~23, 2018).} Cohen told the President's personal counsel he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him.% 1032 \footnote{Cohen 11/20/18 302, at~7; @@ -4292,54 +4286,54 @@ \subsubsection{The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen} Cohen understood based on this conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the President's personal counsel that as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a pardon or through the investigation being shut down.% 1034 \footnote{Cohen 3/19/19 302, at~3--4.} -On April~24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would consider a pardon for Cohen with, "Stupid question."% 1035 +On April~24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would consider a pardon for Cohen with, ``Stupid question.''% 1035 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bilateral Meeting, The White House (Apr.~24, 2018).} -On June~8, 2018, the President said he "hadn't even thought about" pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, "It's far too early to be thinking about that. +On June~8, 2018, the President said he ``hadn't even thought about'' pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, ``It's far too early to be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. -There's nothing to pardon."% 1036 +There's nothing to pardon.''% 1036 \footnote{\textit{President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for the G-7 Summit}, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (June~8, 2018).} -And on June~15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a press interview and said, "I feel badly about a lot of them, because I think lot of it is very unfair."% 1037 +And on June~15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a press interview and said, ``I feel badly about a lot of them, because I think lot of it is very unfair.''% 1037 \footnote{Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June~15, 2018).} \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government} -On July~2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an "exclusive" interview with Cohen that Cohen "strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York---even if that puts President Trump in jeopardy."% 1038 -\footnote{\textit{EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his 'first loyalty'}, ABC (July~2, 2018). -Cohen said in the interview, "To be crystal clear, my wife, my daughter and my son, and this country have my first loyalty."} +On July~2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an ``exclusive'' interview with Cohen that Cohen ``strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York---even if that puts President Trump in jeopardy.''% 1038 +\footnote{\textit{EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his `first loyalty'}, ABC (July~2, 2018). +Cohen said in the interview, ``To be crystal clear, my wife, my daughter and my son, and this country have my first loyalty.''} That week, the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team who previously had worked as a legal advisor to President Bill Clinton.% 1039 -\footnote{\textit{See e.g.}, Darren Samuelsohn, \textit{Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis}, Politico (July~5, 2018).} +\footnote{\textit{See[,] e.g.}, Darren Samuelsohn, \textit{Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis}, Politico (July~5, 2018).} Beginning on July~20, 2018, the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman who said she had had an affair with Trump.% 1040 -\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Matt Apuzzo et al., \textit{Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model}, New York Times (July~20, 2018).} -On July~21, 2018, the President responded: "Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer's office (early in the morning)---almost unheard of. +\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Matt Apuzzo et~al., \textit{Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model}, New York Times (July~20, 2018).} +On July~21, 2018, the President responded: ``Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer's office (early in the morning)---almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client---totally unheard of \& perhaps illegal. -The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!"% 1041 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/21/18 (8:10~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} -On July~27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump~Jr.\ told his father about the June~9, 2016 meeting to get "dirt" on Hillary Clinton,% 1042 +The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!''% 1041 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/21/18 (8:10~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +On July~27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump~Jr.\ told his father about the June~9, 2016 meeting to get ``dirt'' on Hillary Clinton,% 1042 \footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Jim Sciutto, \textit{Cuomo Prime Time Transcript}, CNN (July~26, 2018).} the President tweeted: -"[S]o the Fake News doesn't waste my time with dumb questions, NO, I did NOT know of the meeting with my son, Don jr. +``[S]o the Fake News doesn't waste my time with dumb questions, NO, I did NOT know of the meeting with my son, Don jr. Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill and Crooked Hillary's lawyer. -Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"% 1043 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38~a.m.~ET) Tweet; -\@realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56~a.m.~ET) Tweet. +Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!''% 1043 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 7/27/18 (7:26~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 7/27/18 (7:38~a.m.~ET) Tweet; +\UseVerb{DJT} 7/27/18 (7:56~a.m.~ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had reported that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators. -See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., \textit{Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model}, New York Times (July~20, 2018).} +\textit{See, e.g.}, Matt Apuzzo et~al., \textit{Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model}, New York Times (July~20, 2018).} On August~21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the President.% 1044 \footnote{\textit{Cohen} Information.} -During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked "at the direction of" the candidate in making those payments.% 1045 +During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked ``at the direction of\thinspace'' the candidate in making those payments.% 1045 \footnote{\textit{Cohen} 8/21/18 Transcript, at~23.} -The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. -'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'---make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' -Such respect for a brave man!"% 1046 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, ``I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. +`Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to `break'---make up stories in order to get a `deal.' +Such respect for a brave man!''% 1046 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 8/22/18 (9:21~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} On September~17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President.% 1047 \footnote{9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President, with attachments).} -Among other issues, the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the President "at any time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease," or whether the President was "informed at any time that the project had been abandoned."% 1048 +Among other issues, the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the President ``at any time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease,'' or whether the President was ``informed at any time that the project had been abandoned.''% 1048 \footnote{9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President), Question~III, Parts~(a) through~(g).} On November~20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the timing of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued.% 1049 @@ -4358,7 +4352,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go On November~29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.% 1051 \footnote{\textit{Cohen} Information; \textit{Cohen} 8/21/18 Transcript.} -In a plea agreement with this Office, Cohen agreed to "provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deems relevant."% 1052 +In a plea agreement with this Office, Cohen agreed to ``provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deems relevant.''% 1052 \footnote{Plea Agreement at~4, \textit{United States~v.\ Michael Cohen}, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.~29, 2018).} Later on November~29, after Cohen's guilty plea had become public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying: @@ -4367,51 +4361,48 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have been nothing wrong if I did do it. If I did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. -That -May---Certain--- +That was my business\dots. It was an option that I decided not to do\dots. I decided not to do it. -I was running my -was my business\dots. The primary reason\dots. I was focused on running for President\dots. -business while I was campaigning. +I was running my business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won, in which case I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities?% 1053 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Departure Remarks}, C-SPAN (Nov.~29, 2018). -In contrast to the President's remarks following Cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's August~28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not the President, "decided to abandon the proposal" in late January 2016; -that Cohen "did not ask or brief Mr.~Trump \dots\ before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal"; -and that the decision to abandon the proposal was "unrelated" to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)). +In contrast to the President's remarks following Cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's August~28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not the President, ``decided to abandon the proposal'' in late January 2016; +that Cohen ``did not ask or brief Mr.~Trump \dots\ before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal''; +and that the decision to abandon the proposal was ``unrelated'' to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq.\ (Aug.~28, 2017)). } \end{quote} -The President also said that Cohen was "a weak person. +The President also said that Cohen was ``a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people that you watch---he is a weak person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. -So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about."% 1054 +So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about.''% 1054 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Departure Remarks}, C-SPAN (Nov.~29, 2018).} The President also brought up Cohen's written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: -"So here's the story: Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or Senate. -It talked about his position."% 1055 +``So here's the story: Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or Senate. +It talked about his position.''% 1055 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Departure Remarks}, C-SPAN (Nov.~29, 2018).} -The President added, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."% 1056 +The President added, ``Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.''% 1056 \footnote{\textit{President Trump Departure Remarks}, C-SPAN (Nov.~29, 2018).} -In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he "decided not to do the project," this Office again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he "decided not to do the project," who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated the decision.% 1057 +In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he ``decided not to do the project,'' this Office again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he ``decided not to do the project,'' who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated the decision.% 1057 \footnote{1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.} -The Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify "what period of the campaign" he was involved in discussions concerning the project.% 1058 +The Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify ``what period of the campaign'' he was involved in discussions concerning the project.% 1058 \footnote{1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.} -In response, the President's personal counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that "the President has fully answered the questions at issue."% 1059 +In response, the President's personal counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that ``the President has fully answered the questions at issue.''% 1059 \footnote{2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office.} In the weeks following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office, the President repeatedly implied that Cohen's family members were guilty of crimes. -On December~3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted, "Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.' +On December~3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted, ``\thinspace`Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.' You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE, unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long prison term? -He makes up stories to get a GREAT \& ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and get his wife and father-in-law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. -He lied for this outcome and should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence."% 1060 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24~a.m.~ET and 10:29~a.m.~ET) Tweets (emphasis added).} +He makes up stories to get a GREAT \& ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and \textit{get his wife and father-in-law (who has the money?) off Scott Free}. +He lied for this outcome and should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence.''% 1060 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 12/3/18 (10:24~a.m.~ET and 10:29~a.m.~ET) Tweets (emphasis added).} \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}% 1061 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:48~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 12/3/18 (10:48~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} On December~12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.% 1062 \footnote{\textit{Cohen} 12/12/18 Transcript.} @@ -4419,49 +4410,49 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go \begin{quote} I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law\dots. -Those charges were just agreed to by him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he did---including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. +Those charges were just agreed to by him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he did---including the fact \textit{that his family was temporarily let off the hook}. As a lawyer, Michael has great liability to me!% 1063 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 12/13/18 (8:17~a.m.~ET, 8:25~a.m.~ET, and 8:39~a.m.~ET) Tweets (emphasis added).} +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 12/13/18 (8:17~a.m.~ET, 8:25~a.m.~ET, and 8:39~a.m.~ET) Tweets (emphasis added).} \end{quote} -On December~16, 2018, the President tweeted, "Remember, Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat' after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable \& unheard of until the Witch Hunt was illegally started. +On December~16, 2018, the President tweeted, ``Remember, Michael Cohen only became a `Rat' after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable \& unheard of until the Witch Hunt was illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY'S OFFICE! -Why didn't they break into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked's office?"