sni_03_cronjobs.txt

Vulnerabilities in Default Cron Jobs
      Title: Vulnerabilities in Default Cron Jobs
      Date Issued: December 23, 1996
      Last Modified: December 23, 1996
      Code: SNI-03
      Source: Network Associates (was SNI)

                        ######    ##   ##    ######
                        ##        ###  ##      ##
                        ######    ## # ##      ##
                            ##    ##  ###      ##
                        ###### .  ##   ## .  ######.

                            Secure Networks Inc.

                             Security Advisory
                             December 23, 1996

                     Vulnerabilities in Default Cron Jobs

We have become aware of serious problems relating to the handling of 
temporary files by the default BSD cron jobs /etc/security and later 
became aware of an equally serious problem in /etc/daily.  In addition, 
the 4.4BSDlite2 version of /etc/security passes unchecked data to a 
shell.  These bugs make it possible for unpriviliged users to obtain root 
access, EVEN IF THERE ARE NO SETUID PROGRAMS ON THE SYSTEM.

Technical Details
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The first problem with /etc/security is that it passes unchecked data to 
a shell.  If a user creates a file whose name contains shell 
metacharacters and makes it executable and setuid, /etc/security will 
gladly execute commands specified in the name of the file as root.
The problem is the big find line used to search for setuid files, 
which in 4.4BSDlite2 reads:
(find / ! -fstype local -a -prune -o     \( -perm -u+s -o -perm -g+s -o ! -type d -a ! -type f -a ! -type l -a        ! -type s \) | sort | sed -e 's/^/ls -ldgT /' | sh > $LIST) 2> $OUTPUT


The second problem with /etc/security is its poor use of temporary 
files.  In 4.4BSDLite2 /etc/security uses six temporary files unsafely.  
They are all named /tmp/_secure?.$$, where ? is a number in the range 
1 through 6, and $$ is replaced with the process id of the shell 
interpreting /etc/security at run time.  A malicious user needs merely 
to run an at job a minute before /etc/security which creates symlinks 
named /tmp/_secure?.$$, and wait for the cron job to overwrite the file 
of his choice.  In addition, the user has much control over the contents 
of some of these temporary files, allowing users to obtain root access.

Similarly, the /etc/daily script search for core files to be deleted can 
be induced to corrupt arbitrary files, and even create valid .rhosts 
files.  By creating files with names like:
+ + #.core
and leaving an appropriate symbolic link in /tmp, users can obtain 
root priviliges.

These are doubtless not the only shell scripts with /tmp problems, and 
4.4BSD is certainly not alone in having these kinds of problems.  However, 
given the wide availiblity of source to shell scripts which ship with 
operating systems, it is fairly easy for the informed system 
administrator to determine whether scripts on his system are vulnerable.

