From 7c2f30614c5547493d3186dca38da69fb63d2e4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duncan Dean Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 12:42:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Introduce `InboundV1Channel` & `OutboundV1Channel` --- lightning/src/ln/channel.rs | 2687 ++++++++++----------- lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs | 481 +++- lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs | 22 + lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs | 32 +- lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs | 8 +- 5 files changed, 1788 insertions(+), 1442 deletions(-) diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index c037d8b6353..81ded7e525e 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -302,6 +302,85 @@ const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisc pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; +pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO + +pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 { + const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724; + const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124; + if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT } +} + +#[cfg(not(test))] +const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172; +#[cfg(test)] +pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172; + +pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330; + +/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to, +/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107, +/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for +/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`. +pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10; + +/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if +/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported. +/// It's 2^24 - 1. +pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1; + +/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis. +pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000; + +/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the +/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire +/// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it. +/// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many +/// implementations use this value for their dust limit today. +pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546; + +/// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty. +pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS; + +/// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing +/// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept +/// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length. +/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we +/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output +/// standard. +/// See for more details. +pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354; + +// Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit. +pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000; + +/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a +/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our +/// channel_id in ChannelManager. +pub(super) enum ChannelError { + Ignore(String), + Warn(String), + Close(String), +} + +impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { + match self { + &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e), + &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e), + &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e), + } + } +} + +macro_rules! secp_check { + ($res: expr, $err: expr) => { + match $res { + Ok(thing) => thing, + Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)), + } + }; +} + /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to @@ -1719,231 +1798,210 @@ impl<'a, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + 'a> ChannelInterface<'a, Signer> } } -// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking -// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like -// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an -// inbound channel. -// -// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client. -// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity. -pub(super) struct FundedChannel { +impl<'a, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + 'a> ChannelInterface<'a, Signer> for InboundV1Channel { + fn get_context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext { + &self.context + } + + fn get_context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext { + &mut self.context + } +} + +impl<'a, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + 'a> ChannelInterface<'a, Signer> for OutboundV1Channel { + fn get_context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext { + &self.context + } + + fn get_context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext { + &mut self.context + } +} + +// A not yet funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment. +pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel { #[cfg(not(test))] context: ChannelContext, #[cfg(test)] pub context: ChannelContext, } -#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] -struct CommitmentTxInfoCached { - fee: u64, - total_pending_htlcs: usize, - next_holder_htlc_id: u64, - next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64, - feerate: u32, -} +impl InboundV1Channel { + /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one. + /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! + pub fn new_from_req( + fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, + their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, + current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64 + ) -> Result, ChannelError> + where ES::Target: EntropySource, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false }; -pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO + // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't + // support this channel type. + let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type { + if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned())); + } -pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 { - const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724; - const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124; - if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT } -} + // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in + // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support + // `static_remote_key`. + if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned())); + } + // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type. + if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned())); + } + if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned())); + } + channel_type.clone() + } else { + let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features); + if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned())); + } + channel_type + }; + let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); -#[cfg(not(test))] -const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172; -#[cfg(test)] -pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172; + let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id); + let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); + let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { + funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint, + payment_point: msg.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, + htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint + }; -pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330; + if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT))); + } -/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to, -/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107, -/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for -/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`. -pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10; + // Check sanity of message fields: + if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); + } + if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis))); + } + if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); + } + let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; + if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + } + if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); + } + if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + } + FundedChannel::::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?; -/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if -/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported. -/// It's 2^24 - 1. -pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1; + let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); + if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay))); + } + if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); + } + if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); + } -/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis. -pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000; + // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... + if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis))); + } + if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); + } + if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); + } + if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); + } + if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); + } + if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + } + if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + } -/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the -/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire -/// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it. -/// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many -/// implementations use this value for their dust limit today. -pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546; + // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state: -/// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty. -pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS; + if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference { + if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned())); + } + } -/// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing -/// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept -/// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length. -/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we -/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output -/// standard. -/// See for more details. -pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354; - -// Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit. -pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000; - -/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a -/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our -/// channel_id in ChannelManager. -pub(super) enum ChannelError { - Ignore(String), - Warn(String), - Close(String), -} - -impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError { - fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { - match self { - &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e), - &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e), - &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e), - } - } -} - -macro_rules! secp_check { - ($res: expr, $err: expr) => { - match $res { - Ok(thing) => thing, - Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)), - } - }; -} - -impl FundedChannel { - /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the - /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through - /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`] - /// - /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%. - /// - /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel - fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 { - let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 { - 1 - } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 { - 100 - } else { - config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64 - }; - channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent - } - - fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { - // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is - // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option - // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy - // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`. - let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); - if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && - config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy && - their_features.supports_scid_privacy() { - ret.set_scid_privacy_required(); + let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = FundedChannel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config); + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because + // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); } - - // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we - // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of - // `only_static_remotekey`. - #[cfg(anchors)] - { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41. - if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx && - their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); - } + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat))); } - - ret - } - - /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried, - /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this - /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed. - pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result { - if !self.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); } - if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { - // We've exhausted our options - return Err(()); + if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.", + msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS); } - // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional - // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has - // accepted one. - // - // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the - // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type` - // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the - // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for - // whatever reason. - if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); - assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none()); - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None; - } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() { - self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy(); - } else { - self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); } - Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash)) - } - - // Constructors: - pub fn new_outbound( - fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, - channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, - outbound_scid_alias: u64 - ) -> Result, APIError> - where ES::Target: EntropySource, - SP::Target: SignerProvider, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - { - let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay; - let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id); - let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id); - let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); - if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)}); - } - if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)}); - } - let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000; - if push_msat > channel_value_msat { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) }); - } - if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)}); - } - let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = FundedChannel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config); - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because - // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) }); + // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient + // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful. + let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat; + let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000; + if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee))); } - let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features); - debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config))); - - let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - - let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat; - let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); - if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) }); + let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee; + // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't + // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve. + if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned())); } - let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { + match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => { + // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything + if script.len() == 0 { + None + } else { + if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))) + } + Some(script.clone()) + } + }, + // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel + &OptionalField::Absent => { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned())); + } + } + } else { None }; let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey()) @@ -1951,29 +2009,31 @@ impl FundedChannel { if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { - return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() }); + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey))); } } - Ok(FundedChannel { + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + + let chan = InboundV1Channel { context: ChannelContext { user_id, config: LegacyChannelConfig { options: config.channel_config.clone(), - announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel, + announced_channel, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, }, prev_config: None, - inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()), + inbound_handshake_limits_override: None, - channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(), - channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32, + channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, + channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32), announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, secp_ctx, - channel_value_satoshis, latest_monitor_update_id: 0, @@ -1983,7 +2043,7 @@ impl FundedChannel { cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, - value_to_self_msat, + value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat, pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2004,52 +2064,56 @@ impl FundedChannel { monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(), #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), + holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)), #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), + counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)), last_sent_closing_fee: None, pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None, closing_fee_limits: None, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, - inbound_awaiting_accept: false, + inbound_awaiting_accept: true, funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, short_channel_id: None, channel_creation_height: current_chain_height, - feerate_per_kw: feerate, - counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0, + feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw, + channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis, + counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, - counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0, - holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), - counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel + counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000), + holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), + counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis), holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0, + counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat, holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, - counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0, - minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel + counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs, + minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)), counterparty_forwarding_info: None, channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, - is_outbound_from_holder: true, - counterparty_parameters: None, + is_outbound_from_holder: false, + counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { + selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, + pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, + }), funding_outpoint: None, - opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None }, + opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None }, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None }, funding_transaction: None, - counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None, + counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point), counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, counterparty_node_id, - counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None, + counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey, commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), @@ -2078,248 +2142,300 @@ impl FundedChannel { pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(), } - }) + }; + + Ok(chan) } - fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, - feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option, logger: &L) - -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, - { - // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates, - // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee. - // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it - // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. - let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25, - fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10); - if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit))); - } - let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing - // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate - // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250 - // sat/kw before the comparison here. - if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit { - if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw { - if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate { - log_warn!(logger, - "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.", - cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw); - return Ok(()); - } - } - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit))); - } - Ok(()) - } + fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one. - /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! - pub fn new_from_req( - fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, - counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, - their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, - current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64 - ) -> Result, ChannelError> - where ES::Target: EntropySource, - SP::Target: SignerProvider, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, - { - let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false }; + let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); + let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx; + { + let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis); + // They sign the holder commitment transaction... + log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.", + log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), + encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), + encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); + } - // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't - // support this channel type. - let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type { - if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned())); - } + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); + let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; - // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in - // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support - // `static_remote_key`. - if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned())); - } - // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type. - if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned())); - } - if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned())); - } - channel_type.clone() - } else { - let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features); - if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned())); - } - channel_type - }; - let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); + let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); - let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id); - let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id); - let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); - let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { - funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint, - payment_point: msg.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, - htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint - }; + let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx) + .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0; - if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT))); - } + // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish. + Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature)) + } - // Check sanity of message fields: - if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); + pub fn funding_created( + mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L + ) -> Result<(FundedChannel, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), (Self, ChannelError)> + where + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + L::Target: Logger + { + if self.is_outbound() { + return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()))); } - let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; - if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { + // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT + // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the + // channel. + return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()))); } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); + if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept { + return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()))); } - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || + self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); } - FundedChannel::::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?; - let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); - if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay))); - } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); - } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); - } + let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index }; + self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo); + // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular + // funding_created_signature may fail. + self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); - // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... - if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); - } - if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); - } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); - } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); - } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); - } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); - } + let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => { + self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None; + return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e))); + }, + Err(e) => { + // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here + // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state. + panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e); + } + }; - // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state: + let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( + initial_commitment_tx, + msg.signature, + Vec::new(), + &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() + ); - if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference { - if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned())); - } + if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) { + return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))); } - let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = FundedChannel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config); - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because - // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); - } - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat))); - } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.", - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS); - } - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); - } + // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: - // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient - // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful. - let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat; - let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000; - if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee))); - } + let mut channel = FundedChannel { + context: self.context, + }; - let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee; - // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't - // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve. - if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned())); - } + let funding_redeemscript = channel.get_funding_redeemscript(); + let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&channel.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &channel.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, channel.is_outbound()); + let shutdown_script = channel.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner()); + let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel.context.channel_value_satoshis, channel.context.channel_keys_id); + monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel.context.channel_transaction_parameters); + let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(channel.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, + shutdown_script, channel.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + &channel.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()), + &channel.context.channel_transaction_parameters, + funding_redeemscript.clone(), channel.context.channel_value_satoshis, + obscure_factor, + holder_commitment_tx, best_block, channel.context.counterparty_node_id); - let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { - match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { - &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => { - // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything - if script.len() == 0 { - None - } else { - if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))) - } - Some(script.clone()) - } - }, - // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel - &OptionalField::Absent => { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned())); - } - } - } else { None }; + channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), channel.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, channel.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); - let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { - Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey()) - } else { None }; + channel.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32; + channel.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); + channel.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + channel.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { - if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey))); - } - } + log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); + channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id; - let chan = FundedChannel { + Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned { + channel_id, + signature + }, channel_monitor)) + } + + pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool { + self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept + } + + /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel` + pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) { + assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept); + self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0); + } + + /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which + /// should be sent back to the counterparty node. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel + pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { + if self.is_outbound() { + panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?"); + } + if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { + panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward"); + } + if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); + } + if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept { + panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted"); + } + + self.context.user_id = user_id; + self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false; + + self.generate_accept_channel_message() + } + + /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an + /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use + /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel + fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { + let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); + let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); + + msgs::AcceptChannel { + temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, + dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, + minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), + to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS, + funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, + payment_point: keys.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint, + htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint, + first_per_commitment_point, + shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), + None => Builder::new().into_script(), + }), + channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), + } + } + + /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an + /// inbound channel without accepting it. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { + self.generate_accept_channel_message() + } +} + +// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment. +pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel { + #[cfg(not(test))] + context: ChannelContext, + #[cfg(test)] + pub context: ChannelContext, +} + +impl OutboundV1Channel { + pub fn new_outbound( + fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, + channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, + outbound_scid_alias: u64 + ) -> Result, APIError> + where ES::Target: EntropySource, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + { + let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay; + let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id); + let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); + + if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)}); + } + if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)}); + } + let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000; + if push_msat > channel_value_msat { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) }); + } + if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)}); + } + let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = FundedChannel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config); + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because + // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) }); + } + + let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features); + debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config))); + + let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); + + let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat; + let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); + if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) }); + } + + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + + let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { + Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey()) + } else { None }; + + if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { + if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { + return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() }); + } + } + + Ok(OutboundV1Channel { context: ChannelContext { user_id, config: LegacyChannelConfig { options: config.channel_config.clone(), - announced_channel, + announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, }, prev_config: None, - inbound_handshake_limits_override: None, + inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()), - channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, - channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32), + channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(), + channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32, announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, secp_ctx, + channel_value_satoshis, latest_monitor_update_id: 0, @@ -2329,7 +2445,7 @@ impl FundedChannel { cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, - value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat, + value_to_self_msat, pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2350,56 +2466,52 @@ impl FundedChannel { monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(), #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)), + holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)), + counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), last_sent_closing_fee: None, pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None, closing_fee_limits: None, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, - inbound_awaiting_accept: true, + inbound_awaiting_accept: false, funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, short_channel_id: None, channel_creation_height: current_chain_height, - feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw, - channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis, - counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis, + feerate_per_kw: feerate, + counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0, holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, - counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000), - holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), - counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis), + counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0, + holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), + counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat, + counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0, holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, - counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs, - minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)), + counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0, + minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel counterparty_forwarding_info: None, channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, - is_outbound_from_holder: false, - counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { - selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, - pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, - }), + is_outbound_from_holder: true, + counterparty_parameters: None, funding_outpoint: None, - opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None }, + opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None }, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None }, funding_transaction: None, - counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point), + counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None, counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, counterparty_node_id, - counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey, + counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None, commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), @@ -2428,365 +2540,168 @@ impl FundedChannel { pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(), } - }; - - Ok(chan) + }) } - #[inline] - fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script { - // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script - // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method - // outside of those situations will fail. - self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner() + /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created) + fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); + let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; + Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx) + .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0) } - #[inline] - fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 { - let mut ret = - (4 + // version - 1 + // input count - 36 + // prevout - 1 + // script length (0) - 4 + // sequence - 1 + // output count - 4 // lock time - )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts - 2 + // witness marker and flag - 1 + // witness element count - 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script) - self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script - 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags - if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey { - ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length - spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier + /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates + /// a funding_created message for the remote peer. + /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice, + /// or if called on an inbound channel. + /// Note that channel_id changes during this call! + /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call! + /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close. + pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<(FundedChannel, msgs::FundingCreated), (OutboundV1Channel, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger { + if !self.is_outbound() { + panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!"); } - if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey { - ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length - spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier + if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { + panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)"); + } + if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || + self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); } - ret - } - - #[inline] - fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) { - assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()); - let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis; - let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 }; - let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 }; + self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo); + self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); - if value_to_holder < 0 { - assert!(self.is_outbound()); - total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64; - } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 { - assert!(!self.is_outbound()); - total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64; - } + let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(e) => { + log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e); + self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None; + return Err((self, e)); + } + }; - if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis { - value_to_counterparty = 0; - } + let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id; - if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis { - value_to_holder = 0; - } + // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: - assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some()); - let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(); - let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(); - let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(); + let mut channel = FundedChannel { + context: self.context, + }; - let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint); - (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis) - } + channel.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32; + channel.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); + channel.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction); - fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint { - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap() + Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated { + temporary_channel_id, + funding_txid: funding_txo.txid, + funding_output_index: funding_txo.index, + signature + })) } - /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] - /// entirely. - /// - /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage - /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]). - /// - /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is - /// disconnected). - pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update - (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) - where L::Target: Logger { - // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc` - // (see equivalent if condition there). - assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0); - let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update - let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger); - self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id; - if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp { - assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell. + fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { + // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is + // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option + // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy + // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`. + let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && + config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy && + their_features.supports_scid_privacy() { + ret.set_scid_privacy_required(); } - } - fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger { - // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any - // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an - // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us, - // either. - if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) { - panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state"); + // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we + // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of + // `only_static_remotekey`. + #[cfg(anchors)] + { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41. + if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx && + their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); + } } - assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); - let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()); - - // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from - // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop - // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal. + ret + } - let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX; - let mut htlc_value_msat = 0; - for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() { - if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg { - assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc); - match htlc.state { - InboundHTLCState::Committed => {}, - InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => { - if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { - } else { - log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed"); - } - return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; - }, - _ => { - debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); - // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor - } - } - pending_idx = idx; - htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat; - break; - } - } - if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX { - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and - // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds. - debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); - return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; + /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried, + /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this + /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed. + pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result { + if !self.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); } + if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { + // We've exhausted our options + return Err(()); } - - // Now update local state: + // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional + // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has + // accepted one. // - // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we - // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment. - self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1; - let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { - update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, - updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { - payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(), - }], - }; + // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the + // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type` + // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the + // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for + // whatever reason. + if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); + assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none()); + self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None; + } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() { + self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy(); + } else { + self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + } + Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash)) + } - if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 { - // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in - // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly - - // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we - // do not not get into this branch. - for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { - match pending_update { - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { - if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { - // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here: - self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1; - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); - return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; - } - }, - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { - if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { - log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its - // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden. - debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed"); - return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; - } - }, - _ => {} - } - } - log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state); - self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { - payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, - }); - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg); - return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; + pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel { + if !self.is_outbound() { + panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?"); + } + if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { + panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward"); } - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg); - { - let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; - if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state { - } else { - debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); - return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; - } - log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id)); - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone())); + if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); } - UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { - monitor_update, - htlc_value_msat, - msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), - htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, - payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, + let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); + let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); + + msgs::OpenChannel { + chain_hash, + temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, + funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, + push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat, + dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, + feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32, + to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS, + funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, + payment_point: keys.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint, + htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint, + first_per_commitment_point, + channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0}, + shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), + None => Builder::new().into_script(), }), + channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), } } - pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger { - match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) { - UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => { - let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger); - // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be - // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here. - self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id; - monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); - self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update); - UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { - monitor_update: self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(), - htlc_value_msat, - } - }, - UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => { - self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update); - UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { - monitor_update: self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(), - htlc_value_msat, - } - } - UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}, - } - } - - /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill - /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot, - /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed - /// before we fail backwards. - /// - /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always - /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be - /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`]. - pub fn queue_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) - -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { - self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger) - .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?")) - } - - /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill - /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot, - /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed - /// before we fail backwards. - /// - /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always - /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be - /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`]. - fn fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) - -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { - if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) { - panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state"); - } - assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); - - // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from - // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop - // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal. - - let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX; - for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() { - if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg { - match htlc.state { - InboundHTLCState::Committed => {}, - InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => { - if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { - } else { - debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed"); - } - return Ok(None); - }, - _ => { - debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id))); - } - } - pending_idx = idx; - } - } - if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX { - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this - // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early. - debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); - return Ok(None); - } - - if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 { - debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!"); - force_holding_cell = true; - } - - // Now update local state: - if force_holding_cell { - for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { - match pending_update { - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { - if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); - return Ok(None); - } - }, - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { - if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { - debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed"); - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned())); - } - }, - _ => {} - } - } - log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { - htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, - err_packet, - }); - return Ok(None); - } - - log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - { - let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone())); - } - - Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), - htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, - reason: err_packet - })) - } - - // Message handlers: - + // Message handlers pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits }; @@ -2915,212 +2830,413 @@ impl FundedChannel { Ok(()) } +} - fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { - let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - - let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); - let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx; - { - let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); - let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); - let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis); - // They sign the holder commitment transaction... - log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.", - log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), - encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), - encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); - } - - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); - let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; - - let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); - let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); - log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); - - let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx) - .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0; +// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client. +// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity. +pub(super) struct FundedChannel { + #[cfg(not(test))] + context: ChannelContext, + #[cfg(test)] + pub context: ChannelContext, +} - // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish. - Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature)) - } +#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] +struct CommitmentTxInfoCached { + fee: u64, + total_pending_htlcs: usize, + next_holder_htlc_id: u64, + next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64, + feerate: u32, +} - pub fn funding_created( - &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L - ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> - where - SP::Target: SignerProvider, - L::Target: Logger +impl FundedChannel { + fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, + feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option, logger: &L) + -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - if self.is_outbound() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())); - } - if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { - // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT - // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the - // channel. - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())); - } - if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())); + // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates, + // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee. + // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it + // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. + let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25, + fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10); + if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit))); } - if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { - panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); + let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); + // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing + // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate + // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250 + // sat/kw before the comparison here. + if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit { + if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw { + if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate { + log_warn!(logger, + "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.", + cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw); + return Ok(()); + } + } + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit))); } + Ok(()) + } - let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index }; - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo); - // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular - // funding_created_signature may fail. - self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); + #[inline] + fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script { + // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script + // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method + // outside of those situations will fail. + self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner() + } - let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => { - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None; - return Err(ChannelError::Close(e)); - }, - Err(e) => { - // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here - // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state. - panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e); - } - }; + #[inline] + fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 { + let mut ret = + (4 + // version + 1 + // input count + 36 + // prevout + 1 + // script length (0) + 4 + // sequence + 1 + // output count + 4 // lock time + )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts + 2 + // witness marker and flag + 1 + // witness element count + 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script) + self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script + 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags + if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey { + ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length + spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier + } + if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey { + ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length + spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier + } + ret + } - let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( - initial_commitment_tx, - msg.signature, - Vec::new(), - &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, - self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() - ); + #[inline] + fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) { + assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()); - self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) - .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?; + let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis; + let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 }; + let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 }; - // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: + if value_to_holder < 0 { + assert!(self.is_outbound()); + total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64; + } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 { + assert!(!self.is_outbound()); + total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64; + } - let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()); - let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner()); - let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id); - monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); - let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, - shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), - &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()), - &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, - funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, - obscure_factor, - holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id); + if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis { + value_to_counterparty = 0; + } - channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); + if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis { + value_to_holder = 0; + } - self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32; - self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some()); + let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(); + let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(); + let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(); - log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint); + (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis) + } - let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); - self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint { + self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap() + } - Ok((msgs::FundingSigned { - channel_id: self.context.channel_id, - signature - }, channel_monitor)) + /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] + /// entirely. + /// + /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage + /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]). + /// + /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is + /// disconnected). + pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update + (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) + where L::Target: Logger { + // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc` + // (see equivalent if condition there). + assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0); + let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update + let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger); + self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id; + if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp { + assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell. + } } - /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end. - /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!) - pub fn funding_signed( - &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L - ) -> Result, ChannelError> - where - SP::Target: SignerProvider, - L::Target: Logger - { - if !self.is_outbound() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())); + fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger { + // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any + // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an + // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us, + // either. + if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) { + panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state"); } - if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())); + assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); + + let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()); + + // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from + // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop + // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal. + + let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX; + let mut htlc_value_msat = 0; + for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() { + if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg { + assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc); + match htlc.state { + InboundHTLCState::Committed => {}, + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => { + if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { + } else { + log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed"); + } + return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; + }, + _ => { + debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); + // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor + } + } + pending_idx = idx; + htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat; + break; + } } - if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { - panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); + if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX { + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and + // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds. + debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); + return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; } - let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); + // Now update local state: + // + // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we + // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment. + self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1; + let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(), + }], + }; - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); - let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; - let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); - let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 { + // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in + // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly - + // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we + // do not not get into this branch. + for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { + match pending_update { + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { + // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here: + self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1; + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); + return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; + } + }, + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { + log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its + // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden. + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed"); + return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; + } + }, + _ => {} + } + } + log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state); + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { + payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, + }); + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg); + return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; + } + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg); + + { + let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; + if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state { + } else { + debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); + return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; + } + log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id)); + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone())); + } - log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { + monitor_update, + htlc_value_msat, + msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC { + channel_id: self.channel_id(), + htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, + payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, + }), + } + } - let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); - let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx; - { - let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); - let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); - let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis); - // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish. - if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())); + pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger { + match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) { + UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => { + let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger); + // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be + // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here. + self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); + self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update); + UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { + monitor_update: self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(), + htlc_value_msat, + } + }, + UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => { + self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update); + UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { + monitor_update: self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(), + htlc_value_msat, + } } + UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}, } + } - let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( - initial_commitment_tx, - msg.signature, - Vec::new(), - &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, - self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() - ); + /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill + /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot, + /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed + /// before we fail backwards. + /// + /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always + /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be + /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`]. + pub fn queue_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) + -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger) + .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?")) + } - self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) - .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?; + /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill + /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot, + /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed + /// before we fail backwards. + /// + /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always + /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be + /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`]. + fn fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) + -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) { + panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state"); + } + assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); + // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from + // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop + // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal. - let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); - let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()); - let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner()); - let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id); - monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); - let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, - shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), - &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script), - &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, - funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, - obscure_factor, - holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id); + let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX; + for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() { + if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg { + match htlc.state { + InboundHTLCState::Committed => {}, + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => { + if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { + } else { + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed"); + } + return Ok(None); + }, + _ => { + debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id))); + } + } + pending_idx = idx; + } + } + if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX { + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this + // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early. + debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); + return Ok(None); + } - channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); + if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 { + debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!"); + force_holding_cell = true; + } - assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update! - self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32; - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + // Now update local state: + if force_holding_cell { + for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { + match pending_update { + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); + return Ok(None); + } + }, + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed"); + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned())); + } + }, + _ => {} + } + } + log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { + htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, + err_packet, + }); + return Ok(None); + } - log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + { + let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone())); + } - let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); - self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - Ok(channel_monitor) + Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: self.channel_id(), + htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, + reason: err_packet + })) } + // Message handlers: + /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to /// reply with. @@ -3176,110 +3292,30 @@ impl FundedChannel { Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice( &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available") ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already"))) - }; - if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned())); - } - return Ok(None); - } else { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())); - } - - self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point; - self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point); - - log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - - Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger)) - } - - /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast - pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option { - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 { - self.context.funding_transaction.clone() - } else { - None - } - } - - /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs - fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option) -> HTLCStats { - let mut stats = HTLCStats { - pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, - pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0, - on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0, - on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0, - holding_cell_msat: 0, - on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0, - }; - - let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() { - (0, 0) - } else { - let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64; - (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000, - dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000) - }; - let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; - let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; - for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() { - stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat; - if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat { - stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat; - } - if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat { - stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat; - } - } - stats - } - - /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell. - fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option) -> HTLCStats { - let mut stats = HTLCStats { - pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, - pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0, - on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0, - on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0, - holding_cell_msat: 0, - on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0, - }; - - let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() { - (0, 0) - } else { - let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64; - (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000, - dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000) - }; - let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; - let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; - for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { - stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat; - if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat { - stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat; - } - if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat { - stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat; + }; + if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned())); } + return Ok(None); + } else { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())); } - for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { - if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update { - stats.pending_htlcs += 1; - stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat; - stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat; - if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat { - stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat; - } - if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat { - stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat; - } else { - stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1; - } - } + self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point; + self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point); + + log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + + Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger)) + } + + /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast + pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option { + if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 { + self.context.funding_transaction.clone() + } else { + None } - stats } pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> @@ -5324,284 +5360,111 @@ impl FundedChannel { self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger) } - fn do_best_block_updated( - &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, - genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L - ) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason> - where - NS::Target: NodeSigner, - L::Target: Logger - { - let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); - // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to - // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring - // ~now. - let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; - self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| { - match htlc_update { - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => { - if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit { - timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone())); - false - } else { true } - }, - _ => true - } - }); - - self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time); - - if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) { - let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer { - self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger) - } else { None }; - log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id)); - return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)); - } - - let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); - if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 || - (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 { - let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1; - if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 { - // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to - // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags - // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready - funding_tx_confirmations = 0; - } - - // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and - // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed, - // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably - // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes). - // - // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or - // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the - // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have - // to. - if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() { - let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", - self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations); - return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason }); - } - } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() && - height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS { - log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id)); - // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active - assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32); - assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0); - return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut); - } - - let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer { - self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger) - } else { None }; - Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) - } - - /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may - /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two - /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks. - pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { - if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 { - // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one - // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1. - let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1; - // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its - // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last - // time we saw and it will be ignored. - let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter; - match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) { - Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => { - assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?"); - assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?"); - assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?"); - Ok(()) - }, - Err(e) => Err(e) - } - } else { - // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore - Ok(()) - } - } - - // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned - // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message): - - pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel { - if !self.is_outbound() { - panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?"); - } - if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { - panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward"); - } - - if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { - panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); - } - - let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); - let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); - - msgs::OpenChannel { - chain_hash, - temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, - funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, - push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat, - dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, - max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, - channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, - feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32, - to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), - max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS, - funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, - payment_point: keys.