% 1064 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (9:39~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +Why didn't they break into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked's office?''% 1064 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 12/16/18 (9:39~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January~12, 2019, the President was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded: \begin{quote} -[I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says "I have an idea, I'll ah, tell---I'll give you some information on the president." +[I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says ``I have an idea, I'll ah, tell---I'll give you some information on the president.'' Well, there is no information. -But he should give information may be on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at because where does that money---that's the money in the family. -And I guess he didn't want to talk about his father-in-law, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. +But \textit{he should give information may be on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at because where does that money---that's the money in the family. +And I guess he didn't want to talk about his father-in-law}, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. So it's ah, pretty sad. You know, it's weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that.% 1065 \footnote{\textit{Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump}, Fox News (Jan.~12, 2019) (emphasis added).} \end{quote} -On January~18, 2019, the President tweeted, "Kevin Corke, \@FoxNews 'Don't forget, Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars\dots."- Lying to reduce his jail time! Watch father-in-law!"% 1066 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 1/18/19 (10:02~a.m.~ET) Tweet (emphasis added).} +On January~18, 2019, the President tweeted, ``Kevin Corke, \UseVerb{atFoxNews} `Don't forget, Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars\dots.' Lying to reduce his jail time! \textit{Watch father-in-law!}''% 1066 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 1/18/19 (10:02~a.m.~ET) Tweet (emphasis added).} On January~23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against his family.% 1067 \footnote{Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen's personal counsel (Jan.~23, 2019).} -The next day, the President tweeted, "So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton to represent him---Gee, how did that happen?"% 1068 -\footnote{\@realDonaldTrump 1/24/19 (7:48~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} +The next day, the President tweeted, ``So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton to represent him---Gee, how did that happen?''% 1068 +\footnote{\UseVerb{DJT} 1/24/19 (7:48~a.m.~ET) Tweet.} Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January 2016. -Giuliani stated that "it's our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow project] went on throughout 2016. +Giuliani stated that ``it's our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow project] went on throughout 2016. Weren't a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him about it. -The president also remembers---yeah, probably up---could be up to as far as October, November."% 1069 +The president also remembers---yeah, probably up---could be up to as far as October, November.''% 1069 \footnote{Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan.~20, 2019).} -In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were "going on from the day I announced to the day I won."% 1070 -\footnote{Mark Mazzetti et al., \textit{Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through "the Day I Won," Trump Is Said to Acknowledge}, New York Times (Jan.~20, 2019).} -On January~21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: "My recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow 'project' were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the president."% 1071 -\footnote{Maggie Haberman, \textit{Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were "Hypothetical"}, New York Times (Jan.~21, 2019). -In a letter to this Office, the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's public comments "were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [written responses to the Special Counsel's Office]." +In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were ``going on from the day I announced to the day I won.''% 1070 +\footnote{Mark Mazzetti et~al., \textit{Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through ``the Day I Won,'' Trump Is Said to Acknowledge}, New York Times (Jan.~20, 2019).} +On January~21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: ``My recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow `project' were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the president.''% 1071 +\footnote{Maggie Haberman, \textit{Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were ``Hypothetical''}, New York Times (Jan.~21, 2019). +In a letter to this Office, the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's public comments ``were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [written responses to the Special Counsel's Office].'' 2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office.} \begin{center} @@ -4477,7 +4468,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go First, with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress, while there is evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony. -Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a "party line" that developed within the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia. +Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a ``party line'' that developed within the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia. Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear that he would stay on message---which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony. But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned testimony. @@ -4487,7 +4478,7 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, the President's personal counsel---who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project---responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JDA\null. -For example, Cohen omitted any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of the JDA to delete the sentence, "The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials." +For example, Cohen omitted any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of the JDA to delete the sentence, ``The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials.'' The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel. The President's conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney--client privilege, and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. @@ -4495,26 +4486,26 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal investigators or to Congress. -Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately urged Cohen to stay on message and not "flip." Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go "rogue." -In the days and weeks that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that Cohen was a "good man" and said he was" a fine person with a wonderful family \dots\ who I have always liked \& respected." -Privately, the President told Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay strong." People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that "the President loves you,""the boss loves you," and "everyone knows the boss has your back." -Through the President's personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen "thanks for what you do" after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. +Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately urged Cohen to stay on message and not ``flip.'' Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go ``rogue.'' +In the days and weeks that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that Cohen was a ``good man'' and said he was ``a fine person with a wonderful family \dots\ who I have always liked \& respected.'' +Privately, the President told Cohen to ``hang in there'' and ``stay strong.'' People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that ``the President loves you,'' ``the boss loves you,'' and ``everyone knows the boss has your back.'' +Through the President's personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen ``thanks for what you do'' after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. At that time, the Trump Organization continued to pay Cohen's legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President's personal counsel, who told him to stay on message and everything would be fine. -The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that "[m]ost people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble" but that he "d[idn't] see Michael doing that." +The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that ``[m]ost people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble'' but that he ``d[idn't] see Michael doing that.'' -After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the President accused Cohen of "mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?)," called Cohen a "rat," and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen's family members had committed crimes. +After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the President accused Cohen of ``mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?),'' called Cohen a ``rat,'' and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen's family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events could support an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating. -b.\qquad\underline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. +b.\qquad\myuline{Nexus to an official proceeding}. The President's relevant conduct towards Cohen occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office, Congress, and the U.S.~Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen's conduct. The President acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with the government investigations. c.\qquad\underline{Intent}. In analyzing the President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a potential witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's information would shed adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements. -Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations---a goal that was in the President's interest, as reflected by the President's own statements. -During and after the campaign, the President made repeated statements that he had "no business" in Russia and said that there were "no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away." +\qquad i.\qquad Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations---a goal that was in the President's interest, as reflected by the President's own statements. +During and after the campaign, the President made repeated statements that he had ``no business'' in Russia and said that there were ``no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away.'' As Cohen knew, and as he recalled communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements. In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project, that the conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible travel to Russia to pursue the project. @@ -4523,10 +4514,10 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time of Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in early 2017 following media inquiries. -Cohen recalled that on September~20, 2017, the day after he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress---which said the project "was terminated in January of 2016"---the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. -And after Cohen's guilty plea, the President told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was' being pursued. +Cohen recalled that on September~20, 2017, the day after he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress---which said the project ``was terminated in January of 2016''---the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. +And after Cohen's guilty plea, the President told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was being pursued. -The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project. +\qquad ii.\qquad The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from this Office about the project and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress. Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had decided to no longer pursue the project. @@ -4534,33 +4525,33 @@ \subsubsection{The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Go The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and timing of the President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the information that Cohen could provide as a witness. -The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. +\qquad iii.\qquad The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. -The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to "break" and "make up stories in order to get a 'deal.'" -And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. -So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about." But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign." +The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to ``break'' and ``make up stories in order to get a `deal.'\thinspace'' +And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress, the President said, ``what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. +So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about.'' But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying, ``Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.'' As described above, there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's connections to Russia during the campaign. -Finally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others. -It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[] up stories" in order to get a deal for himself and "get his wife and father-in-law \dots\ off Scott Free." It also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. -But the President's suggestion that Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen "should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence") and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress. +\qquad iv.\qquad Finally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others. +It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen ``ma[d]e[] up stories'' in order to get a deal for himself and ``get his wife and father-in-law \dots\ off Scott Free.'' It also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. +But the President's suggestion that Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen ``should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence'') and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation. \subsection{Overarching Factual Issues} Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts concerning the President's course of conduct. -Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of-justice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. +1.\quad Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of-justice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues. -Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume~II, Section III.B, \textit{infra}. +Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article~II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we address in \hyperlink{subsection.2.3.2}{Volume~II, Section~III.B}, \textit{infra}. A factual analysis of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses. Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime. -Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States~v.\ Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d~Cir.~1988), or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see, e.g., United States~v.\ Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 591 (2d~Cir.~2015). +Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper obstructive purpose, \textit{see, e.g., United States~v.\ Willoughby}, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d~Cir.~1988), or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, \textit{see, e.g., United States~v.\ Binday}, 804 F.3d 558, 591 (2d~Cir.~2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. -See United States~v.\ Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th~Cir.