diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 1488390a..43020b79 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ This document outlines major changes between releases.
## [Unreleased]
New features:
+ * TLA+ model for MEV-resistant dBFT extension (#116)
Behaviour changes:
* simplify PublicKey interface (#114)
diff --git a/formal-models/.github/dbft_antiMEV.drawio b/formal-models/.github/dbft_antiMEV.drawio
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8382b326
--- /dev/null
+++ b/formal-models/.github/dbft_antiMEV.drawio
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/formal-models/.github/dbft_antiMEV.png b/formal-models/.github/dbft_antiMEV.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c54ba856
Binary files /dev/null and b/formal-models/.github/dbft_antiMEV.png differ
diff --git a/formal-models/README.md b/formal-models/README.md
index 7f476875..b4b8ed38 100644
--- a/formal-models/README.md
+++ b/formal-models/README.md
@@ -356,6 +356,66 @@ configuration:
* [TLA⁺ specification](./dbft2.1_centralizedCV/dbftCentralizedCV.tla)
* [TLC Model Checker configuration](./dbft2.1_centralizedCV/dbftCentralizedCV___AllGoodModel.launch)
+## MEV-resistant dBFT models
+
+[Neo X chain](https://docs.banelabs.org/) uses dBFT 2.0 algorithm as a consensus engine. As a part of
+the Neo X anti-MEV feature implementation, dBFT 2.0 extension was designed to
+provide single-block finality for encrypted transactions (a.k.a. envelope
+transactions). Compared to dBFT 2.0, MEV-resistant dBFT algorithm includes an
+additional `post-Commit` phase that is required to be passed through by consensus
+nodes before every block acceptance. This phase allows consensus nodes to exchange
+some additional data related to encrypted transactions and to the final state of
+accepting block using a new type of consensus messages. The improved protocol based
+on dBFT 2.0 with an additional phase will be referred below as MEV-resistant dBFT.
+
+We've checked MEV-resistant dBFT model with the TLC Model Checker against the same
+set of launch configurations that was used to reveal the liveness problems of the
+[basic dBFT 2.0 model](#basic-dbft-20-model). MEV-resistant dBFT model brings no extra problems to the
+protocol, but it has been proved that this model has exactly the same
+[liveness bug](https://github.com/neo-project/neo-modules/issues/792) that the
+original dBFT 2.0 model has which is expected.
+
+### Basic MEV-resistant dBFT model
+
+This specification is an extension of the
+[basic dBFT 2.0 model](#basic-dbft-20-model). Compared to the base model,
+MEV-resistant dBFT specification additionally includes:
+
+1. New message type `Ack` aimed to reflect the additional `Acknowledgement` protocol
+ message that should be sent by resource manager if at least `M` `Commit`
+ messages were collected by the node.
+2. New resource manager state `ackSent` aimed to reflect the `post-Commit` phase of
+ the protocol, i.e. a consensus node state when it has sent the `Acknowledgement`
+ message but has not accepted the block yet.
+3. New specification step `RMSendAck` describing the transition between `Commit` and
+ `post-Commit` phases of the protocol, or, which is the same, the transition from
+ `commitSent` to `ackSent` resource managers state. This step allows the resource
+ manager to send `Ack` message if at least `M` valid `Commit` messages are
+ collected.
+4. Adjusted behaviour of `RMAcceptBlock` step: block acceptance is possible iff the
+ node has sent the `Acknowledgement` message and there are at least `M` `Ack`
+ messages collected by the node.
+5. Adjusted behaviour of "faulty" resource managers: allow malicious nodes to send an
+ `Ack` message via `RMFaultySendAck` step.
+
+It should be noted that, in comparison with the dBFT 2.0 protocol where the node is
+being locked in the `Commit` phase until the block acceptance, MEV-resistant dBFT
+does not allow to accept the block right after the `Commit` phase. However, it allows
+the node to move from `Commit` phase further to the `post-Commit` phase and locks
+the node at this state until the block acceptance. No view change may be initiated or
+accepted by a node entered the `post-Commit` phase.
+
+Here's the scheme of transitions between consensus node states for MEV-resistant dBFT
+algorithm:
+
+
+
+Here you can find the specification file and the basic MEV-resistant dBFT TLC Model
+Checker launch configuration for the four "honest" consensus nodes scenario:
+
+* [TLA⁺ specification](dbft_antiMEV/dbft.tla)
+* [TLC Model Checker configuration](dbft_antiMEV/dbft___AllGoodModel.launch)
+
## How to run/check the TLA⁺ specification
### Prerequirements
diff --git a/formal-models/dbft_antiMEV/dbft.tla b/formal-models/dbft_antiMEV/dbft.tla
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..50439c4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/formal-models/dbft_antiMEV/dbft.tla
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+-------------------------------- MODULE dbft --------------------------------
+
+EXTENDS
+ Integers,
+ FiniteSets
+
+CONSTANTS
+ \* RM is the set of consensus node indexes starting from 0.
+ \* Example: {0, 1, 2, 3}
+ RM,
+
+ \* RMFault is a set of consensus node indexes that are allowed to become
+ \* FAULT in the middle of every considered behavior and to send any
+ \* consensus message afterwards. RMFault must be a subset of RM. An empty
+ \* set means that all nodes are good in every possible behaviour.
+ \* Examples: {0}
+ \* {1, 3}
+ \* {}
+ RMFault,
+
+ \* RMDead is a set of consensus node indexes that are allowed to die in the
+ \* middle of every behaviour and do not send any message afterwards. RMDead
+ \* must be a subset of RM. An empty set means that all nodes are alive and
+ \* responding in in every possible behaviour. RMDead may intersect the
+ \* RMFault set which means that node which is in both RMDead and RMFault
+ \* may become FAULT and send any message starting from some step of the
+ \* particular behaviour and may also die in the same behaviour which will
+ \* prevent it from sending any message.
+ \* Examples: {0}
+ \* {3, 2}
+ \* {}
+ RMDead,
+
+ \* MaxView is the maximum allowed view to be considered (starting from 0,
+ \* including the MaxView itself). This constraint was introduced to reduce
+ \* the number of possible model states to be checked. It is recommended to
+ \* keep this setting not too high (< N is highly recommended).
+ \* Example: 2
+ MaxView
+
+VARIABLES
+ \* rmState is a set of consensus node states. It is represented by the
+ \* mapping (function) with domain RM and range RMStates. I.e. rmState[r] is
+ \* the state of the r-th consensus node at the current step.
+ rmState,
+
+ \* msgs is the shared pool of messages sent to the network by consensus nodes.
+ \* It is represented by a subset of Messages set.
+ msgs
+
+\* vars is a tuple of all variables used in the specification. It is needed to
+\* simplify fairness conditions definition.
+vars == <>
+
+\* N is the number of validators.
+N == Cardinality(RM)
+
+\* F is the number of validators that are allowed to be malicious.
+F == (N - 1) \div 3
+
+\* M is the number of validators that must function correctly.
+M == N - F
+
+\* These assumptions are checked by the TLC model checker once at the start of
+\* the model checking process. All the input data (declared constants) specified
+\* in the "Model Overview" section must satisfy these constraints.
+ASSUME
+ /\ RM \subseteq Nat
+ /\ N >= 4
+ /\ 0 \in RM
+ /\ RMFault \subseteq RM
+ /\ RMDead \subseteq RM
+ /\ Cardinality(RMFault) <= F
+ /\ Cardinality(RMDead) <= F
+ /\ Cardinality(RMFault \cup RMDead) <= F
+ /\ MaxView \in Nat
+ /\ MaxView <= 2
+
+\* RMStates is a set of records where each record holds the node state and
+\* the node current view.
+RMStates == [
+ type: {"initialized", "prepareSent", "commitSent", "cv", "ackSent", "blockAccepted", "bad", "dead"},
+ view : Nat
+ ]
+
+\* Messages is a set of records where each record holds the message type,
+\* the message sender and sender's view by the moment when message was sent.
