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If an authoritative resolver were configured to respond quite slowly
(think slow loris [XXXrefereceXXX]), is it possible to cause a DoS on
the TLS server via complete exhaustion of TCP connections?
Nit: I'd say this is tangential. There are many ways of attempting DoS, with
risks increasing for public servers and/or resolvers. I fail to see why single
out this one particular attack approach in this RFC. (BTW, what's
"authoritative resolver" anyway?)
Nit: I'd say this is tangential. There are many ways of attempting DoS, with
risks increasing for public servers and/or resolvers. I fail to see why single
out this one particular attack approach in this RFC. (BTW, what's
"authoritative resolver" anyway?)
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-ietf-dance-architecture-06-dnsdir-early-cunat-2024-07-19/
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