From 9d0005b57d588b4b357b2e75898c5520bbc33fd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2024 13:59:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/10] chore: setting up file scaffolding --- .../nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32298680 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +--- +title: The Difference Between Being and Nothing +description: Learn about the difference between being and nothing from Hegel's Science of Logic. +isArticle: true +authors: Filip Niklas (2024) +editors: +contributors: +--- + +## The Difference Between Being and Nothing + +Text From e7e2787dd58046b947d16f5e234e9860c295a86e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2024 14:26:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/10] test: demo quote --- .../reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index 32298680..cf686cdd 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -9,4 +9,4 @@ contributors: ## The Difference Between Being and Nothing -Text +Here is a bunch of test "with an important quote" (Hegel, 2010, 123). From a45554a9391b27ab227ab5c223815830d2dbd6e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2024 14:27:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/10] test: demo citation source --- .../reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index cf686cdd..9617d145 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -9,4 +9,4 @@ contributors: ## The Difference Between Being and Nothing -Here is a bunch of test "with an important quote" (Hegel, 2010, 123). +Here is a bunch of test "with an important quote" (Hegel 1999, 123). From e9f9217193587d32fab95ad29c5e4c73bc7e8848 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2024 14:29:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/10] test: demo citation3 --- .../reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index 9617d145..f375be12 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -9,4 +9,4 @@ contributors: ## The Difference Between Being and Nothing -Here is a bunch of test "with an important quote" (Hegel 1999, 123). +Here is a bunch of test "with an important quote" (Hegel 2010, 123). From beaa308502e86cd5c7d58f5820cee3fbe6a9ab1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 00:37:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/10] docs: started houlgate on difference being nothing --- cspell.json | 1 + .../difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 22 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/cspell.json b/cspell.json index 972c2d4b..183ee263 100644 --- a/cspell.json +++ b/cspell.json @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ "Houlgate", "itselfness", "Keon", + "Meinen", "mindmap", "Niklas", "posteriori", diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index f375be12..4a04de19 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -9,4 +9,24 @@ contributors: ## The Difference Between Being and Nothing -Here is a bunch of test "with an important quote" (Hegel 2010, 123). +Following the early logical development of Hegel's _Science of Logic_, pure being and pure nothing are understood to be the same. Each proves to be other yet, equally, both are the same such that there is no distinguishing to be made between them. However, Hegel insists that they are "absolutely distinct" (Hegel 2010, 60/21.70). What is the sense of this distinction? + +Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, property or some other being through which the two are differentiated. However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish the two categories. One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a border without evoking that space again. + +Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early development. What sense of difference remains then? + +### The Immediate Difference Between Pure Being and Pure Nothing + +Stephen Houlgate points out that the difference between `being` and `nothing` lies in _intention_ (_Im Meinen_): "There is no clear, determinate difference between the two, but they are nonetheless _meant_ to be different" (Houlgate 2022, 144). He adds that this is not a difference we, as human beings, draw, but belongs to `being` and `nothing` themselves. They are themselves absolutely distinct. + +> Pure being does not have any contrast with nothing built into it, but it is pure and simple _being_ without further determination. As such, it is the utter opposite of nothing: it is pure being with no trace of the negative whatsoever. Similarly, nothing has no contrast with being built into it – and so is not to be understood as "non-being" – but it is sheer and utter _nothing_. As such, however, it is the complete absence of being (Houlgate 2022, 144). + +Notice how each category immediately means something unique to itself yet is _then_ regarded upon reflection in relation to its opposite. But this relation hardly merits the name of a relation since neither category has built into it any form of contrast, whether explicitly or implicitly. Each category simply is. + +This simplicity coupled with immediacy sets the difference between `pure being` and `nothing`. "Being and nothing are immediately different because each is purely and immediately _itself_ and thereby completely excludes the other ... each in being itself _in fact_ shuts out the other" (Houlgate 2022, 144). This signals that there is in `pure being` nothing but `pure being`, or, put differently, there is in the thought of `pure being` no conceptual space for anything else—not even `nothing`—. + +Likewise, as Houlgate goes on to point out, this difference is unsustainable and disappears the moment it is thought. It is merely an _immediate difference_ and so nothing persists beyond this immediacy. Indeed, `being` and `nothing` _vanish_ into each other such that the immediate difference between them is undermined: each is just as indeterminate as the other. + +TODO + +And this indeterminacy envelops also the very difference (does it? or is it wrong to think of it in this way?) From 937435638a59f6c10b4201bcf238243c9eb8dc34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 09:07:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/10] feat: wip being and nothing, turning off autocomplete for mdx for vscode --- .vscode/settings.json | 21 ++++++++++++- cspell.json | 2 ++ .../difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 30 +++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/.vscode/settings.json b/.vscode/settings.json index e5191fdf..242f967f 100644 --- a/.vscode/settings.json +++ b/.vscode/settings.json @@ -7,6 +7,25 @@ "editor.wordWrap": "on" }, "[mdx]": { - "editor.wordWrap": "on" + "editor.wordWrap": "on", + "editor.quickSuggestions": { + "other": false, + "comments": false, + "strings": false + }, + "editor.suggest.showSnippets": false, + "editor.suggest.showWords": false, + "editor.acceptSuggestionOnCommitCharacter": false, + "editor.acceptSuggestionOnEnter": "off", + "editor.wordBasedSuggestions": "off", + "editor.parameterHints.enabled": false, + "editor.suggestOnTriggerCharacters": false + }, + "[plaintext]": { + "editor.quickSuggestions": { + "comments": "off", + "other": "off", + "strings": "off" + }, } } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/cspell.json b/cspell.json index 183ee263..8b5eca47 100644 --- a/cspell.json +++ b/cspell.json @@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ "spatio", "sphil", "sublated", + "sublating", "systemphil", "Taggart", + "Trisokkas", "Wissenschaft" ], "enableFiletypes": [ diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index 4a04de19..c2a37666 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -9,23 +9,41 @@ contributors: ## The Difference Between Being and Nothing -Following the early logical development of Hegel's _Science of Logic_, pure being and pure nothing are understood to be the same. Each proves to be other yet, equally, both are the same such that there is no distinguishing to be made between them. However, Hegel insists that they are "absolutely distinct" (Hegel 2010, 60/21.70). What is the sense of this distinction? +Following the early logical development of Hegel's _Science of Logic_, pure being and pure nothing are understood to be the same. Each proves to be other yet, equally, both are the same such that they cannot be properly distinguished. However, Hegel insists that they are "absolutely distinct" (Hegel 2010, 60/21.70). What is the sense of this distinction? -Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, property or some other being through which the two are differentiated. However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish the two categories. One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a border without evoking that space again. +Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, property or some other form of being through which the two are differentiated. However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish the two categories. One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a border without evoking that space again. -Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early development. What sense of difference remains then? +Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early development. What difference could possibly then? ### The Immediate Difference Between Pure Being and Pure Nothing -Stephen Houlgate points out that the difference between `being` and `nothing` lies in _intention_ (_Im Meinen_): "There is no clear, determinate difference between the two, but they are nonetheless _meant_ to be different" (Houlgate 2022, 144). He adds that this is not a difference we, as human beings, draw, but belongs to `being` and `nothing` themselves. They are themselves absolutely distinct. +Stephen Houlgate points out that the difference between `being` and `nothing` lies in _intention_ [_Im Meinen_]: "There is no clear, determinate difference between the two, but they are nonetheless _meant_ to be different" (Houlgate 2022, 144). He adds that this is not a difference we, as human beings, draw, but belongs to `being` and `nothing` themselves. They are themselves absolutely distinct. > Pure being does not have any contrast with nothing built into it, but it is pure and simple _being_ without further determination. As such, it is the utter opposite of nothing: it is pure being with no trace of the negative whatsoever. Similarly, nothing has no contrast with being built into it – and so is not to be understood as "non-being" – but it is sheer and utter _nothing_. As such, however, it is the complete absence of being (Houlgate 2022, 144). Notice how each category immediately means something unique to itself yet is _then_ regarded upon reflection in relation to its opposite. But this relation hardly merits the name of a relation since neither category has built into it any form of contrast, whether explicitly or implicitly. Each category simply is. -This simplicity coupled with immediacy sets the difference between `pure being` and `nothing`. "Being and nothing are immediately different because each is purely and immediately _itself_ and thereby completely excludes the other ... each in being itself _in fact_ shuts out the other" (Houlgate 2022, 144). This signals that there is in `pure being` nothing but `pure being`, or, put differently, there is in the thought of `pure being` no conceptual space for anything else—not even `nothing`—. +This simplicity coupled with immediacy sets the difference between `pure being` and `nothing`. "Being and nothing are immediately different because each is purely and immediately _itself_ and thereby completely excludes the other ... each in being itself _in fact_ shuts out the other" (Houlgate 2022, 144). This signals that there is in `pure being` nothing but `pure being`, or, put differently, there is in the thought of `pure being` no conceptual space for anything else—not even `nothing`. -Likewise, as Houlgate goes on to point out, this difference is unsustainable and disappears the moment it is thought. It is merely an _immediate difference_ and so nothing persists beyond this immediacy. Indeed, `being` and `nothing` _vanish_ into each other such that the immediate difference between them is undermined: each is just as indeterminate as the other. +Likewise, as Houlgate goes on to point out, this difference is unsustainable and disappears the moment it is thought. It is merely an _immediate difference_ and so nothing persists beyond this immediacy. Indeed, `being` and `nothing` _vanish_ into each other such that the immediate difference between them is undermined: each is just as indeterminate as the other, and this indeterminacy applies back to the difference as well. "This vanishing in turn renders explicit the fact that the _immediate_ difference between being and nothing is an utterly _indeterminate_ one" (Houlgate 2022, 145). + +The immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` turns out to be a self-sublating or self-undermining one. `being` and `nothing` are _immediately_ different, but this difference fails to persist beyond the vanishing of `being` and `nothing`. Each category differs, therefore, "in such a way that neither is definitely – and so stably – itself but each vanishes into its opposite" (Houlgate 2022, 145). + +This has a further implication regarding the nature of purely immediate difference, namely, that what is so purely immediately different is so only in a contradictory and utterly unstable manner. Hegel's dialectic reveals that while `being` _is_ distinct from `nothing`, it is _also_ utterly indistinguishable from it. + +However, as Houlgate points out, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is not simply eliminated but is restored in its very disappearance. The logic for this idea is the following: + +1. As `being` and `nothing` prove to be (and vanish into) each other, such that the difference between them disappears, they prove to be the same indeterminacy. This can be seen as the moment of uniformity. +1. Yet, `being` and `nothing` prove to be the same _by vanishing_ into each other, in and so doing remain _other_ than one another. The vanishing of each occurs precisely through remaining immediately different from the other: "each vanished by proving to be the _other_ in which it is completely absent" (Houlgate 2022, 145). This, by contrast, can be viewed as the moment of distinction. +1. These two moments occur _at once_, for each category in question proves to be the other _in being immediately different_ to the other that it vanishes into as well as _being the same_ as the other. The difficulty in grasping this lies in trying to separate the two moments from each other and understand them sequentially, but Houlgate's point is that these must occur in the same movement. +1. Thus, in annihilating itself, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` has restored itself. +1. Finally, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is thus doubly contradictory. Firstly, it is a difference that is not a difference, and, secondly, it is one that, in disappearing, restores itself.[^1] + +[^1]: From the logic of the argument any trace to the term "preserve" has been omitted both for simplification and because it is contentious (Niklas). + +Houlgate uses the term "preserve" alongside "restore" in his exposition of this argument. However, the term "preserve" suggests that the _singularly_ same immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is carried through its disappearance. But there is no distinguishing factor either for or against this; the difference is exactly immediate and so nothing determinate can be made out about it that would definitively show that it is one or the other, namely, that it is _this_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` or _the same type of_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` (as being the instance of a class). For all intends and purposes, this matter may be inconsequential but it is not unambiguous. + +{/* TODO Revisit this when commentary on the Concept is written. Trisokkas uses the term "preserve" as a peculiar characteristic of the concept. */} TODO From 2ede3e3884c92d5981c1c0a62158376392599b8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 23:42:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/10] feat: finish houlgate and mctaggart and niklas commentary --- cspell.json | 1 + .../difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 32 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/cspell.json b/cspell.json index 8b5eca47..1bac4ef5 100644 --- a/cspell.json +++ b/cspell.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "Befreiung", "Burbidge", "determinacies", + "diremption", "Filip", "Georg", "Guyer", diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index c2a37666..e18ec5b8 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -11,12 +11,20 @@ contributors: Following the early logical development of Hegel's _Science of Logic_, pure being and pure nothing are understood to be the same. Each proves to be other yet, equally, both are the same such that they cannot be properly distinguished. However, Hegel insists that they are "absolutely distinct" (Hegel 2010, 60/21.70). What is the sense of this distinction? -Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, property or some other form of being through which the two are differentiated. However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish the two categories. One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a border without evoking that space again. +Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, property or some other form of being through which the two are differentiated. However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish the two categories. -Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early development. What difference could possibly then? +> If being and nothing had any determinateness differentiating them, then, as we said, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and the pure nothing which they still are at this point (Hegel 2010, 68/21.79). + +One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a border without evoking that space again. + +Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early development. What difference could possibly remain then? ### The Immediate Difference Between Pure Being and Pure Nothing +{/* If more commentary is added to this article, consider categorizing by commentator. */} + +John McTaggart notes that there is more to `being` and `nothing` than their identity. He puts it that each term "originally meant" different things, namely, by `being` it was intended to a "pure positive—reality without unreality", and by `nothing`, conversely, was intended a "pure negative—unreality without reality". Whilst the two terms have been discoverd to be equivalent, a contradiction has nonetheless arisen. The original meaning has not been discarded: "For it is that same characteristic which determines their equivalence" (McTaggart 1910, 16-17). + Stephen Houlgate points out that the difference between `being` and `nothing` lies in _intention_ [_Im Meinen_]: "There is no clear, determinate difference between the two, but they are nonetheless _meant_ to be different" (Houlgate 2022, 144). He adds that this is not a difference we, as human beings, draw, but belongs to `being` and `nothing` themselves. They are themselves absolutely distinct. > Pure being does not have any contrast with nothing built into it, but it is pure and simple _being_ without further determination. As such, it is the utter opposite of nothing: it is pure being with no trace of the negative whatsoever. Similarly, nothing has no contrast with being built into it – and so is not to be understood as "non-being" – but it is sheer and utter _nothing_. As such, however, it is the complete absence of being (Houlgate 2022, 144). @@ -39,12 +47,26 @@ However, as Houlgate points out, the immediate difference between `being` and `n 1. Thus, in annihilating itself, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` has restored itself. 1. Finally, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is thus doubly contradictory. Firstly, it is a difference that is not a difference, and, secondly, it is one that, in disappearing, restores itself.[^1] -[^1]: From the logic of the argument any trace to the term "preserve" has been omitted both for simplification and because it is contentious (Niklas). +[^1]: Any trace to the term "preserve" has been omitted from the logic of Houlgate's argument both for simplification and because it is contentious (Niklas). Houlgate uses the term "preserve" alongside "restore" in his exposition of this argument. However, the term "preserve" suggests that the _singularly_ same immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is carried through its disappearance. But there is no distinguishing factor either for or against this; the difference is exactly immediate and so nothing determinate can be made out about it that would definitively show that it is one or the other, namely, that it is _this_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` or _the same type of_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` (as being the instance of a class). For all intends and purposes, this matter may be inconsequential but it is not unambiguous. {/* TODO Revisit this when commentary on the Concept is written. Trisokkas uses the term "preserve" as a peculiar characteristic of the concept. */} -TODO +### The Dynamism of Being + +> If the result that being and nothing are the same seems inherently startling or paradoxical, there is not much to be done about it. We should be amazed rather at this amazement that appears so refreshing in philosophy... (Hegel 2010, 61/21.71). + +The opening of the _Science of Logic_ quickly violates the principle of non-contradiction or the law of identity. The form of thinking involved in Hegel's logic disrupts that kind which clings on to clear and definite distinctions between `being` and `nothing`, such as that found in Parmenides which resists the thought that they could ever be the same (Houlgate 2022, 146). The idea that a thing could only ever be the thing that it is, or whose being is identical to itself, is disproven at the very outset of the _Logic_, for at the very least `being` (and `nothing`) is unable to _simply be_ – it vanishes into `nothing`. + +As Houlgate describes it, there is nothing mysterious or irrational about the dialectical change taking place in `being` and `nothing` into each other. "That dialectical conversion is logically necessary: being and nothing pass into one another for the reasons we have seen, and the immediate difference between them thereby proves to be, of necessity, an indeterminate, unstable difference" (Houlgate 2022, 146). Hegel therefore does not mean to flout the traditional principles of reasoning or to undermine rational argument, he is simply revealing the "dynamism in being that he takes to become evident when one focuses on being in its purity and immediacy _without uncritically assumed preconceptions_" (Houlgate 2022, 146). When `being` is considered [without presuppositions](/hegel/guides/presuppositionless-thinking), the argument of the _Logic_ is unassailable: `pure being` is utterly incapable to simply be. + +### Parallel Categories, Divergent Conceptions (Niklas) + +When regarding the respective transitions of `being` and `nothing`, note that in the text concerning the development of these categories is slightly divergent. The development of `being` ends with it turning out to be `nothing`, whereas the development of `nothing` ends with it turning out to be _the same as_ `being`. + +The former case uses _is_ whereas the latter case uses _same_. The first signifies a more immediate transition whereas the latter seems to convey the sense of some essence, an "area" where being and nothing are conjoined. If the two categories were to be differentiated in terms of immediacy and mediation, `nothing` appears to fall on the side of mediation. If this notion of _sameness_ indeed belongs to `nothing` inasmuch as it is the thought that reveals the sameness of the two, then it could be thought of as the "gathering" or aggregating category whilst `being` signals "dispersal" or diremption. + +This has the implication that not only does `being` and `nothing` immediately mean something different, but that there is a different conceptual movement at work in each of them. One breaks off into new ground whereas the other coalesces a return to what was. -And this indeterminacy envelops also the very difference (does it? or is it wrong to think of it in this way?) +Alternatively, this element of sameness is conjoined with the intention of the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing`, and that that intention is the presence of `becoming` (Hegel 2010, 68/21.79), such that this is not a peculiar property of `being` or `nothing` but is the alpha of the emergent category. From c5c9c3de29c81953b7b4d3c3fce5e0ebf6eea88f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2024 13:31:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/10] chore: apply formatting to article --- .../difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 228 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 179 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index e18ec5b8..9614f07d 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: The Difference Between Being and Nothing -description: Learn about the difference between being and nothing from Hegel's Science of Logic. +description: + Learn about the difference between being and nothing from Hegel's Science of + Logic. isArticle: true authors: Filip Niklas (2024) editors: @@ -9,64 +11,192 @@ contributors: ## The Difference Between Being and Nothing -Following the early logical development of Hegel's _Science of Logic_, pure being and pure nothing are understood to be the same. Each proves to be other yet, equally, both are the same such that they cannot be properly distinguished. However, Hegel insists that they are "absolutely distinct" (Hegel 2010, 60/21.70). What is the sense of this distinction? - -Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, property or some other form of being through which the two are differentiated. However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish the two categories. - -> If being and nothing had any determinateness differentiating them, then, as we said, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and the pure nothing which they still are at this point (Hegel 2010, 68/21.79). - -One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a border without evoking that space again. - -Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early development. What difference could possibly remain then? +Following the early logical development of Hegel's _Science of Logic_, pure +being and pure nothing are understood to be the same. Each proves to be other +yet, equally, both are the same such that they cannot be properly distinguished. +However, Hegel insists that they are "absolutely distinct" (Hegel 2010, +60/21.70). What is the sense of this distinction? + +Typically, one would _determine_ a distinction by developing some quality, +property or some other form of being through which the two are differentiated. +However, at the earliest stages of the _Logic_, determinacy itself has not been +developed, such that determinacy cannot justifiably be employed to distinguish +the two categories. + +> If being and nothing had any determinateness differentiating them, then, as we +> said, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure +> being and the pure nothing which they still are at this point (Hegel 2010, +> 68/21.79). + +One cannot then make use of some distinguishing factor for an idea that is +omnipresent; there is no conceptual space, as it were, where one might draw a +border without evoking that space again. + +Moreover, determining something that would distinguish `being` from `nothing` +also annuls the purity of these terms. If some determinacy were to obtain for +either, then they are no longer understood in their purity and the initial +meaning of these categories would be lost as well as invalidating their early +development. What difference could possibly remain then? ### The Immediate Difference Between Pure Being and Pure Nothing {/* If more commentary is added to this article, consider categorizing by commentator. */} -John McTaggart notes that there is more to `being` and `nothing` than their identity. He puts it that each term "originally meant" different things, namely, by `being` it was intended to a "pure positive—reality without unreality", and by `nothing`, conversely, was intended a "pure negative—unreality without reality". Whilst the two terms have been discoverd to be equivalent, a contradiction has nonetheless arisen. The original meaning has not been discarded: "For it is that same characteristic which determines their equivalence" (McTaggart 1910, 16-17). - -Stephen Houlgate points out that the difference between `being` and `nothing` lies in _intention_ [_Im Meinen_]: "There is no clear, determinate difference between the two, but they are nonetheless _meant_ to be different" (Houlgate 2022, 144). He adds that this is not a difference we, as human beings, draw, but belongs to `being` and `nothing` themselves. They are themselves absolutely distinct. - -> Pure being does not have any contrast with nothing built into it, but it is pure and simple _being_ without further determination. As such, it is the utter opposite of nothing: it is pure being with no trace of the negative whatsoever. Similarly, nothing has no contrast with being built into it – and so is not to be understood as "non-being" – but it is sheer and utter _nothing_. As such, however, it is the complete absence of being (Houlgate 2022, 144). - -Notice how each category immediately means something unique to itself yet is _then_ regarded upon reflection in relation to its opposite. But this relation hardly merits the name of a relation since neither category has built into it any form of contrast, whether explicitly or implicitly. Each category simply is. - -This simplicity coupled with immediacy sets the difference between `pure being` and `nothing`. "Being and nothing are immediately different because each is purely and immediately _itself_ and thereby completely excludes the other ... each in being itself _in fact_ shuts out the other" (Houlgate 2022, 144). This signals that there is in `pure being` nothing but `pure being`, or, put differently, there is in the thought of `pure being` no conceptual space for anything else—not even `nothing`. - -Likewise, as Houlgate goes on to point out, this difference is unsustainable and disappears the moment it is thought. It is merely an _immediate difference_ and so nothing persists beyond this immediacy. Indeed, `being` and `nothing` _vanish_ into each other such that the immediate difference between them is undermined: each is just as indeterminate as the other, and this indeterminacy applies back to the difference as well. "This vanishing in turn renders explicit the fact that the _immediate_ difference between being and nothing is an utterly _indeterminate_ one" (Houlgate 2022, 145). - -The immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` turns out to be a self-sublating or self-undermining one. `being` and `nothing` are _immediately_ different, but this difference fails to persist beyond the vanishing of `being` and `nothing`. Each category differs, therefore, "in such a way that neither is definitely – and so stably – itself but each vanishes into its opposite" (Houlgate 2022, 145). - -This has a further implication regarding the nature of purely immediate difference, namely, that what is so purely immediately different is so only in a contradictory and utterly unstable manner. Hegel's dialectic reveals that while `being` _is_ distinct from `nothing`, it is _also_ utterly indistinguishable from it. - -However, as Houlgate points out, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is not simply eliminated but is restored in its very disappearance. The logic for this idea is the following: - -1. As `being` and `nothing` prove to be (and vanish into) each other, such that the difference between them disappears, they prove to be the same indeterminacy. This can be seen as the moment of uniformity. -1. Yet, `being` and `nothing` prove to be the same _by vanishing_ into each other, in and so doing remain _other_ than one another. The vanishing of each occurs precisely through remaining immediately different from the other: "each vanished by proving to be the _other_ in which it is completely absent" (Houlgate 2022, 145). This, by contrast, can be viewed as the moment of distinction. -1. These two moments occur _at once_, for each category in question proves to be the other _in being immediately different_ to the other that it vanishes into as well as _being the same_ as the other. The difficulty in grasping this lies in trying to separate the two moments from each other and understand them sequentially, but Houlgate's point is that these must occur in the same movement. -1. Thus, in annihilating itself, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` has restored itself. -1. Finally, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is thus doubly contradictory. Firstly, it is a difference that is not a difference, and, secondly, it is one that, in disappearing, restores itself.[^1] - -[^1]: Any trace to the term "preserve" has been omitted from the logic of Houlgate's argument both for simplification and because it is contentious (Niklas). - -Houlgate uses the term "preserve" alongside "restore" in his exposition of this argument. However, the term "preserve" suggests that the _singularly_ same immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is carried through its disappearance. But there is no distinguishing factor either for or against this; the difference is exactly immediate and so nothing determinate can be made out about it that would definitively show that it is one or the other, namely, that it is _this_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` or _the same type of_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` (as being the instance of a class). For all intends and purposes, this matter may be inconsequential but it is not unambiguous. +John McTaggart notes that there is more to `being` and `nothing` than their +identity. He puts it that each term "originally meant" different things, namely, +by `being` it was intended to a "pure positive—reality without unreality", +and by `nothing`, conversely, was intended a "pure negative—unreality +without reality". Whilst the two terms have been discoverd to be equivalent, a +contradiction has nonetheless arisen. The original meaning has not been +discarded: "For it is that same characteristic which determines their +equivalence" (McTaggart 1910, 16-17). + +Stephen Houlgate points out that the difference between `being` and `nothing` +lies in _intention_ [_Im Meinen_]: "There is no clear, determinate difference between +the two, but they are nonetheless _meant_ to be different" (Houlgate 2022, 144). +He adds that this is not a difference we, as human beings, draw, but belongs to `being` +and `nothing` themselves. They are themselves absolutely distinct. + +> Pure being does not have any contrast with nothing built into it, but it is +> pure and simple _being_ without further determination. As such, it is the +> utter opposite of nothing: it is pure being with no trace of the negative +> whatsoever. Similarly, nothing has no contrast with being built into it +> – and so is not to be understood as "non-being" – but it is sheer +> and utter _nothing_. As such, however, it is the complete absence of being +> (Houlgate 2022, 144). + +Notice how each category immediately means something unique to itself yet is +_then_ regarded upon reflection in relation to its opposite. But this relation +hardly merits the name of a relation since neither category has built into it +any form of contrast, whether explicitly or implicitly. Each category simply is. + +This simplicity coupled with immediacy sets the difference between `pure being` +and `nothing`. "Being and nothing are immediately different because each is +purely and immediately _itself_ and thereby completely excludes the other ... +each in being itself _in fact_ shuts out the other" (Houlgate 2022, 144). This +signals that there is in `pure being` nothing but `pure being`, or, put +differently, there is in the thought of `pure being` no conceptual space for +anything else—not even `nothing`. + +Likewise, as Houlgate goes on to point out, this difference is unsustainable and +disappears the moment it is thought. It is merely an _immediate difference_ and +so nothing persists beyond this immediacy. Indeed, `being` and `nothing` +_vanish_ into each other such that the immediate difference between them is +undermined: each is just as indeterminate as the other, and this indeterminacy +applies back to the difference as well. "This vanishing in turn renders explicit +the fact that the _immediate_ difference between being and nothing is an utterly +_indeterminate_ one" (Houlgate 2022, 145). + +The immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` turns out to be a +self-sublating or self-undermining one. `being` and `nothing` are _immediately_ +different, but this difference fails to persist beyond the vanishing of `being` +and `nothing`. Each category differs, therefore, "in such a way that neither is +definitely – and so stably – itself but each vanishes into its +opposite" (Houlgate 2022, 145). + +This has a further implication regarding the nature of purely immediate +difference, namely, that what is so purely immediately different is so only in a +contradictory and utterly unstable manner. Hegel's dialectic reveals that while +`being` _is_ distinct from `nothing`, it is _also_ utterly indistinguishable +from it. + +However, as Houlgate points out, the immediate difference between `being` and +`nothing` is not simply eliminated but is restored in its very disappearance. +The logic for this idea is the following: + +1. As `being` and `nothing` prove to be (and vanish into) each other, such that + the difference between them disappears, they prove to be the same + indeterminacy. This can be seen as the moment of uniformity. +1. Yet, `being` and `nothing` prove to be the same _by vanishing_ into each + other, in and so doing remain _other_ than one another. The vanishing of each + occurs precisely through remaining immediately different from the other: + "each vanished by proving to be the _other_ in which it is completely absent" + (Houlgate 2022, 145). This, by contrast, can be viewed as the moment of + distinction. +1. These two moments occur _at once_, for each category in question proves to be + the other _in being immediately different_ to the other that it vanishes into + as well as _being the same_ as the other. The difficulty in grasping this + lies in trying to separate the two moments from each other and understand + them sequentially, but Houlgate's point is that these must occur in the same + movement. +1. Thus, in annihilating itself, the immediate difference between `being` and + `nothing` has restored itself. +1. Finally, the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is thus + doubly contradictory. Firstly, it is a difference that is not a difference, + and, secondly, it is one that, in disappearing, restores itself.[^1] + +[^1]: + Any trace to the term "preserve" has been omitted from the logic of + Houlgate's argument both for simplification and because it is contentious + (Niklas). + +Houlgate uses the term "preserve" alongside "restore" in his exposition of this +argument. However, the term "preserve" suggests that the _singularly_ same +immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` is carried through its +disappearance. But there is no distinguishing factor either for or against this; +the difference is exactly immediate and so nothing determinate can be made out +about it that would definitively show that it is one or the other, namely, that +it is _this_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` or _the same +type of_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` (as being the +instance of a class). For all intends and purposes, this matter may be +inconsequential but it is not unambiguous. {/* TODO Revisit this when commentary on the Concept is written. Trisokkas uses the term "preserve" as a peculiar characteristic of the concept. */} ### The Dynamism of Being -> If the result that being and nothing are the same seems inherently startling or paradoxical, there is not much to be done about it. We should be amazed rather at this amazement that appears so refreshing in philosophy... (Hegel 2010, 61/21.71). - -The opening of the _Science of Logic_ quickly violates the principle of non-contradiction or the law of identity. The form of thinking involved in Hegel's logic disrupts that kind which clings on to clear and definite distinctions between `being` and `nothing`, such as that found in Parmenides which resists the thought that they could ever be the same (Houlgate 2022, 146). The idea that a thing could only ever be the thing that it is, or whose being is identical to itself, is disproven at the very outset of the _Logic_, for at the very least `being` (and `nothing`) is unable to _simply be_ – it vanishes into `nothing`. - -As Houlgate describes it, there is nothing mysterious or irrational about the dialectical change taking place in `being` and `nothing` into each other. "That dialectical conversion is logically necessary: being and nothing pass into one another for the reasons we have seen, and the immediate difference