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint, - htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint, - first_per_commitment_point, - channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0}, - shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { - Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), - None => Builder::new().into_script(), - }), - channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), - } - } - - pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool { - self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept - } - - /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel` - pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) { - assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept); - self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0); - } - - /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which - /// should be sent back to the counterparty node. - /// - /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel - pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { - if self.is_outbound() { - panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?"); - } - if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { - panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward"); - } - if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { - panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); - } - if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept { - panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted"); - } - - self.context.user_id = user_id; - self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false; - - self.generate_accept_channel_message() - } - - /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an - /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use - /// [`FundedChannel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead. - /// - /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel - fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { - let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); - let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); - - msgs::AcceptChannel { - temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, - dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, - max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, - channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, - minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), - to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), - max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS, - funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, - payment_point: keys.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint, - htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint, - first_per_commitment_point, - shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { - Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), - None => Builder::new().into_script(), - }), - channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), - } - } - - /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an - /// inbound channel without accepting it. - /// - /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel - #[cfg(test)] - pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { - self.generate_accept_channel_message() - } - - /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created) - fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); - let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; - Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx) - .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0) - } + fn do_best_block_updated( + &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, + genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L + ) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason> + where + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + L::Target: Logger + { + let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); + // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to + // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring + // ~now. + let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| { + match htlc_update { + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => { + if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit { + timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone())); + false + } else { true } + }, + _ => true + } + }); - /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates - /// a funding_created message for the remote peer. - /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice, - /// or if called on an inbound channel. - /// Note that channel_id changes during this call! - /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call! - /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close. - pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { - if !self.is_outbound() { - panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!"); - } - if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { - panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)"); - } - if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { - panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); - } + self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time); - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo); - self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); + if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) { + let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer { + self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger) + } else { None }; + log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id)); + return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)); + } - let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(e) => { - log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e); - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None; - return Err(e); + let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); + if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 || + (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 { + let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1; + if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 { + // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to + // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags + // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready + funding_tx_confirmations = 0; } - }; - - let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id; - // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: + // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and + // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed, + // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably + // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes). + // + // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or + // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the + // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have + // to. + if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() { + let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", + self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations); + return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason }); + } + } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() && + height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS { + log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id)); + // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active + assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32); + assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0); + return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut); + } - self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32; - self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); - self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction); + let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer { + self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger) + } else { None }; + Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) + } - Ok(msgs::FundingCreated { - temporary_channel_id, - funding_txid: funding_txo.txid, - funding_output_index: funding_txo.index, - signature - }) + /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may + /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two + /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks. + pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { + if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 { + // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one + // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1. + let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1; + // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its + // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last + // time we saw and it will be ignored. + let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter; + match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) { + Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => { + assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?"); + assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?"); + assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?"); + Ok(()) + }, + Err(e) => Err(e) + } + } else { + // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore + Ok(()) + } } + // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned + // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message): + /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an @@ -6264,6 +6127,90 @@ impl FundedChannel { pub fn take_workaround_lnd_bug_4006(&mut self) -> Option { self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take() } + + /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end. + /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!) + pub fn funding_signed( + &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L + ) -> Result, ChannelError> + where + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + L::Target: Logger + { + if !self.is_outbound() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())); + } + if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())); + } + if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || + self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); + } + + let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); + + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); + let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; + let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + + log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + + let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); + let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx; + { + let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis); + // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish. + if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())); + } + } + + let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( + initial_commitment_tx, + msg.signature, + Vec::new(), + &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() + ); + + self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) + .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?; + + + let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); + let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()); + let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner()); + let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id); + monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); + let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, + shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script), + &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, + funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, + obscure_factor, + holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id); + + channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); + + assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update! + self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32; + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + + log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + + let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); + self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + Ok(channel_monitor) + } } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3; @@ -7086,7 +7033,7 @@ mod tests { use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId}; #[cfg(anchors)] use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures; - use crate::ln::channel::{FundedChannel, ChannelInterface, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator}; + use crate::ln::channel::{FundedChannel, ChannelInterface, OutboundV1Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, InboundV1Channel}; use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS}; use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; @@ -7194,7 +7141,7 @@ mod tests { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - match FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) { + match OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) { Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => { assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner()); }, @@ -7217,7 +7164,7 @@ mod tests { let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let node_a_chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the // same as the old fee. @@ -7236,6 +7183,7 @@ mod tests { let network = Network::Testnet; let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); + let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network); // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure // they have different dust limits. @@ -7243,13 +7191,13 @@ mod tests { // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect. let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); - let mut node_b_chan = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit. let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0); @@ -7257,6 +7205,18 @@ mod tests { node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap(); node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560; + // Node A --> Node B: funding created + let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript(); + let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + }]}; + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap(); + let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap(); + + // Node B --> Node A: funding signed + let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger); + // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel. let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's. node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput { @@ -7312,7 +7272,7 @@ mod tests { let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = FundedChannel::::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors()); let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = FundedChannel::::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors()); @@ -7361,12 +7321,12 @@ mod tests { // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); - let mut node_b_chan = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: accept channel let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0); @@ -7378,8 +7338,8 @@ mod tests { value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]}; let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap(); - let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap(); + let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap(); + let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: funding signed let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger); @@ -7434,12 +7394,12 @@ mod tests { // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value, // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`. - let chan_1 = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64); // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%). - let chan_2 = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64); @@ -7448,38 +7408,38 @@ mod tests { // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value, // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`. - let chan_3 = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64); // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%). - let chan_4 = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64); // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%) // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1. - let chan_5 = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64); // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value // than 100. - let chan_6 = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap(); let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat); // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%) // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1. - let chan_7 = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64); // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value // than 100. - let chan_8 = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000; assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat); } @@ -7519,7 +7479,7 @@ mod tests { let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default(); outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32; - let chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap(); + let chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap(); let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64); assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve); @@ -7529,7 +7489,7 @@ mod tests { inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32; if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 { - let chan_inbound_node = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64); @@ -7537,7 +7497,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve); } else { // Channel Negotiations failed - let result = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42); + let result = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42); assert!