checks.yaml

# Copyright 2021 OpenSSF Scorecard Authors
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
#      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.

# This is the source of truth for all check descriptions and remediation steps.
# Run `cd checks/main && go run /main` to generate `checks.json` and `checks.md`.
checks:
  Maintained:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project is "actively maintained".
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (possibly unpatched vulnerabilities)

      This check determines whether the project is actively maintained. If the project
      is archived, it receives the lowest score. If there is at least one commit per
      week during the previous 90 days, the project receives the highest score.  If there
      is activity on issues from users who are collaborators, members, or owners of the
      project, the project receives a partial score.

      A project which is not active might not be patched, have its
      dependencies patched, or be actively tested and used. However, a lack
      of active maintenance is not necessarily always a problem. Some software,
      especially smaller utility functions, does not normally need to be maintained.
      For example, a library that determines if an integer is even would not normally
      need maintenance unless an underlying implementation language definition
      changed. A lack of active maintenance should signal that potential users should
      investigate further to judge the situation.

      This check will only succeed if a Github project is >90 days old. Projects
      that are younger than this are too new to assess whether they are maintained
      or not, and users should inspect the contents of those projects to ensure they
      are as expected.
    remediation:
      - >-
        There is no remediation work needed from projects with a low score; this
        check simply provides insight into the project activity and maintenance
        commitment. External users should determine whether the software is the type
        that would not normally need active maintenance.
  Dependency-Update-Tool:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, dependencies
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project uses a dependency update tool.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (possibly vulnerable to attacks on known flaws)

      This check tries to determine if the project uses a dependency update tool,
      specifically one of:
      - [Dependabot](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/keeping-your-dependencies-updated-automatically/configuration-options-for-dependency-updates)
      - [Renovate bot](https://docs.renovatebot.com/configuration-options/)
      - [Sonatype Lift](https://help.sonatype.com/lift/getting-started)
      - [PyUp](https://docs.pyup.io/docs) (Python)
      Out-of-date dependencies make a project vulnerable to known flaws and prone to attacks.
      These tools automate the process of updating dependencies by scanning for
      outdated or insecure requirements, and opening a pull request to update them if
      found.

      This check can determine only whether the dependency update tool is enabled; it
      does not ensure that the tool is run or that the tool's pull requests are
      merged.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement dependency updates,
      and it is challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A
      low score is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.

    remediation:
      - >-
        Signup for automatic dependency updates with one of the previously listed dependency update tools and place
        the config file in the locations that are recommended by these tools. Due to
        https://github.com/dependabot/dependabot-core/issues/2804 Dependabot can
        be enabled for forks where security updates have ever been turned on so projects
        maintaining stable forks should evaluate whether this behavior is satisfactory
        before turning it on.
      - >-
        Unlike Dependabot, Renovate bot has support to migrate dockerfiles' dependencies from version pinning to hash pinning
        via the [pinDigests setting](https://docs.renovatebot.com/configuration-options/#pindigests) without
        aditional manual effort.
  Binary-Artifacts:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, dependencies
    repos: GitHub, GitLab, local
    short: Determines if the project has generated executable (binary) artifacts in the source repository.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (non-reviewable code)

      This check determines whether the project has generated executable (binary)
      artifacts in the source repository.

      Including generated executables in the source repository increases user risk.
      Many programming language systems can generate executables from source code
      (e.g., C/C++ generated machine code, Java `.class` files, Python `.pyc` files,
      and minified JavaScript). Users will often directly use executables if they are
      included in the source repository, leading to many dangerous behaviors.

      Problems with generated executable (binary) artifacts:

        - Binary artifacts cannot be reviewed, allowing possible obsolete or
          maliciously subverted executables. Reviews generally review source code, not
          executables, since it's difficult to audit executables to ensure that they
          correspond to the source code. Over time the included executables might not
          correspond to the source code.
        - Generated executables allow the executable generation process to atrophy,
          which can lead to an inability to create working executables. These problems
          can be countered with verified reproducible builds, but it's easier to
          implement verified reproducible builds when executables are not included in
          the source repository (since the executable generation process is less
          likely to have atrophied).

