search.json

[
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-11.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries; and\n b. Reveals error messages only to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n   Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages. The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited by adversaries includes, for example, erroneous logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as the username, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) information recorded, and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting information.  b. the ISSO, ISSM, and SCA\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-11"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the information; and\n b. Exempts [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] from marking as long as the media remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].\n\n   The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable security attributes. The term security labeling refers to the application/use of security attributes with regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Security\nmarking is generally not required for media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain or to be publicly releasable. However, some organizations may require markings for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable. Marking of information system media reflects applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.  MP-3 (b) Guidance: Second parameter not-applicable", 
        "title": "MP-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-21.html", 
        "text": "The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.\n\n   Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own, or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to enable clients to verify the authenticity and integrity of response data.", 
        "title": "SC-21"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of organizational users).\n\n   Organizational users include employees or individuals that organizations deem to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers). This control applies to all accesses other than: (i) accesses that are explicitly identified and documented in AC-14; and (ii) accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts (e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. Organizations employ passwords, tokens, or biometrics to authenticate user identities, or in the case multifactor authentication, or some combination thereof. Access to organizational information systems is defined as either local access or network access. Local access is any access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is\nobtained by direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is obtained through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a type of network access that involves communication through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Internal networks include local area networks and wide area networks. In addition, the use of encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) for network connections between organization- controlled endpoints and non-organization controlled endpoints may be treated as internal networks from the perspective of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information traversing the network.\n\nOrganizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements in this control by complying with the requirements in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 consistent with the specific organizational implementation plans. Multifactor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The factors are defined as: (i) something you know (e.g., password, personal identification number [PIN]); (ii) something you have (e.g.,\ncryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., biometric). Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD common access card. In addition to identifying and authenticating users at the information system level\n(i.e., at logon), organizations also employ identification and authentication mechanisms at the application level, when necessary, to provide increased information security. Identification and authentication requirements for other than organizational users are described in IA-8.", 
        "title": "IA-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\na. Uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements and copyright laws;\nb. Tracks the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses to control copying and distribution; and\nc. Controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.\n\n   Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual methods (e.g., simple spreadsheets) or automated methods (e.g., specialized tracking applications) depending on organizational needs.", 
        "title": "CM-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization conducts penetration testing [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components].\n\n   Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on information systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. Such testing can be used to either validate vulnerabilities or determine the degree of resistance organizational information systems have to adversaries within a set of specified constraints (e.g., time, resources, and/or skills). Penetration testing attempts to duplicate\nthe actions of adversaries in carrying out hostile cyber attacks against organizations and provides a more in-depth analysis of security-related weaknesses/deficiencies. Organizations can also use the results of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing activities. Penetration testing can be conducted on the hardware, software, or firmware components of an information system and can exercise both physical and technical security controls. A standard method for penetration testing includes, for example: (i) pretest analysis based on full knowledge of the target system; (ii) pretest identification of potential vulnerabilities based on pretest analysis; and (iii) testing designed to determine exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement before the commencement of penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the penetration testing rules of engagement with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be employed by adversaries carrying out attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide decisions on the level of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG Guidance: See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents> Penetration Test Guidance \nhttps://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/", 
        "title": "CA-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-17.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] at alternate work sites;\n b. Assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites; and\n c. Provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in case of security incidents or problems.\n\n   Alternate work sites may include, for example, government facilities or private residences of employees. While commonly distinct from alternative processing sites, alternate work sites may provide readily available alternate locations as part of contingency operations. Organizations may define different sets of security controls for specific alternate work sites or types of sites depending on the work-related activities conducted at those sites. This control supports the contingency planning activities of organizations and the federal telework initiative.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings but must include all applicable building and safety codes for the information system's environment\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-17"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that:\n   1. Accurately reflects the current information system;\n   2. Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system;\n   3. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and\n   4. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve effective information system component accountability]; and\n b. Reviews and updates the information system component inventory [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system component inventories that include components from all organizational information systems. In such situations, organizations ensure that the resulting inventories include system-specific information required for proper component accountability (e.g., information system association, information system owner). Information deemed necessary for effective accountability of information system components includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications, software license information, software version numbers, component owners, and for networked components or devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include, for example, manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location.  a. hardware inventory specifications (manufacturer, type, model, serial number, physical location), software license information, information system/component owner, and for a networked component/device, the machine name.;\r\nb. at a minimum, annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CM-8 Requirement: must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.", 
        "title": "CM-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-11.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; and\n b. Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.\n\n   Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities can be determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the application level. Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example, if organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays.  a. 15 minutes\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-11"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities for third-party providers;\n b. Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures established by the organization;\n c. Documents personnel security requirements;\n d. Requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and\n e. Monitors provider compliance.\n\n  Third-party providers include, for example, service bureaus, contractors, and other organizations providing information system development, information technology services, outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. Third-party providers may have personnel working at organizational facilities with credentials, badges, or information system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of third-party personnel changes ensure appropriate termination of privileges and credentials. Organizations define the transfers and terminations deemed reportable by security-related characteristics that include, for example, functions, roles, and nature of credentials/privileges associated with individuals transferred or terminated. \n\n d. at a minimum, the ISSO and personnel responsible for transferring credentials\n\nd. immediately\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect and respond to physical security incidents;\n b. Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and upon occurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events]; and\n c. Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response capability.\n\n   Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of and responses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas not normally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses.  b. every 30 days\n\nb. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-17.html", 
        "text": "The organization issues public key certificates under an [Assignment: organization- defined certificate policy] or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.\n\n   For all certificates, organizations manage information system trust stores to ensure only approved trust anchors are in the trust stores. This control addresses both certificates with visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services.  DoDI 8520.02, \"Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-17"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system operations] for essential missions/business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives] when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable;\n b. Ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption; and \n c. Ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.\n\n   Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary processing sites. An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the event that the primary processing site is not available. Items covered by alternate processing site agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of personnel. Requirements are specifically allocated to alternate processing sites that reflect the requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\na. 1 hour (Availability High ) 12 hours (Availability Moderate) as defined in the contingency plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CP-7 (a) Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.", 
        "title": "CP-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information system account types];\n b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts;\n c. Establishes conditions for group and role membership;\n d. Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account;\n e. Requires approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests to create information system accounts;\n f. Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions];\n g. Monitors the use of, information system accounts;\n h. Notifies account managers:\n   1. When accounts are no longer required;\n   2. When users are terminated or transferred; and\n   3. When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes;\n i. Authorizes access to the information system based on:\n   1. A valid access authorization;\n   2. Intended system usage; and\n   3. Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions;\n j. Reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n k. Establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group.\n  Information system account types include individual, shared, group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, and service. Some of the account management requirements listed above can be implemented by organizational information systems. The identification of authorized users of the information system and the specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system accounts receive additional scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner, mission/business owner, or chief information security officer) responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, by type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for authorizing access include, for example, restrictions on time-of-day, day-of-week, and point-of-origin. In defining other account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements (e.g., scheduled maintenance, system upgrades) and mission/business requirements, (e.g., time zone differences, customer requirements, remote access to support travel requirements). Failure to consider these factors could affect information system availability. Temporary and emergency accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as a part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local logon accounts used for special tasks defined by organizations or when network resources are unavailable). Such accounts remain available and are not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions for disabling or deactivating accounts include, for example: (i) when shared/group, emergency, or temporary accounts are no longer required; or (ii) when individuals are transferred or terminated. Some types of information system accounts may require specialized training.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\ne. ISSM or ISSO\n\nf. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nj. at a minimum, annually \n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:\n a. Perform configuration management during system, component, or service [Selection (one or more): design; development; implementation; operation];\n b. Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration items under configuration management];\n c. Implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;\n d. Document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential security impacts of such changes; and\n e. Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].\n\n   This control also applies to organizations conducting internal information systems development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of the configuration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective security safeguards. Safeguards include, for example, protecting from unauthorized modification or destruction, the master copies of all material used to generate security-relevant portions of the system hardware, software, and firmware. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the information system, information system component, or information system service requires configuration control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Configuration items that are placed under configuration management (if existence/use is required by other security controls) include: the formal model; the functional, high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data; implementation documentation; source code and hardware schematics; the running version of the object code; tools for comparing new versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source code with previous versions; and test fixtures and documentation. Depending on the mission/business needs of organizations and the nature of the contractual relationships in place, developers may provide configuration management support during the operations and maintenance phases of the life cycle.  b. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\ne. at a minimum, the ISSO and ISSM\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SA-10 (e)  Requirement: for JAB authorizations, track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to organization-defined personnel, to include FedRAMP.", 
        "title": "SA-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the event.\n\n   Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred).", 
        "title": "AU-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.\n\n   Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, Information System Security Managers, and Information System Security Engineers) conduct security impact analyses. Individuals conducting security impact analyses possess the necessary skills/technical expertise to analyze the changes to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementation and how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional security controls are required. Security impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security categories of the information systems.", 
        "title": "CM-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-6.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects the availability of resources by allocating [Assignment: organization-defined resources] by [Selection (one or more); priority; quota; [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]].\n\n   Priority protection helps prevent lower-priority processes from delaying or interfering with the information system servicing any higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources. This control does not apply to information system components for which there are only single users/roles.\n\nControl Enhancements:  None.\n\nReferences:  None.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-7.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system;\n b. Implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are [Selection: physically; logically] separated from internal organizational networks; and\n c. Connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security architecture.\n\n   Managed interfaces include, for example, gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based malicious code analysis and virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application gateways residing on protected subnetworks). Subnetworks that are physically or logically separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or prohibiting interfaces within organizational information systems includes, for example, restricting external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external traffic that appears to be spoofing internal addresses. Organizations consider the shared nature of commercial telecommunications services in the implementation of security controls associated with the use of such services. Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on network components and consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial customers, and may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements. Such transmission services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security provisions.", 
        "title": "SC-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization defines, documents, approves, and enforces physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.\n\n   Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of information systems can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the systems. Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access information systems for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Organizations maintain records of access to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to support after-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes. Access restrictions for change also include software libraries. Access restrictions include, for example, physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), workflow automation, media libraries, abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times, making unauthorized changes easy to discover).", 
        "title": "CM-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events: [Assignment: organization-defined auditable events];\n b. Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit- related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events;\n c. Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after- the-fact investigations of security incidents; and\n d. Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system: [Assignment: organization-defined audited events (the subset of the auditable events defined in AU-2 a.) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified event].\n\n   An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information system. Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to the security of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate in order to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. Audit events can include, for example, password changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems, administrative privilege usage, PIV credential usage, or third-party credential usage. In determining the set of auditable events, organizations consider the auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be implemented. To balance auditing requirements with other information system needs, this control also requires identifying that subset of auditable events that are audited at a given point in time. For example, organizations may determine that information systems must have the capability to log every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for specific circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. Auditing requirements, including the need for auditable events, may be referenced in other security controls and control enhancements. Organizations also include auditable events that are required by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Audit records can be generated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level as information traverses the network. Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability and can facilitate the identification of root causes to problems. Organizations consider in the definition of auditable events, the auditing necessary to cover related events such as the steps in distributed, transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple organizations) and actions that occur in service-oriented architectures.  AU-2 Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.", 
        "title": "AU-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the organization\u2019s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during\nthe assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system; and\n b. Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous monitoring activities.\n\n   Plans of action and milestones are key documents in security authorization packages and are subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB.  b. At least every 90 days\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CA-5 Requirement: POA&Ms must be provided at least monthly.\nCA-5 Guidance: See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service\nProvider (CSP) Documents> Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) Template Completion Guide\nhttps://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/", 
        "title": "CA-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.\n\n  Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies, attribute-based policies) and access enforcement mechanisms (e.g., access control lists, access control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records, domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information system level and recognizing that information systems can host many applications and services in support of organizational missions and business operations, access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security.", 
        "title": "AC-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-11.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:\n a. Create and implement a security assessment plan;\n b. Perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Assignment: organization-defined depth and coverage];\n c. Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation;\n d. Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; and\n e. Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.\n\n   Developmental security testing/evaluation occurs at all post\u2010design phases of the system development life cycle. Such testing/evaluation confirms that the required security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security policy, and meeting established security requirements. Security properties of information systems may be affected by the interconnection of system components or changes to those components. These interconnections or changes (e.g., upgrading or replacing applications and operating systems) may adversely affect previously implemented security controls. This control provides additional types of security testing/evaluation that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential flaws. Testing custom software applications may require approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Developers can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Security assessment plans provide the specific activities that developers plan to carry out including the types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of software and firmware components, the degree of rigor to be applied, and the types of artifacts produced during those processes. The depth of security testing/evaluation refers to the rigor and level of detail associated with the assessment process (e.g., black box, gray box, or white box testing). The coverage of security testing/evaluation refers to the scope (i.e., number and type) of the artifacts included in the assessment process. Contracts specify the acceptance criteria for security assessment plans, flaw remediation processes, and the evidence that the plans/processes have been diligently applied. Methods for reviewing and protecting assessment plans, evidence, and documentation are commensurate with the security category or classification level of the information system. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.  b. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-11"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and retrieval of information system backup information; and\n b. Ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.\n\n   Alternate storage sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary storage sites. An alternate storage site maintains duplicate copies of information and data in the event that the primary storage site is not available. Items covered by alternate storage site agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval of backup\nmedia. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so that organizations can maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems.", 
        "title": "CP-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.\n\n   Recovery is executing information system contingency plan activities to restore organizational missions/business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning organizational information systems to fully operational states. Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities, recovery point/time and reconstitution objectives, and established organizational metrics consistent with contingency plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of any interim information system capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes assessments of fully restored information system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous monitoring activities, potential information system reauthorizations, and activities to prepare the systems against future disruptions, compromises, or failures. Recovery/reconstitution capabilities employed by organizations can include both automated mechanisms and manual procedures.", 
        "title": "CP-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pl-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information system, the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to information and information system usage;\n b. Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to information and the information system;\n c. Reviews and updates the rules of behavior [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and d. Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to read and\nresign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated.\n\n  This control enhancement applies to organizational users. Organizations consider rules of behavior based on individual user roles and responsibilities, differentiating, for example, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules that apply to general users. Establishing rules of behavior for some types of non-organizational users including, for example, individuals who simply receive data/information from federal information systems, is often not feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of their interactions with the systems. Rules of behavior for both organizational and non-organizational users can also be established in AC-8, System Use Notification. PL-4 b. (the signed acknowledgment portion of this control) may be satisfied by the security awareness training and role-based security training programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behavior. Organizations can use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behavior.  c. annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PL-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and associated system and information integrity controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. System and information integrity policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2.  System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all appointed information assurance personnel\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems;\n b. Reviews and updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n c. Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information systems:\n   1. Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and\n   2. Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n  Access agreements include, for example, nondisclosure agreements, acceptable use agreements, rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access agreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to abide by the constraints associated with organizational information systems to which access is authorized. Organizations can use electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unless specifically prohibited by organizational policy.  b. annually\n\nc (2) when there is a change to the user's level of access\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-10.html", 
        "text": "The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment: organization-defined account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number].\n\n   Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for information system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user, domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may limit the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in particularly sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple system accounts.\n\nControl Enhancements:  None.\n\nReferences: None.\n\n all account types and/or accounts\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated incident response controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Incident response policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Incident response procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel identified as stakeholders in the incident response process, as well as the ISSM and ISSO\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ma-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy and associated system maintenance controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. System maintenance policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. System maintenance procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all stakeholders identified in the maintenance policy\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "MA-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that:\n a. Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures;\n b. Establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items;\n c. Defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items under configuration management; and\n d. Protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.\n\n   Configuration management plans satisfy the requirements in configuration management policies while being tailored to individual information systems. Such plans define detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support system development life cycle activities at the information system level. Configuration management plans are typically developed during the development/acquisition phase of the system development life cycle. The plans describe how to move changes through change management processes, how to update configuration settings and baselines, how to maintain information system component inventories, how to control development, test, and operational environments, and how to develop, release, and update key documents. Organizations can employ templates to help ensure consistent and timely development and implementation of configuration management plans. Such templates can represent a master configuration management plan for the organization at large with subsets of the plan implemented on a system by system basis. Configuration management approval processes include designation of key management stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving proposed changes to information systems, and personnel that conduct security impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Configuration items are the information system items (hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) to be configuration-managed. As information systems continue through the system development life cycle, new configuration items may be identified and some existing configuration items may no longer need to be under configuration control.", 
        "title": "CM-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-16.html", 
        "text": "The organization authorizes, monitors, and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system components] entering and exiting the facility and maintains records of those items.\n\n   Effectively enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of information system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and possibly isolating the areas from the information system and media libraries.  All system components\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-16"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Authorizes internal connections of [Assignment: organization-defined information system components or classes of components] to the information system; and\n b. Documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated.\n\n   This control applies to connections between organizational information systems and (separate) constituent system components (i.e., intra-system connections) including, for example, system connections with mobile devices, notebook/desktop computers, printers, copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. Instead of authorizing each individual internal connection, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of components with common characteristics and/or configurations, for example, all digital printers, scanners, and copiers with a specified processing, storage, and transmission capability or all smart phones with a specific baseline configuration.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CA-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization- defined specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection.\n\n  Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and authentication may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information systems typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP], Radius server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks. Organizations determine the required strength of authentication mechanisms by the security categories of information systems. Because of the challenges of applying this control on large scale, organizations are encouraged to only apply the control to those limited number (and type) of devices that truly need to support this capability.  all mobile devices and network connected endpoint devices (including but not limited to: workstations, printers, servers (outside a datacenter), VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs). \n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IA-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-11.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined policies] governing the installation of software by users;\n b. Enforces software installation policies through [Assignment: organization-defined methods]; and\n c. Monitors policy compliance at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   If provided the necessary privileges, users have the ability to install software in organizational information systems. To maintain control over the types of software installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation. Permitted software installations may include, for example, updates and security patches to existing software and downloading applications from organization-approved \u201capp stores.\u201d Prohibited software installations may include, for example, software with unknown or suspect pedigrees or software that organizations consider potentially malicious. The policies organizations select governing user-installed software may be organization-developed or provided by some external entity. Policy enforcement methods include procedural methods (e.g., periodic examination of user accounts), automated methods (e.g., configuration settings implemented on organizational information systems), or both.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings;\r\nb. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings;\r\nc. at least monthly\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-11"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-20.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Provides additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries; and\n b. Provides the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child domains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.\n\n   This control enables external clients including, for example, remote Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include, for example, DNS Security (DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. The means to indicate the security status of child zones includes, for example, the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. The DNS security controls reflect (and are referenced from) OMB Memorandum 08-23. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data.", 