+Messages == [type : {"PrepareRequest", "PrepareResponse", "Commit", "Ack", "ChangeView"}, rm : RM, view : Nat]
+
+\* -------------- Useful operators --------------
+
+\* IsPrimary is an operator defining whether provided node r is primary
+\* for the current round from the r's point of view. It is a mapping
+\* from RM to the set of {TRUE, FALSE}.
+IsPrimary(r) == rmState[r].view % N = r
+
+\* GetPrimary is an operator defining mapping from round index to the RM that
+\* is primary in this round.
+GetPrimary(view) == CHOOSE r \in RM : view % N = r
+
+\* GetNewView returns new view number based on the previous node view value.
+\* Current specifications only allows to increment view.
+GetNewView(oldView) == oldView + 1
+
+\* CountCommitted returns the number of nodes that have sent the Commit message
+\* in the current round or in some other round.
+CountCommitted(r) == Cardinality({rm \in RM : Cardinality({msg \in msgs : msg.rm = rm /\ msg.type = "Commit"}) /= 0})
+
+\* MoreThanFNodesCommitted returns whether more than F nodes have been committed
+\* in the current round (as the node r sees it).
+\*
+\* IMPORTANT NOTE: we intentionally do not add the "lost" nodes calculation to the specification, and here's
+\* the reason: from the node's point of view we can't reliably check that some neighbour is completely
+\* out of the network. It is possible that the node doesn't receive consensus messages from some other member
+\* due to network delays. On the other hand, real nodes can go down at any time. The absence of the
+\* member's message doesn't mean that the member is out of the network, we never can be sure about
+\* that, thus, this information is unreliable and can't be trusted during the consensus process.
+\* What can be trusted is whether there's a Commit message from some member was received by the node.
+MoreThanFNodesCommitted(r) == CountCommitted(r) > F
+
+\* PrepareRequestSentOrReceived denotes whether there's a PrepareRequest
+\* message received from the current round's speaker (as the node r sees it).
+PrepareRequestSentOrReceived(r) == [type |-> "PrepareRequest", rm |-> GetPrimary(rmState[r].view), view |-> rmState[r].view] \in msgs
+
+\* -------------- Safety temporal formula --------------
+
+\* Init is the initial predicate initializing values at the start of every
+\* behaviour.
+Init ==
+ /\ rmState = [r \in RM |-> [type |-> "initialized", view |-> 0]]
+ /\ msgs = {}
+
+\* RMSendPrepareRequest describes the primary node r broadcasting PrepareRequest.
+RMSendPrepareRequest(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "initialized"
+ /\ IsPrimary(r)
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "prepareSent"]
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {[type |-> "PrepareRequest", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <<>>
+
+\* RMSendPrepareResponse describes non-primary node r receiving PrepareRequest from
+\* the primary node of the current round (view) and broadcasting PrepareResponse.
+\* This step assumes that PrepareRequest always contains valid transactions and
+\* signatures.
+RMSendPrepareResponse(r) ==
+ /\ \/ rmState[r].type = "initialized"
+ \* We do allow the transition from the "cv" state to the "prepareSent" or "commitSent" stage
+ \* as it is done in the code-level dBFT implementation by checking the NotAcceptingPayloadsDueToViewChanging
+ \* condition (see
+ \* https://github.com/nspcc-dev/dbft/blob/31c1bbdc74f2faa32ec9025062e3a4e2ccfd4214/dbft.go#L419
+ \* and
+ \* https://github.com/neo-project/neo-modules/blob/d00d90b9c27b3d0c3c57e9ca1f560a09975df241/src/DBFTPlugin/Consensus/ConsensusService.OnMessage.cs#L79).
+ \* However, we can't easily count the number of "lost" nodes in this specification to match precisely
+ \* the implementation. Moreover, we don't need it to be counted as the RMSendPrepareResponse enabling
+ \* condition specifies only the thing that may happen given some particular set of enabling conditions.
+ \* Thus, we've extended the NotAcceptingPayloadsDueToViewChanging condition to consider only MoreThanFNodesCommitted.
+ \* It should be noted that the logic of MoreThanFNodesCommittedOrLost can't be reliable in detecting lost nodes
+ \* (even with neo-project/neo#2057), because real nodes can go down at any time. See the comment above the MoreThanFNodesCommitted.