      Allowed by Scorecard:

        - Files in the source repository that are simultaneously reviewable source
          code and executables, since these are reviewable. (Some interpretive
          systems, such as many operating system shells, don't have a mechanism for
          storing generated executables that are different from the source file.)
        - Source code in the source repository generated by other tools (e.g., by
          bison, yacc, flex, and lex). There are potential downsides to generated
          source code, but generated source code tends to be much easier to review and
          thus presents a lower risk. Generated source code is also often difficult
          for external tools to detect.
        - Generated documentation in source repositories. Generated documentation is
          intended for use by humans (not computers) who can evaluate the context.
          Thus, generated documentation doesn't pose the same level of risk.

    remediation:
      - >-
        Remove the generated executable artifacts from the repository.
      - >-
        Build from source.
  Branch-Protection:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, source-code, code-reviews
    repos: GitHub, GitLab
    short: Determines if the default and release branches are protected with GitHub's branch protection settings.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (vulnerable to intentional malicious code injection)

      This check determines whether a project's default and release branches are
      protected with GitHub's [branch protection](https://docs.github.com/github/administering-a-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/about-protected-branches) 
      or [repository rules](https://docs.github.com/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets) settings.
      Branch protection allows maintainers to define rules that enforce
      certain workflows for branches, such as requiring review or passing certain
      status checks before acceptance into a main branch, or preventing rewriting of
      public history.

      Note: The following settings queried by the Branch-Protection check require an admin token: `DismissStaleReviews`, `EnforceAdmins`, `RequireLastPushApproval`, `RequiresStatusChecks` and `UpToDateBeforeMerge`. If
      the provided token does not have admin access, the check will query the branch
      settings accessible to non-admins and provide results based only on these settings.
      However, all of these settings are accessible via Repo Rules. `EnforceAdmins` is calculated slightly differently.
      This setting is calculated as `false` if any [Bypass Actors](https://docs.github.com/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/creating-rulesets-for-a-repository#granting-bypass-permissions-for-your-ruleset)
       are defined on any rule, regardless of if they are admins.

      Different types of branch protection protect against different risks:

        - Require code review: 
          - requires at least one reviewer, which greatly
          reduces the risk that a compromised contributor can inject malicious code.
          Review also increases the likelihood that an unintentional vulnerability in
          a contribution will be detected and fixed before the change is accepted.

          - requiring two or more reviewers protects even more from the insider risk 
          whereby a compromised contributor can be used by an attacker to LGTM 
          the attacker PR and inject a malicious code as if it was legitm.

        - Prevent force push: prevents use of the `--force` command on public
          branches, which overwrites code irrevocably. This protection prevents the
          rewriting of public history without external notice.

        - Require [status checks](https://docs.github.com/en/github/collaborating-with-pull-requests/collaborating-on-repositories-with-code-quality-features/about-status-checks):
          ensures that all required CI tests are met before a change is accepted.

      Although requiring code review can greatly reduce the chance that
      unintentional or malicious code enters the "main" branch, it is not feasible for
      all projects, such as those that don't have many active participants. For more
      discussion, see [Code Reviews](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#code-review).

      Additionally, in some cases these rules will need to be suspended. For example,
      if a past commit includes illegal content such as child pornography, it may be
      necessary to use a force push to rewrite the history rather than simply hide the
      commit.

      This test has tiered scoring. Each tier must be fully satisfied to achieve points at the next tier. For example, if you fulfill the Tier 3 checks but do not fulfill all the Tier 2 checks, you will not receive any points for Tier 3.

      Note: If Scorecard is run without an administrative access token, the requirements that specify “For administrators” can be safely ignored, and scores will be determined as if all such requirements have been met.

      Tier 1 Requirements (3/10 points):
        - Prevent force push
        - Prevent branch deletion
        - For administrators: Include administrator for review

      Tier 2 Requirements (6/10 points):
        - Require at least 1 reviewer for approval before merging
        - For administrators: Require branch to be up to date before merging
        - For administrators: Require approval of the most recent reviewable push

      Tier 3 Requirements (8/10 points):
        - Require branch to pass at least 1 status check before merging

      Tier 4 Requirements (9/10 points):
        - Require at least 2 reviewers for approval before merging
        - Require review from code owners

      Tier 5 Requirements (10/10 points):
        - For administrators: Dismiss stale reviews and approvals when new commits are pushed

      GitLab Integration Status:
        - GitLab associates releases with commits and not with the branch. Releases are ignored in this portion of the scoring.

    remediation:
      - >-
        Enable branch protection settings in your source hosting provider to
        avoid force pushes or deletion of your important branches.
      - >-
        For GitHub, check out the steps [here](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/managing-a-branch-protection-rule).
  CI-Tests:
    risk: Low
    tags: supply-chain, testing
    repos: GitHub, GitLab
    short: Determines if the project runs tests before pull requests are merged.
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (possible unknown vulnerabilities)

      This check tries to determine if the project runs tests before pull requests are
      merged. It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not
      support other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Running tests helps developers catch mistakes early on, which can reduce the
      number of vulnerabilities that find their way into a project.

      The check works by looking for a set of CI-system names in GitHub `CheckRuns`
      and `Statuses` among the recent commits (~30). A CI-system is considered
      well-known if its name contains any of the following: appveyor, buildkite,
      circleci, e2e, github-actions, jenkins, mergeable, test, travis-ci.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement CI testing, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low score
      is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.

      If a project's system was not detected and you think it should be, please
      [open an issue in the scorecard project](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/issues/new/choose).
    remediation:
      - Check-in scripts that run all the tests in your repository.
      - >-
        Integrate those scripts with a CI/CD platform that runs it on every pull
        request (e.g. if hosted on GitHub, [GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/introduction-to-github-actions),
        [Prow](https://github.com/kubernetes/test-infra/tree/master/prow), etc).
  CII-Best-Practices:
    risk: Low
    tags: security-awareness, security-training, security
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project has an OpenSSF (formerly CII) Best Practices Badge.
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (possibly not following security best practices)

      This check determines whether the project has earned an [OpenSSF (formerly CII) Best Practices Badge](https://www.bestpractices.dev/) at the passing, silver, or gold level.
      The OpenSSF Best Practices badge indicates whether or not that the project uses a set of security-focused best development practices for open
      source software. The check uses the URL for the Git repo and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge API.

      The OpenSSF Best Practices badge has 3 tiers: passing, silver, and gold. We give
      full credit to projects that meet the [gold criteria](https://www.bestpractices.dev/criteria/2), which is a significant achievement for projects and requires multiple developers in the project.
      Lower scores represent a project that has met the silver criteria, met the passing criteria, or is working to achieve the passing badge, with increasingly more points awarded as more criteria are met. Note that even meeting the passing criteria is a significant achievement.

      - [gold badge](https://www.bestpractices.dev/criteria/2): 10
      - [silver badge](https://www.bestpractices.dev/criteria/1): 7
      - [passing badge](https://www.bestpractices.dev/criteria/0): 5
      - in progress badge: 2

      Some of these criteria overlap with other Scorecard checks.
      However, note that in those overlapping cases, Scorecard can only report what it can automatically detect, while the OpenSSF Best Practices badge can report on claims and claim justifications from people (this counters false negatives and positives but has the challenge of requiring additional work from people).
    remediation:
      - >-
        Sign up for the [OpenSSF Best Practices program](https://www.bestpractices.dev/).
  Code-Review:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, source-code, code-reviews
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project requires human code review before pull requests (aka merge requests) are merged.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (unintentional vulnerabilities or possible injection of malicious
      code)

      This check determines whether the project requires human code review
      before pull requests (merge requests) are merged.

      Reviews detect various unintentional problems, including vulnerabilities that
      can be fixed immediately before they are merged, which improves the quality of
      the code. Reviews may also detect or deter an attacker trying to insert
      malicious code (either as a malicious contributor or as an attacker who has
      subverted a contributor's account), because a reviewer might detect the
      subversion.

      The check determines whether the most recent changes (over the last ~30 commits) have 
      an approval on GitHub
      or if the merger is different from the committer (implicit review). It also
      performs a similar check for reviews using
      [Prow](https://github.com/kubernetes/test-infra/tree/master/prow#readme) (labels
      "lgtm" or "approved") and [Gerrit](https://www.gerritcodereview.com/) ("Reviewed-on" and "Reviewed-by").
      If recent changes are solely bot activity (e.g. Dependabot, Renovate bot, or custom bots),
      the check returns inconclusively.

      Scoring is leveled instead of proportional to make the check more predictable.
      If any bot-originated changes are unreviewed, 3 points are deducted. If any human
      changes are unreviewed, 7 points are deducted if a single change is unreviewed, and
      another 3 are deducted if multiple changes are unreviewed.