        "title": "SC-20"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pl-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops an information security architecture for the information system that:\n   1. Describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;\n   2. Describes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports the enterprise architecture; and\n   3. Describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external services;\n b. Reviews and updates the information security architecture [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture; and\n c. Ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security plan, the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational procurements/acquisitions.\n\n   This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design and development of information systems. The information security architecture at the individual information system level is consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide information security architecture described in PM-7 that is integral to and developed as part of the enterprise architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description, the placement/allocation of security functionality (including security controls), security-related information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and the protection mechanisms associated with each interface. In addition, the security architecture can include other important security-related information, for example, user roles and access privileges assigned to each role, unique security requirements, the types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system, restoration priorities of information and information system services, and any other specific protection needs.\n\nIn today\u2019s modern architecture, it is becoming less common for organizations to control all information resources. There are going to be key dependencies on external information services and service providers. Describing such dependencies in the information security architecture is important to developing a comprehensive mission/business protection strategy. Establishing, developing, documenting, and maintaining under configuration control, a baseline configuration for organizational information systems is critical to implementing and maintaining an effective information security architecture. The development of the information security architecture is coordinated with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) to ensure that security controls needed to support privacy requirements are identified and effectively implemented. PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture for the information system, and that the security architecture is integrated with or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture through the organization-wide information security architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily directed at external information technology product/system developers and integrators (although SA-17 could be used internally within organizations for in-house system development). SA-17, which is complementary to PL-8, is selected when organizations outsource the development of information systems or information system components to external entities, and there is a need to demonstrate/show consistency with the organization\u2019s enterprise architecture and information security architecture.  b. annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG PL-8 (b) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.", 
        "title": "PL-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-10.html", 
        "text": "The information system checks the validity of [Assignment: organization-defined information inputs].\n\n   Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker- supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the tainted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate and correct inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.\n\nReferences: None.\n All inputs except those identified specifically by the organization\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization restricts access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n    Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Restricting non-digital media access includes, for example, denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking access to such records are authorized healthcare providers. Restricting access to digital media includes, for example, limiting access to design specifications stored on compact disks in the media library to the project leader and the individuals on the development team.", 
        "title": "MP-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and associated personnel security controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Personnel security policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Personnel security procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-6.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Verifies the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security functions];\n b. Performs this verification [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined system transitional states]; upon command by user with appropriate privilege; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]];\n c. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of failed security verification tests; and\n d. [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system; [Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are discovered.\n\n  Transitional states for information systems include, for example, system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, for example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or hardware indications such as lights.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nb. upon system startup, and/or restart, upon command by user with appropriate privileges\n\nb. 30 days\n\nc. the ISSO and ISSM\n\nd. notifies system administrator\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-21.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\na. Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information for [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user discretion is required]; and\nb. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.\n\u00a0\n \u00a0This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner (e.g., privileged medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information, personally identifiable information, classified information related to special access programs or compartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the particular information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special access program/compartment.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nb. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-21"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy and associated system and services acquisition controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. System and services acquisition policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2.  System and services acquisition procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and associated contingency planning controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Contingency planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Contingency planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n  This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all stakeholders identified in the contingency plan\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CP-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users).\n\n   Non-organizational users include information system users other than organizational users explicitly covered by IA-2. These individuals are uniquely identified and authenticated for accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented in AC-14. In accordance with the E-Authentication E-Government initiative, authentication of non- organizational users accessing federal information systems may be required to protect federal, proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security systems). Organizations use risk assessments to determine authentication needs and consider scalability, practicality, and security in balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal information and information systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk. IA-2 addresses identification and authentication requirements for access to information systems by organizational users.", 
        "title": "IA-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between interconnected systems based on [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies].\n\n  Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled information from being transmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the organization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not from the internal web proxy server, and limiting information transfers between organizations based on data structures and content. Transferring information between information systems representing different security domains with different security policies introduces risk that such transfers violate one or more domain security policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between interconnected systems. Organizations consider mandating specific architectural solutions when required to enforce specific security policies. Enforcement includes, for example: (i) prohibiting information transfers between interconnected systems (i.e., allowing access only); (ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows; and (iii) implementing trustworthy regarding mechanisms to reassign security attributes and security labels.\n\nOrganizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks, individuals, and devices) within information systems and between interconnected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or message- filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering/inspection mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 22 primarily address cross-domain solution needs which focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow enforcement mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, for example, high-assurance guards. Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf information technology products.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-16.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide [Assignment: organization-defined training] on the correct use and operation of the implemented security functions, controls, and/or mechanisms.\n\n   This control applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Training of personnel is an essential element to ensure the effectiveness of security controls implemented within organizational information systems. Training options include, for example, classroom-style training, web-based/computer-based training, and hands-on training. Organizations can also request sufficient training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offer self- training to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary and may require different types of training for different security functions, controls, or mechanisms.", 
        "title": "SA-16"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:\n   1. Security controls and control enhancements under assessment;\n   2. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and\n   3. Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities;\n b. Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting established security requirements;\n c. Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and\n d. Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles].\n\n   Organizations assess security controls in organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of: (i) initial and ongoing security authorizations; (ii) FISMA annual assessments; (iii) continuous monitoring; and (iv) system development life cycle activities. Security assessments: (i) ensure that information security is built into organizational information systems; (ii) identify weaknesses and deficiencies early in the development process; (iii) provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions as part of security authorization processes; and (iv) ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation procedures. Assessments are conducted on the implemented security controls from Appendix F (main catalog) and Appendix G (Program Management controls) as documented in System Security Plans and Information Security Program Plans. Organizations can use other types of assessment activities such as vulnerability scanning and system monitoring to maintain the security posture of information systems during the entire life cycle. Security assessment reports document assessment results in sufficient detail as deemed necessary by organizations, to determine the accuracy and completeness of the reports and whether the security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security requirements. The FISMA requirement for assessing security controls at least annually does not require additional assessment activities to those activities already in place in organizational security authorization processes. Security assessment results are provided to the individuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example, assessments conducted in support of security authorization decisions are provided to authorizing officials or authorizing official designated representatives.\n\nTo satisfy annual assessment requirements, organizations can use assessment results from the following sources: (i) initial or ongoing information system authorizations; (ii) continuous monitoring; or (iii)  system development life cycle activities. Organizations ensure that security assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of security control effectiveness, and obtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing security control assessment results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented with additional assessments as needed. Subsequent to initial authorizations and in accordance with OMB policy, organizations assess security controls during continuous monitoring. Organizations establish the frequency for ongoing security control assessments in accordance with organizational continuous monitoring strategies. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts provide useful examples of vulnerability mitigation procedures. External audits (e.g., audits by external entities such as regulatory agencies) are outside the scope of this control.  CA-2 Guidance: See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service\nProvider (CSP) Documents> Annual Assessment Guidance\nhttps://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/", 
        "title": "CA-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-5.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] in the event of an audit processing failure; and\n b. Takes the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken (e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records)].\n\n   Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures (e.g., by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies to each audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories combined), or both.  a. At a minimum, the SCA and ISSO\r\nb. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the information system.\n\n   This control establishes baseline configurations for information systems and system components including communications and connectivity-related aspects of systems. Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed and agreed-upon sets of specifications for information systems or configuration items within those systems. Baseline configurations serve as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or changes to information systems. Baseline configurations include information about information system components (e.g., standard software packages installed on workstations, notebook computers, servers, network components, or mobile devices; current version numbers and patch information on operating systems and applications; and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of those components within the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating new baselines as organizational information systems change over time. Baseline configurations of information systems reflect the current enterprise architecture.", 
        "title": "CM-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/at-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy and associated security awareness and training controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Security awareness and training policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2.  Security awareness and training procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\n\nb. (1) every 5 years \r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AT-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Protects and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] during transport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards];\n b. Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled areas;\n c. Documents activities associated with the transport of information system media; and\n d. Restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized personnel.\n\n   Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information\nstorage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers), that are transported outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations provide sufficient physical and/or procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems.\n\nPhysical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category or classification of the information residing on the media. Safeguards to protect media during transport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms used. Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities such as releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes. For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals from outside the organization (e.g., U.S. Postal Service or a commercial transport or delivery service). Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, restricting transport activities to authorized personnel, and tracking and/or obtaining explicit records of transport activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish documentation requirements for activities associated with the transport of information system media in accordance with organizational assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define different record-keeping methods for the different types of media transport as part of an overall system of transport-related records.  MP-5 (a) Requirement: The service provider defines security measures to protect digital and non-digital media in transport.  The security measures are approved and accepted by the JAB.", 
        "title": "MP-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Displays to users [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message or banner] before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance and states that:\n   1. Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system;\n   2. Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;\n   3. Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and\n   4. Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;\n b. Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system; and \n c. For publicly accessible systems:\n   1. Displays system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before granting further access;\n   2. Displays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and\n   3. Includes a description of the authorized uses of the system.\n\n   System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. Organizations consider system use notification messages/banners displayed in multiple languages based on specific organizational needs and the demographics of information system users. Organizations also consult with the Office of the General Counsel for legal review and approval of warning banner content.\n\nControl Enhancements:  None.\n\nReferences: None.\n\n AC-8 Requirement: The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. \nRequirement: The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.\nGuidance: If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided. \nRequirement: If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.", 
        "title": "AC-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization manages information system identifiers by:\n a. Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign an individual, group, role, or device identifier;\n b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device;\n c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device;\n d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and\n e. Disabling the identifier after [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity].\n\n   Common device identifiers include, for example, media access control (MAC), Internet protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. Management of individual identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest and anonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the user names of the information system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. This control also addresses individual identifiers not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers used in physical security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to information systems). Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, or devices.  a. ISSM or ISSO\r\nd. 1 year for user identifiers (DoD is not going to specify value for device identifier).\r\ne. 35 days\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG IA-4 (e) Requirement: The service provider defines the time period of inactivity for device identifiers.\nGuidance: For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.", 
        "title": "IA-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-9.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.\n\n   Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. This control focuses on technical protection of audit information. Physical protection of audit information is addressed by media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls.", 
        "title": "AU-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-11.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate [Selection (one or more): an orderly shutdown of the information system; transition of the information system to long-term alternate power] in the event of a primary power source loss.", 
        "title": "PE-11"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident response capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and\n b. Reports security incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].\n\n   The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting requirements within an organization and the formal incident reporting requirements for federal agencies and their subordinate organizations. Suspected security incidents include, for example, the receipt of suspicious email communications that can potentially contain malicious code. The types of security incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designated reporting authorities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Current federal policy requires that all federal agencies (unless specifically exempted from such requirements) report security incidents to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within specified time frames designated in the US-CERT Concept of Operations for Federal Cyber Security Incident Handling.  IR-6 Requirement: Reports security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.", 
        "title": "IR-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ma-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure.\n\n   Organizations specify the information system components that result in increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nWithin 24 hours (Low and Moderate Availability) or immediately upon failure for (High Availability)\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "MA-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-11.html", 
        "text": "The organization retains audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent with records retention policy] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.\n\n   Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that they are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of audit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of action. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules provide federal policy on record retention.  5 years for SAMI; otherwise for at least 1 year\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AU-11 Requirement: The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.", 
        "title": "AU-11"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-17.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes and documents usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and\n b. Authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.\n\n   Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations often employ encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity over remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs does not make the access non-remote; however, the use of VPNs, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls (e.g., employing appropriate encryption techniques for confidentiality and integrity protection) may provide sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections as internal networks. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does not enhance the availability of remote connections. Also, VPNs with encrypted tunnels can affect the organizational capability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote access controls apply to information systems other than public web servers or systems designed for public access. This control addresses authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying the formats for such authorization. While organizations may use interconnection security agreements to authorize remote access connections, such agreements are not required by this control. Enforcing access restrictions for remote connections is addressed in AC-3.", 
        "title": "AC-17"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident response capability that offers advice and assistance to users of the information system for the handling and reporting of security incidents.\n\n   Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, for example, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required.", 
        "title": "IR-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-10.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects against an individual (or process acting on behalf of an individual) falsely denying having performed [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be covered by non-repudiation].\n\n   Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include, for example, creating information, sending and receiving messages, approving information (e.g., indicating concurrence or signing a contract). Non-repudiation protects individuals against later claims by: (i) authors of not having authored particular documents; (ii) senders of not having transmitted messages; (iii) receivers of not having received messages; or (iv) signatories of not having signed documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information originated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an email, signing a contract, approving a procurement request) or received specific information. Organizations obtain non-repudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms (e.g., digital signatures, digital message receipts).  actions defined by DoDI 8520.02 and DoDI 8520.03 \n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system components in emergency situations;\n b. Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location by information system or system component] to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel; and\n c. Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.\n\n   This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.", 
        "title": "PE-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; and\n b. Records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and meets [Assignment: organization-defined granularity of time measurement].\n\n   Time stamps generated by the information system include date and time. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks and reference clocks, for example, clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or within tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for different system components. Time service can also be critical to other security capabilities such as access control and identification and authentication, depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support those capabilities.  b. one second\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization manages information system authenticators by:\n  a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, or device receiving the authenticator;\n  b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;\n  c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;\n  d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;\n  e. Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;\n  f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for authenticators;\n  g. Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by authenticator type];\n  h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;\n  i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to protect authenticators; and\n  j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.\n\n  Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, biometrics, PKI certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g., the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with factory default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information systems (e.g., passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with administrator privileges). Information systems support individual authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including, for example, minimum password length, password composition, validation time window for time synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric authentication. Specific actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, for example, maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing individual authenticators with others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators immediately. Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators for temporary access such as that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators include, for example, certificates and passwords.  IA-5 Requirement: Authenticators must be compliant with NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines IAL, AAL, FAL level 3. Link https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3", 
        "title": "IA-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-16.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.\n\n   Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non- executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Security safeguards employed to protect memory include, for example, data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-16"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Physically controls and securely stores [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; and\n b. Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.\n\n   Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Physically controlling information system media includes, for example, conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to check out and return media to the media library, and maintaining accountability for all stored media. Secure storage includes, for example, a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet, or a controlled media library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information residing on the media. Controlled areas are areas for which organizations provide sufficient physical and procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel, fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate protection.  MP-4 (a) Requirement: The service provider defines controlled areas within facilities where the information and information system reside.", 
        "title": "MP-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection policy and associated system and communications protection controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. System and communications protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. System and communications protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. at a minimum, the ISSM/ISSO\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled;\n b. Reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses;\n c. Documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system;\n d. Implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system;\n e. Retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system for [Assignment: organization-defined time period];\n f. Audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the information system; and\n g. Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee, board] that convenes [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change conditions]].\n\n   Configuration change controls for organizational information systems involve the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of changes to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change control includes changes to baseline configurations for components and configuration items of information systems, changes to configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., operating systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), unscheduled/unauthorized changes, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities. Typical processes for managing configuration changes to information systems include, for example, Configuration Control Boards that approve proposed changes to systems. For new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from development organizations on the Configuration Control Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after changes are made to organizational information systems and the auditing activities required to implement such changes.  e. The time period should be defined at the organization's CCB. \r\ng. a configuration control board;\r\ng. at a frequency determined by the CCB;\r\ng. configuration change conditions determined by the CCB.\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CM-3 Requirement: The service provider establishes a central means of communicating major changes to or developments in the information system or environment of operations that may affect its services to the federal government and associated service consumers (e.g., electronic bulletin board, web status page). The means of communication are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.\nCM-3 (e) Guidance: In accordance with record retention policies and procedures.", 
        "title": "CM-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ra-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Risk assessment policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Risk assessment procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO\n\nb. (1) every five years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "RA-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [Assignment:\norganization-defined audit record storage requirements].\n\n   Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss or reduction of auditing capability.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements;\n b. Documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated; and\n c. Reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems (i.e., system interconnections) and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections such as email and website browsing. Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be introduced when information systems are connected to other systems with different security requirements and security controls, both within organizations and external to organizations. Authorizing officials determine the risk associated with information system connections and the appropriate controls employed. If interconnecting systems have the same authorizing official, organizations do not need to develop Interconnection Security Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe the interface characteristics between those interconnecting systems in their respective security plans. If interconnecting systems have different authorizing officials within the same organization, organizations can either develop Interconnection Security Agreements or describe the interface characteristics between systems in the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations may also incorporate Interconnection Security Agreement information into formal contracts, especially for interconnections established between federal agencies and nonfederal (i.e., private sector) organizations. Risk considerations also include information systems sharing the same networks. For certain technologies (e.g., space, unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical devices), there may be specialized connections in place during preoperational testing. Such connections may require Interconnection Security Agreements and be subject to additional security controls.\n c. at least annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CA-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals];\n b. Documents separation of duties of individuals; and\n c. Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.\n\n   Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AC-5 Guidance: CSPs have the option to provide a separation of duties matrix as an attachment to the SSP.", 
        "title": "AC-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-17.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a design specification and security architecture that:\n a. Is consistent with and supportive of the organization\u2019s security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization\u2019s enterprise architecture;\n b. Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality, and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and\n c. Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.\n\n   This control is primarily directed at external developers, although it could also be used for internal (in-house) development. In contrast, PL-8 is primarily directed at internal developers to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture and such security architecture is integrated or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture. This distinction is important if/when organizations outsource the development of information systems, information system components, or information system services to external entities, and there is a requirement to demonstrate consistency with the organization\u2019s enterprise architecture and information security architecture.", 
        "title": "SA-17"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-20.html", 
        "text": "The organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information systems, allowing authorized individuals to:\n a. Access the information system from external information systems; and\n b. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external information systems.\n\n   External information systems are information systems or components of information systems that are outside of the authorization boundary established by organizations and for which organizations typically have no direct supervision and authority over the application of required security controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External information systems include, for example: (i) personally owned information systems/devices (e.g., notebook computers, smart phones, tablets, personal digital assistants); (ii) privately owned computing and communications devices resident in commercial or public facilities (e.g., hotels, train stations, convention centers, shopping malls, or airports); (iii) information systems owned or controlled by nonfederal governmental organizations; and (iv) federal information systems that are not owned by, operated by, or under the direct supervision and authority of organizations. This control also addresses the use of external information systems for the processing, storage, or transmission of\norganizational information, including, for example, accessing cloud services (e.g., infrastructure as a service, platform as a service, or software as a service) from organizational information systems.\n\nFor some external information systems (i.e., information systems operated by other federal agencies, including organizations subordinate to those agencies), the trust relationships that have been established between those organizations and the originating organization may be such, that no explicit terms and conditions are required. Information systems within these organizations\nwould not be considered external. These situations occur when, for example, there are pre-existing sharing/trust agreements (either implicit or explicit) established between federal agencies or organizations subordinate to those agencies, or when such trust agreements are specified by applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, or policies. Authorized individuals include, for example, organizational personnel, contractors, or other individuals with authorized access to organizational information systems and over which organizations have the authority to impose rules of behavior with regard to system access. Restrictions that organizations impose on authorized individuals need not be uniform, as those restrictions may vary depending upon the\ntrust relationships between organizations. Therefore, organizations may choose to impose different security restrictions on contractors than on state, local, or tribal governments.\n\nThis control does not apply to the use of external information systems to access public interfaces to organizational information systems (e.g., individuals accessing federal information through www.usa.gov). Organizations establish terms and conditions for the use of external information systems in accordance with organizational security policies and procedures. Terms and conditions address as a minimum: types of applications that can be accessed on organizational information systems from external information systems; and the highest security category of information that can be processed, stored, or transmitted on external information systems. If terms and conditions with the owners of external information systems cannot be established, organizations may impose restrictions on organizational personnel using those external systems.", 
        "title": "AC-20"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pl-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops a security plan for the information system that:\n   1. Is consistent with the organization\u2019s enterprise architecture;\n   2. Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system;\n   3. Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and business processes;\n   4. Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting rationale;\n   5. Describes the operational environment for the information system and relationships with or connections to other information systems;\n   6. Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system;\n   7. Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable;\n   8. Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements including a rationale for the tailoring and supplementation decisions; and\n   9. Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation;\n b. Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];\n c. Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];\n d. Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; and\n e. Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.\n\n   Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls and control enhancements. Security plans also describe, at a high level, how the security controls and control enhancements meet those security requirements, but do not provide detailed, technical descriptions of the specific design or implementation of the controls/enhancements. Security plans contain sufficient information (including the specification of parameter values for assignment and selection statements either explicitly or by reference) to enable a design and implementation that is unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation if the plan is implemented as intended. Organizations can also apply tailoring guidance to the security control baselines in Appendix D and CNSS Instruction 1253 to develop overlays for community-wide use or to address specialized requirements, technologies, or missions/environments of operation (e.g., DoD-tactical, Federal Public Key Infrastructure, or Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management, space operations). Appendix I provides guidance on developing overlays.\n\nSecurity plans need not be single documents; the plans can be a collection of various documents including documents that already exist. Effective security plans make extensive use of references to policies, procedures, and additional documents (e.g., design and implementation specifications) where more detailed information can be obtained. This reduces the documentation requirements associated with security programs and maintains security-related information in other established management/operational areas related to enterprise architecture, system development life cycle, systems engineering, and acquisition. For example, security plans do not contain detailed contingency plan or incident response plan information but instead provide explicitly or by reference, sufficient information to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans.  b. at a minimum, the ISSO, ISSM and SCA\n\nc. annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PL-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Physical and environmental protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Physical and environmental protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\n\nb. (1) annually\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-10.html", 
        "text": "The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity.\n   This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity may be established by organizations and include, for example, time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.\nControl Enhancements:  None.\n\nReferences:  None. 10 minutes in band management and 15 minutes for user sessions\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-10"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information].\n\n   Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due to errors or malicious activity (e.g., tampering). Software includes, for example, operating systems (with key internal components such as kernels, drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware includes, for example, the Basic Input Output System (BIOS). Information includes metadata such as security attributes associated with information. State-of-the-practice integrity- checking mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes) and associated tools can automatically monitor the integrity of information systems and hosted applications.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality.\n\n   Information system management functionality includes, for example, functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and typically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information system management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separation of system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different computers, different central processing units, different instances of operating systems, different network addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other methods, as appropriate. This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. Separation of system and user functionality may include isolating administrative interfaces on different domains and with additional access controls.", 
        "title": "SC-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/at-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities:\na. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties;\nb. When required by information system changes; and\nc. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.\n\n   Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition, organizations provide enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers, acquisition/procurement officials, information system managers, system/network administrators, personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, personnel performing independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, and other personnel having access to system-level software, adequate security-related technical training specifically tailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical safeguards and countermeasures. Such training can include for example, policies, procedures, tools, and artifacts for the organizational security roles defined. Organizations also provide the training necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations and\nsupply chain security within the context of organizational information security programs. Role-based security training also applies to contractors providing services to federal agencies.  c. annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AT-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-19.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices; and\n b. Authorizes the connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.\n\n   A mobile device is a computing device that: (i) has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); (iii) possesses local, non- removable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained power source. Mobile devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations. Examples include smart phones, E-readers, and tablets. Mobile devices are typically associated with a single individual and the device is usually in close proximity to the individual; however, the degree of proximity can vary depending upon on the form factor and size of the device. The processing, storage, and transmission capability of the mobile device may be comparable to or merely a subset of desktop systems, depending upon the nature and intended purpose of the device. Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different technical characteristics and capabilities, organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes/types of such devices. Usage restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include, for example, configuration management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory protective software (e.g., malicious code detection, firewall), scanning devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting primary operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware (e.g., wireless, infrared). Organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements in this control. Many safeguards and countermeasures for mobile devices are reflected in other security controls in the catalog allocated in the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some degree of overlap in the requirements articulated by the security controls within the different families of controls. AC-20 addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled.", 
        "title": "AC-19"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops an incident response plan that:\n   1. Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;\n   2. Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;\n   3. Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;\n   4. Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;\n   5. Defines reportable incidents;\n   6. Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;\n   7. Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability; and\n   8. Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];\n b. Distributes copies of the incident response plan to [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];\n c. Reviews the incident response plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];\n d. Updates the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;\n  e. Communicates incident response plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; and\nf. Protects the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.\n\n   It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, and objectives for incident response help to determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As part of a comprehensive incident response capability, organizations consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems.  a. at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO\r\nb.all stakeholders identified in the incident response plan\r\nc. at least annually (incorporating lessons learned from past incidents)\r\ne. all stakeholders identified in the incident response plan, not later than 30 days after the change is made\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG IR-8 (b) Requirement: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.\nIR-8 (e) Requirement: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.", 
        "title": "IR-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-7.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides an audit reduction and report generation capability that:\n a. Supports on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact investigations of security incidents; and\n b. Does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.\n\n   Audit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit information and organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same information system or from the same organizational entities conducting auditing activities. Audit reduction capability can include, for example, modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the information system can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be a significant issue if the granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient.", 
        "title": "AU-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ra-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;\n b. Documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security plan for the information system; and\n c. Ensures that the security categorization decision is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative.\n\n   Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and information systems are comprised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information system owners, mission/business owners, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level adverse impacts. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations facilitate the development of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specific information system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted.", 
        "title": "RA-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.\n\n   Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and information systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions/business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary, to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege to the development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems.", 
        "title": "AC-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:\n a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a contingency role or responsibility;\n b. When required by information system changes; and\n c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.\n\n   Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know\nwhen and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected; system administrators may require additional training on how to set up information systems at alternate processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders may receive more specific training on how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to establish communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination on\ncontingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specific continuity requirements in the contingency plan.  a. at a maximum, 10 working days \n\nc. at least annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CP-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Manages the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined system development life cycle] that incorporates information security considerations;\n b. Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle;\n c. Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and\n d. Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system development life cycle activities.\n\n   A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. To apply the required security controls within the system development life cycle requires a basic understanding of information security, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to critical missions/business functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 cannot be properly applied if individuals that design, code, and test information systems and system components (including information technology products) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations include qualified personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects, security engineers, and information system security officers in system development life cycle activities to ensure that security requirements are incorporated into organizational information systems. It is equally important that developers include individuals on the development team that possess the requisite security expertise and skills to ensure that needed security capabilities are effectively integrated into the information system. Security awareness and training programs can help ensure that individuals having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate experience, skills, and expertise to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The effective integration of security requirements into enterprise architecture also helps to ensure that important security considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and that those considerations are directly related to the organizational mission/business processes. This process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprise architecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the information system resides;\n b. Issues authorization credentials for facility access;\n c. Reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n d. Removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.\n\n   This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed (including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards) consistent with federal standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to areas within facilities that have not been designated as publicly accessible.  c. every 90 days\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-13.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined cryptographic uses and type of cryptography required for each use] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.\n\n   Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions including, for example, the protection of classified and Controlled Unclassified Information, the provision of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorized individuals have the necessary clearances for such information but lack the necessary formal access approvals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number generation and hash generation. Generally applicable cryptographic standards include FIPS-validated cryptography and NSA-approved cryptography. This control does not impose any requirements on organizations to use cryptography. However, if cryptography is required based on the selection of other security controls, organizations define each type of cryptographic use and the type of cryptography required (e.g., protection of classified information: NSA-approved cryptography; provision of digital signatures: FIPS-validated cryptography).", 
        "title": "SC-13"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pl-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associated security planning controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Security planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Security planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n  This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PL-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Monitors the information system to detect:\n   1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with [Assignment: organization- defined monitoring objectives]; and\n   2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;\n b. Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through [Assignment: organization- defined techniques and methods];\n c. Deploys monitoring devices: (i) strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential information; and (ii) at ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization;\n d. Protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion;\n e. Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information;\n f. Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations; and\n g. Provides [Assignment: or ganization-defined information system monitoring information] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or more): as needed; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].\n\n   Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information system boundary (i.e., part of perimeter defense and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the information system. Organizations can monitor information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system monitoring capability is achieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, for example, selected perimeter locations and near server farms supporting critical applications, with such devices typically being employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 and AC-17. Einstein network monitoring devices from the Department of Homeland Security can also be included as monitoring devices. The granularity of monitoring information collected is based on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring is an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Output from system monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs. A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through a network (e.g., local area network, Internet). A remote connection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., the Internet). Local, network, and remote connections can be either wired or wireless.  a. (1) sensor placement and monitoring requirements within CJCSI 6510.01F\n\na. (2) Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\ng. (1) Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\ng. (2) Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\ng. (3) Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SI-4 Guidance: See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.", 
        "title": "SI-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; and\n b. Rescreens individuals according to [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of such rescreening].\n\n   Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems.  b. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\na. Implements an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery;\nb. Coordinates incident handling activities with contingency planning activities; and\nc. Incorporates lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing/exercises, and implements the resulting changes accordingly.\n\n   Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on the capabilities of organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems. Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports, and reported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes coordination among many organizational entities including, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices, legal departments, operations personnel, procurement offices, and the risk executive (function).  IR-4 Requirement: The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.", 
        "title": "IR-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ma-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Approves and monitors nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;\n b. Allows the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the information system;\n c. Employs strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions;\n d. Maintains records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and\n e. Terminates session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.\n\n   Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access requirements in IA-2. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric.  Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished in part by other controls.", 
        "title": "MA-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-13.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source.\n\n   This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Fire suppression and detection devices/systems include, for example, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, and smoke detectors.\n\nReferences: None.", 
        "title": "PE-13"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-6.html", 
        "text": "The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.\n\n   The feedback from information systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types of information systems or system components, for example, desktops/notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (often referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems or components, for example, mobile devices with 2-4 inch screens, this threat may be less significant, and may need to be balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input errors due to the small keyboards. Therefore, the means for obscuring the authenticator feedback is selected accordingly. Obscuring the feedback of authentication information includes, for example, displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices, or displaying feedback for a very limited time before fully obscuring it.", 
        "title": "IA-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages; and\n b. Updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.\n\n   Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile devices, and notebook/laptop computers. Spam can be transported by different means including, for example, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions.", 
        "title": "SI-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of [Assignment: organization- defined types of information system media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].\n\n   Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user access to media, this control restricts the use of certain types of media on information systems, for example, restricting/prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Organizations can employ technical and nontechnical safeguards (e.g., policies, procedures, rules of behavior) to restrict the use of information system media. Organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to prohibit access to certain external ports, or disabling/removing the ability to insert, read or write to such devices. Organizations may also limit the use of portable storage devices to only approved devices including, for example, devices provided by the organization, devices provided by other approved organizations, and devices that are not personally owned. Finally, organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices based on the type of device, for example, prohibiting the use of writeable, portable storage devices, and implementing this restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write to such devices.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "MP-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Sanitizes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media] prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using [Assignment: organization- defined sanitization techniques and procedures] in accordance with applicable federal and organizational standards and policies; and\n b. Employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or classification of the information.\n\n    This control applies to all information system media, both digital and non- digital, subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples include media found in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network components, and mobile devices. The sanitization process removes information from the media such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques, including clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, and destruction, prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals when such media is reused or released for disposal. Organizations determine the appropriate sanitization methods recognizing that destruction is sometimes necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization. Organizations use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques and procedures for media containing information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly releasable, or deemed to have no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if released for reuse or disposal. Sanitization of non-digital media includes, for example, removing a classified appendix from an otherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections or words from a document by obscuring the redacted sections/words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to removing them from the document. NSA standards and policies control the sanitization process for media containing classified information.", 
        "title": "MP-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-24.html", 
        "text": "The information system fails to a [Assignment: organization-defined known-state] for [Assignment: organization-defined types of failures] preserving [Assignment: organization-defined system state information] in failure.\n\n   Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the mission/business needs of organizations. Failure in a known secure state helps to prevent the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational information systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems from failing to a state that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving information system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode of organizations with less disruption of mission/business processes.", 
        "title": "SC-24"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-7.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication.\n\n   Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role.", 
        "title": "IA-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-12.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.\n\n   This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.", 
        "title": "PE-12"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-12.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a. at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components];\n b. Allows [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to select which auditable events are to be audited by specific components of the information system; and\n c.    Generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d. with the content defined in AU-3. \n\n   Audit records can be generated from many different information system components. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. These events are typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable of generating audit records.  a. all information system and network components;\r\nb. ISSM or individuals appointed by the ISSM\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-12"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.\n\n   Documenting information system security incidents includes, for example, maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information necessary for forensics, evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can be obtained from  a variety of sources including, for example, incident reports, incident response teams, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator reports.", 
        "title": "IR-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ma-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;\n b. Ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the information system have required access authorizations; and\n c. Designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the required access authorizations.\n\n   This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software maintenance on organizational information systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems (e.g., custodial staff, physical plant maintenance personnel). Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the information systems while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel, such as information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants, may require privileged access to organizational information systems, for example, when required to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods.", 
        "title": "MA-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-14.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational missions/business functions; and\n b. Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.\n\n   This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that no identification or authentication is required in organizational information systems. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication including, for example, when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received. Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch that commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational information systems without identification and authentication and thus, the values for assignment statements can be none.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-14"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Assigns a risk designation to all organizational positions;\n b. Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and\n c. Reviews and updates position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management policy and guidance. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations individuals receive when accessing organizational information and information systems. Position screening criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements (e.g., training, security clearances).  c. Annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis;\n b. Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;\n c. Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-defined elements within the organization]; [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations]]; and\n d. Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.\n\n   The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness across the federal government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance to security directives is essential due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential immediate adverse effects\non organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include, for example, external mission/business partners, supply chain partners, external service providers, and other peer/supporting organizations.  a. At a minimum, USCYBERCOM.\n\nc. the ISSO and ISSM\n\nc. not applicable as elements are not selected as recipients of security alerts, advisories and directives\n\nc. CNDSP Tier 1 for vetting. The CNDSP Tier 1 will pass the information to the accredited Tier 2 CNDSPs. Tier 2 CNDSPs are responsible for ensuring all Tier 3 entities receive the information. Tier 3 organizations will ensure all local Op Centers/LAN shops receive information\r\n(i.e. Component IT System and Security Personnel)\r\n(e.g. ISSM, ISSOs, and system administrators)\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Enforces physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points to the facility where the information system resides] by;\n   1. Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and\n   2. Controlling ingress/egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined physical access control systems/devices]; guards];\n b. Maintains physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points];\n c. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to control access to areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible;\n d. Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring];\n e. Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices;\n f. Inventories [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n g. Changes combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or when keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated.\n\n   This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including, for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative staff or information system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks, combinations, and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities include, for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, and isolating selected information systems and/or system components in secured areas. Physical access control systems comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. The Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Program provides implementation guidance for identity, credential, and access management capabilities for physical access control systems. Organizations have flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural (e.g., a written log of individuals accessing the facility and when such access occurred), automated (e.g., capturing ID provided by a PIV card), or some combination thereof. Physical access points can include facility access points, interior access points to information systems and/or components requiring supplemental access controls, or both. Components of organizational information systems (e.g., workstations, terminals) may be located in areas designated as publicly accessible with organizations safeguarding access to such devices.", 
        "title": "PE-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-12.html", 
        "text": "The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography employed within the information system in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction].\n\n   Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations define key management requirements in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance, specifying appropriate options, levels, and parameters. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that only approved trust anchors are in such trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems.  DoDI 8520.02 \"Public Key Infrastructure and Public Key Enabling\" and DoDI 8520.03 \"Identity Authentication for Information Systems\"\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SC-12 Guidance: Federally approved cryptography", 
        "title": "SC-12"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-22.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information system;\n b. Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information;\n c. Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and\n d. Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered.\n\n   In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized access to nonpublic information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information). This control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the general public, typically without identification or authentication. The posting of information on\nnon-organization information systems is covered by organizational policy.  d. Every 90 days or as new information is posted\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-22"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Determines information security requirements for the information system or information system service in mission/business process planning;\n b. Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control process; and\n c. Establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming and budgeting documentation.\n\n   Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the sustainment of the system/service.", 