+ \/ /\ rmState[r].type = "cv"
+ /\ MoreThanFNodesCommitted(r)
+ /\ \neg IsPrimary(r)
+ /\ PrepareRequestSentOrReceived(r)
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "prepareSent"]
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {[type |-> "PrepareResponse", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <<>>
+
+\* RMSendCommit describes node r sending Commit if there's enough PrepareResponse
+\* messages.
+RMSendCommit(r) ==
+ /\ \/ rmState[r].type = "prepareSent"
+ \* We do allow the transition from the "cv" state to the "prepareSent" or "commitSent" stage,
+ \* see the related comment inside the RMSendPrepareResponse definition.
+ \/ /\ rmState[r].type = "cv"
+ /\ MoreThanFNodesCommitted(r)
+ /\ Cardinality({
+ msg \in msgs : /\ (msg.type = "PrepareResponse" \/ msg.type = "PrepareRequest")
+ /\ msg.view = rmState[r].view
+ }) >= M
+ /\ PrepareRequestSentOrReceived(r)
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "commitSent"]
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {[type |-> "Commit", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <<>>
+
+\* RMSendAck describes node r collecting enough Commit messages and sending
+\* the Ack message.
+RMSendAck(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "bad"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "dead"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "ackSent"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "blockAccepted"
+ /\ PrepareRequestSentOrReceived(r)
+ /\ Cardinality({msg \in msgs : msg.type = "Commit" /\ msg.view = rmState[r].view}) >= M
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "ackSent"]
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {[type |-> "Ack", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <<>>
+
+\* RMAcceptBlock describes node r collecting enough Ack messages and accepting
+\* the block.
+RMAcceptBlock(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "ackSent"
+ /\ Cardinality({msg \in msgs : msg.type = "Ack" /\ msg.view = rmState[r].view}) >= M
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "blockAccepted"]
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMSendChangeView describes node r sending ChangeView message on timeout.
+RMSendChangeView(r) ==
+ /\ \/ (rmState[r].type = "initialized" /\ \neg IsPrimary(r))
+ \/ rmState[r].type = "prepareSent"
+ /\ LET cv == [type |-> "ChangeView", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]
+ IN /\ cv \notin msgs
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "cv"]
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {[type |-> "ChangeView", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]}
+
+\* RMReceiveChangeView describes node r receiving enough ChangeView messages for
+\* view changing.
+RMReceiveChangeView(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "bad"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "dead"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "blockAccepted"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "commitSent"
+ /\ rmState[r].type /= "ackSent"
+ /\ Cardinality({
+ rm \in RM : Cardinality({
+ msg \in msgs : /\ msg.type = "ChangeView"
+ /\ msg.rm = rm
+ /\ GetNewView(msg.view) >= GetNewView(rmState[r].view)
+ }) /= 0
+ }) >= M
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "initialized", ![r].view = GetNewView(rmState[r].view)]
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMBeBad describes the faulty node r that will send any kind of consensus message starting
+\* from the step it's gone wild. This step is enabled only when RMFault is non-empty set.
+RMBeBad(r) ==
+ /\ r \in RMFault
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "bad"}) < F
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "bad"]
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMFaultySendCV describes sending CV message by the faulty node r.
+RMFaultySendCV(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "bad"
+ /\ LET cv == [type |-> "ChangeView", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]
+ IN /\ cv \notin msgs
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {cv}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMFaultyDoCV describes view changing by the faulty node r.
+RMFaultyDoCV(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "bad"
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].view = GetNewView(rmState[r].view)]
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMFaultySendPReq describes sending PrepareRequest message by the primary faulty node r.
+RMFaultySendPReq(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "bad"
+ /\ IsPrimary(r)
+ /\ LET pReq == [type |-> "PrepareRequest", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]
+ IN /\ pReq \notin msgs
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {pReq}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMFaultySendPResp describes sending PrepareResponse message by the non-primary faulty node r.