(result.is_err()); } } @@ -7545,19 +7505,42 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn channel_update() { let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000}); + let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let seed = [42; 32]; let network = Network::Testnet; + let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network); let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(); let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); - // Create a channel. + // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); - assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none()); - assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default - assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none()); + let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); + + // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message + // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect. + let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); + let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); + let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); + + // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit. + let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0); + accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; + node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap(); + node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560; + + // Node A --> Node B: funding created + let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript(); + let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + }]}; + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap(); + let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap(); + + // Node B --> Node A: funding signed + let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger); // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected. let update = ChannelUpdate { @@ -7632,7 +7615,7 @@ mod tests { let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let mut config = UserConfig::default(); config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false; - let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test + let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546; chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel @@ -8351,7 +8334,7 @@ mod tests { let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let node_a_chan = FundedChannel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, + let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); @@ -8360,7 +8343,7 @@ mod tests { let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); - let res = FundedChannel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, + let res = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42); assert!(res.is_ok()); @@ -8385,7 +8368,7 @@ mod tests { // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both // need to signal it. - let channel_a = FundedChannel::::new_outbound( + let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42 @@ -8396,13 +8379,13 @@ mod tests { expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required(); expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); - let channel_a = FundedChannel::::new_outbound( + let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42 ).unwrap(); let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); - let channel_b = FundedChannel::::new_from_req( + let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42 @@ -8434,7 +8417,7 @@ mod tests { let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required; let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec()); - let channel_a = FundedChannel::::new_outbound( + let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42 ).unwrap(); @@ -8445,7 +8428,7 @@ mod tests { // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel. - let channel_b = FundedChannel::::new_from_req( + let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors, &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42 @@ -8481,7 +8464,7 @@ mod tests { // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by // B as it's not supported by LDK. - let channel_a = FundedChannel::::new_outbound( + let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42 ).unwrap(); @@ -8489,7 +8472,7 @@ mod tests { let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone()); - let res = FundedChannel::::new_from_req( + let res = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init, &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42 @@ -8500,14 +8483,14 @@ mod tests { // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by // LDK. - let mut channel_a = FundedChannel::::new_outbound( + let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::::new_outbound( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42 ).unwrap(); let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); - let channel_b = FundedChannel::::new_from_req( + let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::::new_from_req( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42 diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 327334092d7..b2366808a8d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to // construct one themselves. use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; -use crate::ln::channel::{FundedChannel, ChannelInterface, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch}; +use crate::ln::channel::{FundedChannel, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, ChannelInterface, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch}; use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures; @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::onion_utils; use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; -use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; +use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, FundingCreated, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; #[cfg(test)] use crate::ln::outbound_payment; use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment}; @@ -495,12 +495,22 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction, /// State we hold per-peer. pub(super) struct PeerState { - /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`. + /// `channel_id` -> `FundedChannel`. /// - /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a - /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the - /// `channel_id`. + /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty. pub(super) funded_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], FundedChannel>, + /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`. + /// + /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has + /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in + /// `funded_channel_by_id`. + pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel>, + /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`. + /// + /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has + /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in + /// `funded_channel_by_id`. + pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel>, /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer. latest_features: InitFeatures, /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except @@ -537,6 +547,18 @@ impl PeerState { } self.funded_channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() } + + // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels. + fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize { + self.funded_channel_by_id.len() + self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() + + self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() + } + + // Returns a count of all pending channels that have not yet completed handshake and generated + // funded. + fn pending_channel_count(&self) -> usize { + self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() + self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() + } } /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is @@ -1287,6 +1309,106 @@ impl ChannelDetails { config: Some(channel.config()), } } + + fn from_inbound_v1_channel(channel: &InboundV1Channel, + best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self { + + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); + let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = + channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); + ChannelDetails { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + features: latest_features, + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, + forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), + // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value + // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` + // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). + // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the + // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. + outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { + Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + }, + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so + // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. + channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: false, + is_public: channel.should_announce(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.config()), + } + } + + fn from_outbound_v1_channel(channel: &OutboundV1Channel, + best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self { + + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); + let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = + channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); + ChannelDetails { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + features: latest_features, + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, + forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), + // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value + // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` + // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). + // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the + // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. + outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { + Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + }, + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so + // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. + channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: false, + is_public: channel.should_announce(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.config()), + } + } } /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments. @@ -1404,48 +1526,45 @@ macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { }} } -/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error) -macro_rules! convert_chan_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { - match $err { - ChannelError::Warn(msg) => { - (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone())) - }, - ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => { - (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone())) - }, - ChannelError::Close(msg) => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel); - let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true); - (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(), - shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok())) - }, +macro_rules! break_chan_entry { + ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => { + match $res { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(e) => { + let channel_id = $entry.key().clone(); + let (drop, res) = $self.convert_funded_chan_err(e, $entry.get_mut(), &channel_id); + if drop { + $entry.remove_entry(); + } + break Err(res); + } } } } -macro_rules! break_chan_entry { +macro_rules! try_chan_entry { ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => { match $res { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + let channel_id = $entry.key().clone(); + let (drop, res) = $self.convert_funded_chan_err(e, $entry.get_mut(), &channel_id); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } - break Err(res); + return Err(res); } } } } -macro_rules! try_chan_entry { +macro_rules! try_outbound_v1_chan_entry { ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => { match $res { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + let channel_id = $entry.key().clone(); + let (drop, res) = $self.convert_outbound_v1_chan_err(e, $entry.get_mut(), &channel_id); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } @@ -1465,6 +1584,26 @@ macro_rules! remove_channel { } } +macro_rules! remove_inbound_v1_channel { + ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => { + { + let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1; + $self.update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(&channel.channel_id(), channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + channel + } + } +} + +macro_rules! remove_outbound_v1_channel { + ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => { + { + let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1; + $self.update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(&channel.channel_id(), channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + channel + } + } +} + macro_rules! send_channel_ready { ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { @@ -1733,7 +1872,7 @@ where let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - match FundedChannel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key, + match OutboundV1Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) { @@ -1747,7 +1886,7 @@ where let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id(); - match peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { + match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(fuzzing) { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() }); @@ -1765,7 +1904,7 @@ where Ok(temporary_channel_id) } - fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + fn list_funded_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res` // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside @@ -1792,7 +1931,37 @@ where /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for /// more information. pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec { - self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true) + // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res` + // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without + // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside + // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is + // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for + // the same channel. + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); + { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.iter() { + let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, + peer_state.latest_features.clone()); + res.push(details); + } + for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() { + let details = ChannelDetails::from_inbound_v1_channel(channel, best_block_height, + peer_state.latest_features.clone()); + res.push(details); + } + for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() { + let details = ChannelDetails::from_outbound_v1_channel(channel, best_block_height, + peer_state.latest_features.clone()); + res.push(details); + } + } + } + res } /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to @@ -1805,7 +1974,7 @@ where // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user // really wanted anyway. - self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live()) + self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live()) } /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order. @@ -2002,30 +2171,54 @@ where let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?; - let mut chan = { + let (update_res, counterparty_node_id) = { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg { + ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) } + } else { + ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed + }; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { - if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg { - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }); - } else { - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); - } - remove_channel!(self, chan) + self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(), closure_reason); + let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan); + self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); + (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) + } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { + channel_id: chan.get().channel_id(), + user_channel_id: chan.get().get_user_id(), + reason: closure_reason + }); + let mut chan = remove_inbound_v1_channel!(self, chan); + self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); + let err = Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}); + (err, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) + } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { + channel_id: chan.get().channel_id(), + user_channel_id: chan.get().get_user_id(), + reason: closure_reason + }); + let mut chan = remove_outbound_v1_channel!(self, chan); + self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); + let err = Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}); + (err, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) } else { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) }); } }; log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); - self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + if let Ok(update) = update_res { let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } - Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) + Ok(counterparty_node_id) } fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> { @@ -2757,7 +2950,7 @@ where /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel. - fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( + fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput ) -> Result<(), APIError> { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); @@ -2767,27 +2960,28 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; let (chan, msg) = { - let (res, chan) = { - match peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { - Some(mut chan) => { + let res = { + match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; - (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) - .