        "title": "SA-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops a contingency plan for the information system that:\n   1. Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements;\n   2. Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;\n   3. Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact information;\n   4. Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system disruption, compromise, or failure;\n   5. Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and\n   6. Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];\n b. Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];\n c. Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities;\n d. Reviews the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];\n e. Updates the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution, or testing;\n f. Communicates contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; and\n g. Protects the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.\n\n   Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business functions. Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation of alternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. The effectiveness of contingency planning is maximized by considering such planning throughout the phases of the system development life cycle. Performing contingency planning on hardware, software, and firmware development can be an effective means of achieving information system resiliency. Contingency plans reflect the degree of restoration required for organizational information systems since not all systems may need to fully recover to achieve the level of continuity of operations desired. Information system recovery objectives reflect applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, and guidelines. In addition to information system availability, contingency plans also address other security-related events resulting in a reduction in mission and/or business effectiveness, such as malicious attacks compromising the confidentiality or integrity of information systems. Actions addressed in contingency plans include, for example, orderly/graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fallback to a manual mode, alternate information flows, and operating in modes reserved for when systems are under attack. By closely coordinating contingency planning with incident handling activities, organizations can ensure that the necessary contingency planning activities are in place and activated in the event of a security incident.  a. at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO\r\nb. all stakeholders identified in the contingency plan\r\nd. annually\r\nf: all stakeholders identified in the contingency plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CP-2 Requirement: For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.", 
        "title": "CP-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-28.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of [Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].\n\n   This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information at rest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, configurations or rule sets for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, filtering routers, and authenticator content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, including the use of cryptographic mechanisms and file share scanning. Integrity protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) technologies. Organizations may also employ other security controls including, for example, secure off-line storage in lieu of online storage when adequate protection of information at rest cannot otherwise be achieved and/or continuous monitoring to identify malicious code at rest.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings. At a minimum, must include PII and classified information.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SC-28 Guidance: The organization supports the capability to use cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest.", 
        "title": "SC-28"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-15.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that:\n   1. Explicitly addresses security requirements;\n   2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;\n   3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and\n   4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and\n b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization- defined security requirements].\n\n   Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes.", 
        "title": "SA-15"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-7.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and\n b. Automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; locks the account/node until released by an administrator; delays next logon prompt according to [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]] when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.\n\n   This control applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by information systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined time period established by organizations. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may choose to employ different algorithms for different information system components based on the capabilities of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at both the operating system and the application levels.  a(1). Three \r\na(2). 15 minutes \r\nb(1). locks the account/node \r\nb(2). Until released by an administrator \r\nb(3). Minimum of 5 seconds\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Security assessment and authorization policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Security assessment and authorization procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n  This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CA-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Reviews and analyzes information system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for indications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual activity]; and\n b. Reports findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n   Audit review, analysis, and reporting covers information security-related auditing performed by organizations including, for example, auditing that results from monitoring of account usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and nonlocal maintenance, physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at the information system boundaries, use of mobile code, and use of VoIP. Findings can be reported to organizational entities that include, for example, incident response team, help desk, information security group/department. If organizations are prohibited from reviewing and analyzing audit information or unable to conduct such activities (e.g., in certain national security applications or systems), the review/analysis may be carried out by other organizations granted such authority.  a. every seven days or more frequently if required by an alarm event or anomaly;\r\na. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings;\r\nb. at a minimum, the ISSO and ISSM\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AU-6 Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.", 
        "title": "AU-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ra-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits;\n b. Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report; [Assignment: organization-defined document]];\n c. Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];\n d. Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and\n e. Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the system.\n\n   Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into account risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems on behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing\nentities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication of public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect nonpublic or privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also address public access to federal information systems.\n\nRisk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information system level) and at any phase in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can also be conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework, including categorization, security control selection, security control implementation, security control assessment, information\nsystem authorization, and security control monitoring. RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control must be partially implemented prior to the implementation of other controls in order to complete the\nfirst two steps in the Risk Management Framework. Risk assessments can play an important role in security control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring guidance, which includes security control supplementation.  RA-3 Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F.\nRA-3 (d) Requirement: Include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.", 
        "title": "RA-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy and associated configuration management controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Configuration management policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Configuration management procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n  This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all stakeholders in the configuration management process\r\nb. 1. annually\r\nb. 2. annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization responds to information spills by:\n a. Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination;\n b. Alerting [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the information spill using a method of communication not associated with the spill;\n c. Isolating the contaminated information system or system component;\n d. Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component;\n e. Identifying other information systems or system components that may have been subsequently contaminated; and\n f. Performing other [Assignment: organization-defined actions].\n  Information spillage refers to instances where either classified or sensitive information is inadvertently placed on information systems that are not authorized to process such information. Such information spills often occur when information that is initially thought to be of lower sensitivity is transmitted to an information system and then is subsequently determined to be of higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective action is required. The nature of the organizational response is generally based upon the degree of sensitivity of the spilled information (e.g., security category or classification level), the security capabilities of the information system, the specific nature of contaminated storage media, and the access authorizations (e.g., security clearances) of individuals with authorized access to the contaminated system. The methods used to communicate information about the spill after the fact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual spill to minimize the risk of further spreading the contamination before such contamination is isolated and eradicated.\n\nReferences: None.\n b. at a minimum, the OCA, the information owner/originator, the ISSM, the activity security manager, and the responsible computer incident response center\n\nf. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-18.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for wireless access; and\n b. Authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.\n\n   Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio (UHF/VHF), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., EAP/TLS, PEAP), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication.", 
        "title": "AC-18"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions.\n\n   The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions by means of an isolation boundary (implemented via partitions and domains). Such isolation controls access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform those security functions. Information systems implement code separation (i.e., separation of security functions from nonsecurity functions) in a number of ways, including, for example, through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes. For non-kernel code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system protections that serve to protect the code on disk, and address space protections that protect executing code. Information systems restrict access to security functions through the use of access control mechanisms and by implementing least privilege capabilities. While the ideal is for all of the code within the security function isolation boundary to only contain security-relevant code, it is sometimes necessary to include nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundary as an exception.", 
        "title": "SC-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/at-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors):\n a. As part of initial training for new users;\n b. When required by information system changes; and\n c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.\n\n   Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awareness training and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to respond to suspected security incidents. The content also addresses awareness of the need for operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information security awareness events.  c. annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AT-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of transmitted information.\n\n   This control applies to both internal and external networks and all types of information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines). Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by employing physical distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing encryption techniques). Organizations relying on commercial providers offering transmission services as commodity services rather than as fully dedicated services (i.e., services which can be highly specialized to individual customer needs), may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the implementation of needed security controls for transmission confidentiality/integrity. In such situations, organizations determine what types of confidentiality/integrity services are available in standard, commercial telecommunication service packages. If it is infeasible or impractical to obtain the necessary security controls and assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles, organizations implement appropriate compensating security controls or explicitly accept the additional risk.", 
        "title": "SC-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:\n a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident response role or responsibility;\n b. When required by information system changes; and\n c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.\n\n   Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know who to call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders may receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration. Incident response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of suspicious activities, both from external and internal sources.  a. 30 working days\n\nc. Annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ma-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;\n b. Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location;\n c. Requires that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly approve the removal of the information system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;\n d. Sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;\n e. Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and\n f. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related information] in organizational maintenance records.\n\n   This control addresses the information security aspects of the information system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to any system component (including applications) conducted by any local or nonlocal entity (e.g., in-contract, warranty, in- house, software maintenance agreement). System maintenance also includes those components not directly associated with information processing and/or data/information retention such as scanners, copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes, for example: (i) date and time of maintenance; (ii) name of individuals or group performing the maintenance; (iii) name of escort, if necessary; (iv) a description of the maintenance performed; and (v) information system components/equipment removed or replaced (including identification numbers, if applicable). The level of detail included in maintenance records can be informed by\nthe security categories of organizational information systems. Organizations consider supply chain issues associated with replacement components for information systems.  c. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nf. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "MA-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-15.html", 
        "text": "The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and known to key personnel.\n\n   This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire organizations.", 
        "title": "PE-15"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-23.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.\n\n   This control addresses communications protection at the session, versus packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) and establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, for example, protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false information into sessions.", 
        "title": "SC-23"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;\n b. Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services; and\n c. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.\n\n   External information system services are services that are implemented outside of the authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes services that are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. FISMA and OMB policy require that organizations using external service providers that are processing, storing, or transmitting federal information or operating information systems on behalf of the federal government ensure that such providers meet the same security requirements that federal agencies are required to meet. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in a variety of ways including, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, and supply chain exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust requires that organizations establish and retain a level of confidence that each participating provider in the potentially complex consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this chain of trust varies based on the relationships between organizations and the external providers. Organizations document the basis for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over time. External information system services documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles and responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define expectations of performance for security controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies and response requirements for identified instances of noncompliance.  a. security controls defined by CNSSI 1253\n\nc. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\na. Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives];\nb. Conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives];\nc. Conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related documentation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives]; and\nd. Protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage locations.\n\n   System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations to protect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond the\nscope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as well as other organizational requirements for backing up information.  a. at least weekly as defined in the contingency plan \r\nb. at least weekly and as required by system baseline configuration changes in accordance with the contingency plan \r\nc. when created or received, when updated, and as required by system baseline configuration changes in accordance with the contingency plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CP-9 Requirement: The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.\nCP-9 (a) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.\nCP-9 (b) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.\nCP-9 (c) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.", 
        "title": "CP-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-19.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used maliciously; and\n b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system.", 
        "title": "SC-19"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and\n b. Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   Visitor access records include, for example, names and organizations of persons visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure times, purposes of visits, and names and organizations of persons visited. Visitor access records are not required for publicly accessible areas.\n\nReferences: None.\n a. at least one year\r\nb. every 30 days\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/mp-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media protection controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Media protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Media protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all users\n\nb. (1) every 5 years\r\nb. (2) annually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "MP-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-39.html", 
        "text": "The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing process.\n\n   Information systems can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each information system process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. This capability is available in most commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies.", 
        "title": "SC-39"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.\n\n   This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after those resources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This control does not address: (i) information remanence which refers to residual representation of data that has been nominally erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage and/or timing channels) where shared resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii) components within information systems for which there are only single users/roles.", 
        "title": "SC-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined security configuration checklists] that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements;\n b. Implements the configuration settings;\n c. Identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined operational requirements]; and\n d. Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.\n\n   Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the security posture and/or functionality of the system. Information technology products for which security- related configuration settings can be defined include, for example, mainframe computers, servers (e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), workstations, input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network components (e.g., firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, sensors), operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those parameters impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required to satisfy other security control requirements. Security-related parameters include, for example: (i) registry settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, ports, protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The established settings become part of the systems configuration baseline.\n\nCommon secure configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown\nand hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation guides) provide recognized, standardized, and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuring those information system components to meet operational requirements. Common secure configurations can be developed by a variety of organizations including, for example, information technology product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal agencies, and other organizations in the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) which affects the implementation of CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7. The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol (e.g., Common Configuration Enumeration) provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings. OMB establishes federal policy on configuration requirements for federal information systems.  a. DoD security configuration or implementation guidance (e.g. STIGs, SRGs, NSA configuration guides, CTOs, DTMs etc.).;\r\nc. All configurable information system components;\r\nc. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings;\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG\nNOTE: DISA will evaluate Commercial CSP equivalencies on a case by case basis. CM-6 (a) Requirement 1: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.\nCM-6 (a) Requirement 2: The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).\nCM-6 (a) Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc", 
        "title": "CM-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/au-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and associated audit and accountability controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Audit and accountability policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Audit and accountability procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. the ISSO and ISSM and others as the local organization deems appropriate \r\nb. 1. Annually\r\nb. 2. Annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information system;\n b. Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before commencing operations; and\n c. Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed through authorization decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e., authorizing officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide budgetary\noversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the mission/business operations supported by those systems. The security authorization process is an inherently federal responsibility and therefore, authorizing officials must be federal employees. Through the security authorization process, authorizing officials assume responsibility and are accountable for security risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly, authorizing officials are in positions with levels of authority commensurate with understanding and accepting such information security-related risks. OMB policy requires that organizations conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring programs. Continuous monitoring programs can satisfy three-year reauthorization requirements, so separate reauthorization processes are not necessary. Through the employment of comprehensive continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in authorization packages (i.e., security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and information system owners with an up-to-date status of the security state of organizational information systems and environments of operation. To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the results of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering reauthorization decisions.  c. at least every three years, whenever there is a significant change to the system, or if there is a change to the environment in which the system operates.\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CA-6 (c) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.", 
        "title": "CA-6"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-12.html", 
        "text": "The organization protects against supply chain threats to the information system, system component, or information system service by employing [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy.\n\n   Information systems (including system components that compose those systems) need to be protected throughout the system development life cycle (i.e., during design, development, manufacturing, packaging, assembly, distribution, system integration, operations, maintenance, and retirement). Protection of organizational information systems is accomplished through threat awareness, by the identification, management, and reduction of vulnerabilities at each phase of the life cycle and the use of complementary, mutually reinforcing strategies to respond to risk. Organizations consider implementing a standardized process to address supply chain risk with respect to information systems and system components, and to educate the acquisition workforce on threats, risk, and required security controls. Organizations use the acquisition/procurement processes to require supply chain entities to implement necessary security safeguards to: (i) reduce the likelihood of unauthorized modifications at each stage in the supply chain; and (ii) protect information systems and information system components, prior to taking delivery of such systems/components. This control enhancement also applies to information\nsystem services. Security safeguards include, for example: (i) security controls for development systems, development facilities, and external connections to development systems; (ii) vetting development personnel; and (iii) use of tamper-evident packaging during shipping/warehousing. Methods for reviewing and protecting development plans, evidence, and documentation are commensurate with the security category or classification level of the information system. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.  measures of protection IAW DoDI 5200.44, \"Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)\"\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-12"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:\n   1. Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service;\n   2. Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and\n   3. Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) functions;\n b. Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:\n   1. User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security functions/mechanisms;\n   2. Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner; and\n   3. User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service;\n c. Documents attempts to obtain information system, system component, or information system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent and [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in response;\n d. Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy; and e. Distributes documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. \n\n   This control helps organizational personnel understand the implementation and operation of security controls associated with information systems, system components, and information system services. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine the quality/completeness of the content provided. The inability to obtain needed documentation may occur, for example, due to the age of the information system/component or lack of support from developers and contractors. In those situations, organizations may need to recreate selected documentation if such documentation is essential to the effective implementation or operation of security controls. The level of protection provided for selected information system, component, or service documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system. For example, documentation associated with a key DoD weapons system or command and control system would typically require a higher level of protection than a routine administrative system. Documentation that addresses information system vulnerabilities may also require an increased level of protection. Secure operation of the information system, includes, for example, initially starting the system and resuming secure system operation after any lapse in system operation.  c. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\ne. at a minimum, the ISSO, ISSM, and SCA\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization controls physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined information system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].\n\n   Physical security safeguards applied to information system distribution and transmission lines help to prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. In addition, physical safeguards may be necessary to help prevent eavesdropping or in transit modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security safeguards to control physical access to system distribution and transmission lines include, for example: (i) locked wiring closets; (ii) disconnected or locked spare jacks; and/or (iii) protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-15.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n a. Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; and\n b. Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.\n\n   Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals to users when collaborative computing devices are activated.  Dedicated VTC suites located in approved VTC locations that are centrally managed\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SC-15 Requirement: The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.", 
        "title": "SC-15"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\na. Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws;\nb. Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;\nc. Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organization- defined time period] of the release of the updates; and\nd. Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.\n   Organizations identify information systems affected by announced software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities. Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and anti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. Organizations take advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in remediating flaws discovered in organizational information systems. By incorporating flaw remediation into ongoing configuration management processes, required/anticipated remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation actions that can be tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations follow US-CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the degree and type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and also the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software and/or firmware updates is not necessary or practical,\nfor example, when implementing simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also consider in testing decisions, whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures.  c. within the time period directed by an authorative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, STIGs)\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-2"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization;\n b. Initiates [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action];\n c. Modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need due to reassignment or transfer; and\n d. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n\n   This control applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals are permanent or of such extended durations as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended. Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions within organizations include, for example: (i) returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards, and building passes; (ii) closing information system accounts and establishing new accounts; (iii) changing information system access authorizations (i.e., privileges); and (iv) providing for access to official records to which individuals had access at previous work locations and in previous information system accounts.  b. actions to ensure all system accesses no longer required are removed\n\nb. immediately\n\nd. at a minimum, the ISSO and personnel responsible for transferring credentials\n\nd. 24 hours\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization, upon termination of individual employment:\n a. Disables information system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period];\n b. Terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual;\n c. Conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined information security topics];\n d. Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property;\n e. Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by terminated individual; and\n f. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n\n   Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for information system-related property. Security topics of interest at exit interviews can include, for example, reminding terminated individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations on future employment. Exit interviews may not be possible for some terminated individuals, for example, in cases related to job abandonment, illnesses, and nonavailability of supervisors. Exit interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination actions is essential for individuals terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations consider disabling the information system accounts of individuals that are being terminated prior to the individuals being notified.  a. immediately\n\nc. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nf. at a minimum, the ISSO and personnel responsible for revoking credentials\n\nf. immediately or within 24 hours\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code;\n b. Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;\n c. Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:\n   1. Perform periodic scans of the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more); endpoint; network entry/exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational security policy; and\n   2. [Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; send alert to administrator; [Assignment: organization-defined action]] in response to malicious code detection; and\n d. Addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.\n\n   Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats (e.g., UUENCODE, Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden in files using steganography. Malicious code can be transported by different means including, for example, web accesses, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities. Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus signature definitions and reputation-based technologies. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code. Pervasive configuration management and comprehensive software integrity controls may be effective in preventing execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial off-the-shelf software, malicious code may also be present in custom-built software. This could include, for example, logic bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that could affect organizational missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms cannot always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, actions in response to detection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in response to detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files.", 
        "title": "SI-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.\n\n   Controlling physical access to output devices includes, for example, placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas and allowing access to authorized individuals only, and placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by organizational personnel. Monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines, and audio devices are examples of information system output devices.", 
        "title": "PE-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational mission/business needs:\n  a. Security functional requirements;\n b. Security strength requirements;\n c. Security assurance requirements;\n d. Security-related documentation requirements;\n e. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation;\n f. Description of the information system development environment and environment in which the system is intended to operate; and\n g. Acceptance criteria.\n\n   Information system components are discrete, identifiable information technology assets (e.g., hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of an information system. Information system components include commercial information technology products. Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security functions, and security mechanisms. Security strength requirements associated with such capabilities, functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, resistance to direct attack, and resistance to tampering or bypass. Security assurance requirements include: (i) development processes, procedures, practices, and methodologies; and (ii) evidence from development and assessment activities providing grounds for confidence that the required security functionality has been implemented and the required security strength has been achieved. Security documentation requirements address all phases of the system development life cycle.\n\nSecurity functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements are expressed in terms of security controls and control enhancements that have been selected through the tailoring process. The security control tailoring process includes, for example, the specification of parameter values through the use of assignment and selection statements and the specification of platform dependencies and implementation information. Security documentation provides user and administrator guidance regarding the implementation and operation of security controls. The level of detail required in security documentation is based on the security category or classification level of the information system and the degree to which organizations depend on the stated security capability, functions, or mechanisms to meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in the organizational risk management strategy). Security requirements can also include organizationally mandated configuration settings specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services. Acceptance criteria for information systems, information system components, and information system services are defined in the same manner as such criteria for any organizational acquisition or procurement. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 7.103 contains information security requirements from FISMA.  SA-4 Guidance: The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred.\nSee http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.", 
        "title": "SA-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan;\n b. Reviews the contingency plan test results; and\n c. Initiates corrective actions, if needed.\n\n   Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans and to identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through and tabletop exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals arising due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth, and timelines of corrective actions.  a. at least annually\n\na. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CP-4 (a) Requirement: The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.", 
        "title": "CP-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated access controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Access control policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Access control procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n  This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. \n\nThe organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  a. all personnel\r\nb. Annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ca-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes:\n a. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored;\n b. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessments supporting such monitoring;\n c. Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;\n d. Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;\n e. Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and monitoring;\n f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; and\n g. Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls and information security-related risks at a frequency sufficient to support organizational risk-based decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintain the security authorizations of information systems and common controls over time in highly dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies. Having access to security-related information on a continuing basis through reports/dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to make more effective and timely risk management decisions, including ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation supports more frequent updates to security authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware inventories, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of information systems.  CA-7 Requirement: Operating System Scans: at least monthly. Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly. All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually\nCA-7 Guidance: CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.\nCA-7 Guidance: See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service\nProvider (CSP) Documents> Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide\nhttps://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/", 
        "title": "CA-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ra-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications [Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported;\n b. Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:\n   1. Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;\n   2. Formatting checklists and test procedures; and\n   3. Measuring vulnerability impact;\n c. Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments;\n d. Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times], in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk; and\n e. Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).\n\n   Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organizations determine the required vulnerability scanning for all information system components, ensuring that potential sources of vulnerabilities such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not overlooked. Vulnerability analyses for custom software applications may require additional approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example: (i) scanning for patch levels; (ii) scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should not be accessible to users or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly operating information flow control mechanisms. Organizations consider using tools that express vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that use the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine/test for the presence of vulnerabilities. Suggested sources for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In addition, security control assessments such as red team exercises provide other sources of potential vulnerabilities for which to scan. Organizations also consider using tools that express vulnerability impact by the\n\nCommon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).  a. every 30 days or as directed by an authorative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, STIGs)\n\nd. IAW an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs)\n\ne. at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG RA-5 Guidance: See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents> Vulnerability Scanning Requirements \nhttps://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/\nRA-5 (a) Requirement: an accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.\nRA-5 (e) Requirement: to include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP", 
        "title": "RA-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cm-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities; and\n b. Prohibits or restricts the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, and/or services: [Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services].\n\n   Information systems can provide a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from single information system components, but doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. Where feasible, organizations limit component functionality to a single function per device (e.g., email servers or web servers, but not both). Organizations review functions and services provided by information systems or individual components of information systems, to determine which functions and services are candidates for elimination (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, Instant Messaging, auto-execute, and file sharing). Organizations consider disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols (e.g., Universal Serial Bus, File Transfer Protocol, and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) on information systems to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling. Organizations can utilize network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and end-point protections such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection systems to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, ports, protocols, and services.  IAW DoDI 8551.01\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CM-7 (b) Requirement: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.\nCM-7 Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc.\n(Partially derived from AC-17(8).)", 
        "title": "CM-7"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-18.html", 
        "text": "The organization positions information system components within the facility to minimize potential damage from [Assignment: organization-defined physical and environmental hazards] and to minimize the opportunity for unauthorized access.\n\n   Physical and environmental hazards include, for example, flooding, fire, tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, vandalism, electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. In addition, organizations consider the location of physical entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being granted access, might nonetheless be in close proximity to information systems and therefore increase the potential for unauthorized access to organizational communications (e.g., through the use of wireless sniffers or microphones).", 
        "title": "PE-18"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-5.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following types of denial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial of service attacks or reference to source for such information] by employing [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].\n\n   A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate the effects of denial of service attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect information system components on internal organizational networks from being directly affected by denial of service attacks. Employing increased capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy may also reduce the susceptibility to denial of service attacks.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-5"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/at-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; and\n b. Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n\n   Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the option of the organization.  b. at least 5 years or 5 years after completion of a specific training program\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AT-4"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ps-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures; and\n b. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.\n\n  Organizational sanctions processes reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Sanctions processes are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies and procedures for organizations. Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of employee sanctions.  b. at a minimum, the ISSO\n\nb. immediately\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/si-12.html", 
        "text": "The organization handles and retains information within the information system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and operational requirements.\n\n   Information handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. The National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention.", 
        "title": "SI-12"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-18.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies;\n b. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies; and\n c. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system.\n\n   Decisions regarding the employment of mobile code within organizational information systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, Postscript, PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices (e.g., smart phones). Mobile code policy and procedures address preventing the development, acquisition, or introduction of unacceptable mobile code within organizational information systems.", 
        "title": "SC-18"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system from damage and destruction.\n\n   Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for power equipment and cabling employed at different locations both internal and external to organizational facilities and environments of operation. This includes, for example, generators and power cabling outside of buildings, internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources within an office or data center, and power sources for self-contained entities such as vehicles and satellites.", 
        "title": "PE-9"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/cp-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system operations] for essential missions and business functions within [Assignment: organization- defined time period] when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.\n\n   This control applies to telecommunications services (data and voice) for primary and alternate processing and storage sites. Alternate telecommunications services reflect the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time periods for primary/alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include, for example, additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits/lines or satellites in lieu of ground- based communications. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, and access when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\n1 hour (Availability High ) \r\n12 hours (Availability Moderate) as defined in the contingency plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CP-8 Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.", 
        "title": "CP-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sa-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system.\n\n   Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, organizations apply security engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to the extent feasible, given the current state of hardware, software, and firmware within those systems. Security engineering principles include, for example: (i) developing layered protections; (ii) establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii) incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring that system developers are trained on how to build secure software; (vi) tailoring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs; (vii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii) reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions.", 
        "title": "SA-8"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/sc-22.html", 
        "text": "The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal/external role separation.\n\n   Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure and to enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system servers, one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server. Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network subnetworks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with internal roles only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., from internal clients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks including\nthe Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in particular roles (e.g., by address ranges, explicit lists).", 
        "title": "SC-22"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ia-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:\n   1. An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n   2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls; and\n b. Reviews and updates the current:\n   1. Identification and authentication policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and\n   2. Identification and authentication procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.  the ISSO and ISSM and others as the local organization deems appropriate;\r\nb. 1. annually\r\nb. 2. annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IA-1"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/pe-14.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n a. Maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system resides at [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels]; and\n b. Monitors temperature and humidity levels [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.  PE-14 (a) Requirements:  The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.", 
        "title": "PE-14"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ir-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results.\n\n   Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing can also include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction in mission capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response.  At least every six months for high availability and at least annually for low/med availability\n\nTests as defined in the incident response plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG IR-3-2 Requirement: The service provider defines tests and/or exercises in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended). For JAB authorization, the service provider provides test plans to the JAB/AO annually. Test plans are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO prior to test commencing.", 
        "title": "IR-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ma-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools.\n\n   This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools are potential vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include, for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet sniffers. This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing \u201cping,\u201d \u201cls,\u201d \u201cipconfig,\u201d or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch.", 
        "title": "MA-3"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/controls/ac-12.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically terminates a user session after [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].\n\n   This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational information system. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user access) without terminating network sessions. Session termination terminates all processes associated with a user\u2019s logical session except those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, time-of-day restrictions on information system use.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-12"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization retains [Assignment: organization-defined previous versions of baseline configurations of the information system] to support rollback.\n\n   Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support rollback may include, for example, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, and configuration records.\n the previous approved baseline configuration of IS components for a minimum of 3 month\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.\n\n   Continuously with HBSS 30 days for any additional internal network scans not covered by HBSS Annually for external scans by (Computer Network Defense Service Provider) CNDSP\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/mp-6-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved.\n\n  Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted by qualified and authorized external entities (e.g., other federal agencies or external service providers).\n every 180 days.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG MP-6 (2) Guidance: Equipment and procedures may be tested or validated for effectiveness", 
        "title": "MP-6 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-18-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization disables, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities internally embedded within information system components prior to issuance and deployment.", 
        "title": "AC-18 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system performs an integrity check of [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information] [Selection (one or more): at startup; at [Assignment: organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events]; [Assignment: organization- defined frequency]].\n\n   Security-relevant events include, for example, the identification of a new threat to which organizational information systems are susceptible, and the installation of new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include, for example, system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nAnnually\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization prevents the unauthorized exfiltration of information across managed interfaces.\n\n   Safeguards implemented by organizations to prevent unauthorized exfiltration of information from information systems include, for example: (i) strict adherence to protocol formats; (ii) monitoring for beaconing from information systems; (iii) monitoring for steganography; (iv) disconnecting external network interfaces except when explicitly needed; (v) disassembling and reassembling packet headers; and (vi) employing traffic profile analysis to detect deviations from the volume/types of traffic expected within organizations or call backs to command and control centers. Devices enforcing strict adherence to protocol formats include, for example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. These devices verify adherence to protocol formats and specification at the application layer and serve to identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network or transport layers. This control enhancement is closely associated with cross-domain solutions and system guards enforcing information flow requirements.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (10)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-20-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.\n\n   Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of such devices or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may be used.", 
        "title": "AC-20 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system, for password-based authentication:\n (a)   Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type];\n (b)   Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are created: [Assignment: organization-defined number];\n (c)   Stores and transmits only encrypted representations of passwords;\n (d)   Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: organization- defined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum];\n (e)   Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations; and\n (f) Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.\n\n   This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication of individuals using passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner, when passwords are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not apply when passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity Verification cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of the requirements in the enhancement. Encrypted representations of passwords include, for example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required with respect to the total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime restrictions do not apply to temporary passwords.  IA-5 (1) (a), and (d) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance:\nGuidance: If password policies are compliant with NIST SP 800-63B Memorized Secret (Section 5.1.1) Guidance, the control may be considered compliant", 
        "title": "IA-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.\n\n   Unusual/unauthorized activities or conditions related to information system inbound and outbound communications traffic include, for example, internal traffic that indicates the presence of malicious code within organizational information systems or propagating among system components, the unauthorized exporting of information, or signaling to external information systems. Evidence of malicious code is used to identify potentially compromised information systems or information system components.\n Continuously\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-4 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged accounts.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-11-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.\n\n   Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews. Such analysis can be used to identify security vulnerabilities and enforce security coding practices. Static code analysis is most effective when used early in the development process, when each code change can be automatically scanned for potential weaknesses. Static analysis can provide clear remediation guidance along with defects to enable developers to fix such defects. Evidence of correct implementation of static analysis can include, for example, aggregate defect density for critical defect types, evidence that defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that defects were fixed. An excessively high density of ignored findings (commonly referred to as ignored or false positives) indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or tool. In such cases, organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources.\n SA-11 (1) Requirement: The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.", 
        "title": "SA-11 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-9-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization restricts the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing; information/data; information system services] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined requirements or conditions].\n\n   The location of information processing, information/data storage, or information system services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on the ability of those organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. This situation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services. The criteria external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensure that data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of information security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be adversely affected\nby the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur and/or the locations from which information system services emanate.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-9 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system enforces access restrictions and supports auditing of the enforcement actions.", 
        "title": "CM-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet [Assignment: organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts].\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AC-2 (9) Required if shared/group accounts are deployed", 
        "title": "AC-2 (9)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-4-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security controls to be employed.\n\n   Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality (i.e., security capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.", 
        "title": "SA-4 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-8-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information system are not duplicated in other information system inventories.\n\n   This control enhancement addresses the potential problem of duplicate accounting of information system components in large or complex interconnected systems.", 
        "title": "CM-8 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-3-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the information system.\n\n   If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance diagnostic and test programs, organizations determine that the media contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.", 
        "title": "MA-3 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-11.html", 
        "text": "The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the information system and selected [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the system (e.g., subnetworks, subsystems)] to discover anomalies.\n\n   Anomalies within organizational information systems include, for example, large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, unusual protocols and ports in use, and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (11)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-7-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization prepares the alternate processing site so that the site is ready to be used as the operational site supporting essential missions and business functions.\n\n   Site preparation includes, for example, establishing configuration settings for information system components at the alternate processing site consistent with the requirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies and other logistical considerations are in place.", 
        "title": "CP-7 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-9-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit tools.\n\n   Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash.", 
        "title": "AU-9 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review of visitor access records.", 
        "title": "PE-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Develops primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priority- of-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives); and\n (b)   Requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for national security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary and/or alternate telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.\n\n   Organizations consider the potential mission/business impact in situations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with similar priority-of-service provisions.", 
        "title": "CP-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-9-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization transfers information system backup information to the alternate storage site [Assignment: organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery time and recovery point objectives].\n\n   Information system backup information can be transferred to alternate storage sites either electronically or by physical shipment of storage media.", 
        "title": "CP-9 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to [Assignment: organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information], use non- privileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions.\n\n   This control enhancement limits exposure when operating from within privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations implement access control policies such as role-based access control and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and non-privileged account.  AC-6 (2) Guidance:  Examples of security functions include but are not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters, system programming, system and security administration, other privileged functions.", 
        "title": "AC-6 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization correlates information from audit records with information obtained from monitoring physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate, unusual, or malevolent activity.\n\n   The correlation of physical audit information and audit logs from information systems may assist organizations in identifying examples of suspicious behavior or supporting evidence of such behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual\u2019s identify for logical access to certain information systems with the additional physical security information that the individual was actually present at the facility when the logical access occurred, may prove to be useful in investigations.\n AU-6 (6) Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (6)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-4-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.\n\n   Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. This control enhancement does not require organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align such elements with specific plans. It does require, however, that if such organizational elements are responsible for related plans, organizations should coordinate with those elements.", 
        "title": "CP-4 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs vulnerability scanning procedures that can identify the breadth and depth of coverage (i.e., information system components scanned and vulnerabilities checked).", 
        "title": "RA-5 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-4-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents] and [Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response to classes of incidents] to ensure continuation of organizational missions and business functions.\n\n   Classes of incidents include, for example, malfunctions due to design/implementation errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted malicious attacks. Appropriate incident response actions include, for example, graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fall back to manual mode/alternative technology whereby the system operates differently, employing deceptive measures, alternate information flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when systems are under attack.", 
        "title": "IR-4 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time-period of expected inactivity or description of when to log out].\n\n   At the end of the users standard work period unless otherwise defined in formal organizational policy.\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AC-2 (5) Guidance: Should use a shorter timeframe than AC-12.", 
        "title": "AC-2 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-4-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes dynamic reconfiguration of [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] as part of the incident response capability.\n\n   Dynamic reconfiguration includes, for example, changes to router rules, access control lists, intrusion detection/prevention system parameters, and filter rules for firewalls and gateways. Organizations perform dynamic reconfiguration of information systems, for example, to stop attacks, to misdirect attackers, and to isolate components of systems, thus limiting the extent of the damage from breaches or compromises. Organizations include time frames for achieving the reconfiguration of information systems in the definition of the reconfiguration capability, considering the potential need for rapid response in order to effectively address sophisticated cyber threats.", 
        "title": "IR-4 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions, and notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n   System administrator and ISSO\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-2 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; prior to a new scan; when new vulnerabilities are identified and reported].\n\n   prior to running scans\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "RA-5 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pl-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system with [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or groups] before conducting such activities in order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.\n\n   Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments, audits, hardware and software maintenance, patch management, and contingency plan testing. Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or nonurgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate security-related activities can be included in security plans for information systems or other documents, as appropriate.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PL-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-28-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of [Assignment: organization-defined information] on [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].\n\n   Selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. This control enhancement applies to significant concentrations of digital media in organizational areas designated for media storage and also to limited quantities of media generally associated with information system components in operational environments (e.g., portable storage devices, mobile devices). Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields). Organizations employing cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest also consider cryptographic key management solutions.", 
        "title": "SC-28 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization authorizes network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands] only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] and documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.\n\n   Network access is any access across a network connection in lieu of local access (i.e., user being physically present at the device).", 
        "title": "AC-6 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization specifies the permitted actions for each [Selection (one or more): information system process; role; user] associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit information.\n\n   Organizations specify permitted actions for information system processes, roles, and/or users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit records through account management techniques. Specifying permitted actions on audit information is a way to enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforced by the information system and include, for example, read, write, execute, append, and delete.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/at-3-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides training to its personnel on [Assignment: organization-defined indicators of malicious code] to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in organizational information systems.\n\n   A well-trained workforce provides another organizational safeguard that can be employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect organizations against malicious code coming in to organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are trained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpected email, receiving an email containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from an unfamiliar sender but who appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel are also trained on how to respond to such suspicious email or web communications (e.g., not opening attachments, not clicking on embedded web links, and checking the source of email addresses). For this process to work effectively, all organizational personnel are trained and made aware of what constitutes suspicious communications. Training personnel on how to recognize anomalous behaviors in organizational information systems can potentially provide early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recognition of such anomalous behavior by organizational personnel can supplement automated malicious code detection and protection tools and systems employed by organizations. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AT-3 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-12.html", 