+RMFaultySendPResp(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "bad"
+ /\ \neg IsPrimary(r)
+ /\ LET pResp == [type |-> "PrepareResponse", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]
+ IN /\ pResp \notin msgs
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {pResp}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMFaultySendCommit describes sending Commit message by the faulty node r.
+RMFaultySendCommit(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "bad"
+ /\ LET commit == [type |-> "Commit", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]
+ IN /\ commit \notin msgs
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {commit}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMFaultySendAck describes sending Ack message by the faulty node r.
+RMFaultySendAck(r) ==
+ /\ rmState[r].type = "bad"
+ /\ LET ack == [type |-> "Ack", rm |-> r, view |-> rmState[r].view]
+ IN /\ ack \notin msgs
+ /\ msgs' = msgs \cup {ack}
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* RMDie describes node r that was removed from the network at the particular step
+\* of the behaviour. After this node r can't change its state and accept/send messages.
+RMDie(r) ==
+ /\ r \in RMDead
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "dead"}) < F
+ /\ rmState' = [rmState EXCEPT ![r].type = "dead"]
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* Terminating is an action that allows infinite stuttering to prevent deadlock on
+\* behaviour termination. We consider termination to be valid if at least M nodes
+\* has the block being accepted.
+Terminating ==
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "blockAccepted"}) >= M
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* TerminatingFourNodesDeadlock describes node r that is in the state where dBFT
+\* stucks in a four nodes scenario with one dead node allowed. Allow infinite
+\* stuttering to prevent TLC deadlock recognition.
+\* Note that this step is unused in the current specification, however, it may be
+\* used for further investigations of this deadlock.
+TerminatingFourNodesDeadlockSameView(r) ==
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "dead" /\ rmState[rm].view = rmState[r].view}) = 1
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "cv" /\ rmState[rm].view = rmState[r].view}) = 2
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "commitSent" /\ rmState[rm].view = rmState[r].view}) = 1
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* TerminatingFourNodesDeadlock describes node r that is in the state where dBFT
+\* stucks in a four nodes scenario and the same view. Allow infinite stuttering
+\* to prevent TLC deadlock recognition.
+\* Note that this step is unused in the current specification, however, it may be
+\* used for further investigations of this deadlock.
+TerminatingFourNodesDeadlock ==
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "dead"}) = 1
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "cv"}) = 2
+ /\ Cardinality({rm \in RM : rmState[rm].type = "commitSent"}) = 1
+ /\ UNCHANGED <>
+
+\* Next is the next-state action describing the transition from the current state
+\* to the next state of the behaviour.
+Next ==
+ \/ Terminating
+ \/ \E r \in RM:
+ RMSendPrepareRequest(r) \/ RMSendPrepareResponse(r) \/ RMSendCommit(r) \/ RMSendAck(r)
+ \/ RMAcceptBlock(r) \/ RMSendChangeView(r) \/ RMReceiveChangeView(r)
+ \/ RMDie(r) \/ RMBeBad(r)
+ \/ RMFaultySendCV(r) \/ RMFaultyDoCV(r) \/ RMFaultySendCommit(r) \/ RMFaultySendAck(r) \/ RMFaultySendPReq(r) \/ RMFaultySendPResp(r)
+
+\* Safety is a temporal formula that describes the whole set of allowed
+\* behaviours. It specifies only what the system MAY do (i.e. the set of
+\* possible allowed behaviours for the system). It asserts only what may
+\* happen; any behaviour that violates it does so at some point and
+\* nothing past that point makes difference.
+\*
+\* E.g. this safety formula (applied standalone) allows the behaviour to end
+\* with an infinite set of stuttering steps (those steps that DO NOT change
+\* neither msgs nor rmState) and never reach the state where at least one
+\* node is committed or accepted the block.
+\*
+\* To forbid such behaviours we must specify what the system MUST
+\* do. It will be specified below with the help of fairness conditions in
+\* the Fairness formula.
+Safety == Init /\ [][Next]_vars
+
+\* -------------- Fairness temporal formula --------------
+
+\* Fairness is a temporal assumptions under which the model is working.
