fp15.txt

IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, 
        to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of 
        Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a 
        complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit 
        that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed 
        or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. 
        In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, 
        the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation 
        from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you 
        will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or 
        irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of information on a 
        subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a free people, 
        that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, 
        and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased 
        by the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim 
        to remove the obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner 
        as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch. In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of 
        the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the "insufficiency 
        of the present Confederation to the preservation of the Union." It may 
        perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate 
        a position which is not either controverted or doubted, to which the understandings 
        and feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted 
        by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It 
        must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in other 
        respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, 
        that there are material imperfections in our national system, and that 
        something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. 
        The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. 
        They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, 
        and have at length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had 
        the principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, 
        a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of 
        our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted 
        by the intelligent friends of the Union. We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last 
        stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound 
        the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do 
        not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are 
        held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant 
        and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own 
        citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of 
        our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory 
        provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important 
        posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, 
        ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to 
        the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in 
        a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, 
        nor treasury, nor government. [1] Are we even in a condition 
        to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in 
        respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled 
        by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the 
        Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable 
        resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause 
        as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national 
        wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in 
        the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? 
        The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Our 
        ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent 
        and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? 
        The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower 
        than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and 
        can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, 
        which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct 
        tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend 
        and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing 
        and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more 
        from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten 
        an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, 
        it may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder, 
        poverty, and insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly 
        blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part 
        of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those 
        very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the proposed 
        Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink 
        of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits 
        us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to 
        influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, 
        our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the 
        fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and 
        prosperity. It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be 
        resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition 
        that there exist material defects in our national system; but the usefulness 
        of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, 
        is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles 
        that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government 
        of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring 
        upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem 
        still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation 
        of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty 
        in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in 
        fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an 
        imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects 
        of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience 
        do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental 
        errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise 
        than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the 
        fabric. The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation 
        is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their 
        CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the 
        INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run 
        through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs 
        those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule 
        of appointment, the United States has an indefinite discretion to make 
        requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, 
        by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence 
        of this is, that though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects 
        are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in 
        practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard 
        at their option. It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that 
        after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there 
        should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating 
        from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is 
        in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, 
        in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent 
        and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy. There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance 
        between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated 
        in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and 
        quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its 
        execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist 
        among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace 
        and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions 
        of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century 
        there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from 
        which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were 
        never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and 
        the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation 
        were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they 
        were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but 
        afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on 
        treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, 
        and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse 
        of any immediate interest or passion. If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar 
        relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general DISCRETIONARY 
        SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail 
        upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; 
        but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable 
        Abandoning all views towards a confederate government, this would bring 
        us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in 
        a situation to be alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our 
        mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign 
        nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we 
        still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is 
        the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common 
        council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients 
        which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between 
        a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to 
        the persons of the citizens, --the only proper objects of government. Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea 
        of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty 
        or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, 
        the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount 
        to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever 
        it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts 
        and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the 
        magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply 
        only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies 
        politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process 
        of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, 
        be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of 
        their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by 
        the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to 
        the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach 
        of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become 
        the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly 
        not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to 
        commit his happiness to it. There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the 
        regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense 
        of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members, 
        and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions 
        of the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild 
        as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, 
        when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, 
        experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs 
        by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements 
        to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted 
        at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of 
        reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies 
        of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? 
        The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the 
        conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. 
        Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a 
        bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly 
        upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the 
        deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom 
        they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would 
        blush in a private capacity. In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, 
        an impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the 
        exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to 
        restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in 
        every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting 
        in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found 
        a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the 
        operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off 
        from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted 
        for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged 
        is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled 
        or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there 
        is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the administration of the 
        affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be 
        ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, 
        to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse 
        of this results from the constitution of human nature. If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed without 
        the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little 
        prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective 
        members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will 
        undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will 
        consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their immediate 
        interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would 
        attend its adoption. All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested 
        and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circumstances 
        and reasons of state, which is essential to a right judgment, and with 
        that strong predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail 
        to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member 
        of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed 
        by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion 
        of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have 
        been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen 
        how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, 
        to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will readily 
        conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, 
        deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times, and under 
        different impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits. In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is 
        requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every 
        important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was 
        to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed; 
        the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves 
        to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the national 
        government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time 
        scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, 
        till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute 
        for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to 
        this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified 
        produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance 
        with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States 
        furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the 
        complying, or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in 
        proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? 
        Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common 
        burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, 
        and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, 
        could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive 
        voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn 
        its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall 
        upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.