~2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline, that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime"). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Greer}, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th~Cir.~2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline, that ``obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime''). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong. @@ -4573,23 +4564,23 @@ \subsection{Overarching Factual Issues} And no principle of law excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system's integrity is equally threatened. -Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts---e.g., the President's statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to remove the Special Counsel---it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. +2.\quad Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts---\textit{e.g.}, the President's statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to remove the Special Counsel---it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. -Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction investigations. +a.\quad Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney General's recusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. -For example, the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election---interference only---a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. +For example, the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election-interference only---a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. The President's efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede to his requests. -Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI\null. +Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's prosecution and conviction for lying to the~FBI\null. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General that the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President's order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President's message to Sessions that he should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special Counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the President's aides and associates beyond those already filed. -In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. +b.\quad In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the first phase, before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful. diff --git a/src/volume-2/introduction.tex b/src/volume-2/introduction.tex index 3406310..26213f0 100644 --- a/src/volume-2/introduction.tex +++ b/src/volume-2/introduction.tex @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume II} \textit{First}, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that ``the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions'' in violation of ``the constitutional separation of powers.''% 1 -\footnote{\textit{A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution}, 24~Op.\ O.L.C. 222, 222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.).} -Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28~U.S.C. \S~515; 28~C.F.R. \S~600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. +\footnote{\textit{A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution}, 24~Op.\ O.L.C. 222, [] 260~(2000) (OLC Op.).} +Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, \textit{see} 28~U.S.C. \S~515; 28~C.F.R. \S~600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC's constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.% 2 -\footnote{\textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.} Art.~I \S~2, cl.~5; \S~3, cl.~6; \textit{cf.} OLC Op.\ at~257--258 (discussing relationship between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).} +\footnote{\textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I} \S~2, cl.~5; \S~3, cl.~6; \textit{cf.} OLC Op.\ at~257--258 (discussing relationship between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).} \textit{Second}, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President's term is permissible.% 3 \footnote{OLC Op.\ at~257 n.36 (``A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of immunity'').} @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume II} \textit{Third}, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct ``constitutes a federal offense.'' -U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual \S~9-27.220 (2018) (Justice Manual). +U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual \S~9-27.220~(2018) (Justice Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume II} \hr This report on our investigation consists of four parts. -Section~I provides an overview of obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations. -Section~II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence. -Section~III addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. -Section~IV states our conclusion. +\hyperlink{section.2.1}{Section~I} provides an overview of obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations. +\hyperlink{section.2.2}{Section~II} sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence. +\hyperlink{section.2.3}{Section~III} addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. +\hyperlink{section.2.4}{Section~IV} states our conclusion. diff --git a/src/volume-2/legal-defenses-of-president.tex b/src/volume-2/legal-defenses-of-president.tex index 664d3ff..15e8b26 100644 --- a/src/volume-2/legal-defenses-of-president.tex +++ b/src/volume-2/legal-defenses-of-president.tex @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ \section{Legal Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes to the President} +\markboth{Legal Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes to the President}{Legal Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes to the President} The President's personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the President's conduct.% 1072 \footnote{6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; -see also 1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; +\textit{see also} 1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~4.} As a statutory matter, the President's counsel has argued that a core obstruction-of-justice statute, 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(c)(2), does not cover the President's actions.% 1073 @@ -10,37 +11,39 @@ \section{Legal Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes to Counsel has also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18~U.S.C. \S~1505, protect only pending proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~7--8. Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the person contemplated. -See Volume~II, Section III.A, \textit{supra}.} +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsection.2.3.1}{Volume~II, Section~III.A}, \textit{supra}.} As a constitutional matter, the President's counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate the FBI Director.% 1074 \footnote{6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~1 (``[T]he President cannot obstruct \dots\ by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers.'').} Under that view, any statute that restricts the President's exercise of those powers would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role. -The President's counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve exercises of his Article II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning perjury.% 1075 +The President's counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve exercises of his Article~II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning perjury.% 1075 \footnote{6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~2 n.1.} But counsel has made a categorical argument that ``the President's exercise of his constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice.% 1076 \footnote{6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~2 n.1 (dashes omitted); -\textit{see also} 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~4 (``[T]he obstruction-of-justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article II discretionary authority to remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function.'').} +\textit{see also} 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~4 (``[T]he obstruction-of-justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article~II discretionary authority to remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function.'').} In analyzing counsel's statutory arguments, we concluded that the President's proposed interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction. As for the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the President's position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation of powers. -Under that framework, we concluded, Article II of the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that we investigated. +Under that framework, we concluded, Article~II of the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that we investigated. Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to use his official powers to curtail, end, or interfere with an investigation. \subsection{Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under Investigation} The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c) provides: -(c)~Whoever corruptly - +(c)~Whoever corruptly--- +\begin{quote} (1)~alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2)~otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, +\end{quote} shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512(c)(2) states a broad, independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice.% 1077 -\footnote{See U.S. Br., United States~v.\ Kumar, Nos.~06-5482-cr(L), 06-5654--cr(CON) (2d~Cir.\ filed Oct.~26, 2007), at pp.~15--28; United States~v.\ Singleton, Nos.~H-04-CR-514SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D. Tex.\ filed June 5, 2006).} +\footnote{\textit{See} U.S. Br., \textit{United States~v.\ Kumar}, Nos.~06-5482-cr(L), 06-5654--cr(CON) (2d~Cir.\ filed Oct.~26, 2007), at pp.~15--28; \textit{United States~v.\ Singleton}, Nos.~H-04-CR-514SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D. Tex.\ filed June~5, 2006).} While defendants have argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to cover only acts that would impair the availability or integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(1)'s focus, strong arguments weigh against that proposed limitation. The text of Section 1512(c)(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to Section 1512(c)(1); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section 1512(c)(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplated---including by improper exercises of official power. @@ -63,28 +66,28 @@ \subsubsection{The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstruc \textit{See, e.g., United States~v.\ McKibbins}, 656~F.3d 707, 711 (7th~Cir.~2011) (``The intent element is important because the word `corruptly' is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction.'') (internal quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section 1512(c)(2) is ``obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing]'' a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language. -\textit{See Loughrin~v.\ United States}, 573~U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (``[W]hen `Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another'---let alone in the very next provision---this Court `presume[s]' that Congress intended a difference in meaning'') (quoting \textit{Russello~v.\ United States}, 464~U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); -\textit{accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc.\~v.\ Somers}, 138~S. Ct.~767, 777 (2018). +\textit{See Loughrin~v.\ United States}, 573~U.S. 351, 358~(2014) (``[W]hen `Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another'---let alone in the very next provision---this Court `presume[s]' that Congress intended a difference in meaning'') (quoting \textit{Russello~v.\ United States}, 464~U.S. 16, 23~(1983)); +\textit{accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc.~v.\ Somers}, 138~S.~Ct.\ 767, 777~(2018). Second, the structure of Section~1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512(c)(2) defines an independent offense. -Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different elements from Section 1512(c)(1) -- and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own ``attempt'' prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. +Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different elements from Section 1512(c)(1)---and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own ``attempt'' prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections of Section 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction ``or,'' indicating that each provides an alternative basis for criminal liability. \textit{See Loughrin}, 573~U.S. at~357 (``ordinary use [of `or'] is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings'') (internal quotation marks omitted). In \textit{Loughrin}, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use of the word ``or'' to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18~U.S.C. \S~1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2) therefore should not be interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection 1344(1). -\textit{Id.}; \textit{see also Shaw~v.\ United States}, 137~S. Ct.~462, 465--469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the bank fraud statute ``overlap substantially'' but identifying distinct circumstances covered by each).% 1078 +\textit{Id.}; \textit{see also Shaw~v.\ United States}, 137~S.~Ct.\ 462, 465--469~(2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the bank fraud statute ``overlap substantially'' but identifying distinct circumstances covered by each).% 1078 \footnote{The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in concluding that language that appeared in the first clause of the Wire Act, 18~U.S.C. \S~1084, restricting its prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to ``any sporting event or contest,'' did not apply to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. \textit{See Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling} (Nov.~2, 2018), slip op.~7 (relying on plain language); -\textit{id}. at~11 (finding it not ``tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier `on any sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause''); -\textit{id}. at~12 (relying on \textit{Digital Realty}).} +\textit{id.}~at~11 (finding it not ``tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier `on any sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause''); +\textit{id.}~at~12 (relying on \textit{Digital Realty}).} And here, as in \textit{Loughrin}, Section 1512(c)'s ``two clauses have separate numbers, line breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent indentation---thus placing the clauses visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings.'' 573~U.S. at~359. Third, the introductory word ``otherwise'' in Section 1512(c)(2) signals that the provision covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512(c)(1). -\textit{See} Black's Law Dictionary 1101 (6th ed.~1990) (``otherwise'' means``in a different manner; in another way, or in other ways''); +\textit{See} Black's Law Dictionary 1101 (6th ed.~1990) (``otherwise'' means ``in a different manner; in another way, or in other ways''); \textit{see also, e.g.}, American Heritage College Dictionary Online (``1. In another way; differently; 2. Under other circumstances''); -\textit{see also Gooch~v.\ United States}, 297~U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (characterizing ``otherwise'' as a ``broad term'' and holding that a statutory prohibition on kidnapping ``for ransom or reward or otherwise'' is not limited by the words ``ransom'' and ``reward'' to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); +\textit{see also Gooch~v.\ United States}, 297~U.S. 124, 128~(1936) (characterizing ``otherwise'' as a ``broad term'' and holding that a statutory prohibition on kidnapping ``for ransom or reward or otherwise'' is not limited by the words ``ransom'' and ``reward'' to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); \textit{Collazos~v.\ United States}, 368~F.3d 190, 200 (2d~Cir.