      Review by bots, including bots powered by
      artificial intelligence / machine learning (AI/ML),
      do not count as code review.
      Such reviews do not provide confidence that there will
      be a second person who understands the
      code change (e.g., if the originator suddenly becomes unavailable).
      However, analysis by bots
      may be able to meet (at least in part) the [SAST](#sast) criterion.

      Note: Requiring reviews for all changes is infeasible for some projects, such as
      those with only one active participant. Even a project with multiple active
      contributors may not have enough active participation to be able to require
      review of all proposed changes. Projects with a small number of active
      participants instead sometimes aim for a review of a
      percentage of proposals (e.g., "at least half of all proposed changes are
      reviewed").

      Requiring review does not eliminate all risks. The other reviewers might fail to
      notice unintentional vulnerabilities or malicious code, be colluding with a
      malicious developer, or even be the same person (using a "[sock
      puppet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sock_puppet_account)" account).

    remediation:
      - >-
        If the project has only one contributor, or does not have enough
        reviewers to practically require that all contributions be reviewed, try to
        recruit more maintainers to the project who will be willing to review
        others' work. Ideally at least some of these people will be from different
        organizations (see [Contributors](checks.md#contributors)). If the project has very limited utility, consider expanding
        its intended utility so more people will be interested in improving it, and
        make that larger scope clear to potential contributors.
      - >-
        Follow security best practices by performing strict code reviews for every
        new pull request / merge request.
      - >-
        Make "code reviews" mandatory in your repository configuration.
        ([Instructions for GitHub.](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/about-protected-branches#require-pull-request-reviews-before-merging))
      - >-
        Enforce the rule for administrators / code owners as well.
        ([Instructions for GitHub.](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/about-protected-branches#include-administrators))
  Contributors:
    risk: Low
    tags: source-code
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project has a set of contributors from multiple organizations (e.g., companies).
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (lower number of trusted code reviewers)

      This check tries to determine if the project has recent contributors from
      multiple organizations (e.g., companies). It is currently limited to
      repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support other source hosting
      repositories (i.e., Forges).

      The check looks at the `Company` field on the GitHub user profile for authors of
      recent commits. To receive the highest score, the project must have had
      contributors from at least 3 different companies in the last 30 commits; each of
      those contributors must have had at least 5 commits in the last 30 commits.

      Note: Some projects cannot meet this requirement, such as small projects with
      only one active participant, or projects with a narrow scope that cannot attract
      the interest of multiple organizations. See
      [Code Reviews](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#code-review)
      for more information about evaluating projects with a small number of
      participants.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Ask contributors to
        [join their respective organizations](https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-membership-in-your-organization/inviting-users-to-join-your-organization),
        if they have not already. Otherwise, there is no remediation for this check;
        it simply provides insight into which organizations have contributed so that
        you can make a trust-based decision based on that information.
  Fuzzing:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, testing
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project uses fuzzing.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible vulnerabilities in code)

      This check tries to determine if the project uses
      [fuzzing](https://owasp.org/www-community/Fuzzing) by checking:
      1. if the repository name is included in the [OSS-Fuzz](https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz) project list;
      2. if [ClusterFuzzLite](https://google.github.io/clusterfuzzlite/) is deployed in the repository;
      3. if there are user-defined language-specified fuzzing functions in the repository.
         - currently only supports [Go fuzzing](https://go.dev/doc/fuzz/),
         - a limited set of property-based testing libraries for Haskell including [QuickCheck](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/QuickCheck), [Hedgehog](https://hedgehog.qa/), [validity](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/validity) or [SmallCheck](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/smallcheck),
         - a limited set of property-based testing libraries for JavaScript and TypeScript including [fast-check](https://fast-check.dev/).
      4. if it contains a [OneFuzz](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz) integration [detection file](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/blob/main/docs/getting-started.md#detecting-the-use-of-onefuzz);

      Fuzzing, or fuzz testing, is the practice of feeding unexpected or random data
      into a program to expose bugs. Regular fuzzing is important to detect
      vulnerabilities that may be exploited by others, especially since attackers can
      also use fuzzing to find the same flaws.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement fuzzing, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low score
      is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Integrate the project with OSS-Fuzz by following the instructions
        [here](https://google.github.io/oss-fuzz/).
  Packaging:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, releases
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project is published as a package that others can easily download, install, easily update, and uninstall.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (users possibly missing security updates)

      This check tries to determine if the project is published as a package. It is
      currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support other
      source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Packages give users of a project an easy way to download, install, update, and
      uninstall the software by a package manager. In particular, they make it easy
      for users to receive security patches as updates.

      The check currently looks for
      [GitHub packaging workflows](https://docs.github.com/en/packages/learn-github-packages/publishing-a-package)
      and language-specific GitHub Actions that upload the package to a corresponding
      hub, e.g., [Npm](https://www.npmjs.com/). We plan to add better support to query
      package manager hubs directly in the future, e.g., for
      [Npm](https://www.npmjs.com/), [PyPi](https://pypi.org/).

      You can create a package in several ways:

        - Many program language ecosystems have a generally-used packaging format
          supported by a language-level package manager tool and public package
          repository.
        - Many operating system platforms also have at least one package format,
          tool, and public repository (in some cases the source repository generates
          system-independent source packages, which are then used by others to
          generate system executable packages).
        - Using container images.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to package software, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low
      score is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk. If
      Scorecard fails to detect the way you publish a package and you think we should
      support your use case, please let us know by [opening an
      issue](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/issues/new/choose).
    remediation:
      - Publish your project as a downloadable package, e.g., if hosted on GitHub, use [GitHub's mechanisms for publishing a package](https://docs.github.com/en/packages/learn-github-packages/publishing-a-package).
      - If hosted on GitHub, use a GitHub action to release your package to language-specific hubs.
  Pinned-Dependencies:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, dependencies
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project has declared and pinned the dependencies of its build process.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible compromised dependencies)

      This check tries to determine if the project pins dependencies used during its build and release process.
      A "pinned dependency" is a dependency that is explicitly set to a specific hash instead of
      allowing a mutable version or range of versions. It
      is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support
      other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      The check works by looking for unpinned dependencies in Dockerfiles, shell scripts, and GitHub workflows
      which are used during the build and release process of a project.
      Special considerations for Go modules treat full semantic versions as pinned
      due to how the Go tool verifies downloaded content against the hashes when anyone first downloaded the module.

      Pinned dependencies reduce several security risks:

        - They ensure that checking and deployment are all done with the same
          software, reducing deployment risks, simplifying debugging, and enabling
          reproducibility.
        - They can help mitigate compromised dependencies from undermining the
          security of the project (in the case where you've evaluated the pinned
          dependency, you are confident it's not compromised, and a later version is
          released that is compromised).
        - They are one way to [counter dependency confusion (aka substitution) attacks](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/resources/3-ways-to-mitigate-risk-using-private-package-feeds/),
          in which an application uses multiple feeds to acquire software packages (a
          "hybrid configuration"), and attackers fool the user into using a malicious
          package via a feed that was not expected for that package.

      However, pinning dependencies can inhibit software updates, either because of a
      security vulnerability or because the pinned version is compromised. Mitigate
      this risk by:

        - using automated tools to notify applications when their dependencies are
          outdated;
        - quickly updating applications that do pin dependencies.

      For projects hosted on GitHub, you can learn more about
      dependencies using the [GitHub dependency graph](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/understanding-your-software-supply-chain/about-the-dependency-graph).
    remediation:
      - >-
        If your project is producing an application, declare all your dependencies with specific versions in your package
        format file (e.g. `package.json` for npm, `requirements.txt` for python, `packages.config` for nuget).
        For C/C++, check in the code from a trusted source and add a `README` on the
        specific version used (and the archive SHA hashes).
      - >-
        If your project is producing an application and the package manager supports lock files (e.g. `package-lock.json` for
        npm), make sure to check these in the source code as well. These files
        maintain signatures for the entire dependency tree and saves from future
        exploitation in case the package is compromised.
      - >-
        For Dockerfiles used in building and releasing your project, pin dependencies by hash. See [Dockerfile](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/cron/internal/worker/Dockerfile) for example. If you are using a manifest list to support builds
        across multiple architectures, you can pin to the manifest list hash instead
        of a single image hash. You can use a tool like [crane](https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/main/cmd/crane/README.md)
        to obtain the hash of the manifest list like in this [example](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/issues/1773#issuecomment-1076699039).
      - >-
        For GitHub workflows used in building and releasing your project, pin dependencies by hash. See [main.yaml](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/f55b86d6627cc3717e3a0395e03305e81b9a09be/.github/workflows/main.yml#L27) for example.
        To determine the permissions needed for your workflows, you may use [StepSecurity's online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/secureworkflow/) by ticking
        the "Pin actions to a full length commit SHA". You may also tick the "Restrict permissions for GITHUB_TOKEN" to fix issues found
        by the Token-Permissions check.
      - >-
        To help update your dependencies after pinning them, use tools such as those listed for the dependency update tool check.
  SAST:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, testing
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project uses static code analysis.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible unknown bugs)

