diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs index b71f10f58d4..b502c6af629 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs @@ -636,6 +636,27 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter, ) } } + + /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from force-closed channels after a transaction + /// signature generation failure. + /// + /// `monitor_opt` can be used as a filter to only trigger them for a specific channel monitor. + pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, monitor_opt: Option) { + let monitors = self.monitors.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(funding_txo) = monitor_opt { + if let Some(monitor_holder) = monitors.get(&funding_txo) { + monitor_holder.monitor.signer_unblocked( + &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &self.logger + ) + } + } else { + for (_, monitor_holder) in &*monitors { + monitor_holder.monitor.signer_unblocked( + &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &self.logger + ) + } + } + } } impl diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 924fc63fbba..5848cf192ec 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -1769,6 +1769,25 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ); } + /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction + /// signature generation failure. + pub fn signer_unblocked( + &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L, + ) + where + B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator); + let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner); + let current_height = inner.best_block.height; + inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims( + current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger, + ); + } + /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be @@ -1811,6 +1830,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) { self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script; } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn do_signer_call ()>(&self, mut f: F) { + let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer); + } } impl ChannelMonitorImpl { @@ -3508,9 +3533,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { continue; } } else { None }; - if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx( - &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) { - holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx); + if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx( + &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage + ) { + if !htlc_tx.input.iter().any(|input| input.witness.is_empty()) { + holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx); + } } } } diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs b/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs index 1adf34e6fa1..51a3705680c 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs @@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim { /// Represents the different feerates a pending request can use when generating a claim. pub(crate) enum FeerateStrategy { + /// We must reuse the most recently used feerate, if any. + RetryPrevious, /// We must pick the highest between the most recently used and the current feerate estimate. HighestOfPreviousOrNew, /// We must force a bump of the most recently used feerate, either by using the current feerate @@ -506,9 +508,13 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler } match claim { OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => { - let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Broadcasting RBF-bumped" } else { "Rebroadcasting" }; - log_info!(logger, "{} onchain {}", log_start, log_tx!(tx)); - broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); + if tx.input.iter().any(|input| input.witness.is_empty()) { + log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of unsigned onchain transaction {}", tx.txid()); + } else { + let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Broadcasting RBF-bumped" } else { "Rebroadcasting" }; + log_info!(logger, "{} onchain {}", log_start, log_tx!(tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); + } }, OnchainClaim::Event(event) => { let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Yielding fee-bumped" } else { "Replaying" }; @@ -610,7 +616,7 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler ) { assert!(new_feerate != 0); - let transaction = cached_request.finalize_malleable_package( + let transaction = cached_request.maybe_finalize_malleable_package( cur_height, self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger ).unwrap(); log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer, new_feerate); @@ -623,7 +629,7 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler // which require external funding. let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs(); debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1); - let tx = match cached_request.finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) { + let tx = match cached_request.maybe_finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) { Some(tx) => tx, None => return None, }; @@ -645,8 +651,8 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler let commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(fee_sat, tx.weight().to_wu()); if commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight >= package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight { - log_debug!(logger, "Pre-signed {} already has feerate {} sat/kW above required {} sat/kW", - log_tx!(tx), commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, + log_debug!(logger, "Pre-signed commitment {} already has feerate {} sat/kW above required {} sat/kW", + tx.txid(), commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight); return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))); } @@ -785,8 +791,12 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler // `OnchainClaim`. let claim_id = match claim { OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => { - log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); - broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); + if tx.input.iter().any(|input| input.witness.is_empty()) { + log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of unsigned onchain transaction {}", tx.txid()); + } else { + log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); + } ClaimId(tx.txid().to_byte_array()) }, OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => { @@ -978,8 +988,13 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler ) { match bump_claim { OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => { - log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx)); - broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]); + if bump_tx.input.iter().any(|input| input.witness.is_empty()) { + log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of RBF-bumped unsigned onchain transaction {}", + bump_tx.txid()); + } else { + log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]); + } }, OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => { log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints()); @@ -1061,8 +1076,12 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler request.set_feerate(new_feerate); match bump_claim { OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => { - log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx)); - broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]); + if bump_tx.input.iter().any(|input| input.witness.is_empty()) { + log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of unsigned onchain transaction {}", bump_tx.txid()); + } else { + log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]); + } }, OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => { log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints()); @@ -1115,13 +1134,10 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler &self.holder_commitment.trust().built_transaction().transaction } - //TODO: getting lastest holder transactions should be infallible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may - // have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after OutboundV1Channel::get_funding_created, - // before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing - // to monitor before. - pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction { - let sig = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("signing holder commitment"); - self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig) + pub(crate) fn get_maybe_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction { + self.signer.sign_holder_commitment(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) + .map(|sig| self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| self.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx().clone()) } #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] @@ -1130,7 +1146,7 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig) } - pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option) -> Option { + pub(crate) fn get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option) -> Option { let get_signed_htlc_tx = |holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction| { let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust(); if trusted_tx.txid() != outp.txid { @@ -1158,10 +1174,11 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler preimage: preimage.clone(), counterparty_sig: counterparty_htlc_sig.clone(), }; - let htlc_sig = self.signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &htlc_descriptor, &self.secp_ctx).unwrap(); - htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness( - htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, &htlc_sig, preimage, - ); + if let Ok(htlc_sig) = self.signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &htlc_descriptor, &self.secp_ctx) { + htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness( + htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, &htlc_sig, preimage, + ); + } Some(htlc_tx) }; diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/package.rs b/lightning/src/chain/package.rs index 52cdf9f37fd..908283f1070 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/package.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/package.rs @@ -633,14 +633,14 @@ impl PackageSolvingData { } true } - fn get_finalized_tx(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler) -> Option { + fn get_maybe_finalized_tx(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler) -> Option { match self { PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { debug_assert!(!outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); - return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage); + onchain_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage) } PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => { - return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)); + Some(onchain_handler.get_maybe_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)) } _ => { panic!("API Error!"); } } @@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ impl PackageTemplate { } htlcs } - pub(crate) fn finalize_malleable_package( + pub(crate) fn maybe_finalize_malleable_package( &self, current_height: u32, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler, value: u64, destination_script: ScriptBuf, logger: &L ) -> Option { @@ -927,19 +927,17 @@ impl PackageTemplate { } for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() { log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout); - if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; } + if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { continue; } } - log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid()); Some(bumped_tx) } - pub(crate) fn finalize_untractable_package( + pub(crate) fn maybe_finalize_untractable_package( &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler, logger: &L, ) -> Option { debug_assert!(!self.is_malleable()); if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() { - if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) { + if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_maybe_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) { log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout); - log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid()); return Some(final_tx); } return None; @@ -996,6 +994,7 @@ impl PackageTemplate { if self.feerate_previous != 0 { let previous_feerate = self.feerate_previous.try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value()); match feerate_strategy { + FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious => previous_feerate, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew => cmp::max(previous_feerate, feerate_estimate), FeerateStrategy::ForceBump => if feerate_estimate > previous_feerate { feerate_estimate @@ -1141,6 +1140,10 @@ where // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee... let (new_fee, new_feerate) = if let Some((new_fee, new_feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) { match feerate_strategy { + FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious => { + let previous_fee = previous_feerate * predicted_weight / 1000; + (previous_fee, previous_feerate) + }, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew => if new_feerate > previous_feerate { (new_fee, new_feerate) } else { diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs index 0f51bea0d36..10f4239a188 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs @@ -10,7 +10,12 @@ //! Tests for asynchronous signing. These tests verify that the channel state machine behaves //! properly with a signer implementation that asynchronously derives signatures. -use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; +use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, Amount}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; + +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; +use crate::events::bump_transaction::WalletSource; +use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; @@ -321,3 +326,124 @@ fn test_async_commitment_signature_for_peer_disconnect() { }; } } + +fn do_test_async_holder_signatures(anchors: bool, remote_commitment: bool) { + // Ensures that we can obtain holder signatures for commitment and HTLC transactions + // asynchronously by allowing their retrieval to fail and retrying via + // `ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`. + let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let closing_node = if remote_commitment { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }; + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![ + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: closing_node.wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + ], + }; + if anchors { + *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2; + *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2; + closing_node.wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + } + + // Route an HTLC and set the signer as unavailable. + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + + nodes[0].set_channel_signer_available(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_id, false); + + if remote_commitment { + // Make the counterparty broadcast its latest commitment. + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000); + } else { + // We'll connect blocks until the sender has to go onchain to time out the HTLC. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); + + // No transaction should be broadcast since the signer is not available yet. + assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // Mark it as available now, we should see the signed commitment transaction. + nodes[0].set_channel_signer_available(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_id, true); + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).signer_unblocked(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster, nodes[0].fee_estimator, &nodes[0].logger); + } + + let commitment_tx = { + let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + if anchors || remote_commitment { + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + txn.remove(0) + } else { + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == funding_tx.txid() { + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]); + txn.remove(0) + } else { + check_spends!(txn[1], funding_tx); + check_spends!(txn[0], txn[1]); + txn.remove(1) + } + } + }; + + // Mark it as unavailable again to now test the HTLC transaction. We'll mine the commitment such + // that the HTLC transaction is retried. + nodes[0].set_channel_signer_available(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_id, false); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx); + + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000); + + // If the counterparty broadcast its latest commitment, we need to mine enough blocks for the + // HTLC timeout. + if remote_commitment { + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); + } + + // No HTLC transaction should be broadcast as the signer is not available yet. + if anchors && !remote_commitment { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1); + } + assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty()); + + // Mark it as available now, we should see the signed HTLC transaction. + nodes[0].set_channel_signer_available(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_id, true); + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).signer_unblocked(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster, nodes[0].fee_estimator, &nodes[0].logger); + + if anchors && !remote_commitment { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1); + } + { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx); + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_async_holder_signatures() { + do_test_async_holder_signatures(false, false); + do_test_async_holder_signatures(false, true); + do_test_async_holder_signatures(true, false); + do_test_async_holder_signatures(true, true); +} diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index 2007a9e772c..dc5afd3612c 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -1258,7 +1258,10 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`]. + #[cfg(not(test))] channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], + #[cfg(test)] + pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it. diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs index e7fc68924ef..58d3b503474 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs @@ -487,16 +487,38 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c> Node<'a, 'b, 'c> { /// `release_commitment_secret` are affected by this setting. #[cfg(test)] pub fn set_channel_signer_available(&self, peer_id: &PublicKey, chan_id: &ChannelId, available: bool) { + use crate::sign::ChannelSigner; + log_debug!(self.logger, "Setting channel signer for {} as available={}", chan_id, available); + let per_peer_state = self.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(peer_id).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); - let signer = (|| { - match chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(chan_id) { - Some(phase) => phase.context().get_signer(), - None => panic!("Couldn't find a channel with id {}", chan_id), + + let mut channel_keys_id = None; + if let Some(chan) = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(chan_id).map(|phase| phase.context()) { + chan.get_signer().as_ecdsa().unwrap().set_available(available); + channel_keys_id = Some(chan.channel_keys_id); + } + + let mut monitor = None; + for (funding_txo, channel_id) in self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() { + if *chan_id == channel_id { + monitor = self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_txo).ok(); } - })(); - log_debug!