~2004) (construing ``otherwise'' in 28~U.S.C. \S~2466(1)(C) to reach beyond the ``specific examples'' listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the ``myriad means that human ingenuity might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court''); -\textit{cf.~Begay~v.\ United States}, 553~U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that ``otherwise'' is defined to mean ``in a different way or manner,'' and holding that the word ``otherwise'' introducing the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18~U.S.C. \S~924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, ``refer to a crime that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others'').% 1079 -\footnote{In \textit{Sykes~v.\ United States}, 564~U.S. 1, 15 (2011), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned Begay's reading of the residual clause, and in \textit{Johnson~v.\ United States}, 135~S. Ct.~2551 (2015), the Court invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. +\textit{cf.~Begay~v.\ United States}, 553~U.S. 137, 144~(2006) (recognizing that ``otherwise'' is defined to mean ``in a different way or manner,'' and holding that the word ``otherwise'' introducing the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18~U.S.C. \S~924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, ``refer to a crime that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others'').% 1079 +\footnote{In \textit{Sykes~v.\ United States}, 564~U.S. 1, 15~(2011), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned \textit{Begay}'s reading of the residual clause, and in \textit{Johnson~v.\ United States}, 135~S.~Ct.\ 2551~(2015), the Court invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. \textit{Begay's} analysis of the word ``otherwise'' is thus of limited value.} The purpose of the word ``otherwise'' in Section 1512(c)(2) is therefore to clarify that the provision covers obstructive acts \textit{other} than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its integrity or availability, which is the conduct addressed in Section 1512(c)(1). The word ``otherwise'' does not signal that Section 1512(c)(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive conduct than the language of the provision implies. @@ -95,75 +98,75 @@ \subsubsection{Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2)} As one court explained, ``[t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover `otherwise' obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document destruction, which is listed in (c)(1).'' \textit{United States~v.\ Volpendesto}, 746~F.3d 273, 286 (7th~Cir.~2014) (some quotation marks omitted). -For example, in \textit{United States~v.\ Ring}, 628~F. Supp.~2d 195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argument that ``\S~1512(c)(2)'s reference to conduct that `otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection (c)(1)---namely, conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of `record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official proceeding.'' +For example, in \textit{United States~v.\ Ring}, 628~F. Supp.~2d 195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argument that ``\S~1512(c)(2)'s reference to conduct that `otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection (c)(1)---namely, conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of `record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official proceeding.[']\thinspace'' \textit{Id.}~at~224. The court explained that ``the meaning of \S~1512(c)(2) is plain on its face.'' -\textit{Id.}~(alternations in original), And courts have upheld convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly thwarted arrests or investigations. +\textit{Id.}~(alternations in original). And courts have upheld convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly thwarted arrests or investigations. \textit{See, e.g., United States~v.\ Martinez}, 862~F.3d 223, 238 (2d~Cir.~2017) (police officer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before ``outstanding warrants could be executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding''); \textit{United States~v.\ Ahrensfield}, 698~F.3d 1310, 1324--1326 (10th~Cir.~2012) (officer disclosed existence of an undercover investigation to its target); \textit{United States~v.\ Phillips}, 583~F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th~Cir.~2009) (defendant disclosed identity of an undercover officer thus preventing him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). -Those cases illustrate that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts---including by public officials---that frustrate the commence mentor conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or impair its integrity. +Those cases illustrate that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts---including by public officials---that frustrate the commencement or conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or impair its integrity. Section 1512(c)(2)'s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus clause of 18~U.S.C. \S~1503, which covers anyone who ``corruptly \dots\ obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.'' That clause of Section~1503 follows two more specific clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The omnibus clause has nevertheless been construed to be ``far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute.'' -\textit{United States~v.\ Aguilar}, 515~U.S. 593, 599 (1995). +\textit{United States~v.\ Aguilar}, 515~U.S. 593, 599~(1995). ``The omnibus clause is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due administration of justice.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Brenson}, 104~F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th~Cir.~1997). Courts have accordingly given it a ``non-restrictive reading.'' -\textit{United States~v.\ Kumar}, 617~F.3d 612, 620 (2d~Cir.~2010); id, at~620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits). +\textit{United States~v.\ Kumar}, 617~F.3d 612, 620 (2d~Cir.~2010); \textit{id.}~at 620~n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause ``prohibits acts that are similar in result, rather than manner, to the conduct described in the first part of the statute.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Howard}, 569~F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th~Cir.~1978). While the specific clauses ``forbid certain means of obstructing justice \dots\ the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the means used to reach that result.'' \textit{Id.}~(collecting cases). -Given the similarity of Section 1512(c)(2) to Section 1503's omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions---i.e., the result of obstructing justice---rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. +Given the similarity of Section 1512(c)(2) to Section 1503's omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions---\textit{i.e.}, the result of obstructing justice---rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section 1512(c)(2) serves a distinct function in the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes: it captures corrupt conduct, other than document destruction, that has the natural tendency to obstruct contemplated as well as pending proceedings. Section 1512(c)(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them superfluous. Section~1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial proceedings, and Section~1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional proceedings, reach ``endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede'' the proceedings---a broader test for inchoate violations than Section 1512(c)(2)'s ``attempt'' standard, which requires a substantial step towards a completed offense. \textit{See United States~v.\ Sampson}, 898~F.3d 287, 302 (2d~Cir.~2018) (``[E]fforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an `endeavor' yet fall short of an `attempt' cannot be prosecuted under \S~1512.''); \textit{United States~v.\ Leisure}, 844~F.2d 1347, 1366--1367 (8th~Cir.~1988) (collecting cases recognizing the difference between the ``endeavor'' and ``attempt'' standards). -And 18~U.S.C. \S~1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or records in contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the ``nexus'' showing under Aguilar, which Section 1512(c)(2) demands. +And 18~U.S.C. \S~1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or records in contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the ``nexus'' showing under \textit{Aguilar}, which Section 1512(c)(2) demands. \textit{See, e.g., United States~v.\ Yielding}, 657~F.3d 688, 712 (8th~Cir.~2011) (``The requisite knowledge and intent [under Section~1519] can be present even if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely to succeed in obstructing the matter.''); \textit{United States~v.\ Gray}, 642~F.3d 371, 376--377 (2d~Cir.~2011) (``[I]n enacting \S~1519, Congress rejected any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant's conduct and an imminent or pending official proceeding.''). The existence of even ``substantial'' overlap is not ``uncommon'' in criminal statutes. \textit{Loughrin}, 573~U.S. at~359 n.4; -\textit{see Shaw}, 137~S. Ct.~at~458--469; -\textit{Aguilar}, 515~USS. at~616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (``The fact that there is now some overlap between \S~1503 and \S~1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause of \S~1503 and the other provision of \S~1503 itself.''). +\textit{see Shaw}, 137~S.~Ct.\ at~458--469; +\textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~616 (Scalia,~J., dissenting) (``The fact that there is now some overlap between \S~1503 and \S~1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause of \S~1503 and the other provision of \S~1503 itself.''). But given that Sections 1503, 1505, and~1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give Section 1512(c)(2) an artificially limited construction. -\textit{See Shaw}, 137~S. Ct.~at~469.% 1080 -\footnote{The Supreme Court's decision in \textit{Marinello~v.\ United States}, 138~S. Ct.~1101 (2018), does not support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section 1512(c)(2). +\textit{See Shaw}, 137~S.~Ct.\ at~469.% 1080 +\footnote{The Supreme Court's decision in \textit{Marinello~v.\ United States}, 138~S.~Ct.\ 1101~(2018), does not support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section 1512(c)(2). \textit{Marinello} interpreted the tax obstruction statute, 26~U.S.C. \S~7212(a), to require ``a `nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular administrative proceeding.'' \textit{Id.}~at~1109. -The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar interpretation given to ``other obstruction provisions,'' \textit{id}. (citing \textit{Aguilar} and \textit{Arthur Andersen}), as well as considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. +The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar interpretation given to ``other obstruction provisions,'' \textit{id.}\ (citing \textit{Aguilar} and \textit{Arthur Andersen}), as well as considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. \textit{Id.}~at~1106--1108. -The type of ``nexus'' element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section 1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section 1512(c)(2) language that is not there. -\textit{See Bates~v.\ United States}, 522~U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (the Court ``ordinarily resist[s] reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.'').} +The type of ``nexus'' element the Court adopted in \textit{Marinello} already applies under Section 1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section 1512(c)(2) language that is not there. +\textit{See Bates~v.\ United States}, 522~U.S. 23, 29~(1997) (the Court ``ordinarily resist[s] reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.'').} \subsubsection{The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its Texts} ``Given the straightforward statutory command'' in Section 1512(c)(2), ``there is no reason to resort to legislative history.'' -\textit{United States~v.\ Gonzales}, 520~U.S. 1, 6 (1997). +\textit{United States~v.\ Gonzales}, 520~U.S. 1, 6~(1997). In any event, the legislative history of Section 1512(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its reach. -Congress enacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.\ L. No.~107-204, Tit.~XI, \S~1102, 116~Stat.~807. +Congress enacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.\ L.~No.~107-204, Tit.~XI, \S~1102, 116~Stat.~807. The relevant section of the statute was entitled ``Tampering with a Record \textit{or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding}.'' 116~Stat.~807 (emphasis added). That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent effect. Section 1512(c) was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a certain ``loophole'' with respect to ``document shredding.'' \textit{See} 148~Cong.\ Rec.\ S6545 (July 10, 2002) (Sen.~Lott); -\textit{id}. at S6549-S6550 (Sen: Hatch). +\textit{id.}~at S6549--S6550 (Sen.~Hatch). But those explanations do not limit the enacted text. -\textit{See Pittston Coal Group~v.\ Sebben}, 488~U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (``[I]t is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history.''); -\textit{see also Encino Motorcars, LLC~v.\ Navarro}, 138~S. Ct.~1134, 1143 (2018) (``Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading.''). +\textit{See Pittston Coal Group~v.\ Sebben}, 488~U.S. 105, 115~(1988) (``[I]t is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history.''); +\textit{see also Encino Motorcars, LLC~v.\ Navarro}, 138~S.~Ct.\ 1134, 1143~(2018) (``Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading.''). The floor statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. -\textit{See Barnhart~v.\ Sigmon Coal Co.}, 534~U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (``Floor statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. +\textit{See Barnhart~v.\ Sigmon Coal Co.}, 534~U.S. 438, 457~(2002) (``Floor statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text.''). That principle has particular force where one of the proponents of the amendment to Section~1512 introduced his remarks as only ``briefly elaborat[ing] on some of the specific provisions contained in this bill.'' 148~Cong.\ Rec.\ S6550 (Sen.~Hatch). -Indeed, the language Congress used in Section 1512(c)(2)---prohibiting ``corruptly \dots\ obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding'' or attempting to do so--- parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen protections against witness tampering and obstruction of justice. +Indeed, the language Congress used in Section 1512(c)(2)---prohibiting ``corruptly \dots\ obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding'' or attempting to do so---parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen protections against witness tampering and obstruction of justice. While the earlier provision is not a direct antecedent of Section 1512(c)(2), Congress's understanding of the broad scope of the earlier provision is instructive. -Recognizing that ``the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted'' by a ``variety of corrupt methods \dots\ limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined,'' S. Rep.\ No.~532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.~17--18 (1982), Congress considered a bill that would have amended Section~1512 by making it a crime, \textit{inter alia}, when a person ``corruptly \dots\ influences, obstructs, or impedes \dots\ [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal law,'' ``administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted,'' or the ``exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry.'' \textit{Id.}~at~17--19 (quoting S. 2420). +Recognizing that ``the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted'' by a ``variety of corrupt methods \dots\ limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined,'' S.~Rep.\ No.~532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.~17--18~(1982), Congress considered a bill that would have amended Section~1512 by making it a crime, \textit{inter alia}, when a person ``corruptly \dots\ influences, obstructs, or impedes \dots\ [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal law,'' ``administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted,'' or the ``exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry.'' \textit{Id.}~at~17--19 (quoting S.