      This check tries to determine if the project uses Static Application Security
      Testing (SAST), also known as [static code analysis](https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/Static_Code_Analysis).
      It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support
      other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      SAST is testing run on source code before the application is run. Using SAST
      tools can prevent known classes of bugs from being inadvertently introduced in the
      codebase.

      The checks currently looks for known Github apps such as
      [CodeQL](https://codeql.github.com/) (github-code-scanning) or
      [SonarCloud](https://sonarcloud.io/) in the recent (~30) merged PRs, or the use
      of "github/codeql-action" in a GitHub workflow. It also checks for the deprecated
      [LGTM](https://lgtm.com/) service until its forthcoming shutdown.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement SAST, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low score
      is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Run CodeQL checks in your CI/CD by following the instructions
        [here](https://github.com/github/codeql-action#usage).
  Security-Policy:
    risk: Medium
    short: Determines if the project has published a security policy.
    repos: GitHub
    tags: supply-chain, security, policy
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible insecure reporting of vulnerabilities)

      This check tries to determine if the project has published a security policy. It
      works by looking for a file named `SECURITY.md` (case-insensitive) in a few
      well-known directories.

      A security policy (typically a `SECURITY.md` file) can give users information
      about what constitutes a vulnerability and how to report one securely so that
      information about a bug is not publicly visible.

      This check examines the contents of the security policy file awarding points
      for those policies that express vulnerability process(es), disclosure timelines,
      and have links (e.g., URL(s) and email(s)) to support the users.

      Linking Requirements (one or more) (6/10 points):
        - A valid form of an email address to contact for vulnerabilities
        - A valid form of a http/https address to support vulnerability reporting

      Free Form Text (3/10 points):
        - Free form text is present in the security policy file which is beyond
          simply having a http/https address and/or email in the file
        - The string length of any such links in the policy file do not count
          towards detecting free form text

      Security Policy Specific Text (1/10 points):
        - Specific text providing basic or general information about vulnerability
          and disclosure practices, expectations, and/or timelines
        - Text should include a total of 2 or more hits which match (case insensitive)
          `vuln` and as in "Vulnerability" or "vulnerabilities";
          `disclos` as "Disclosure" or "disclose";
          and numbers which convey expectations of times, e.g., 30 days or 90 days

    remediation:
      - >-
        Place a security policy file `SECURITY.md` in the root directory of your
        repository. This makes it easily discoverable by a vulnerability reporter.
      - >-
        The file should contain information on what constitutes a vulnerability
        and a way to report it securely (e.g. issue tracker with private issue
        support, encrypted email with a published public key). Follow the
        [coordinated vulnerability disclosure guidelines](https://github.com/ossf/oss-vulnerability-guide/blob/main/maintainer-guide.md)
        to respond to vulnerability disclosures.
      - >-
        For GitHub, see more information
        [here](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/getting-started/adding-a-security-policy-to-your-repository).
  Signed-Releases:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, releases
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project cryptographically signs release artifacts.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (possibility of installing malicious releases)

      This check tries to determine if the project cryptographically signs release
      artifacts. It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does
      not support other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Signed releases attest to the provenance of the artifact.

      This check looks for the following filenames in the project's last five
      [release assets](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/releasing-projects-on-github/about-releases):
      [*.minisig](https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign), *.asc (pgp),
      *.sig, *.sign, [*.intoto.jsonl](https://slsa.dev).

      If a signature is found in the assets for each release, a score of 8 is given.
      If a [SLSA provenance file](https://slsa.dev/spec/v0.1/index) is found in the assets for each release (*.intoto.jsonl), the maximum score of 10 is given.

      Note: The check does not verify the signatures.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Publish the release.
      - >-
        Generate a signing key.
      - >-
        Download the release as an archive locally.
      - >-
        Sign the release archive with this key (should output a signature file).
      - >-
        Attach the signature file next to the release archive.
      - >-
        If the source is hosted on GitHub, check out the steps
        [here](https://wiki.debian.org/Creating%20signed%20GitHub%20releases).
  Token-Permissions:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, infrastructure
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project's workflows follow the principle of least privilege.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (vulnerable to malicious code additions)

      This check determines whether the project's automated workflows tokens follow the
      principle of least privilege. This is important because attackers may use a
      compromised token with write access to, for example, push malicious code into the
      project.

      It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support
      other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      The highest score is awarded when the permissions definitions in each workflow's
      yaml file are set as read-only at the
      [top level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions)
      and the required write permissions are declared at the
      [run-level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idpermissions).
      One point is reduced from the score if all jobs have their permissions defined but the top level permissions are not defined.
      This configuration is secure, but there is a chance that when a new job is added to the workflow, its job permissions could be
      left undefined because of human error.

      Though a project's score won't be penalized, the check's details will include
      warnings for more sensitive run-level permissions, listed below:

      * `actions` - May allow an attacker to steal GitHub secrets by approving to run an action that needs approval.
      * `checks` - May allow an attacker to remove pre-submit checks and introduce a bug.
      * `contents` - Allows an attacker to commit unreviewed code. However, points are not reduced if the job utilizes a recognized packaging action or command.
      * `deployments` - May allow an attacker to charge repo owner by triggering VM runs, and tiny chance an attacker can trigger a remote service with code they own if server accepts code/location variables unsanitized.
      * `packages` - Allows an attacker to publish packages. However, points are not reduced if the job utilizes a recognized packaging action or command.
      * `security-events` - May allow an attacker to read vulnerability reports before a patch is available. However, points are not reduced if the job utilizes a recognized action for uploading SARIF results.
      * `statuses` - May allow an attacker to change the result of pre-submit checks and get a PR merged.

      This compromise makes it clear the maintainer has done what's possible to use those permissions safety,
      but allows users to identify that the permissions are used.

      The check cannot detect if the "read-only" GitHub permission setting is
      enabled, as there is no API available.

    remediation:
      - >-
        Set top-level permissions as `read-all` or `contents: read` as described in
        GitHub's [documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions).
      - >-
        Set any required write permissions at the job-level. Only set the permissions
        required for that job; do not set `permissions: write-all` at the job level.
      - >-
        To help determine the permissions needed for your workflows, you may use [StepSecurity's online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/secureworkflow/) by ticking
        the "Restrict permissions for GITHUB_TOKEN". You may also tick the "Pin actions to a full length commit SHA" to fix issues found
        by the Pinned-dependencies check.
  Vulnerabilities:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, vulnerabilities
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project has open, known unfixed vulnerabilities.
    description: |
      Risk: `High`  (known vulnerabilities)

      This check determines whether the project has open, unfixed vulnerabilities 
      in its own codebase or its dependencies using the [OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)](https://osv.dev/) service.
      An open vulnerability is readily exploited by attackers and should be fixed as soon as
      possible.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Fix the vulnerabilities in your own code base. The details of each vulnerability can be found
        on <https://osv.dev>.
      - >-
        If the vulnerability is in a dependency, update the dependency to a non-vulnerable version. If no update is available, consider whether to remove the dependency.
      - >-
        If you believe the vulnerability does not affect your project, the 
        vulnerability can be ignored. 
        To ignore, create an `osv-scanner.toml` file next to the dependency manifest (e.g. package-lock.json) and specify the ID to ignore and reason.
        Details on the structure of `osv-scanner.toml` can be found on 
        [OSV-Scanner repository](https://github.com/google/osv-scanner#ignore-vulnerabilities-by-id).

  Dangerous-Workflow:
    risk: Critical
    tags: supply-chain, security, infrastructure
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project's GitHub Action workflows avoid dangerous patterns.
    description: |
      Risk: `Critical`  (vulnerable to repository compromise)

      This check determines whether the project's GitHub Action workflows has dangerous
      code patterns. Some examples of these patterns are untrusted code checkouts,
      logging github context and secrets, or use of potentially untrusted inputs in scripts.
      The following patterns are checked:

      Untrusted Code Checkout: This is the misuse of potentially dangerous triggers.
      This checks if a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` workflow trigger was used in conjunction
      with an explicit pull request checkout. Workflows triggered with `pull_request_target` / `workflow_run`
      have write permission to the target repository and access to target repository
      secrets. With the PR checkout, PR authors may compromise the repository, for
      example, by using build scripts controlled by the author of the PR or reading
      token in memory. This check does not detect whether untrusted code checkouts are
      used safely, for example, only on pull request that have been assigned a label.

      Script Injection with Untrusted Context Variables: This pattern detects whether a
      workflow's inline script may execute untrusted input from attackers. This occurs when
      an attacker adds malicious commands and scripts to a context. When a workflow runs,
      these strings may be interpreted as code that is executed on the runner. Attackers
      can add their own content to certain github context variables that are considered
      untrusted, for example, `github.event.issue.title`. These values should not flow
      directly into executable code.

      The highest score is awarded when all workflows avoid the dangerous code patterns.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Avoid the dangerous workflow patterns.
        See this [post](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)
        for information on avoiding untrusted code checkouts.
        See this [document](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections)
        for information on avoiding and mitigating the risk of script injections.

  License:
    risk: Low
    tags: license
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project has defined a license.
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (possible impediment to security review)

      This check tries to determine if the project has published a license. It
      works by using either hosting APIs or by checking standard locations
      for a file named according to common conventions for licenses.

      A license can give users information about how the source code may or may
      not be used. The lack of a license will impede any kind of security review
      or audit and creates a legal risk for potential users.

      Scorecard uses the
      [GitHub License API](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/licenses#get-the-license-for-a-repository)
      for GitHub hosted projects. Otherwise, Scorecard uses its own heuristics to
      detect a published license file.

      On its own, this check will detect files in the top-level directory with
      any combination of the following names and extensions:`LICENSE`, `LICENCE`,
      `COPYING`, `COPYRIGHT` and having common extensions such as `.html`, `.txt`,
      or `.md`. It will also detect these files in a directory named `LICENSES`.
      (Files in a `LICENSES` directory are typically named as their
      [SPDX](https://spdx.org/licenses/) license identifier followed by an
      appropriate file extension, as described in the [REUSE](https://reuse.software/spec/) Specification.)

      License Requirements:
        - A detected `LICENSE`, `COPYRIGHT`, or `COPYING` filename (6/10 points)
        - The detected file is at the top-level directory (3/10 points)
        - A [FSF or OSI](https://spdx.org/licenses/) license is specified (1/10 points)

    remediation:
      - >-
        Determine [which license](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/licensing-a-repository)
        to apply to your project. For GitHub hosted projects, follow those
        instructions to establish a license for your project.
      - >-
        For other hosting environments, create the license in a `.adoc`, `.asc`,
        `.docx`, `.doc`, `.ext`, `.html`, `.markdown`, `.md`, `.rst`, `.txt`,
        or `.xml`, named `LICENSE`, `COPYRIGHT`, or `COPYING`, and place it in the
        top-level directory. To identify a specific license, use an [SPDX license identifier](https://spdx.org/licenses/)
        in the filename. Examples include `LICENSE.md`, `Apache-2.0-LICENSE.md` or
        `LICENSE-Apache-2.0`.
      - >-
        Alternately, create a `LICENSE` directory and add a license file(s) with a name
        that matches your [SPDX license identifier](https://spdx.org/licenses/).
        such as `LICENSES/Apache-2.0.txt`.

  Webhooks:
    risk: Critical
    tags: security, infrastructure
    repos: GitHub
    short: This check validates if the webhook defined in the repository has a token configured.
    description: |
      Risk: `Critical` (service possibly accessible to third parties)

      This check determines whether the webhook defined in the repository has a token configured to authenticate the origins of requests.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Check whether your service supports token authentication.
      - >-
        If there is support for token authentication, set the secret in the webhook configuration. See [Setting up a webhook](https://docs.github.com/en/developers/webhooks-and-events/webhooks/creating-webhooks#setting-up-a-webhook).
      - >-
        If there is no support for token authentication, request the webhook service implement token authentication functionality by following [these directions](https://docs.github.com/en/developers/webhooks-and-events/webhooks/securing-your-webhooks).