        "text": "The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV)\ncredentials.\n\n   This control enhancement applies to organizations implementing logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials.  IA-2 (12) Guidance: Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (12)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization monitors physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.", 
        "title": "PE-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-12-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization maintains availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys by users.\n\n   Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring availability in the event of loss of keys (e.g., due to forgotten passphrase).", 
        "title": "SC-12 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.\n\n   Threats that affect alternate storage sites are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.", 
        "title": "CP-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-9-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system backs up audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.\n\n  This control enhancement helps to ensure that a compromise of the information system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records.  every seven days\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-9 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-15-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to detect the presence of water in the vicinity of the information system and alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n   Automated mechanisms can include, for example, water detection sensors, alarms, and notification systems.", 
        "title": "PE-15 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-5-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides an alert in [Assignment: organization-defined real-time period] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations] when the following audit failure events occur: [Assignment: organization-defined audit failure events requiring real-time alerts].\n\n   Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert occurs in seconds or less).", 
        "title": "AU-5 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-8-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes in the information system component inventory information, a means for identifying by [Selection (one or more): name; position; role], individuals responsible/accountable for administering those components.\n\n   Identifying individuals who are both responsible and accountable for administering information system components helps to ensure that the assigned components are properly administered and organizations can contact those individuals if some action is required (e.g., component is determined to be the source of a breach/compromise, component needs to be recalled/replaced, or component needs to be relocated).", 
        "title": "CM-8 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-3-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:\n (a)   Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment; \n (b)   Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;\n (c)   Retaining the equipment within the facility; or\n (d)   Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.\n\n   Organizational information includes all information specifically owned by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as information stewards.\n d. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "MA-3 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to make security alert and advisory information available throughout the organization.\n\n   The significant number of changes to organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate requires the dissemination of security-related information to a variety of organizational entities that have a direct interest in the success of organizational missions and business functions. Based on the information provided by the security alerts and advisories, changes may be required at one or more of the three tiers related to the management of information security risk including the governance level, mission/business process/enterprise architecture level, and the information system level.", 
        "title": "SI-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-9-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that the interests of [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers] are consistent with and reflect organizational interests.\n\n   As organizations increasingly use external service providers, the possibility exists that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In such situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operational safeguards in place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control those safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming organizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include, for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel, examining ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers with which organizations have had positive experiences), and conducting periodic/unscheduled visits to service provider facilities.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nAll external service providers from whom services are solicited.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-9 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-10-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization establishes the following restrictions on the use of open source software: [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].\n\n   Open source software refers to software that is available in source code form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open source software is that it provides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. However, there are also various licensing issues associated with open source software including, for example, the constraints on derivative use of such software.\n IAW DoD Memorandum \"Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open Source Software (OSS)\" 16 Oct 2009 (http://dodcio.defense.gov/Home/Issuances/ DoDCIOMemorandums.aspx).\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-10 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-5.html", 
        "text": "The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the following indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: [Assignment: organization- defined compromise indicators].\n\n   Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including, for example, audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, gateways, and routers. Alerts can be transmitted, for example, telephonically, by electronic mail messages, or by text messaging. Organizational personnel on the notification list can include, for example, system administrators, mission/business owners, system owners, or information system security officers.  at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO\n\nReal time intrusion detection and when there are threats identified by authoritative sources (e.g. CTOs) and IAW incident categories I, II, IV, & VII within CJCSM 6510.01B\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SI-4 (5) Guidance: In accordance with the incident response plan.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non- privileged accounts.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-3-7.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements nonsignature-based malicious code detection mechanisms.\n\n   Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, the use of heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious code and to provide safeguards against malicious code for which signatures do not yet exist or for which existing signatures may not be effective. This includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). This control enhancement does not preclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.", 
        "title": "SI-3 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-10-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.\n\n   Transaction-based information systems include, for example, database management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction recovery include, for example, transaction rollback and transaction journaling.", 
        "title": "CP-10 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-3-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization ensures that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] are under configuration management.\n\n   Regardless of the cryptographic means employed (e.g., public key, private key, shared secrets), organizations ensure that there are processes and procedures in place to effectively manage those means. For example, if devices use certificates as a basis for identification and authentication, there needs to be a process in place to address the expiration of those certificates.", 
        "title": "CM-3 (6)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-8-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system conforms to FICAM-issued profiles.\n\n   This control enhancement addresses open identity management standards. To ensure that these standards are viable, robust, reliable, sustainable (e.g., available in commercial information technology products), and interoperable as documented, the United States Government assesses and scopes identity management standards and technology implementations against applicable federal legislation, directives, policies, and requirements. The result is FICAM-issued implementation profiles of approved protocols (e.g., FICAM authentication protocols such as SAML 2.0 and OpenID 2.0, as well as other protocols such as the FICAM Backend Attribute Exchange).", 
        "title": "IA-8 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/mp-6-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization applies non-destructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices prior to connecting such devices to the information system under the following circumstances: [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage devices].\n\n   This control enhancement applies to digital media containing classified information and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). Portable storage devices can be the source of malicious code insertions into organizational information systems. Many of\nthese devices are obtained from unknown and potentially untrustworthy sources and may contain malicious code that can be readily transferred to information systems through USB ports or other entry portals. While scanning such storage devices is always recommended, sanitization provides additional assurance that the devices are free of malicious code to include code capable of initiating zero-day attacks. Organizations consider nondestructive sanitization of portable storage devices when such devices are first purchased from the manufacturer or vendor prior to initial use or when organizations lose a positive chain of custody for the devices.", 
        "title": "MP-6 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Reviews the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to identify unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and\n (b)   Disables [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within the information system deemed to be unnecessary and/or nonsecure].\n\n   The organization can either make a determination of the relative security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on the assessment of other entities. Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking are examples of less than secure protocols.  a. every 30 days;\r\nb. Not appropriate to define unnecessary functions, ports, protocols and service at the Enterprise level. Nonsecure functions, ports, protocols and services are defined in DoDI 8551.01.\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-11-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.\n\n   Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamic images, for example, patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images convey sensitive information.\n\nReferences:  OMB Memorandum 06-16.", 
        "title": "AC-11 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-4-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as\n[Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status].\n\n   Characteristics identifying the status of individuals include, for example, contractors and foreign nationals. Identifying the status of individuals by specific characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee to know that one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor.", 
        "title": "IA-4 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and\n (b)   Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined benchmarks] for taking corrective actions.\n\n   This control enhancement requires organizations to determine the current time it takes on the average to correct information system flaws after such flaws have been identified, and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for taking corrective actions. Benchmarks can be established by type of flaw and/or severity of the potential vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.\n b. within the period directed by an authorative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, STIGs)\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available baseline configuration of the information system.\n\n   Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent baseline configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and software inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network management tools. Such tools can be deployed and/or allocated as common controls, at the information system level, or at the operating system or component level (e.g., on workstations, servers, notebook computers, network components, or mobile devices). Tools can be used, for example, to track version numbers on operating system applications, types of software installed, and current patch levels. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-8 (2) for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities.", 
        "title": "CM-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-10.html", 
        "text": "The information system terminates shared/group account credentials when members leave the group.\n AC-2 (10) Required if shared/group accounts are deployed", 
        "title": "AC-2 (10)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-7.html", 
        "text": "The information system, in conjunction with a remote device, prevents the device from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with the system and communicating via some other connection to resources in external networks.\n\n   This control enhancement is implemented within remote devices (e.g., notebook computers) through configuration settings to disable split tunneling in those devices, and by preventing those configuration settings from being readily configurable by users. This control enhancement is implemented within the information system by the detection of split tunneling (or of configuration settings that allow split tunneling) in the remote device, and by prohibiting the connection if the remote device is using split tunneling. Split tunneling might be desirable by remote users to communicate with local information system resources such as printers/file servers. However, split tunneling would in effect allow unauthorized external connections, making the system more vulnerable to attack and to exfiltration of organizational information. The use of VPNs for remote connections, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls, may provide the organization with sufficient assurance that it can effectively treat such connections as non-remote connections from the confidentiality and integrity perspective. VPNs thus provide a means for allowing non-remote communications paths from remote devices. The use of an adequately provisioned VPN does not eliminate the need for preventing split tunneling.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n (a)   Compares the internal information system clocks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] with [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]; and\n (b)   Synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the time difference is greater than [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n\n   This control enhancement provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.\n AU-8 (1) Requirement: The service provider selects primary and secondary time servers used by the NIST Internet time service. The secondary server is selected from a different geographic region than the primary server.\nAU-8 (1) Requirement: The service provider synchronizes the system clocks of network computers that run operating systems other than Windows to the Windows Server Domain Controller emulator or to the same time source for that server.\nAU-8 (1) Guidance: Synchronization of system clocks improves the accuracy of log analysis.", 
        "title": "AU-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-7-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.\n\n   Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk.", 
        "title": "CP-7 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-11-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.\n\n   This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of a secondary commercial power supply or other external power supply. Long-term alternate power supplies for the information system can be either manually or automatically activated.", 
        "title": "PE-11 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-14-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs temperature and humidity monitoring that provides an alarm or notification of changes potentially harmful to personnel or equipment.", 
        "title": "PE-14 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization coordinates contingency plan development with organizational elements responsible for related plans.\n\n   Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plan, and Occupant Emergency Plans.", 
        "title": "CP-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes as part of security control assessments, [Assignment: organization- defined frequency], [Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more): in-depth monitoring; vulnerability scanning; malicious user testing; insider threat assessment; performance/load testing; [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of security assessment]].\n\n   Organizations can employ information system monitoring, insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification and validation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing officials approve the assessment methods in coordination with the organizational risk executive function. Organizations can incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation processes.  annually\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CA-2 (2) Requirement: To include 'announced', 'vulnerability scanning'", 
        "title": "CA-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-11.html", 
        "text": "The information system, for hardware token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined token quality requirements].\n\n   Hardware token-based authentication typically refers to the use of PKI-based tokens, such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card. Organizations define specific requirements for tokens, such as working with a particular PKI.\n DoDI 8520.03\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IA-5 (11)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-9.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to non-privileged accounts.\n\n   Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by recording/replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (9)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/at-3-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives.\n\n   Practical exercises may include, for example, security training for software developers that includes simulated cyber attacks exploiting common software vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows), or spear/whale phishing attacks targeted at senior leaders/executives. These types of practical exercises help developers better understand the effects of such vulnerabilities and appreciate the need for security coding standards and processes.", 
        "title": "AT-3 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents and in the collection and analysis of incident information.\n\n   Automated mechanisms for tracking security incidents and collecting/analyzing incident information include, for example, the Einstein network monitoring device and monitoring online Computer Incident Response Centers (CIRCs) or other electronic databases of incidents.", 
        "title": "IR-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-9-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization stores backup copies of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system software and other security-related information] in a separate facility or in a fire-rated container that is not collocated with the operational system.\n\n   Critical information system software includes, for example, operating systems, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection/prevention systems. Security-related information includes, for example, organizational inventories of hardware, software, and firmware components. Alternate storage sites typically serve as separate storage facilities for organizations.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CP-9 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-20.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides the capability to dynamically isolate/segregate [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] from other components of the system.\n\n   The capability to dynamically isolate or segregate certain internal components of organizational information systems is useful when it is necessary to partition or separate certain components of dubious origin from those components possessing greater\ntrustworthiness. Component isolation reduces the attack surface of organizational information systems. Isolation of selected information system components is also a means of limiting the damage from successful cyber attacks when those attacks occur.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (20)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization adjusts the level of audit review, analysis, and reporting within the information system when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.\n\n   The frequency, scope, and/or depth of the audit review, analysis, and reporting may be adjusted to meet organizational needs based on new information received.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (10)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-9-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization assigns [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with responsibility for responding to information spills. \n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-9 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-5.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organization- identified information system components] for selected [Assignment: organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities].\n\n   In certain situations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be more intrusive or the information system component that is the subject of the scanning may contain highly sensitive information. Privileged access authorization to selected system components facilitates more thorough vulnerability scanning and also protects the sensitive nature of such scanning.\n all information systems and infrastructure components\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "RA-5 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence] to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing basis.\n\n   Organizations can maximize the value of assessments of security controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments be conducted by assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based on continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in advocacy positions for the organizations acquiring their services.", 
        "title": "CA-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n 35 days\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AC-2 (3) Requirement: The service provider defines the time period for non-user accounts (e.g., accounts associated with devices).  The time periods are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. Where user management is a function of the service, reports of activity of consumer users shall be made available.", 
        "title": "AC-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization correlates the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence of multi-vulnerability/multi-hop attack vectors.\n RA-5 (10) Guidance: If multiple tools are not used, this control is not applicable.", 
        "title": "RA-5 (10)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-4-6.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity and confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.", 
        "title": "MA-4 (6)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-6-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to respond to unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration settings].\n\n   Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing.", 
        "title": "CM-6 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-12-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system compiles audit records from [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time- correlated to within [Assignment: organization-defined level of tolerance for relationship between time stamps of individual records in the audit trail].\n\n   Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time ordering of the records within organizational tolerances.", 
        "title": "AU-12 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-18-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization selects radio antennas and calibrates transmission power levels to reduce the probability that usable signals can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries.\n\n   Actions that may be taken by organizations to limit unauthorized use of wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include, for example: (i) reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are less likely to emit a signal that can be used by adversaries outside of the physical perimeters of organizations; (ii) employing measures such as TEMPEST to control wireless emanations; and (iii) using directional/beam forming antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals. Prior to taking such actions, organizations can conduct periodic wireless surveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational information systems as well as other systems that may be operating in the area.", 
        "title": "AC-18 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-7-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant changes to the information system] into the organizational incident response capability.\n\n   This control enhancement helps to ensure that detected events are tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical records is important both for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an extended period of time and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include, for example, unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or unauthorized elevation of information system privileges.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-7 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-8-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs only FICAM-approved information system components in [Assignment:\norganization-defined information systems] to accept third-party credentials.\n\n   This control enhancement typically applies to information systems that are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing websites. FICAM-approved information system components include, for example, information technology products and software libraries that have been approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management conformance program.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IA-8 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-3-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to:\n (a)   Document proposed changes to the information system;\n (b)   Notify [Assignment: organized-defined approval authorities] of proposed changes to the information system and request change approval;\n (c)   Highlight proposed changes to the information system that have not been approved or disapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined time period];\n (d)   Prohibit changes to the information system until designated approvals are received; \n (e)   Document all changes to the information system; and\n (f) Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] when approved changes to the information system are completed.", 
        "title": "CM-3 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization ensures that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications or access scripts or stored on function keys.\n\n   Organizations exercise caution in determining whether embedded or stored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators. This is irrespective of whether that representation is perhaps an encrypted version of something else (e.g., a password).", 
        "title": "IA-5 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events.\n\n   Automated tools include, for example, host-based, network-based, transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools or Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) technologies that provide real time analysis of alerts and/or notifications generated by organizational information systems.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires individuals to be authenticated with an individual authenticator when a group authenticator is employed.\n\n   Requiring individuals to use individual authenticators as a second level of authentication helps organizations to mitigate the risk of using group authenticators.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system prevents [Assignment: organization-defined software] from executing at higher privilege levels than users executing the software.\n\n   In certain situations, software applications/programs need to execute with elevated privileges to perform required functions. However, if the privileges required for execution are at a higher level than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking such applications/programs, those users are indirectly provided with greater privileges than assigned by organizations.\n any software except software explicitly documented\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-6 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-8-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms.", 
        "title": "SI-8 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-8-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to detect the presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components within the information system; and\n (b)   Takes the following actions when unauthorized components are detected: [Selection (one or more): disables network access by such components; isolates the components; notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].\n\n   This control enhancement is applied in addition to the monitoring for unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems for that purpose. Automated mechanisms can be implemented within information systems or in other separate devices. Isolation can be achieved, for example, by placing unauthorized information system components in separate domains or subnets or otherwise quarantining such components. This type of component isolation is commonly referred to as sandboxing.  a. continuously;\r\nb. the ISSO and ISSM and others as the local organization deems appropriate\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-8 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-17-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system monitors and controls remote access methods.\n\n   Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows organizations to detect cyber attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by auditing connection activities of remote users on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones, and tablets).", 
        "title": "AC-17 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-8-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components.\n\n   Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-to-date, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-2 (2) for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities.", 
        "title": "CM-8 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization reviews historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in the information system has been previously exploited.\n\n   RA-5 (8) Requirements: This enhancement is required for all high vulnerability scan findings. \nGuidance: While scanning tools may label findings as high or critical, the intent of the control is based around NIST's definition of high vulnerability.", 
        "title": "RA-5 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-4-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] to correlate and share [Assignment: organization-defined incident information] to achieve a cross- organization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses.\n\n   The coordination of incident information with external organizations including, for example, mission/business partners, military/coalition partners, customers, and multitiered developers, can provide significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination with respect to incident handling can serve as an important risk management capability. This capability allows organizations to leverage critical information from a variety of sources to effectively respond to information security-related incidents potentially affecting the organization\u2019s operations, assets, and individuals.", 
        "title": "IR-4 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-9.html", 
        "text": "The information system audits the execution of privileged functions.\n\n   Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse, and in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat (APT).", 
        "title": "AC-6 (9)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-9-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires providers of [Assignment: organization-defined external information system services] to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.\n\n   Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be particularly useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols.  All external information system services\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-9 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-20.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of privileged users.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-4 (20)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to non-privileged accounts.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-3-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms.\n\n   Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of malicious code protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed flaw malicious code protection security controls.", 
        "title": "SI-3 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-10-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides the capability to restore information system components within [Assignment: organization-defined restoration time-periods] from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.\n\n   Restoration of information system components includes, for example, reimaging which restores components to known, operational states.", 
        "title": "CP-10 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization protects authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.\n\n   For information systems containing multiple security categories of information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of information on the systems.", 
        "title": "IA-5 (6)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-4-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system enforces information flow control using [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment: organization-defined information flows].\n\n   Organization-defined security policy filters can address data structures and content. For example, security policy filters for data structures can check for maximum file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured and unstructured data). Security policy filters for data content can check for specific words (e.g., dirty/clean word filters), enumerated values or data value ranges, and hidden content. Structured data permits the interpretation of data content by applications. Unstructured data typically refers to digital information without a particular data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate the development of rule sets to address the particular sensitivity of the information conveyed by the data or the associated flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists of: (i) bitmap objects that are inherently non language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files); and (ii) textual objects that are based on written or printed languages (e.g., commercial off-the- shelf word processing documents, spreadsheets, or emails). Organizations can implement more than one security policy filter to meet information flow control objectives (e.g., employing clean word lists in conjunction with dirty word lists may help to reduce false positives).", 
        "title": "AC-4 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-8-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system accepts only FICAM-approved third-party credentials.\n\n   This control enhancement typically applies to organizational information systems that are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing websites. Third-party credentials are those credentials issued by nonfederal government entities approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Trust Framework Solutions initiative. Approved third-party credentials meet or exceed the set of minimum federal government-wide technical, security, privacy, and organizational maturity requirements. This allows federal government relying parties to trust such credentials at their approved assurance levels.", 
        "title": "IA-8 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-18-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies and explicitly authorizes users allowed to independently configure wireless networking capabilities.\n\n   Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure wireless networking capability are enforced in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms employed within organizational information systems.", 
        "title": "AC-18 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/mp-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organizational information systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.\n\n   Requiring identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or projects) for portable storage devices reduces the risk of using such technologies by allowing organizations to assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities in the devices (e.g., malicious code insertion).", 
        "title": "MP-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically [Selection: removes; disables] temporary and emergency accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account].\n\n  This control enhancement requires the removal of both temporary and emergency accounts automatically after a predefined period of time has elapsed, rather than at the convenience of the systems administrator.\n For temporary user accounts: 72 hours \n\nFor emergency admin accounts: never (see supplemental recommendation)\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-4-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization correlates incident information and individual incident responses to achieve an organization-wide perspective on incident awareness and response.\n\n   Sometimes the nature of a threat event, for example, a hostile cyber attack, is such that it can only be observed by bringing together information from different sources including various reports and reporting procedures established by organizations.", 