~2420). The Senate Committee explained that: @@ -181,17 +184,18 @@ \subsubsection{The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Na \textit{See Haldeman}, 559~F.3d at~51, 86--87, 120--129, 162.% 1081 \footnote{The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus clause. \textit{See United States~v.\ Poindexter}, 951~F.2d 369, 382--383 (D.C.~Cir.~1991) (tracing history of the proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). -During the floor debate on the bill, Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely ``duplicative'' of other obstruction laws, 128~Cong.\ Rec.\ 26,810 (1982) (Sen.~Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and~1505.} +During the floor debate on the bill, Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely ``duplicative'' of other obstruction laws, 128~Cong.\ Rec.\ 26,810~(1982) (Sen.~Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and~1505.} \subsubsection{General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section 1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation} The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of Section 1512(c)(2)'s text.% 1082 \footnote{In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider principles of statutory construction relevant in that context. -See Volume~II, Section III.B.1, \textit{infra}.} +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.3.2.1}{Volume~II, Section~III.B.1}, \textit{infra}.} a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has ``exercised restraint'' in interpreting obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out of respect for Congress's role in defining crimes and in the interest of providing individuals with ``fair warning'' of what a criminal statute prohibits. -\textit{Marinello~v.\ United States}, 138~S. Ct.~1101, 1106 (2018); -\textit{Arthur Andersen}, 544~U.S. at~703; Aguilar, 515~U.S. at~599--602. +\textit{Marinello~v.\ United States}, 138~S.~Ct.\ 1101, 1106~(2018); +\textit{Arthur Andersen}, 544~U.S. at~703; +\textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~599--602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. \textit{Marinello}, 138~S, Ct.~at~1109; \textit{Arthur Andersen}, 544~U.S. at~707--708; @@ -203,21 +207,21 @@ \subsubsection{General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That \textit{United States~v.\ Reich}, 479~F.3d 179, 186 (2d~Cir.~2007). To satisfy the nexus requirement, the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted ``in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice,'' such that the statute ``excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful.'' \textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~601--602 (internal quotation marks omitted); -\textit{see id}. at~599 (``the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice'') (internal quotation marks omitted). +\textit{see id.}~at~599 (``the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice'') (internal quotation marks omitted). The government must also show as a subjective matter that the actor ``contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding.'' \textit{Petruk}, 781~F.3d at~445. Those requirements alleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind. b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns. -\textit{See, e.g., McDonnell~v.\ United States}, 136~S. Ct.~2355, 2373 (2016); -\textit{Skilling~v.\ United States}, 561~U.S. 358, 368, 402--404 (2010). +\textit{See, e.g., McDonnell~v.\ United States}, 136~S.~Ct.\ 2355, 2373~(2016); +\textit{Skilling~v.\ United States}, 561~U.S. 358, 368, 402--404~(2010). Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime ``with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited'' and ``in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'' \textit{Id.}~at~402--403 (internal quotation marks omitted). The obstruction statutes' requirement of acting ``corruptly'' satisfies that test. ``Acting `corruptly' within the meaning of \S~1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct'' the relevant proceeding. \textit{United States~v.\ Gordon}, 710~F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th~Cir.~2013) (some quotation marks omitted). -The majority opinion in \textit{Aguilar} did not address the defendant's vagueness challenge to the word ``corruptly,'' 515~U.S. at~600 n.~1, but Justice Scalia's separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge, \textit{id}. at~616--617 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). +The majority opinion in \textit{Aguilar} did not address the defendant's vagueness challenge to the word ``corruptly,'' 515~U.S. at~600 n.1, but Justice Scalia's separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge, \textit{id.}~at~616--617 (Scalia,~J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas,~JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ``Statutory language need not be colloquial,'' Justice Scalia explained, and ``the term `corruptly' in criminal laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.'' \textit{Id.}~at~616 (internal quotation marks omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). @@ -228,30 +232,30 @@ \subsubsection{General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That \textit{United States~v.\ Brenson}, 104~F.3d 1267, 1280--1281 (11th~Cir.~1997); \textit{United States~v.\ Howard}, 569~F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (Sh~Cir.~1978). This well-established intent standard precludes the need to limit the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct.% 1083 -\footnote{In United States~v.\ Poindexter, 951~F.2d 369 (D.C.~Cir.~1991), the court of appeals found the term ``corruptly'' in 18~U.S.C. \S~1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to Congress. +\footnote{In \textit{United States~v.\ Poindexter}, 951~F.2d 369 (D.C.~Cir.~1991), the court of appeals found the term ``corruptly'' in 18~U.S.C. \S~1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to Congress. After suggesting that the word ``corruptly'' was vague on its face, 951~F.2d at~378, the court concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the ``core'' conduct to which Section~1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person influencing another person to violate a legal duty. \textit{Id.}~at~379--386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by providing that ``[a]s used in [S]ection 1505, the term `corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including by making false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.'' 18~U.S.C. \S~1515(b). Other courts have declined to follow \textit{Poindexter} either by limiting it to Section~1505 and the specific conduct at issue in that case, \textit{see Brenson}, 104~F.3d at~1280--1281; -reading it as narrowly limited to certain types of conduct, see \textit{United States~v.\ Morrison}, 98~F.3d 619, 629--630 (D.C.~Cir.~1996); +reading it as narrowly limited to certain types of conduct, \textit{see United States~v.\ Morrison}, 98~F.3d 619, 629--630 (D.C.~Cir.~1996); or by noting that it predated \textit{Arthur Andersen}'s interpretation of the term ``corruptly,'' \textit{see Edwards}, 869~F.3d at~501--502. } c. Finally, the rule of lenity does not justify treating Section 1512(c)(2) as a prohibition on evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. The rule of lenity is an interpretive principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction. -\textit{Cleveland~v.\ United States}, 531~U.S. 12, 25 (2000). +\textit{Cleveland~v.\ United States}, 531~U.S. 12, 25~(2000). ``[A]s [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized,'' however, the rule of lenity applies only if, ``after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.'' -\textit{Abramski~v.\ United States}, 573~U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). +\textit{Abramski~v.\ United States}, 573~U.S. 169, 188 n.10~(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule has been cited, for example, in adopting a narrow meaning of ``tangible object'' in an obstruction statute when the prohibition's title, history, and list of prohibited acts indicated a focus on destruction of records. -\textit{See Yates~v.\ United States}, 135~S. Ct.~1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting ``tangible object'' in the phrase ``record, document, or tangible object'' in 18~U.S.C. \S~1519 to mean an item capable of recording or preserving information). +\textit{See Yates~v.\ United States}, 135~S.~Ct.\ 1074, 1088~(2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting ``tangible object'' in the phrase ``record, document, or tangible object'' in 18~U.S.C. \S~1519 to mean an item capable of recording or preserving information). Here, as discussed above, the text, structure, and history of Section 1512(c)(2) leaves no ``grievous ambiguity'' about the statute's meaning. Section 1512(c)(2) defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of official proceedings. \subsubsection{Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation} Regardless whether Section 1512(c)(2) covers all corrupt acts that obstruct, influence, or impede pending or contemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in pending proceedings, provided that the remaining statutory elements are satisfied. -As discussed above, the omnibus clause in 18~U.S.C. \S~1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending judicial and grand proceedings.% 1084 +As discussed above, the omnibus clause in 18~U.S.C. \S~1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending judicial and grand [jury] proceedings.% 1084 \footnote{Section 1503(a) provides for criminal punishment of: \begin{quote} Whoever \dots\ corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. @@ -267,120 +271,120 @@ \subsubsection{Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Inv \textit{See, e.g., United States~v.\ Rainey}, 757~F.3d 234, 241--247 (St~Cir.~2014). Finally, 18~U.S.C. \S~1512(b)(3) criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the communication of information about a crime to law enforcement. -The nexus inquiry articulated in Aguilar---that an individual has ``knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding,'' 515~U.S. at~599---does not apply to Section 1512(b)(3). +The nexus inquiry articulated in \textit{Aguilar}---that an individual has ``knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding,'' 515~U.S. at~599---does not apply to Section 1512(b)(3). \textit{See United States~v.\ Byrne}, 435~F.3d 16, 24--25 (1st~Cir.~2006). The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor's intent to prevent communications to a federal law enforcement official. -\textit{See Fowler~v.\ United States}, 563~U.S. 668, 673--678 (2011). +\textit{See Fowler~v.\ United States}, 563~U.S. 668, 673--678~(2011). \hr -In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction---laws lacks merit. +In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction laws lacks merit. \subsection{Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to Presidential Conduct} The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations. The Constitution vests the ``executive Power'' in the President and enjoins him to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S\S~1,~3. Those powers and duties form the foundation of prosecutorial discretion. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Armstrong}, 517~U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney General and United States Attorneys ``have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'{}''). +\textit{See United States~v.\ Armstrong}, 517~U.S. 456, 464~(1996) (Attorney General and United States Attorneys ``have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'\thinspace''). The President also has authority to appoint officers of the United States and to remove those whom he has appointed. \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~2, cl.~2 (granting authority to the President to appoint all officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the heads of departments, or the courts of law); -\textit{see also Free Enterprise Fund~v.\ Public Company Accounting Oversight Board}, 561~U.S. 477, 492--493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as flowing from the President's ``responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed''). +\textit{see also Free Enterprise Fund~v.\ Public Company Accounting Oversight Board}, 561~U.S. 477, 492--493, 509~(2010) (describing removal authority as flowing from the President's ``responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed''). -Although the President has broad authority under Article II, that authority coexists with Congress's Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings, federal investigations, the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions. -Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the criminal laws under Article II to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. +Although the President has broad authority under Article~II, that authority coexists with Congress's Article~I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings, federal investigations, the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions. +Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the criminal laws under Article~II to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President's official actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes, any constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powers analysis. The President's counsel has argued that ``the President's exercise of his constitutional authority \dots\ to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations \dots\ cannot constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice.''% 1086 -\footnote{6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~2 n.~1.} +\footnote{6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at~2 n.1.} As noted above, no Department of Justice position or Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue. We did not find counsel's contention, however, to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-of-powers issues. Applying the Court's framework for analysis, we concluded that Congress can validly regulate the President's exercise of official duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt intent to obstruct justice. -The limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction would not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions. +The limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction would not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article~II functions. \subsubsection{The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes} -Before addressing Article II issues directly, we consider one threshold statutory construction principle that is unique to the presidency: ``The principle that general statutes must be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would arguably limit the President's constitutional role.'' -OLC, \textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. 350, 352 (1995). -This ``clear statement rule,'' \textit{id}., has its source in two principles: statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions, and Congress should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional separation of powers without clear assurance that it intended that result. -OLC, \textit{The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress}, 20~Op.\ O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996). +Before addressing Article~II issues directly, we consider one threshold statutory construction principle that is unique to the presidency: ``The principle that general statutes must be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would arguably limit the President's constitutional role.'' +OLC, \textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. 350, 352~(1995). +This ``clear statement rule,'' \textit{id.}, has its source in two principles: statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions, and Congress should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional separation of powers without clear assurance that it intended that result. +OLC, \textit{The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress}, 20~Op.\ O.L.C. 124, 178~(1996). The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases. In one leading case, the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5~U.S.C. \S~701 \textit{et seq}., not to apply to judicial review of presidential action. -\textit{Franklin~v.