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { - MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) + chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) + .map_err(|e| if let (mut chan, ChannelError::Close(msg)) = e { + let err = MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None); + (chan, err) } else { unreachable!(); }) - , chan) }, None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) }, } }; - match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { - Ok(funding_msg) => { - (chan, funding_msg) + match res { + Ok(res) => res, + Err((chan, err)) => match handle_error!(self, Err::(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { + Ok(_) => { unreachable!() }, + Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() + }) }, }, - Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() - }) }, } }; @@ -2999,7 +3193,8 @@ where chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) }, None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id) + err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.", + log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id) }) } }; @@ -3602,7 +3797,7 @@ where if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { - let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); + let (needs_close, err) = self.convert_funded_chan_err(e, chan, chan_id); handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id)); if needs_close { return false; } } @@ -4334,14 +4529,15 @@ where fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.funded_channel_by_id.is_empty()); + let peers_without_funded_channels = + self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 }); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.len() == 1; - match peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1; + match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => { if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() }); @@ -4402,7 +4598,7 @@ where let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap(); if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; } let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height); - if num_unfunded_channels == peer.funded_channel_by_id.len() { + if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() { peers_without_funded_channels += 1; } } @@ -4421,6 +4617,11 @@ where num_unfunded_channels += 1; } } + for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() { + if chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 { + num_unfunded_channels += 1; + } + } num_unfunded_channels } @@ -4441,7 +4642,8 @@ where // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels. - let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.funded_channel_by_id.is_empty()); + let channeled_peers_without_funding = + self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) @@ -4455,7 +4657,7 @@ where // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones. - if peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.is_empty() && + if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 && channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS && !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels { @@ -4471,7 +4673,7 @@ where msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let mut channel = match FundedChannel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, + let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias) { @@ -4481,12 +4683,17 @@ where }, Ok(res) => res }; - match peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + if peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(entry.key()) || peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.contains_key(entry.key()) { + self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) + } + if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels { if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); @@ -4524,9 +4731,9 @@ where })?; let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - match peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { + match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan); + try_outbound_v1_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan); (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) @@ -4555,10 +4762,21 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) = - match peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove()) + let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) = + match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => { + let inbound_chan = chan.remove(); + match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => { + let (drop, err) = self.convert_inbound_v1_chan_err(err, &mut inbound_chan, &msg.temporary_channel_id); + if !drop { + // This shouldn't really ever happen, as we always get `ChannelError::Close`, but covering this in case. + peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(msg.temporary_channel_id, inbound_chan); + } + return Err(err); + }, + } }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) }; @@ -5384,7 +5602,7 @@ where }, Err(e) => { has_update = true; - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); + let (close_channel, res) = self.convert_funded_chan_err(e, chan, channel_id); handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); !close_channel } @@ -5713,6 +5931,97 @@ where self.persistence_notifier.notify(); } } + + /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error) + fn convert_funded_chan_err( + &self, err: ChannelError, channel: &mut FundedChannel<<::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, + channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> (bool, MsgHandleErrInternal) { + match err { + ChannelError::Warn(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Close(msg) => { + log_error!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]), msg); + self.update_maps_on_funded_chan_removal(channel); + let shutdown_res = channel.force_shutdown(true); + (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), + shutdown_res, self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok())) + }, + } + } + + /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the `InboundV1Channel` object from memory, a mapped error) + fn convert_inbound_v1_chan_err( + &self, err: ChannelError, channel: &mut InboundV1Channel<<::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, + channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> (bool, MsgHandleErrInternal) { + match err { + ChannelError::Warn(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Close(msg) => { + log_error!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]), msg); + self.update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(channel_id, channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + let shutdown_res = channel.force_shutdown(true); + (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), + shutdown_res, None)) + }, + } + } + + /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the `InboundV1Channel` object from memory, a mapped error) + fn convert_outbound_v1_chan_err( + &self, err: ChannelError, channel: &mut OutboundV1Channel<<::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, + channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> (bool, MsgHandleErrInternal) { + match err { + ChannelError::Warn(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Close(msg) => { + log_error!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]), msg); + self.update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(channel_id, channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + let shutdown_res = channel.force_shutdown(true); + (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), + shutdown_res, None)) + }, + } + } + + fn remove_outbound_scid_alias(&self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) { + let alias_removed = self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); + debug_assert!(alias_removed); + } + + fn update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], outbound_scid_alias: u64) { + self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(channel_id); + self.remove_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); + self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); + } + + fn update_maps_on_funded_chan_removal(&self, channel: &mut FundedChannel<<::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) { + self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&channel.channel_id()); + let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id); + } else { + // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the + // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we + // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we + // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply + // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding + // stage. + self.remove_outbound_scid_alias(channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + } + short_to_chan_info.remove(&channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + } } impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager @@ -6311,6 +6620,24 @@ where } true }); + peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + self.update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(&chan.channel_id(), chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { + channel_id: chan.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: chan.get_user_id(), + reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, + }); + false + }); + peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + self.update_maps_on_pending_chan_removal(&chan.channel_id(), chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { + channel_id: chan.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: chan.get_user_id(), + reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, + }); + false + }); pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { match msg { &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false, @@ -6375,6 +6702,8 @@ where } e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { funded_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), + outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), + inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(), @@ -6463,7 +6792,7 @@ where if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; } let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - if let Some(chan) = peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, @@ -7445,6 +7774,8 @@ where let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let peer_state = PeerState { funded_channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()), + outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), + inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?, pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(), diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs index 2a988fa6ec3..42064d19ab9 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs @@ -694,6 +694,28 @@ macro_rules! get_channel_ref { } } +#[cfg(test)] +macro_rules! get_inbound_v1_channel_ref { + ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: ident, $peer_state_lock: ident, $channel_id: expr) => { + { + $per_peer_state_lock = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + $peer_state_lock = $per_peer_state_lock.get(&$counterparty_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + $peer_state_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&$channel_id).unwrap() + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +macro_rules! get_outbound_v1_channel_ref { + ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: ident, $peer_state_lock: ident, $channel_id: expr) => { + { + $per_peer_state_lock = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + $peer_state_lock = $per_peer_state_lock.get(&$counterparty_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + $peer_state_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&$channel_id).unwrap() + } + } +} + #[cfg(test)] macro_rules! get_feerate { ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index e9f7e5aecef..bc385ca9615 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCK use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource}; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash}; -use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelInterface, commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT}; +use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelInterface, commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA}; use crate::ln::channel::{FundedChannel, ChannelError}; use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils}; @@ -180,9 +180,15 @@ fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) { let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] }; let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock; let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock; - let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); - chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0; - chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000; + if send_from_initiator { + let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); + chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0; + chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000; + } else { + let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); + chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0; + chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000; + } } let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id); @@ -6891,8 +6897,8 @@ fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound() - if let Err(error) = FundedChannel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }), + // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new_outbound() + if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }), &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42) { @@ -6906,7 +6912,7 @@ fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() { nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap(); let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); open_channel.to_self_delay = 200; - if let Err(error) = FundedChannel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }), + if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }), &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42) { @@ -6938,7 +6944,7 @@ fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() { nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap(); let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); open_channel.to_self_delay = 200; - if let Err(error) = FundedChannel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }), + if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }), &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42) { @@ -7833,7 +7839,7 @@ fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() { let accept_chan_msg = { let mut node_1_per_peer_lock; let mut node_1_peer_state_lock; - let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); + let channel = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); channel.get_accept_channel_message() }; nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg); @@ -8720,16 +8726,16 @@ fn test_duplicate_chan_id() { nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event - let funding_created = { + let (_, funding_created) = { let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead). - let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.funded_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap(); + let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap(); let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); - as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap() + as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|(_, e)| e).unwrap() }; check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created); @@ -9400,7 +9406,7 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e if on_holder_tx { let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; - let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id); + let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id); chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546; } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs index b25e9bdc6bd..11d0d288d73 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs @@ -1427,7 +1427,9 @@ fn do_test_intercepted_payment(test: InterceptTest) { // Check for unknown channel id error. let unknown_chan_id_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &[42; 32], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err(); - assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) }); + assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.", + log_bytes!([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) }); if test == InterceptTest::Fail { // Ensure we can fail the intercepted payment back. @@ -1451,7 +1453,9 @@ fn do_test_intercepted_payment(test: InterceptTest) { // Check that we'll fail as expected when sending to a channel that isn't in `ChannelReady` yet. let temp_chan_id = nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); let unusable_chan_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &temp_chan_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err(); - assert_eq!(unusable_chan_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(temp_chan_id)) }); + assert_eq!(unusable_chan_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.", + log_bytes!(temp_chan_id), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) }); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1); // Open the just-in-time channel so the payment can then be forwarded.