        "title": "IR-4 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization determines what information about the information system is discoverable by adversaries and subsequently takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].\n\n   Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could obtain without directly compromising or breaching the information system, for example, by collecting information the system is exposing or by conducting extensive searches of the web. Corrective actions can include, for example, notifying appropriate organizational personnel, removing designated information, or changing the information system to make designated information less relevant or attractive to adversaries.", 
        "title": "RA-5 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization restricts privileged accounts on the information system to [Assignment:\norganization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n   Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically described as system administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day users from having access to privileged information/functions. Organizations may differentiate in the application of this control enhancement between allowed privileges for local accounts and for domain accounts provided organizations retain the ability to control information system configurations for key security parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently mitigate risk.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-6 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support organizational processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities.\n\n   Organizational processes benefiting from integrated audit review, analysis, and reporting include, for example, incident response, continuous monitoring, contingency planning, and Inspector General audits.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-9-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization uses a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected information system functions as part of contingency plan testing.", 
        "title": "CP-9 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-21.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs boundary protection mechanisms to separate [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] supporting [Assignment: organization- defined missions and/or business functions].\n\n   Organizations can isolate information system components performing different missions and/or business functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information flows among system components and also provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels of protection for selected components. Separating system components with boundary protection mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual components and to more effectively control information flows between those components. This type of enhanced protection limits the potential harm from cyber attacks and errors. The degree of separation provided varies depending upon the mechanisms chosen. Boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, routers, gateways, and firewalls separating system components into physically separate networks or subnetworks, cross-domain devices separating subnetworks, virtualization techniques, and encrypting information flows among system components using distinct encryption keys.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (21)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-3-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].\n\n  This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management and configuration capability provided by the information system.", 
        "title": "AU-3 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-13-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs fire detection devices/systems for the information system that activate automatically and notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders] in the event of a fire.\n\n   Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access authorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified information.", 
        "title": "PE-13 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged accounts.\n\n   Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay- resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization accepts the results of an assessment of [Assignment: organization-defined information system] performed by [Assignment: organization-defined external organization] when the assessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].\n\n   Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information systems by other (external) organizations. Utilizing such existing assessments (i.e., reusing existing assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required for organizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities that organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary. Determinations for accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past assessment experiences one organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have with regard to assessments, the level of detail of supporting assessment documentation provided, or mandates imposed upon organizations by federal legislation, policies, or directives.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CA-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-9-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only [Assignment: organization-defined subset of privileged users].\n\n   Individuals with privileged access to an information system and who are also the subject of an audit by that system, may affect the reliability of audit information by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. This control enhancement requires that privileged access be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges, thus limiting the users with audit-related privileges.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-9 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic incident response training environment.", 
        "title": "IR-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-7-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).\n\n   Priority-of-service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with service providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with their availability requirements and the availability of information resources at the alternate processing site.", 
        "title": "CP-7 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to increase the availability of incident response- related information and support.\n\n   Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability for users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may have the ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.", 
        "title": "IR-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-11.html", 
        "text": "The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts].\n\n  Organizations can describe the specific conditions or circumstances under which information system accounts can be used, for example, by restricting usage to certain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time.", 
        "title": "AC-2 (11)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-16.html", 
        "text": "The organization correlates information from monitoring tools employed throughout the information system.\n\n   Correlating information from different monitoring tools can provide a more comprehensive view of information system activity. The correlation of monitoring tools that usually work in isolation (e.g., host monitoring, network monitoring, anti-virus software) can provide an organization-wide view and in so doing, may reveal otherwise unseen attack patterns. Understanding the capabilities/limitations of diverse monitoring tools and how to maximize the utility of information generated by those tools can help organizations to build, operate, and maintain effective monitoring programs.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (16)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ps-4-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] upon termination of an individual.\n\n   In organizations with a large number of employees, not all personnel who need to know about termination actions receive the appropriate notifications\u2014or, if such notifications are received, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms\ncan be used to send automatic alerts or notifications to specific organizational personnel or roles (e.g., management personnel, supervisors, personnel security officers, information security officers, systems administrators, or information technology administrators) when individuals are terminated. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites.", 
        "title": "PS-4 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-4-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions, ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.\n\n   The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design phases) allows organizations to influence the design of the information system, information system component, or information system service. This early involvement in the life cycle helps organizations to avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that pose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific\nports, protocols, or services (or when requiring information system service providers to do so). Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting of security controls after the information system, system component, or information system service has been implemented. SA-9 describes requirements for external information system services with organizations identifying which functions, ports, protocols, and services are provided from external sources.", 
        "title": "SA-4 (9)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ps-3-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection:\n (a)   Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government duties; and\n (b)   Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].\n\n   Organizational information requiring special protection includes, for example, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Sources and Methods Information (SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity background screening requirements.\n b. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PS-3 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information system accounts.\n\n  The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using email or text messaging to automatically notify account managers when users are terminated or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using telephonic notification to report atypical system account usage.", 
        "title": "AC-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-7-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs trend analyses to determine if security control implementations, the frequency of continuous monitoring activities, and/or the types of activities used in the continuous monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.\n\n   Trend analyses can include, for example, examining recent threat information regarding the types of threat events that have occurred within the organization or across the federal government, success rates of certain types of cyber attacks, emerging vulnerabilities in information technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, results from multiple security control assessments, the effectiveness of configuration settings, and findings from Inspectors General or auditors.", 
        "title": "CA-7 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-9-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] to ensure that organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions.\n\n   Correction actions for information systems contaminated due to information spillages may be very time-consuming. During those periods, personnel may not have access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct organizational business.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-9 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-9-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization tests backup information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify media reliability and information integrity.\n\n   at least monthly in accordance with contingency plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CP-9 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-3-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].\n\n   Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records includes, for example, full text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use of audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleading or could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.\n AU-3 (1) Guidance: For client-server transactions, the number of bytes sent and received gives bidirectional transfer information that can be helpful during an investigation or inquiry.", 
        "title": "AU-3 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-13-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system that provide automatic notification of any activation to Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders].\n\n   Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access authorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified information.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-13 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-7-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system purges/wipes information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices] based on [Assignment: organization-defined purging/wiping requirements/techniques] after [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device logon attempts.\n\n  This control enhancement applies only to mobile devices for which a logon occurs (e.g., personal digital assistants, smart phones, tablets). The logon is to the mobile device, not to any one account on the device. Therefore, successful logons to any accounts on mobile devices reset the unsuccessful logon count to zero. Organizations define information to be purged/wiped carefully in order to avoid over purging/wiping which may result in devices becoming unusable. Purging/wiping may be unnecessary if the information on the device is protected with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms.", 
        "title": "AC-7 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-6-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization monitors physical access to the information system in addition to the physical access monitoring of the facility as [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system].\n\n   This control enhancement provides additional monitoring for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, communications centers).", 
        "title": "PE-6 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-13.html", 
        "text": "The information system prohibits the use of cached authenticators after [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IA-5 (13)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-18.html", 
        "text": "The information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary protection device.\n\n   Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing information system mechanisms to ensure that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices at managed interfaces (e.g., routers, firewalls, guards, and application gateways residing on protected subnetworks commonly referred to as demilitarized zones), information systems do not enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Failures of boundary protection devices cannot lead to, or cause information external to the devices to enter the devices, nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (18)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within\n[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.\n\n   Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of essential missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions\nto the information system and its supporting infrastructure.  1 hour (Availability High ) \r\n12 hours (Availability Moderate) \r\nas defined in the contingency plan\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CP-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization incorporates simulated events into incident response training to facilitate effective response by personnel in crisis situations.", 
        "title": "IR-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-10.html", 
        "text": "The information system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.\n\n   Privileged functions include, for example, establishing information system accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users.", 
        "title": "AC-6 (10)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-5.html", 
        "text": "The information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by default and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).\n\n   This control enhancement applies to both inbound and outbound network communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications traffic policy ensures that only those connections which are essential and approved are allowed.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-7-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Establishes a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability and external providers of information system protection capability; and\n (b)   Identifies organizational incident response team members to the external providers.\n\n   External providers of information system protection capability include, for example, the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.", 
        "title": "IR-7 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-12.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a) Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical use]; and\n (b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n  Atypical usage includes, for example, accessing information systems at certain times of the day and from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage patterns of individuals working in organizations.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nb. at a minimum, the ISSO\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AC-2 (12)(a) Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.\nAC-2 (12)(b) Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.", 
        "title": "AC-2 (12)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-17-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions.\n\n   The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security categorization of the information.", 
        "title": "AC-17 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and information system updates.", 
        "title": "CM-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-5-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information within a production or operational environment; and\n (b)   Reviews and reevaluates privileges [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   In many organizations, information systems support multiple core missions/business functions. Limiting privileges to change information system components with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a particular information system component may have far-reaching effects on mission/business processes supported by the system where the component resides. The complex, many-to-many relationships between systems and mission/business processes are in some cases, unknown to developers.  b. every 90 days\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-5 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-9-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services; and\n (b)   Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n\n   Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as firewalls, or key management services.  b. the DoD Component CIO or their delegate(s)\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-9 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Employs automated mechanisms to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and repairs; and\n (b)   Produces up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance and repair actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed.", 
        "title": "MA-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-23.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based monitoring mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].\n\n   Information system components where host-based monitoring can be implemented include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices. Organizations consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple information technology product developers.\n HBSS\n\nall components\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG\nNOTE: DISA will evaluate Commercial CSP equivalencies on a case by case basis.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (23)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-12-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system:\n (a)   Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever authentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information resources]; and\n (b)   Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination of authenticated communications sessions.\n\n   Information resources to which users gain access via authentication include, for example, local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites/web- based services. Logout messages for web page access, for example, can be displayed after authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for some types of interactive sessions including, for example, file transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, information systems typically send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.\n a. all\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AC-12 (1) Guidance: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_logout_functionality_%28OTG-SESS-006%29", 
        "title": "AC-12 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-4-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization analyzes changes to the information system in a separate test environment before implementation in an operational environment, looking for security impacts due to flaws, weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice.\n\n   Separate test environment in this context means an environment that is physically or logically isolated and distinct from the operational environment. The separation is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the operational environment, and information in the operational environment is not inadvertently transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or logical means. If physically separate test environments are not used, organizations determine the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical separation (e.g., separation achieved through virtual machines).", 
        "title": "CM-4 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-10-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.\n\n   This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to software and firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by developers. Integrity checking mechanisms can also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity of software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided by developers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any updates to such components.", 
        "title": "SA-10 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-3-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms.\n\n   Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions. Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates.", 
        "title": "SI-3 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies.\n\n   This control enhancement applies to logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials.", 
        "title": "IA-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-7-5.html", 
        "text": "The information system automatically [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system; implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]] when integrity violations are discovered.\n\n   Organizations may define different integrity checking and anomaly responses: (i) by type of information (e.g., firmware, software, user data); (ii) by specific information (e.g., boot firmware, boot firmware for a specific types of machines); or (iii) a combination of both. Automatic implementation of specific safeguards within organizational information systems includes, for example, reversing the changes, halting the information system, or triggering audit alerts when unauthorized modifications to critical security files occur.", 
        "title": "SI-7 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-4-21.html", 
        "text": "The information system separates information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organization- defined required separations by types of information].\n\n   Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service requests and responses, and information of differing security categories.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-4 (21)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-2-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Issues [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices] with [Assignment: organization-defined configurations] to individuals traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and\n (b)   Applies [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to the devices when the individuals return.\n\n   When it is known that information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled areas. For example, organizational policies and procedures for notebook computers used by individuals departing on and returning from travel include, for example, determining which locations are of concern, defining required configurations for the devices, ensuring that the devices are configured as intended before travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to the device after travel is completed. Specially configured notebook computers include, for\nexample, computers with sanitized hard drives, limited applications, and additional hardening (e.g., more stringent configuration settings). Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices upon return from travel include, for example, examining the device for signs of physical tampering and purging/reimaging the hard disk drive. Protecting information residing on mobile devices is covered in the media protection family..\\\n a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings;\r\na. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings;\r\nb. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-2 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-19.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of individuals who have been identified by [Assignment: organization-defined sources] as posing an increased level of risk.\n\n   Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, human resource records, intelligence agencies, law enforcement organizations, and/or other credible sources. The monitoring of individuals is closely coordinated with management, legal, security, and human resources officials within organizations conducting such monitoring and complies with federal legislation, Executive Orders, policies, directives, regulations, and standards.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-4 (19)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-12-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles] to change the auditing to be performed on [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event criteria] within [Assignment: organization-defined time thresholds].\n\n   This control enhancement enables organizations to extend or limit auditing as necessary to meet organizational requirements. Auditing that is limited to conserve information system resources may be extended to address certain threat situations. In addition, auditing may be limited to a specific set of events to facilitate audit reduction, analysis, and reporting. Organizations can establish time thresholds in which audit actions are changed, for example, near real-time, within minutes, or within hours.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings; \n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings; \n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings; \n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-12 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].\n\n   Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-18.html", 
        "text": "The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the information system (i.e., system perimeter) and at [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the system (e.g., subsystems, subnetworks)] to detect covert exfiltration of information.\n\n   Covert means that can be used for the unauthorized exfiltration of organizational information include, for example, steganography.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (18)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-8.html", 
        "text": "The information system routes [Assignment: organization-defined internal communications traffic] to [Assignment: organization-defined external networks] through authenticated proxy servers at managed interfaces.\n\n   External networks are networks outside of organizational control. A proxy server is a server (i.e., information system or application) that acts as an intermediary for clients requesting information system resources (e.g., files, connections, web pages, or services) from other organizational servers. Client requests established through an initial connection to the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity and to provide additional protection by limiting direct connectivity. Web content filtering devices are one of the most common proxy servers providing access to the Internet. Proxy servers support logging individual Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions and blocking specific Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), domain names, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Web proxies can be configured with organization-defined lists of authorized and unauthorized websites.  protocols as designated by PPSM guidance (e.g. HTTPS, HTTP, FTP, SNMP)\n\nany network external to the authorization boundary\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-7 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-7-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs authorized to execute on the information system];\n (b)   Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the information system; and\n (c)   Reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs [Assignment: organization- defined frequency].\n\n   The process used to identify software programs that are authorized to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as whitelisting. In addition to whitelisting, organizations consider verifying the integrity of white-listed software programs using, for example, cryptographic checksums, digital signatures, or hash functions. Verification of white-listed software can occur either prior to execution or at system startup.  a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings; \r\nc. Monthly\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-7 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate security clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements:\n    (1)   Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, or formal access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of maintenance and diagnostic activities on the information system by approved organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, and are technically qualified;\n   (2)   Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatile information storage components within the information system are sanitized and all nonvolatile storage media are removed or physically disconnected from the system and secured; and\n (b)   Develops and implements alternate security safeguards in the event an information system component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.\n\n   This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate security clearances (i.e., individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess security clearances at a lower level than required) or who are not U.S. citizens, visual and\nelectronic access to any classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), or any other sensitive information contained on organizational information systems. Procedures for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information systems.", 
        "title": "MA-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-3-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization tests, validates, and documents changes to the information system before implementing the changes on the operational system.\n\n   Changes to information systems include modifications to hardware, software, or firmware components and configuration settings defined in CM-6. Organizations ensure that testing does not interfere with information system operations. Individuals/groups conducting tests understand organizational security policies and procedures, information system security policies and procedures, and the specific health, safety, and environmental risks associated with particular facilities/processes. Operational systems may need to be taken off-line, or replicated to the extent feasible, before testing can be conducted. If information systems must be taken off-line for testing, the tests are scheduled to occur during planned system outages whenever possible. If testing cannot be conducted on operational systems, organizations employ compensating controls (e.g., testing on replicated systems).", 
        "title": "CM-3 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently strong to satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].\n\n   This control enhancement focuses on the creation of strong passwords and the characteristics of such passwords (e.g., complexity) prior to use, the enforcement of which is carried out by organizational information systems in IA-5 (1).  IA-5 (4) Guidance: If automated mechanisms which enforce password authenticator strength at creation are not used, automated mechanisms must be used to audit strength of created password authenticators.", 
        "title": "IA-5 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization connects and configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information system-wide intrusion detection system.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-22.html", 
        "text": "The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by [Assignment: organization-defined authorization or approval processes] and [Selection (one or more): audits; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].\n\n   Unauthorized or unapproved network services include, for example, services in service-oriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation and therefore may be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services.  at a minimum, the ISSM or ISSO\n\nat a minimum, the ISSM or ISSO\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SI-4 (22)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.\n\n   Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of spam protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed spam protection security controls.", 
        "title": "SI-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-11-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the unauthorized installation of software is detected.", 
        "title": "CM-11 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-17-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system routes all remote accesses through [Assignment: organization-defined number] managed network access control points.\n\n   Limiting the number of access control points for remote accesses reduces the attack surface for organizations. Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative requirements for external network connections.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-17 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-14.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system.\n\n   Wireless signals may radiate beyond the confines of organization- controlled facilities. Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections including the conduct of thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Scans are not limited to those areas within facilities containing information systems, but also include areas outside of facilities as needed, to verify that unauthorized wireless access points are not connected to the systems.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (14)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-13.html", 
        "text": "The organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of discovery of the risk.\n\n  Users posing a significant risk to organizations include individuals for whom reliable evidence or intelligence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to information systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Harm includes potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination between authorizing officials, information system administrators, and human resource managers is essential in order for timely execution of this control enhancement.  30 minutes unless otherwise defined in formal organizational policy\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-2 (13)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service; \n (b)   Establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;\n (c)   Protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted across each interface;\n (d)   Documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business need and duration of that need; and\n (e)   Reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission/business need.\n\n   e. every 180 days\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-7 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.\n\n   Threats that affect alternate processing sites are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.  CP-7 (1) Guidance: The service provider may determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between the primary and alternate processing sites, based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites will be less relevant.", 
        "title": "CP-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization conducts capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information processing, telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency operations.\n\n   Capacity planning is needed because different types of threats (e.g., natural disasters, targeted cyber attacks) can result in a reduction of the available processing, telecommunications, and support services originally intended to support the organizational missions/business functions. Organizations may need to anticipate degraded operations during contingency operations and factor such degradation into capacity planning.", 
        "title": "CP-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pl-4-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes in the rules of behavior, explicit restrictions on the use of social media/networking sites and posting organizational information on public websites.\n\n   This control enhancement addresses rules of behavior related to the use of social media/networking sites: (i) when organizational personnel are using such sites for official duties or in the conduct of official business; (ii) when organizational information is involved in social media/networking transactions; and (iii) when personnel are accessing social media/networking sites from organizational information systems. Organizations also address specific rules that prevent unauthorized entities from obtaining and/or inferring non- public organizational information (e.g., system account information, personally identifiable information) from social media/networking sites.", 
        "title": "PL-4 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to manage the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple information systems.\n\n   When individuals have accounts on multiple information systems, there is the risk that the compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other accounts if individuals use the same authenticators. Possible alternatives include, for example: (i) having different authenticators on all systems; (ii) employing some form of single sign-on mechanism; or (iii) including some form of one-time passwords on all systems.", 
        "title": "IA-5 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-8-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Requires primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to have contingency plans;\n (b)   Reviews provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency requirements; and\n (c)   Obtains evidence of contingency testing/training by providers [Assignment: organization- defined frequency].\n\n   Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature of such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficient evidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, state, and local governments. Organizations may use these types of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider contingency plan reviews, testing, and training.", 
        "title": "CP-8 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence] to conduct security control assessments.\n\n   Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartiality implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the organizational information systems under assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. To achieve impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in positions of advocacy for the organizations acquiring their services. Independent assessments can be obtained from elements within organizations or can be contracted to public or private sector entities outside of organizations. Authorizing officials determine the required level of independence based on the security categories of information systems and/or the ultimate risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing officials also determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance that the results are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example, when information system owners are not directly involved in contracting processes or cannot unduly influence the impartiality of assessors conducting assessments. In special situations,\nfor example, when organizations that own the information systems are small or organizational structures require that assessments are conducted by individuals that are in the developmental, operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by independent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and reliability of the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other than direct support to authorization decisions are, when performed by assessors with sufficient independence, more likely to be useable for such decisions, thereby reducing the need to\nrepeat assessments. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CA-2 (1) Requirement: For JAB Authorization, must use an accredited 3PAO.", 
        "title": "CA-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more): prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes to information] during transmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical safeguards].\n\n  Encrypting information for transmission protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative physical security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems.  Protected Distribution System (PDS)\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-13-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis.", 
        "title": "PE-13 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-3-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs [Selection: allow-all, deny-by-exception; deny-all, permit-by-exception] policy for allowing [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to connect to external information systems.\n\n   Organizations can constrain information system connectivity to external domains (e.g., websites) by employing one of two policies with regard to such connectivity: (i) allow-all, deny by exception, also known as blacklisting (the weaker of the two policies); or (ii) deny-all, allow by exception, also known as whitelisting (the stronger of the two policies). For either policy, organizations determine what exceptions, if any, are acceptable.  CA-3 (5) Guidance: For JAB Authorization, CSPs shall include details of this control in their Architecture Briefing", 
        "title": "CA-3 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization analyzes and correlates audit records across different repositories to gain organization-wide situational awareness.\n\n   Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all three tiers of risk management (i.e., organizational, mission/business process, and information system) and supports cross-organization awareness.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-11-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.\n\n   Dynamic code analysis provides run-time verification of software programs, using tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs run-time tools to help to ensure that security functionality performs in the manner in which it was designed. A specialized type of dynamic analysis, known as fuzz testing, induces program failures by deliberately introducing malformed or random data into software programs. Fuzz testing strategies derive from the intended use of applications and the functional and design specifications for the applications.\n SA-11 (8) Requirement: The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.", 
        "title": "SA-11 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Reviews [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to [Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need for such privileges; and\n (b)   Reassigns or removes privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission/business needs.\n\n   The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time reflecting changes in organizational missions/business function, environments of operation, technologies, or threat. Periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, organizations take appropriate corrective actions.  a. at a minimum, annually\n\na. all users\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-6 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-9-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides information spillage response training [Assignment: organization- defined frequency].\n Annually\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-9 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to compare the results of vulnerability scans over time to determine trends in information system vulnerabilities.\n\n   RA-5 (6) Guidance: include in Continuous Monitoring ISSO digest/report to JAB/AO", 
        "title": "RA-5 (6)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-4-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness that contains [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].\n\n   The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within the information system, system component, or information system service continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorporated into the continuous monitoring strategies and programs implemented by organizations.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SA-4 (8) Guidance: CSP must use the same security standards regardless of where the system component or information system service is acquired.", 
        "title": "SA-4 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-4-6.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements incident handling capability for insider threats.\n\n   While many organizations address insider threat incidents as an inherent part of their organizational incident response capability, this control enhancement provides additional emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handling capabilities (as defined within organizations) to provide appropriate and timely responses.", 
        "title": "IR-4 (6)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-17-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only for [Assignment: organization-defined needs]; and\n (b)   Documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.\n\n   a. Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-17 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-5-3.html", 
        "text": "The information system prevents the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components] without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.\n\n   Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed with recognized and approved certificates include, for example, software and firmware version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input output system (BIOS) updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of such signatures, is a method of code authentication.  Any software or firmware components when the vendor provides digitally signed products\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CM-5 (3) Guidance: If digital signatures/certificates are unavailable, alternative cryptographic integrity checks (hashes, self-signed certs, etc.) can be utilized.", 
        "title": "CM-5 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged accounts.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires that the registration process to receive [Assignment: organization- defined types of and/or specific authenticators] be conducted [Selection: in person; by a trusted third party] before [Assignment: organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].\n The DoD PKI CP defines the role and responsibilities of a DoD PKI Registration Authority (RA). The NSS PKI CP defines the role and responsibilities of an NSS PKI RA.\n\nThe DoD PKI RA\u00e2\u20ac\u201cLRA CPS defines the nomination process for DoD PKI RAs. The NSS PKI DoD RPS defines the nomination process for NSS PKI RAs for DoD.\n\nThe DoD PKI CP defines DoD PKI subscribers and the authentication requirements for issuance of credentials to subscribers. The NSS PKI CP defines NSS PKI subscribers and the authentication requirements for issuance of credentials to subscribers.\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IA-5 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-12.html", 
        "text": "The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary protection mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].\n\n   Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, host-based firewalls. Information system components employing host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices.\n McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention (HIPS)\n\nAll information system components.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG\nNOTE: DISA will evaluate Commercial CSP equivalencies on a case by case basis.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (12)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-18-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection\n(one or more): users; devices] and encryption.", 
        "title": "AC-18 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-7-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system prevents program execution in accordance with [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined policies regarding software program usage and restrictions]; rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage].\n\n   Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CM-7 (2) Guidance: This control shall be implemented in a technical manner on the information system to only allow programs to run that adhere to the policy (i.e. white listing). This control is not to be based off of strictly written policy on what is allowed or not allowed to run.", 
        "title": "CM-7 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system: \n (a)   [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];\n (b)   When required due to [Assignment organization-defined circumstances]; and\n (c)   As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades.\n\n   a. annually;\r\nb. baseline configuration changes or as events dictate such as changes due to USCYBERCOM tactical orders/ directives or cyber attacks.\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CM-2 (1) (a) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.", 
        "title": "CM-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-19-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs [Selection: full-device encryption; container encryption] to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices].\n\n   Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to the encryption of data/information on mobile devices, including for example, encrypting selected data structures such as files, records, or fields.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-19 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-4-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization documents in the security plan for the information system, the policies and procedures for the establishment and use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic connections.", 
        "title": "MA-4 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-2-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization reviews and updates the audited events [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].\n\n   Over time, the events that organizations believe should be audited may change. Reviewing and updating the set of audited events periodically is necessary to ensure that the current set is still necessary and sufficient.\n Annually and based on situational awareness of threats, vulnerabilities\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG AU-2 (3) Guidance: Annually or whenever changes in the threat environment are communicated to the service provider by the JAB/AO.", 
        "title": "AU-2 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/pe-3-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system].\n\n   This control enhancement provides additional physical security for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, data and communications centers).  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "PE-3 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-2-7.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n(a) Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;\n(b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and\n(c) Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] when privileged role assignments are no longer appropriate.\n\n  Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized to perform. These privileged roles include, for example, key management, account management, network and system administration, database administration, and web administration.\n c. Disables (or revokes) privileged user account\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-2 (7)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-4-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process.\n\n   Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes include, for example, online incident management systems.", 
        "title": "IR-4 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ra-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.\n\n   The vulnerabilities to be scanned need to be readily updated as new vulnerabilities are discovered, announced, and scanning methods developed. This updating process helps to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the information system are identified and addressed as quickly as possible.", 
        "title": "RA-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records from multiple components within the system.\n\n   Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include, for example, Security Information Management products.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-2-11.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism requirements].\n\n   For remote access to privileged/non-privileged accounts, the purpose of requiring a device that is separate from the information system gaining access for one of the factors during multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising authentication credentials stored on the system. For example, adversaries deploying malicious code on organizational information systems can potentially compromise such credentials resident on the system and subsequently impersonate authorized users.  IA-2 (11) Guidance: PIV=separate device. Please refer to NIST SP 800-157 Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.", 
        "title": "IA-2 (11)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-8-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated from primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.\n\n   Threats that affect telecommunications services are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber/physical attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations where the service provider can provide alternate telecommunications services meeting the separation needs addressed in the risk assessment.", 
        "title": "CP-8 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-6-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in accordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives.", 
        "title": "CP-6 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-12-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NIST FIPS-compliant; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes.\n NIST Approved for Unclassified systems\r\nNSA Approved for Classified systems\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SC-12 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-4-10.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational information systems.", 
        "title": "SA-4 (10)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-2-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization plans for the continuance of essential missions and business functions with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full information system restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.\n\n   Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites).", 
        "title": "CP-2 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.\n\n   Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates more comprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) initiative is an example of limiting the number of external network connections.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-3-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization incorporates simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective response by personnel in crisis situations.", 
        "title": "CP-3 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-5-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides a warning to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when allocated audit record storage volume reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of repository maximum audit record storage capacity.\n\n   Organizations may have multiple audit data storage repositories distributed across multiple information system components, with each repository having different storage volume capacities.", 
        "title": "AU-5 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-3-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.\n\n   Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, and\nOccupant Emergency Plans.", 
        "title": "IR-3 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-23-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session termination.\n\n   This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from capturing and continuing to employ previously valid session IDs.", 
        "title": "SC-23 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-2-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization plans for the resumption of all missions and business functions within\n[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.\n\n   Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of all missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to the information system and its supporting infrastructure.", 
        "title": "CP-2 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-8-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs an independent penetration agent or penetration team to perform penetration testing on the information system or system components.\n\n   Independent penetration agents or teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational information systems. Impartiality implies that penetration agents or teams are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the information systems that are the targets of the penetration testing. Supplemental guidance for CA-2 (1) provides additional information regarding independent assessments that can be applied to penetration testing.", 
        "title": "CA-8 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents.", 
        "title": "IR-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-6-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.\n\n   Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions include, for example: (i) duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites; or (ii) planning for physical access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is disrupted.", 
        "title": "CP-6 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-7-14.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code; and\n (b)   Provides exceptions to the source code requirement only for compelling mission/operational requirements and with the approval of the authorizing official.\n\n   This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine- executable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source software. Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code from sources with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address the fact that these types of software products may be very difficult to review, repair, or extend, given that organizations, in most cases, do not have access to the original source code, and there may be no owners who could make such repairs on behalf of organizations.", 
        "title": "SI-7 (14)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-12-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NSA-approved key management technology and processes; approved PKI Class 3 certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved PKI Class 3 or Class 4 certificates and hardware security tokens that protect the user\u2019s private key].", 
        "title": "SC-12 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-8-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services.", 
        "title": "CP-8 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-7-1.html", 
        "text": "The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest based on [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit records].\n\n   Events of interest can be identified by the content of specific audit record fields including, for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or subnetwork) or selectable by specific information system component.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AU-7 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ca-3-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined unclassified, non-national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment; organization-defined boundary protection device].\n\n   Organizations typically do not have control over external networks (e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified non-national security systems and external networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, storing, or transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG CA-3 (3) Guidance: Refer to Appendix H \u2013 Cloud Considerations of the TIC 2.0 Reference Architecture document.", 
        "title": "CA-3 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/au-6-5.html", 
        "text": "The organization integrates analysis of audit records with analysis of [Selection (one or more): vulnerability scanning information; performance data; information system monitoring information; [Assignment: organization-defined data/information collected from other sources]] to further enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.\n\n   This control enhancement does not require vulnerability scanning, the generation of performance data, or information system monitoring. Rather, the enhancement requires that the analysis of information being otherwise produced in these areas is integrated with the analysis of audit information. Security Event and Information Management System tools can facilitate audit record aggregation/consolidation from multiple information system components as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use of standardized audit record analysis scripts developed by organizations (with localized script adjustments, as necessary) provides more cost-effective approaches for analyzing audit record information collected. The correlation of audit record information with vulnerability scanning information is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans and correlating attack detection events with scanning results. Correlation with performance data can help uncover denial of service attacks or cyber attacks resulting in unauthorized use of resources. Correlation with system monitoring information can assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit information to operational situations.", 
        "title": "AU-6 (5)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization explicitly authorizes access to [Assignment: organization-defined security functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) and security-relevant information].\n\n   Security functions include, for example, establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes, for example, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Explicitly authorized personnel include, for example, security administrators, system and network administrators, system security officers, system maintenance personnel, system programmers, and other privileged users.", 
        "title": "AC-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ir-9-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] for personnel exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations.\n\n   Security safeguards include, for example, making personnel exposed to spilled information aware of the federal laws, directives, policies, and/or regulations regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.\n Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "IR-9 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-4-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site:\n (a)   To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and\n (b)   To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency operations.", 
        "title": "CP-4 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-17-9.html", 
        "text": "The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to the information system within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].\n\n   This control enhancement requires organizations to have the capability to rapidly disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or disable further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality of missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access to organizational information systems.\n immediately\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "AC-17 (9)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/at-2-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.\n\n   Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial resources, bullying or sexual harassment of fellow employees, workplace violence, and other serious violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, or practices. Security awareness training includes how to communicate employee and management concerns regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels in accordance with established organizational policies and procedures.", 
        "title": "AT-2 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-4-3.html", 
        "text": "The organization:\n (a)   Requires that nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from an information system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability implemented on the system being serviced; or\n (b)   Removes the component to be serviced from the information system and prior to nonlocal maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to organizational information) before removal from organizational facilities, and after the service is performed, inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before reconnecting the component to the information system.\n\n   Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the information system being serviced.", 
        "title": "MA-4 (3)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-2-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization centrally manages the flaw remediation process.\n\n   Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of flaw remediation processes. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed flaw remediation security controls.", 
        "title": "SI-2 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cp-2-8.html", 
        "text": "The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions and business functions.\n\n   Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical information system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed (above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routinely implemented) to help ensure that organizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted during contingency operations. In addition, the identification of critical information assets facilitates the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical information system assets include technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information technology services, information system components, information technology products, and mechanisms. Operational aspects include, for example, procedures (manually executed operations) and personnel (individuals operating technical safeguards and/or executing manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can provide assistance in identifying critical assets.", 
        "title": "CP-2 (8)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/mp-6-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization reviews, approves, tracks, documents, and verifies media sanitization and disposal actions.\n\n   Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensure compliance with records-retention policies. Tracking/documenting actions include, for example, listing personnel who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions, types of media sanitized, specific files stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date and time of the sanitization actions, personnel who performed the sanitization, verification actions taken, personnel who performed the verification, and disposal action taken.\nOrganizations verify that the sanitization of the media was effective prior to disposal.", 
        "title": "MP-6 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-7-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization employs automated tools that provide notification to [Assignment: organization- defined personnel or roles] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.\n\n   The use of automated tools to report integrity violations and to notify organizational personnel in a timely matter is an essential precursor to effective risk response. Personnel having an interest in integrity violations include, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, systems administrators, software developers, systems integrators, and information security officers.", 
        "title": "SI-7 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-3-4.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element].\n\n   Information security representatives can include, for example, senior agency information security officers, information system security officers, or information system security managers. Representation by personnel with information security expertise is important because changes to information system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be security-relevant. Detecting such changes early in the process can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of organizational information systems. The configuration change control element in this control enhancement reflects the change control elements defined by organizations in CM-3.", 
        "title": "CM-3 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ia-5-2.html", 
        "text": "The information system, for PKI-based authentication:\n (a)   Validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor including checking certificate status information;\n (b)   Enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key;\n (c)   Maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and\n (d)   Implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in case of inability to access revocation information via the network.\n\n   Status information for certification paths includes, for example, certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, validation of certifications involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common Policy Root trust anchor including certificate policy processing.", 
        "title": "IA-5 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ac-20-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access the information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only when the organization:\n (a)   Verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in the organization\u2019s information security policy and security plan; or\n (b)   Retains approved information system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external information system.\n\n   This control enhancement recognizes that there are circumstances where individuals using external information systems (e.g., contractors, coalition partners) need to access organizational information systems. In those situations, organizations need confidence that the external information systems contain the necessary security safeguards (i.e., security controls), so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational information systems. Verification that the required security controls have been implemented can be achieved, for example, by third-party, independent assessments, attestations, or other means, depending on the confidence level required by organizations.", 
        "title": "AC-20 (1)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sc-7-13.html", 
        "text": "The organization isolates [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools, mechanisms, and support components] from other internal information system components by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.\n\n   Physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces are useful, for example, in isolating computer network defenses from critical operational processing networks to prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques of organizations.  key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components such as, but not limited to PKI, Patching infrastructure, HBSS, CND Tools, Special Purpose Gateway, vulnerability tracking systems, honeypots, internet access points (IAPs); network element and data center administrative/management traffic; Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), Server farms/computing centers, centralized audit log servers etc.\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG SC-7 (13) Requirement: The service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.\nGuidance: Examples include: information security tools, mechanisms, and support components such as, but not limited to PKI, patching infrastructure, cyber defense tools, special purpose gateway, vulnerability tracking systems, internet access points (IAPs); network element and data center administrative/management traffic; Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), Server farms/computing centers,  centralized audit log servers etc.", 
        "title": "SC-7 (13)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/mp-5-4.html", 
        "text": "The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.\n\n   This control enhancement applies to both portable storage devices (e.g., USB memory sticks, compact disks, digital video disks, external/removable hard disk drives) and mobile devices with storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers).", 
        "title": "MP-5 (4)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/si-4-24.html", 
        "text": "The information system discovers, collects, distributes, and uses indicators of compromise.\n\n   Indicators of compromise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions that are identified on organizational information systems (at the host or network level). IOCs provide organizations with valuable information on objects or information systems that have been compromised. IOCs for the discovery of compromised hosts can include for example, the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network traffic include, for example, Universal Resource Locator (URL) or protocol elements that indicate malware command and control servers. The rapid distribution and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by reducing the time that information systems and organizations are vulnerable to the same exploit or attack.", 
        "title": "SI-4 (24)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-11-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.\n\n   Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information systems, system components, and information system services prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat and vulnerability analyses at this phase of the life cycle help to ensure that design or implementation changes have been accounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities created as a result of those changes have been reviewed and mitigated.", 
        "title": "SA-11 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/cm-5-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization reviews information system changes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances] to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred.\n\n   Indications that warrant review of information system changes and the specific circumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out by organizations during the configuration change process.  Every 90 days or more frequently as the organization defines for high systems AND at least annually or more frequently as the organization defines for low and moderate systems;\n\nWhen there is an incident or when planned changes have been performed\n\nSource: \r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "CM-5 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/sa-4-2.html", 
        "text": "The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security controls to be employed that includes: [Selection (one or more): security-relevant external system interfaces; high-level design; low-level design; source code or hardware schematics; [Assignment: organization-defined design/implementation information]] at [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].\n\n   Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis and testing. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system is expressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms of modules with particular emphasis on software and firmware (but not excluding hardware) and the interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code and hardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of the information system.  Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nNot appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings\n\nSource:\r\nDoD RMF TAG", 
        "title": "SA-4 (2)"
    }, 
    {
        "url": "/enhancements/ma-3-1.html", 
        "text": "The organization inspects the maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.\n\n   If, upon inspection of maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper/unauthorized manner or contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling.", 
        "title": "MA-3 (1)"
    }
]