\ Massachusetts}, 505~U.S. 788, 800--801 (1992). +\textit{Franklin~v.\ Massachusetts}, 505~U.S. 788, 800--801~(1992). The Court explained that it ``would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.'' \textit{Id.}~at~801. In another case, the Court interpreted the word ``utilized'' in the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5~U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees established directly or indirectly by the government, thereby excluding the American Bar Association's advice to the Department of Justice about federal judicial candidates. -\textit{Public Citizen~v.\ United States Department of Justice}, 491~U.S. 440, 455, 462--467 (1989). -The Court explained that a broader interpretation of the term ``utilized'' in FACA would raise serious questions whether the statute ``infringed unduly on the President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.'' +\textit{Public Citizen~v.\ United States Department of Justice}, 491~U.S. 440, 455, 462--467~(1989). +The Court explained that a broader interpretation of the term ``utilized'' in FACA would raise serious questions whether the statute ``infringed unduly on the President's Article~II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.'' \textit{Id.}~at~466--467. Another case found that an established canon of statutory construction applied with ``special force'' to provisions that would impinge on the President's foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly. -\textit{Sale~v.\ Haitian Centers Council}, 509~U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect ``foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility''). +\textit{Sale~v.\ Haitian Centers Council}, 509~U.S. 155, 188~(1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect ``foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility''). \textit{See Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~353--354 (discussing \textit{Franklin}, \textit{Public Citizen}, and \textit{Sale}). The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to the approach taken in \textit{Franklin}. \textit{See, e.g.}, Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, \textit{Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution}, at~2, 5 (Aug.~28, 1974) (criminal conflict-of-interest statute, 18~U.S.C. \S~208, does not apply to the President). Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns. -See \textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~350--357 (consanguinity limitations on court appointments, 28~U.S.C. \S~458, found inapplicable to ``presidential appointments of judges to the federal judiciary''); -\textit{Constraints Imposed by 18~U.S.C. \S~1913 on Lobbying Efforts}, 13~Op.\ O.L.C. 300, 304--306 (1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds for certain lobbying programs found in applicable to certain communications by the President and executive officials). +\textit{See Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~350--357 (consanguinity limitations on court appointments, 28~U.S.C. \S~458, found inapplicable to ``presidential appointments of judges to the federal judiciary''); +\textit{Constraints Imposed by 18~U.S.C. \S~1913 on Lobbying Efforts}, 13~Op.\ O.L.C. 300, 304--306~(1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds for certain lobbying programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and executive officials). But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule ``does not apply with respect to a statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the President,'' such as the federal bribery statute, 18~U.S.C. \S~201. -\textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~357 n.11. OLC explained that ``[a]pplication of \S~201 raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one,'' because [t]he Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes.'' id. -In support of that conclusion, OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while in office, ``which is what a bribe would function to do,'' \textit{id}. (citing \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~1, cl.~7), and the express constitutional power of ``Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for, \textit{inter alia}, bribery,'' \textit{id}. (citing \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~4). +\textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~357 n.11. OLC explained that ``[a]pplication of \S~201 raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one,'' because [t]he Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes.'' \textit{Id.} +In support of that conclusion, OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while in office, ``which is what a bribe would function to do,'' \textit{id.}\ (citing \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~1, cl.~7), and the express constitutional power of ``Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for, \textit{inter alia}, bribery,'' \textit{id.}\ (citing \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~4). Under OLC's analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct by the President, such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence, because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions. -\textit{See Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~357 n.~11. +\textit{See Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~357 n.11. The Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, and those actions would transgress the President's duty to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' -\textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S\S~3. -In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the President, Franklin's holding that the President is entirely excluded from statute absent a clear statement would not apply in this context. +\textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~3. +In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the President, \textit{Franklin}'s holding that the President is entirely excluded from statute absent a clear statement would not apply in this context. A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes only certain acts by the President---for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations for corrupt reasons---would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section 1512(c)(2) to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President's conduct of office. No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. For example, the word ``corruptly'' has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of official power for corrupt ends. Indeed, an established definition states that ``corruptly'' means action with an intent to secure an improper advantage ``\textit{inconsistent with official duty} and the rights of others.'' -BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed.~1969) (emphasis added). +\textsc{Ballentine's Law Dictionary} 276 (3d ed.~1969) (emphasis added). And it would be contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory term only when applied to the President. -\textit{See United States~v.\ Santos}, 553~U.S. 507, 522 (2008) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to ``giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory provision, different meanings in different factual contexts''); +\textit{See United States~v.\ Santos}, 553~U.S. 507, 522~(2008) (plurality opinion of Scalia,~J.) (rejecting proposal to ``giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory provision, different meanings in different factual contexts''); \textit{cf.~Public Citizen}, 491~U.S. at~462--467 (giving the term ``utilized'' in the FACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions). -Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive presumption, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sale. +Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive presumption, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in~\textit{Sale}. The principle that courts will construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions ``is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.'' -\textit{Salinas~v.\ United States}, 522~U.S. 52, 59--60 (1997). +\textit{Salinas~v.\ United States}, 522~U.S. 52, 59--60~(1997). ``It is one thing to acknowledge and accept \dots\ well defined (or even newly enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions.'' -\textit{Brogan~v.\ United States}, 522~U.S. 398, 406 (1998). +\textit{Brogan~v.\ United States}, 522~U.S. 398, 406~(1998). -When a proposed construction ``would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute's] compass, ``thereby preventing the statute ``from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear terms,'' \textit{Loughrin}, 573~U.S. at~357, it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress's intent. +When a proposed construction ``would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute's] compass,'' thereby preventing the statute ``from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear terms,'' \textit{Loughrin}, 573~U.S. at~357, it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress's intent. That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes, which ``have been given a broad and all-inclusive meaning.'' \textit{Rainey}, 757~F.3d at~245 (discussing Sections 1503 and~1505) (internal quotation marks omitted). -Accordingly, since no established principle of interpretation would exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505, 1512(b), and~1512(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be raised as an Article II defense to the application of those statutes. +Accordingly, since no established principle of interpretation would exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505, 1512(b), and~1512(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be raised as an Article~II defense to the application of those statutes. \subsubsection{Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President's Official Powers} -When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers, the limitation's validity depends on whether the measure ``disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches.'' -\textit{Nixon~v.\ Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. 425, 443 (1977). -``Even when branch does not arrogate power to itself, \dots\ the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.'' -\textit{Loving~v.\ United States}, 517~U.S. 748, 757 (1996). -The ``separation of powers does not mean,'' however, ``that the branches `ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other.'{}'' -\textit{Clinton~v.\ Jones}, 520~U.S. 681, 703 (1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No.~47, pp.~325--326 (J. Cooke ed.~1961) (emphasis omitted)). +When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article~II powers, the limitation's validity depends on whether the measure ``disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches.'' +\textit{Nixon~v.\ Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. 425, 443~(1977). +``Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself, \dots\ the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.'' +\textit{Loving~v.\ United States}, 517~U.S. 748, 757~(1996). +The ``separation of powers does not mean,'' however, ``that the branches `ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other.'\thinspace'' +\textit{Clinton~v.\ Jones}, 520~U.S. 681, 703~(1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No.~47, pp.~325--326 (J.~Cooke ed.~1961) (emphasis omitted)). In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powers issues. -Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly undermining his Article I functions. +Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly undermining his Article~II functions. \paragraph{The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In This Contexts} A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed to determine ``the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions,'' and, if the ``potential for disruption is present[,] \dots\ whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.'' \textit{Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~443; -\textit{see Nixon~v.\ Fitzgerald}, 457~U.S. 731, 753--754 (1982); -\textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, 418~U.S. 683, 706--707 (1974). +\textit{see Nixon~v.\ Fitzgerald}, 457~U.S. 731, 753--754~(1982); +\textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, 418~U.S. 683, 706--707~(1974). That balancing test applies to a congressional regulation of presidential power through the obstruction-of-justice laws.% 1087 \footnote{OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal prosecution while in office, relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section. -\textit{See A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution}, 24~Op.\ O.L.C. 222, 237--238, 244--245 (2000) (relying on, \textit{inter alia}, \textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, \textit{Nixon~v.\ Fitzgerald}, and \textit{Clinton~v.\ Jones}, and quoting the legal standard from \textit{Administrator of General Services~v.\ Nixon} that is applied in the text), OLC recognized that ``[t]he balancing analysis'' it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is immune from prosecution had ``been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court.'' +\textit{See A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution}, 24~Op.\ O.L.C. 222, 237--238, 244--245~(2000) (relying on, \textit{inter alia}, \textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, \textit{Nixon~v.\ Fitzgerald}, and \textit{Clinton~v.\ Jones}, and quoting the legal standard from \textit{Administrator of General Services~v.\ Nixon} that is applied in the text), OLC recognized that ``[t]he balancing analysis'' it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is immune from prosecution had ``been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court.'' \textit{Id.}~at~244.} -When an Article II power has not been ``explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President of the `executive Power,'{}'' the Court has balanced competing constitutional considerations. -\textit{Public Citizen}, 491~U.S. at~484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.). -As Justice Kennedy noted in Public Citizen, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on ``the President's power to remove Executive officers, a power [that] \dots\ is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the `executive Power.'{}'' -\textit{Id.}~(citing \textit{Morrison~v.\ Olson}, 487~U.S. 654, 694 (1988), and \textit{Myers~v.\ United States}, 272~U.S. 52, 115--116 (1926)). -Consistent with that statement, \textit{Morrison} sustained a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions. +When an Article~II power has not been ``explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President of the `executive Power,'\thinspace'' the Court has balanced competing constitutional considerations. +\textit{Public Citizen}, 491~U.S. at~484 (Kennedy,~J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist,~C.J., and O'Connor,~J.). +As Justice Kennedy noted in \textit{Public Citizen}, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on ``the President's power to remove Executive officers, a power [that] \dots\ is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the `executive Power.'\thinspace'' +\textit{Id.}~(citing \textit{Morrison~v.\ Olson}, 487~U.S. 654, 694~(1988), and \textit{Myers~v.\ United States}, 272~U.S. 52, 115--116~(1926)). +Consistent with that statement, \textit{Morrison} sustained a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article~II functions. 487~U.S. at~691--693, 695--696. The Court has also evaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test. For example, the Court evaluated the President's claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications about his official acts by balancing that interest against the Judicial Branch's need for evidence in a criminal case. @@ -391,21 +395,21 @@ \subsubsection{Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congr Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework. When the President's power is ``both `exclusive' and `conclusive' on the issue,'' Congress is precluded from regulating its exercise. -\textit{Zivotofsky~v.\ Kerry}, 135~S. Ct.~2076, 2084 (2015). -In Zivotofsky, for example, the Court followed ``Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework'' in \textit{Youngstown Sheet \& Tube Co.\~v.\ Sawyer}, 343~U.S. 579, 635--638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President's authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. +\textit{Zivotofsky~v.\ Kerry}, 135~S.~Ct.\ 2076, 2084~(2015). +In \textit{Zivotofsky}, for example, the Court followed ``Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework'' in \textit{Youngstown Sheet \& Tube Co.~v.\ Sawyer}, 343~U.S. 579, 635--638~(1952) (Jackson,~J., concurring), and held that the President's authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. \textit{Id.}~at~2083, 2094. -\textit{See also Public Citizen} 491~U.S. at~485--486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the power to grant pardons under U.S. Const.\ Art.~II, \S~2, cl.~1, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation, \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~7, Cls.~2, 3, as examples of exclusive presidential powers by virtue of constitutional text). +\textit{See also Public Citizen} 491~U.S. at~485--486 (Kennedy,~J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the power to grant pardons under \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~2, cl.~1, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation, \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~7, cls.~2, 3, as examples of exclusive presidential powers by virtue of constitutional text). But even when a power is exclusive, ``Congress' powers, and its central role in making laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and follow'' the President's act. -\textit{Zivotofsky}, 135~S. Ct.~at~2087. +\textit{Zivotofsky}, 135~S.~Ct.\ at~2087. For example, although the President's power to grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation, \textit{see United States~v.\ Klein}, 80~U.S. (13~Wall.) 128, 147--148 (1872), Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt use of ``anything of value'' to influence the testimony of another person in a judicial, congressional, or agency proceeding, 18~U.S.C. \S~201(b)(3)---which would include the offer or promise of a pardon to induce a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would precede the act of pardoning and thus be within Congress's power to regulate even if the pardon itself is not. -Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~6, cl.1, absolutely protects legislative acts, but not a legislator's ``taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way \dots\ for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act,'' \textit{United States~v.\ Brewster}, 408~U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (emphasis omitted), the promise of a pardon to corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. +Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~6, cl.~1, absolutely protects legislative acts, but not a legislator's ``taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way \dots\ for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act,'' \textit{United States~v.\ Brewster}, 408~U.S. 501, 526~(1972) (emphasis omitted), the promise of a pardon to corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise no serious separation-of-powers issue. -\paragraph{The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited} +\paragraph{The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's Capacity to Perform His Article~II Responsibilities is Limited} -Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions affects the President's ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. +Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions affects the President's ability to carry out his Article~II responsibilities. \textit{Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential conduct that does not involve the President's conduct of office---such as influencing the testimony of witnesses---is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right than other citizens to impede official proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony. @@ -415,23 +419,23 @@ \subsubsection{Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congr Each type of action involves the exercise of executive discretion in furtherance of the President's duty to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~3. Congress may not supplant the President's exercise of executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement positions. -\textit{See Bowsher~v.\ Synar}, 478~U.S. 714, 726--727 (1986) (``Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. \dots\ [Because t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws, \dots\ [t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws \dots\ is constitutionally impermissible.''). +\textit{See Bowsher~v.\ Synar}, 478~U.S. 714, 726--727~(1986) (``Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. \dots\ [Because t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws, \dots\ [t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws \dots\ is constitutionally impermissible.''). Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandize power in Congress or usurp executive authority. Instead, they impose a discrete limitation on conduct only when it is taken with the ``corrupt'' intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct official proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. -See Volume~II, Section III.A.3, \textit{supra}. +\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.2.3.1.3}{Volume~II, Section~III.A.3}, \textit{supra}. The direct effect on the President's freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited one. -A preclusion of ``corrupt'' official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. +A preclusion of ``corrupt'' official action is not a major intrusion on Article~II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with the intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such personal purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. -And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to carry out his Article II functions. -\textit{See Heckler~v.\ Chaney}, 470~U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (``Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.''); -\textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, 418~U.S. at~707 (``[t]o read the Art.~I] powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a criminal trial] \dots\ would upset the constitutional balance of `a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art.~III''). +And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to carry out his Article~II functions. +\textit{See Heckler~v.\ Chaney}, 470~U.S. 821, 833~(1985) (``Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.''); +\textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, 418~U.S. at~707 (``[t]o read the Art.~II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a criminal trial] \dots\ would upset the constitutional balance of `a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art.~III''). Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch officials involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive departments and officer positions and to specify how inferior officers are appointed. -E.g., U.S. Const.\ Art.~I, \S~8, cl.~18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, \S~2, cl.~1 (Opinions Clause); Art.~II, \S~2, cl.~2 (Appointments Clause); +\textit{E.g.}, \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~8, cl.~18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); \textsc{Art.~II}, \S~2, cl.~1 (Opinions Clause); \textsc{Art.~II}, \S~2, cl.~2 (Appointments Clause); \textit{see Free Enterprise Fund}, 561~U.S. at~499. While the President's removal power is an important means of ensuring that officers faithfully execute the law, Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removal. \textit{Id.}~at~493--495. @@ -443,48 +447,48 @@ \subsubsection{Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congr Thus, ``there are some `purely executive' officials who must be removable by the President at will if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role.'' \textit{Morrison}, 487~U.S. at~690; \textit{Myers}, 272~U.S. at~134 (the President's ``cabinet officers must do his will,'' and ``[t]he moment that he loses confidence in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the power to remove him without delay''); -\textit{cf.~Humphrey's Executor~v.\ United States}, 295~U.S. 602 (1935) (Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal officers removable only for good cause). +\textit{cf.~Humphrey's Executor~v.\ United States}, 295~U.S. 602~(1935) (Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal officers removable only for good cause). In light of those constitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction statutes could not be constitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as the Attorney General. \textit{See} 5~U.S.C. \S~101; 28~U.S.C. \S~503. In that context, at least absent circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountability for personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances, even the highly limited regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President's freedom to select and supervise the members of his cabinet. The removal of inferior officers, in contrast, need not necessarily be at will for the President to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch. ``[I]nferior officers are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by the President with the Senate's consent.'' -\textit{Free Enterprise Fund}, 561~U.S. at~510 (quoting Edmond~v.\ United States, 520~U.S. 651, 663 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted), The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress's authority to place for-cause limitations on the President's removal of ``inferior Officers'' whose appointment maybe vested in the head of a department. +\textit{Free Enterprise Fund}, 561~U.S. at~510 (quoting \textit{Edmond~v.\ United States}, 520~U.S. 651, 663~(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted), The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress's authority to place for-cause limitations on the President's removal of ``inferior Officers'' whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department. \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~2, cl.~2. \textit{See United States~v.\ Perkins}, 116~U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (``The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads of departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed'') (quoting lower court decision); -\textit{Morrison}, 487~U.S. at~689 n.~27 (citing \textit{Perkins}); -\textit{accord id}. at~723--724 \& n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Perkins is ``established'' law); -\textit{see also Free Enterprise Fund}, 561~U.S. at~493--495 (citing Perkins and Morrison). +\textit{Morrison}, 487~U.S. at~689 n.27 (citing \textit{Perkins}); +\textit{accord id.}~at~723--724 \& n.4 (Scalia,~J., dissenting) (recognizing that \textit{Perkins} is ``established'' law); +\textit{see also Free Enterprise Fund}, 561~U.S. at~493--495 (citing \textit{Perkins} and \textit{Morrison}). The category of inferior officers includes both the FBI Director and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports to the Attorney General. -\textit{See} 28~U.S.C. \S\S~509, 515(a), 531; 28~C.F.R. Part 600. +\textit{See} 28~U.S.C. \S\S~509, 515(a),~531; 28~C.F.R. Part~600. Their work is thus ``directed and supervised'' by a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officer. -\textit{See In re: Grand Jury Investigation}, \textunderscore\textunderscore F.3d \textunderscore\textunderscore, 2019~WL 921692, at *3-*4 (D.C.~Cir.\ Feb.~26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an ``inferior officer'' for constitutional purposes). +\textit{See In re: Grand Jury Investigation}, \textunderscore\textunderscore~F.3d~\textunderscore\textunderscore, 2019~WL 921692, at *3-*4 (D.C.~Cir.\ Feb.~26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an ``inferior officer'' for constitutional purposes). Where the Constitution permits Congress to impose a good-cause limitation on the removal of an Executive Branch officer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. Limiting the range of permissible reasons for removal to exclude a ``corrupt'' purpose imposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring an affirmative showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior officers, Congress may constitutionally restrict the President's removal authority if that authority was exercised for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. And even if a particular inferior officer's position might be of such importance to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal authority, the obstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid removal for a corrupt reason.% 1088 -\footnote{Although the FBI director is an inferior officer, he is appointed by the President and removable by him at will, see 28~U.S.C. \S~532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the FBI director with good-cause tenure protection. +\footnote{Although the FBI director is an inferior officer, he is appointed by the President and removable by him at will, \textit{see} 28~U.S.C. \S~532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the FBI director with good-cause tenure protection. \textit{See} OLC, \textit{Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term of the FBI Director}, 2011 WL2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. June 20, 2011) (``tenure protection for an officer with the FBI Director's broad investigative, administrative, and policymaking responsibilities would raise a serious constitutional question whether Congress had `impede[d] the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty' to take care that the laws be faithfully executed'') (quoting \textit{Morrison}, 487~U.S. at~691).} A narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded corrupt action would leave ample room for all other considerations, including disagreement over policy or loss of confidence in the officer's judgment or commitment. -A corrupt-purpose prohibition therefore would not undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions. +A corrupt-purpose prohibition therefore would not undermine the President's ability to perform his Article~II functions. Accordingly, because the separation-of-powers question is ``whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty,'' \textit{Morrison}, 487~U.S. at~691, a restriction on removing an inferior officer for a corrupt reason---a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than official ends---does not seriously hinder the President's performance of his duties. The President retains broad latitude to supervise investigations and remove officials, circumscribed in this context only by the requirement that he not act for corrupt personal purposes.% 1089 \footnote{The obstruction statutes do not disqualify the President from acting in a case simply because he has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the Department of Justice has made clear, a claim of a conflict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the President of the ability to fulfill his constitutional function. -\textit{See}, e.g, OLC, \textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~O.L.C. Op.\ at~356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, \textit{Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution}, at~2, 5 (Aug.~28, 1974)).} +\textit{See, e.g.}, OLC, \textit{Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~O.L.C. Op.\ at~356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, \textit{Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution}, at~2, 5 (Aug.~28, 1974)).} \paragraph{Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source} -Where a law imposes a burden on the President's performance of Article II functions, separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure ``is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.'' +Where a law imposes a burden on the President's performance of Article~II functions, separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure ``is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.'' \textit{Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-of-justice statutes to protect, among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand jury investigations, and federal criminal trials. Those objectives are within Congress's authority and serve strong governmental interests. -i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it to all persons---including the President. +i. Congress has Article~I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it to all persons---including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and lawmaking efforts. -\textit{See Watkins~v.\ United States}, 354~U.S. 178, 187, 206--207 (1957); +\textit{See Watkins~v.\ United States}, 354~U.S. 178, 187, 206--207~(1957); \textit{Chapman~v.\ United States}, 5~App.\ D.C. 122, 130 (1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system of federal courts, which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. \textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~8, cls.~9, 18 (``The Congress shall have Power \dots\ To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court'' and ``To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers''). @@ -492,57 +496,57 @@ \subsubsection{Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congr \textit{See An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court}, 4~Stat.~487--488 \S~2 (1831) (making it a crime if ``any person or persons shall corruptly \dots\ endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly \dots\ obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein''). ii. The Article~III courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against obstructive acts, whatever their source. -As the Supreme Court explained in United States~v.\ Nixon, a ``primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch'' is ``to do justice in criminal prosecutions.'' 418~U.S. at~707; -\textit{accord Cheney~v.\ United States District Court for the District of Columbia}, 542~U.S. 367, 384 (2004). +As the Supreme Court explained in \textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, a ``primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch'' is ``to do justice in criminal prosecutions.'' 418~U.S. at~707; +\textit{accord Cheney~v.\ United States District Court for the District of Columbia}, 542~U.S. 367, 384~(2004). In \textit{Nixon}, the Court rejected the President's claim of absolute executive privilege because ``the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.'' 407~U.S. at~712. As \textit{Nixon} illustrates, the need to safeguard judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. -\textit{See id}. at~709 (noting that the denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens ``(t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system''). +\textit{See id.}~at~709 (noting that the denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens ``[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system''). iii. Finally, the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from corrupt acts. Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article~III courts based on an indictment issued by a grand jury. -\textit{Cobbledick~v.\ United States}, 309~U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (``The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process.''). +\textit{Cobbledick~v.\ United States}, 309~U.S. 323, 327~(1940) (``The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process.''). And the grand jury's function is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Amend.~V}. (``[n]o person shall be held to answer'' for a serious crime ``unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury''). -``[T]he whole theory of [the grand jury's] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,'' \textit{United States~v.\ Williams}, 504~U.S. 36, 47 (1992), ``pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor.'' -\textit{Costello~v.\ United States}, 350~U.S. 359, 362 (1956). +``[T]he whole theory of [the grand jury's] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,'' \textit{United States~v.\ Williams}, 504~U.S. 36, 47~(1992), ``pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor.'' +\textit{Costello~v.\ United States}, 350~U.S. 359, 362~(1956). If the grand jury were not protected against corrupt interference from all persons, its function as an independent charging body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to determine whether probable cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process. \hr -The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation-of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions. +The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation-of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority notwithstanding the potential impact on Article~II functions. \textit{See Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~443; \textit{see also Morrison}, 487~U.S. at~691--693, 695--696; \textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, 418~U.S. at~711--712. In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited restrictions contained in those statutes on the President's official conduct to protect the integrity of important functions of other branches of government. A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President's responsibility to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' -\textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S\S~3.% 1090 +\textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~II}, \S~3.% 1090 \footnote{As noted above, the President's selection and removal of principal executive officers may have a unique constitutional status.} To the contrary, the concept of ``faithful execution'' connotes the use of power in the interest of the public, not in the office holder's personal interests. \textit{See} 1~Samuel Johnson, \textit{A Dictionary of the English Language} 763 (1755) (``faithfully'' def.~3: ``[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance''). -And immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws ``to promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority,'' \textit{Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~425---i.e., protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article~III courts and grand juries. +And immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws ``to promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority,'' \textit{Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~425---\textit{i.e.}, protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article~III courts and grand juries. -Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article II powers.% 1091 +Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article~II powers.% 1091 \footnote{A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential criminal liability after a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President from office, but would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law. Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in addressing an official's conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. -\textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art}.~I, \S~3, cl.~7. +\textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~3, cl.~7. Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC has recognized. \textit{A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution}, 24~Op.\ O.L.C. at~255 (``Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment.'').} -\subsubsection{Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties} +\subsubsection{Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article~II Duties} Applying the obstruction statutes to the President's official conduct would involve determining as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act, whether the act had a nexus to official proceedings, and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. -But applying those standards to the President's official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article II duties. -\textit{Cf.~Nixon~v.\ Fitzgerald}, 457~U.S. at~752--753 \& n.32 (taking into account chilling effect on the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages action based on official duties). +But applying those standards to the President's official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article~II duties. +\textit{Cf.~Nixon~v.\ Fitzgerald}, 457~U.S. at~752--753 \& n.32 (taking into account [a] chilling effect on the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages action based on official duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence of settled legal standards, the presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence of evidentiary limitations on probing the President's motives. And historical experience confirms that no impermissible chill should exist. a. As an initial matter, the term ``corruptly'' sets a demanding standard. -It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an ``improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.'' BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed.~1969); +It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an ``improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.'' \textsc{Ballentine's Law Dictionary} 276 (3d ed.~1969); \textit{see United States~v.\ Pasha}, 797~F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C.~Cir.~2015); -\textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). +\textit{Aguilar}, 515~U.S. at~616 (Scalia,~J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That standard parallels the President's constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. And virtually everything that the President does in the routine conduct of office will have a clear governmental purpose and will not be contrary to his official duty. Accordingly, the President has no reason to be chilled in those actions because, in virtually all instances, there will be no credible basis for suspecting a corrupt personal motive. @@ -560,7 +564,7 @@ \subsubsection{Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statu b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let alone prosecutions, would occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that obstruction occurred. Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent ``clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties.'' -\textit{Armstrong}, 517~U.S. at~464 (\textit{quoting United States~v.\ Chemical Foundation, Inc.}, 272~U.S. 1, 14--15 (1926)). +\textit{Armstrong}, 517~U.S. at~464 (quoting \textit{United States~v.\ Chemical Foundation, Inc.}, 272~U.S. 1, 14--15~(1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater protection to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any matter involving the President and the likelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and careful review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under OLC's opinion that a sitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successor Administration would be able to prosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President would have any basis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. @@ -571,13 +575,13 @@ \subsubsection{Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statu Prosecutors are generally barred from participating in matters implicating their personal interests, \textit{see} 28~C.F.R. \S~45.2, and are instructed not to be influenced by their ``own professional or personal circumstances,'' Justice Manual \S~9-27.260, so prosecutors would not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and personally motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent a credible factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of prosecutorial immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by ``a defendant [who] often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions.'' -\textit{Imbler~v.\ Pachtman}, 424~U.S. 409, 425 (1976). +\textit{Imbler~v.\ Pachtman}, 424~U.S. 409, 425~(1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity does not justify criminal immunity. -\textit{See O'Sheay~v.\ Littleton}, 414~U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (``Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, \dots\ we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation of constitutional rights.'') (citations omitted).} +\textit{See O'Sheay~v.\ Littleton}, 414~U.S. 488, 503~(1974) (``Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, \dots\ we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation of constitutional rights.'') (citations omitted).} These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in \textit{Nixon~v. Fitzgerald} that, in part because inquiries into the President's motives would be ``highly intrusive,'' the President is absolutely immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct. 457~U.S. at~756--757. As \textit{Fitzgerald} recognized,``there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions.'' -\textit{Fitzgerald}, 457~U.S. at~754 n.37; see Cheney, 542~U.S. at~384. +\textit{Fitzgerald}, 457~U.S. at~754 n.37; \textit{see Cheney}, 542~U.S. at~384. And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity. \textit{Armstrong}, 517~U.S. at~464. @@ -586,13 +590,13 @@ \subsubsection{Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statu But grand juries and courts would not have automatic access to confidential presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be presented in official proceedings only on a showing of sufficient need. \textit{Nixon}, 418~U.S. at~712; \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 121~F.3d 729, 754, 756--757 (D.C.~Cir.~1997); -\textit{see also Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~448--449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege, although successor's failure to support the claim ``detracts from [its] weight'). +\textit{see also Administrator of General Services}, 433~U.S. at~448--449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege, although successor's failure to support the claim ``detracts from [its] weight''). In any event, probing the President's intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably constitutional in at least one context: the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive a thing of value in return for being influenced in official action. 18~U.S.C. \S~201(b)(2). There can be no serious argument against the President's potential criminal liability for bribery offenses, notwithstanding the need to ascertain his purpose and intent. \textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.\ Art.~I}, \S~3; \textsc{Art.~II}, \S~4; -\textit{see also Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~357 n.11 (``Application of \S~201[to the President] raises no separation of powers issue, let alone a serious one.''). +\textit{see also Application of 28~U.S.C. \S~458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges}, 19~Op.\ O.L.C. at~357 n.11 (``Application of \S~201 [to the President] raises no separation of powers issue, let alone a serious one.''). d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies exempting the President from the obstruction laws. As a historical matter, Presidents have very seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations. @@ -602,8 +606,8 @@ \subsubsection{Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statu \hr In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President's counsel, we concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues, we had a valid basis for investigating the conduct at issue in this report. -In our view, the application of the obstruction statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article II function to supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. -And the protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person---including the President---accords with the fundamental principle of our government that ``[n]Jo [person] in this country is so high that he is above the law.'' +In our view, the application of the obstruction statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article~II function to supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. +And the protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person---including the President---accords with the fundamental principle of our government that ``[n]o [person] in this country is so high that he is above the law.'' \textit{United States~v.\ Lee}, 106~U.S. 196, 220 (1882); \textit{see also Clinton~v.\ Jones}, 520~U.S. at~697; \textit{United States~v.\ Nixon}, \textit{supra}.