+\* Usually it specifies different kind of assumptions for each/some
+\* subactions of the Next's state action, but the only think that bothers
+\* us is preventing infinite stuttering at those steps where some of Next's
+\* subactions are enabled. Thus, the only thing that we require from the
+\* system is to keep take the steps until it's impossible to take them.
+\* That's exactly how the weak fairness condition works: if some action
+\* remains continuously enabled, it must eventually happen.
+Fairness == WF_vars(Next)
+
+\* -------------- Specification --------------
+
+\* The complete specification of the protocol written as a temporal formula.
+Spec == Safety /\ Fairness
+
+\* -------------- Liveness temporal formula --------------
+
+\* For every possible behaviour it's true that eventually (i.e. at least once
+\* through the behaviour) block will be accepted. It is something that dBFT
+\* must guarantee (an in practice this condition is violated).
+TerminationRequirement == <>(Cardinality({r \in RM : rmState[r].type = "blockAccepted"}) >= M)
+
+\* A liveness temporal formula asserts only what must happen (i.e. specifies
+\* what the system MUST do). Any behaviour can NOT violate it at ANY point;
+\* there's always the rest of the behaviour that can always make the liveness
+\* formula true; if there's no such behaviour than the liveness formula is
+\* violated. The liveness formula is supposed to be checked as a property
+\* by the TLC model checker.
+Liveness == TerminationRequirement
+
+\* -------------- ModelConstraints --------------
+
+\* MaxViewConstraint is a state predicate restricting the number of possible
+\* behaviour states. It is needed to reduce model checking time and prevent
+\* the model graph size explosion. This formulae must be specified at the
+\* "State constraint" section of the "Additional Spec Options" section inside
+\* the model overview.
+MaxViewConstraint == /\ \A r \in RM : rmState[r].view <= MaxView
+ /\ \A msg \in msgs : msg.view <= MaxView
+
+\* -------------- Invariants of the specification --------------
+
+\* Model invariant is a state predicate (statement) that must be true for
+\* every step of every reachable behaviour. Model invariant is supposed to
+\* be checked as an Invariant by the TLC Model Checker.
+
+\* TypeOK is a type-correctness invariant. It states that all elements of
+\* specification variables must have the proper type throughout the behaviour.
+TypeOK ==
+ /\ rmState \in [RM -> RMStates]
+ /\ msgs \subseteq Messages
+
+\* InvTwoBlocksAccepted states that there can't be two different blocks accepted in
+\* the two different views, i.e. dBFT must not allow forks.
+InvTwoBlocksAccepted == \A r1 \in RM:
+ \A r2 \in RM \ {r1}:
+ \/ rmState[r1].type /= "blockAccepted"
+ \/ rmState[r2].type /= "blockAccepted"
+ \/ rmState[r1].view = rmState[r2].view
+
+\* InvFaultNodesCount states that there can be F faulty or dead nodes at max.
+InvFaultNodesCount == Cardinality({
+ r \in RM : rmState[r].type = "bad" \/ rmState[r].type = "dead"
+ }) <= F
+
+\* This theorem asserts the truth of the temporal formula whose meaning is that
+\* the state predicates TypeOK, InvTwoBlocksAccepted and InvFaultNodesCount are
+\* the invariants of the specification Spec. This theorem is not supposed to be
+\* checked by the TLC model checker, it's here for the reader's understanding of
+\* the purpose of TypeOK, InvTwoBlocksAccepted and InvFaultNodesCount.
+THEOREM Spec => [](TypeOK /\ InvTwoBlocksAccepted /\ InvFaultNodesCount)
+
+=============================================================================
+\* Modification History
+\* Last modified Wed Jun 19 17:51:15 MSK 2024 by anna
+\* Last modified Mon Mar 06 15:36:57 MSK 2023 by root
+\* Last modified Sat Jan 21 01:26:16 MSK 2023 by rik
+\* Created Thu Dec 15 16:06:17 MSK 2022 by anna
diff --git a/formal-models/dbft_antiMEV/dbft___AllGoodModel.launch b/formal-models/dbft_antiMEV/dbft___AllGoodModel.launch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..52b9984e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/formal-models/dbft_antiMEV/dbft___AllGoodModel.launch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+