Impact
~~~~~~
Users with a valid account can obtain root priviliges even if there are 
no setuid programs on the system.

Vulnerable Systems
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4.4BSDlite derived unixes are likely to be vulnerable to the particular 
default cron job problems described here.  

OpenBSD 2.0 is vulnerable to the /etc/daily problem, which is fixed
    in OpenBSD-current.  OpenBSD 2.0 is not vulnerable to any of the
    problems in /etc/security.
FreeBSD 2.1.5 is vulnerable to the /tmp problems in /etc/security and
    but does not pass unchecked data to a shell in /etc/security,
    or have a /tmp related problem in /etc/daily.
BSD/OS 2.0 is vulnerable to the problems in /etc/security, but not
    the problem in /etc/daily.  We have not checked a more recent
    release of BSD/OS.
NetBSD 1.2 is vulnerable to all three problems.
4.4BSDlite2 is vulnerable to all three problems.

Note that the vulnerability information for BSD/OS, NetBSD, and 
4.4BSDlite2 is based exclusively on source inspection.

Be aware that even if not vulnerable to these specific problems, virtually
every operating system has at least one shell script which does not
safely handle temporary files.  Given the availibility of source code
to shell scripts, operating system vendors would do well to make them
a showcase of good programming practices.  


Fix Information
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The version of /etc/security in OpenBSD 2.0 appears safe, as does the 
version of /etc/daily in OpenBSD-current.  On most operating systems, 
mkdir is both atomic, and does not follow symbolic links.  Therefore it 
is possible to use mkdir in a shell script to write portable and secure 
code.

# A viable /etc/security, which requires OpenBSD or GNU
# find and xargs.
# note that this version lacks features found in the 4.4Lite2
# /etc/security.
#------------------------- cut here -----------------------------


#!/bin/sh 
#
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin
LC_ALL=C; export LC_ALL

host=`hostname -s`
echo "Subject: $host security check output"

LOG=/var/log
umask 077
TDIR=/tmp/_secure.$$
if ! mkdir $TDIR ; then
        echo $TDIR already exists
        ls -alF $TDIR
        exit 1
fi

TMP=$TDIR/secure
trap 'rm -rf $TDIR' 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15

echo "checking setuid files and devices:"

        find / -fstype local -and -type f -and                \( -perm 4000 -or -perm 2000 \) -print0 | sort                  | xargs -0 ls -lgTd > $TMP

if [ ! -f $LOG/setuid.today ] ; then
        echo "no $LOG/setuid.today"
        cp $TMP $LOG/setuid.today
fi
if cmp $LOG/setuid.today $TMP >/dev/null; then :; else
        echo "$host setuid diffs:"
        diff -b $LOG/setuid.today $TMP
        mv $LOG/setuid.today $LOG/setuid.yesterday
        mv $TMP $LOG/setuid.today
fi
rm -f $TMP


#------------------------- cut here -----------------------------
# A viable /etc/daily based around the OpenBSD one:
#------------------------- cut here -----------------------------


#!/bin/sh -
PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local
host=`hostname -s`
echo "Subject: $host daily run output"

if [ -f /etc/daily.local ];then
        echo ""
        echo "Running daily.local:"
        . /etc/daily.local
fi

UMASK=`umask`
umask 077

TDIR=/tmp/_daily.$$
if ! mkdir $TDIR ; then
  echo $TDIR already exists
  echo ls -ldgT $TDIR
  exit 1
fi
umask $UMASK

TMP=$TDIR/daily

trap 'rm -rf $TDIR' 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15

echo ""
echo "NOT Removing scratch and junk files."

find / \( ! -fstype local -o -fstype rdonly -o -fstype fdesc      -o -fstype kernfs -o -fstype procfs \) -a -prune -o      -name 'lost+found' -a -prune -o      -name '*.core' -a -print > $TMP

if egrep -q '\.core$' $TMP; then
    echo ""
    echo "Possible core dumps:"
    egrep '\.core$' $TMP

fi

msgs -c

if [ -f /etc/news.expire ]; then
     /etc/news.expire
fi

if [ -f /var/account/acct ]; then
     echo "" ;
     echo "Purging accounting records:" ;
     mv /var/account/acct.2 /var/account/acct.3 ;
     mv /var/account/acct.1 /var/account/acct.2 ;
     mv /var/account/acct.0 /var/account/acct.1 ;
     cp /var/account/acct /var/account/acct.0 ;
     sa -sq ;
fi

echo ""
if [ -d /var/yp/binding -a ! -d /var/yp/`domainname` ]; then
     echo "Not running calendar, (yp client)."
else
     echo "Running calendar."
     calendar -a
fi

# Rotation of mail log now handled automatically by cron and 'newsyslog'

if [ -d /var/spool/uucp -a -f /etc/uuclean.daily ]; then
     echo ""
     echo "Cleaning up UUCP:"
     echo /etc/uuclean.daily | su daemon
fi

echo ""
echo "Checking subsystem status:"
echo ""
echo "disks:"
df -k
echo ""
dump W
echo ""

mailq > $TMP
if ! grep -q "^Mail queue is empty$" $TMP; then
     echo ""
     echo "mail:"
     cat $TMP
fi

if [ -d /var/spool/uucp ]; then
     uustat -a > $TMP
     if [ -s $TMP ]; then
         echo ""
         echo "uucp:"
         cat $TMP
     fi
fi

echo ""
echo "network:"
netstat -i
echo ""

t=/var/rwho/*
if [ "$t" != '/var/rwho/*' ]; then
     ruptime
fi

echo ""
echo "NOT checking filesystems."
#echo "Checking filesystems:"
#fsck -n | grep -v '^\*\* Phase'

echo ""
if [ -f /etc/Distfile ]; then
     echo "Running rdist:"
     rdist -f /etc/Distfile
fi

sh /etc/security 2>&1 | mail -s "$host daily insecurity output" root
#------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Additional Information
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
You can find Secure Networks papers at ftp://ftp.secnet.com/pub/papers
and advisories at ftp://ftp.secnet.com/pub/advisories

If you have questions or comments about this advisory, please contact

David Sacerdote, davids@secnet.com.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQCNAzJ4qJAAAAEEAOgB7mooQ6NgzcUSIehKUufGsyojutC7phVXZ+p8FnHLLZNB
BLQEtj5kmfww2A2pR29q4rgPeqEUOjWPlLNdSLby3NI8yKz1AQSQLHAwIDXt/lku
8QXClaV6pNIaQSN8cnyyvjH6TYF778yZhYz0mwLqW6dU5whHtP93ojDw1UhtAAUR
tCtEYXZpZCBTYWNlcmRvdGUgPGRhdmlkc0BzaWxlbmNlLnNlY25ldC5jb20+
=LtL9
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


Copyright Notice
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The contents of this advisory are Copyright (C) 1997 Secure Networks Inc,
and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is charged for
distribution, and that proper credit is given.

 You can find Secure Networks papers at ftp://ftp.secnet.com/pub/papers
 and advisories at ftp://ftp.secnet.com/advisories

 You can browse our web site at http://www.secnet.com

 You can subscribe to our security advisory mailing list by sending mail to
 majordomo@secnet.com with the line "subscribe sni-advisories"


Source code distributed with this advisory falls under the following license:
 
Copyright (c) 1989, 1993, 1994
     The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   must display the following acknowledgement:
     This product includes software developed by the University of
     California, Berkeley and its contributors.
4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
   may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
   without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGE.