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A vote (#125) about bringing OpenVEX into OpenSSF generated a lot of discussion. This thread is offered as a place to carry on the discussion if needed. I'll start with this position: VEX is a structured way to convey the status of software components with respect to software vulnerabilities. Is this software affected or not? Say it in VEX. Do you publish vulnerability advisories or other information? VEX is an option. I'm aware of at least three VEX implementations: Here are some definitions of VEX, three of them come from the community SBOM workstreams facilitated by CISA.
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I'm aware of at least two NIST VDR implementations:
Both implementations adhere to NIST's Vulnerability Disclosure Report (VDR) data model in standard SP 800-161 RA-5 REA is prepared to withdraw support for it's own VDR format, if the industry can agree to support the CycloneDX VDR format. Steve Springett created a side-by-side comparison of VDR vs VEX This article describes NIST VDR |
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The SPDX defects group is working on the next VEX implementation. I joined them back in January after I saw it for the first time in the SPDX general meeting and I plan to continue helping over there to ensure the SPDX VEX implementation meets the minimum requirements for VEX. /cc @tsteenbe @henkbirkholz |
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@puerco The spdx-defects meeting minutes for Feb 1, starting on line 86, has some discussion of OpenVEX and it's relationship to other vulnerability reporting artifacts and their relationship to SPDX. The V 3.0 vulnerability model is still under development, so this will be a good time to join. |
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This situation has gotten even more messy with the news that LF itself is already making its own third VEX format. I didn't even know about that. So now we're talking about a fourth format?! When VEX is so new that it is barely defined there is zero justification for all this format war. It is entirely counterproductive to actually enhancing real-world security. |
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FWIW there is also the OSV format ( https://ossf.github.io/osv-schema/ ) covering similar goals. And you could express vulnerability info also in the original CVRF or CSAF 2.0 formats or even OVAL, albeit these formats are a bit clumsy to consume. |
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If anyone is wondering "What is CISA's official position on security advisories and VEX"
These official CISA statements align with Allan's VEX video statements. OpenVEX is an attempt to manufacture something completely new and incompatible with all the other work in this area, including CSAF VEX and NIST VDR. |
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Thanks for responding Jason. Does this represent IBM's official position regarding VEX and VDR? A VDR is an attestation by a vendor showing they've checked each component of an SBOM for vulnerabilities. Your description of VDR is completely inaccurate. An exploitable flag (Y/N) indicates if a product/compoent is vulnerable, as you can see in the VDR linked above. |
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I understand, this is your personal opinion @JasonKeirstead I know that IBM has expressed an interest in the software supply chain space. REA's open-source, free to use VDR is exactly what it says it is, a VDR, following NIST SP 800-161. I'm 100% confident in this assertion. VEX is a "negative security advisory" identifying products which are NOT affected by a vulnerability. The ground truth supporting this description is readily available in this video with Allan Friedman and Thomas Schmidt at the 13:00 mark. No matter how many times you try to paint VEX as something different - this will remain the ground truth on VEX. |
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I agree Jason, we don't need to continue this debate. Based on recent voting, it appears OpenVEX will move forward under LF. I recommend that anyone wishing to sell software to the US Government consider following NIST standards/guidance. A Federal Register notice will be coming shortly with more explicit requirements regarding attestations in support of OMB M-22-18.. |
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Closing, the OpenVEX vote has been decided (#125), CISA will be publishing a community-developed VEX minimum requirements document, everyone is free (or predetermined) to discuss, debate, and define VEX. |
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Art,
When you say CISA will be publishing the VEX document, does this mean the VEX document will be subject to the same approval process required by other CISA publications, such as the ICT_SCRM Task Force guidebooks?
Thanks,
Dick Brooks
Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector,
Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership
<https://reliableenergyanalytics.com/products> Never trust software, always verify and report! ™
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Subject: Re: [ossf/wg-vulnerability-disclosures] so what is VEX anyway? (Discussion #127)
Closing, the OpenVEX vote has been decided (#125 <#125> ), CISA will be publishing a community-developed VEX minimum requirements document, everyone is free (or predetermined) to discuss, debate, and define VEX.
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I don't know the approvals processes, but Minimum Requirements for Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX) was published a couple weeks ago.
Quoting from that document, I propose that the answer to this discussion is: