fp70.txt

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous 
        Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The 
        enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope 
        that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never 
        admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of 
        their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in 
        the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of 
        the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the 
        steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against 
        those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt 
        the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the 
        enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every 
        man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic 
        was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under 
        the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious 
        individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes 
        of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, 
        as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest 
        and destruction of Rome. There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this 
        head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. 
        A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government 
        ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad 
        government. Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in 
        the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, 
        what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they 
        be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the 
        republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan 
        which has been reported by the convention? The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, 
        unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; 
        fourthly, competent powers. The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, 
        first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility. Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for 
        the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, 
        have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. 
        They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary 
        qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable 
        to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered 
        the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated 
        to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges 
        and interests. That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, 
        secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one 
        man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater 
        number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities 
        will be diminished. This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power 
        in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting 
        it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control 
        and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of 
        the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, 
        we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. 
        New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which 
        have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. [1] 
        Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their 
        partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. 
        They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may 
        in most lights be examined in conjunction. The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this 
        head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be 
        enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, 
        on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman 
        history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions 
        between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times 
        substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar 
        advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality 
        of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more 
        frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to 
        the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, 
        and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, 
        and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between 
        them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians 
        for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, 
        who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united 
        by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of 
        their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the 
        republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became 
        an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between 
        themselves by lot one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and 
        its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. 
        This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing 
        those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the 
        peace of the republic. But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves 
        purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much 
        greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, 
        under any modification whatever. Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or 
        pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public 
        trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, 
        there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From 
        either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions 
        are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, 
        weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom 
        they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive 
        magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might 
        impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in 
        the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they 
        might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, 
        adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy. Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning 
        it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But 
        if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition 
        then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. 
        They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of 
        personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved 
        upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers 
        have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate 
        lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great 
        interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and 
        to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their 
        passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question 
        now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs 
        of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, 
        in the human character. Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source 
        just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the 
        legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce 
        them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they 
        may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is 
        oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings 
        of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes 
        obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, 
        and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is 
        once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, 
        and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate 
        or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. 
        Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease 
        to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan 
        or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion 
        of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which 
        are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition, 
        and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in 
        which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, 
        every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality. It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight 
        to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal 
        dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely 
        to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with 
        considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is 
        made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. 
        An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate 
        the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the 
        mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture 
        the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness 
        and dilatoriness. But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, 
        and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it 
        tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first 
        is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, 
        in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him 
        unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make 
        him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive 
        adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, 
        amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment 
        of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really 
        to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and 
        under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense 
        about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national 
        miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there 
        are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of 
        agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, 
        yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which 
        may have been incurred is truly chargeable. ``I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their 
        opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the 
        point.'' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true 
        or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur 
        the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? 
        Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising 
        task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how 
        easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render 
        it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties? In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled 
        with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the 
        mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments 
        to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so 
        flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. 
        When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on 
        the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his 
        nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, 
        by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified 
        and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to 
        descend to particulars. It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive 
        tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have 
        for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints 
        of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the 
        division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on 
        account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the 
        opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct 
        of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office 
        or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which 
        has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable 
        for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can 
        be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, 
        who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without 
        this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department 
        an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is 
        not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable 
        for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct 
        in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel 
        given to him at his sole discretion. But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible 
        for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution 
        dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns 
        against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes 
        a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, 
        which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his 
        good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or 
        would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the 
        Chief Magistrate himself. The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained 
        in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican 
        jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men 
        than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable 
        to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not 
        counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I 
        do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly 
        concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated 
        Junius pronounces to be ``deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that ``the executive 
        power is more easily confined when it is ONE'' [2]; that 
        it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and 
        watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of 
        the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security 
        sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is attainable. Numbers 
        must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather 
        a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of 
        several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit 
        and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is 
        placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their 
        interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an 
        artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when 
        abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very 
        circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more 
        readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as 
        when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes 
        their number [3], were more to be dreaded in their usurpation 
        than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing 
        an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have 
        been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, 
        is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination 
        America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single 
        individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for 
        what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, 
        are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always 
        a cloak to his faults. I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident 
        that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal 
        end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must 
        be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form 
        an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred 
        for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the 
        appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from 
        any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that 
        the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing 
        features of our constitution.