(self.logger, "Setting channel signer for {} as available={}", chan_id, available); - signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().set_available(available); + } + if let Some(monitor) = monitor { + monitor.do_signer_call(|signer| { + channel_keys_id = channel_keys_id.or(Some(signer.inner.channel_keys_id())); + signer.set_available(available) + }); + } + + if available { + self.keys_manager.unavailable_signers.lock().unwrap() + .remove(channel_keys_id.as_ref().unwrap()); + } else { + self.keys_manager.unavailable_signers.lock().unwrap() + .insert(channel_keys_id.unwrap()); + } } } diff --git a/lightning/src/sign/ecdsa.rs b/lightning/src/sign/ecdsa.rs index 2e98213c182..15e85634834 100644 --- a/lightning/src/sign/ecdsa.rs +++ b/lightning/src/sign/ecdsa.rs @@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ pub trait EcdsaChannelSigner: ChannelSigner { /// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction. /// /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. + /// + /// An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid + /// signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after + /// previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its + /// monitor. + /// + /// [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked // // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. fn sign_holder_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, @@ -108,8 +115,14 @@ pub trait EcdsaChannelSigner: ChannelSigner { /// [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) /// broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction. /// + /// An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid + /// signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after + /// previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its + /// monitor. + /// /// [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor + /// [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 ) -> Result; @@ -141,6 +154,13 @@ pub trait EcdsaChannelSigner: ChannelSigner { secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; /// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an /// input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`. + /// + /// An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid + /// signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after + /// previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its + /// monitor. + /// + /// [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked fn sign_holder_anchor_input( &self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, ) -> Result; diff --git a/lightning/src/util/test_channel_signer.rs b/lightning/src/util/test_channel_signer.rs index a2cbf78b700..bfa3e32c91f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/util/test_channel_signer.rs +++ b/lightning/src/util/test_channel_signer.rs @@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ impl TestChannelSigner { /// When `true`, methods are forwarded to the underlying signer as normal. When `false`, some /// methods will return `Err` indicating that the signer is unavailable. Intended to be used for /// testing asynchronous signing. - #[cfg(test)] pub fn set_available(&self, available: bool) { *self.available.lock().unwrap() = available; } @@ -210,10 +209,16 @@ impl EcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner { } fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() { + return Err(()); + } Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output(&self.inner, justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, secp_ctx).unwrap()) } fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() { + return Err(()); + } Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self.inner, justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap()) } @@ -221,6 +226,9 @@ impl EcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner { &self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 ) -> Result { + if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() { + return Err(()); + } let state = self.state.lock().unwrap(); if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number && state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number @@ -254,6 +262,9 @@ impl EcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner { } fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() { + return Err(()); + } Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self.inner, htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap()) } @@ -270,6 +281,9 @@ impl EcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner { // As long as our minimum dust limit is enforced and is greater than our anchor output // value, an anchor output can only have an index within [0, 1]. assert!(anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 0 || anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 1); + if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() { + return Err(()); + } EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_anchor_input(&self.inner, anchor_tx, input, secp_ctx) } diff --git a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs index a96711d144c..902d0f61d48 100644 --- a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs @@ -1165,6 +1165,7 @@ pub struct TestKeysInterface { pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool, enforcement_states: Mutex>>>, expectations: Mutex>>, + pub unavailable_signers: Mutex>, } impl EntropySource for TestKeysInterface { @@ -1223,7 +1224,11 @@ impl SignerProvider for TestKeysInterface { fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> TestChannelSigner { let keys = self.backing.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id); let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed); - TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check) + let signer = TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check); + if self.unavailable_signers.lock().unwrap().contains(&channel_keys_id) { + signer.set_available(false); + } + signer } fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result { @@ -1261,6 +1266,7 @@ impl TestKeysInterface { disable_revocation_policy_check: false, enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), expectations: Mutex::new(None), + unavailable_signers: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()), } } @@ -1274,9 +1280,7 @@ impl TestKeysInterface { } pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, id: &[u8; 32]) -> TestChannelSigner { - let keys = self.backing.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, id); - let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed); - TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check) + self.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, *id) } fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc> {