between them thereby proves to be, of necessity, an indeterminate, unstable difference" (Houlgate 2022, 146). Hegel therefore does not mean to flout the traditional principles of reasoning or to undermine rational argument, he is simply revealing the "dynamism in being that he takes to become evident when one focuses on being in its purity and immediacy _without uncritically assumed preconceptions_" (Houlgate 2022, 146). When `being` is considered [without presuppositions](/hegel/guides/presuppositionless-thinking), the argument of the _Logic_ is unassailable: `pure being` is utterly incapable to simply be. +> If the result that being and nothing are the same seems inherently startling +> or paradoxical, there is not much to be done about it. We should be amazed +> rather at this amazement that appears so refreshing in philosophy... (Hegel +> 2010, 61/21.71). + +The opening of the _Science of Logic_ quickly violates the principle of +non-contradiction or the law of identity. The form of thinking involved in +Hegel's logic disrupts that kind which clings on to clear and definite +distinctions between `being` and `nothing`, such as that found in Parmenides +which resists the thought that they could ever be the same (Houlgate 2022, 146). +The idea that a thing could only ever be the thing that it is, or whose being is +identical to itself, is disproven at the very outset of the _Logic_, for at the +very least `being` (and `nothing`) is unable to _simply be_ – it vanishes +into `nothing`. + +As Houlgate describes it, there is nothing mysterious or irrational about the +dialectical change taking place in `being` and `nothing` into each other. "That +dialectical conversion is logically necessary: being and nothing pass into one +another for the reasons we have seen, and the immediate difference between them +thereby proves to be, of necessity, an indeterminate, unstable difference" +(Houlgate 2022, 146). Hegel therefore does not mean to flout the traditional +principles of reasoning or to undermine rational argument, he is simply +revealing the "dynamism in being that he takes to become evident when one +focuses on being in its purity and immediacy _without uncritically assumed +preconceptions_" (Houlgate 2022, 146). When `being` is considered +[without presuppositions](/hegel/guides/presuppositionless-thinking), the +argument of the _Logic_ is unassailable: `pure being` is utterly incapable to +simply be. ### Parallel Categories, Divergent Conceptions (Niklas) -When regarding the respective transitions of `being` and `nothing`, note that in the text concerning the development of these categories is slightly divergent. The development of `being` ends with it turning out to be `nothing`, whereas the development of `nothing` ends with it turning out to be _the same as_ `being`. - -The former case uses _is_ whereas the latter case uses _same_. The first signifies a more immediate transition whereas the latter seems to convey the sense of some essence, an "area" where being and nothing are conjoined. If the two categories were to be differentiated in terms of immediacy and mediation, `nothing` appears to fall on the side of mediation. If this notion of _sameness_ indeed belongs to `nothing` inasmuch as it is the thought that reveals the sameness of the two, then it could be thought of as the "gathering" or aggregating category whilst `being` signals "dispersal" or diremption. - -This has the implication that not only does `being` and `nothing` immediately mean something different, but that there is a different conceptual movement at work in each of them. One breaks off into new ground whereas the other coalesces a return to what was. - -Alternatively, this element of sameness is conjoined with the intention of the immediate difference between `being` and `nothing`, and that that intention is the presence of `becoming` (Hegel 2010, 68/21.79), such that this is not a peculiar property of `being` or `nothing` but is the alpha of the emergent category. +When regarding the respective transitions of `being` and `nothing`, note that in +the text concerning the development of these categories is slightly divergent. +The development of `being` ends with it turning out to be `nothing`, whereas the +development of `nothing` ends with it turning out to be _the same as_ `being`. + +The former case uses _is_ whereas the latter case uses _same_. The first +signifies a more immediate transition whereas the latter seems to convey the +sense of some essence, an "area" where being and nothing are conjoined. If the +two categories were to be differentiated in terms of immediacy and mediation, +`nothing` appears to fall on the side of mediation. If this notion of _sameness_ +indeed belongs to `nothing` inasmuch as it is the thought that reveals the +sameness of the two, then it could be thought of as the "gathering" or +aggregating category whilst `being` signals "dispersal" or diremption. + +This has the implication that not only does `being` and `nothing` immediately +mean something different, but that there is a different conceptual movement at +work in each of them. One breaks off into new ground whereas the other coalesces +a return to what was. + +Alternatively, this element of sameness is conjoined with the intention of the +immediate difference between `being` and `nothing`, and that that intention is +the presence of `becoming` (Hegel 2010, 68/21.79), such that this is not a +peculiar property of `being` or `nothing` but is the alpha of the emergent +category. From c103bbfa3d2b892ee60264e17d21c9e3b6b1355a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2024 11:31:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 09/10] ci: format code [automated action on behalf of Firgrep] --- .vscode/settings.json | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.vscode/settings.json b/.vscode/settings.json index 352c7829..cff6c9fe 100644 --- a/.vscode/settings.json +++ b/.vscode/settings.json @@ -26,6 +26,6 @@ "comments": "off", "other": "off", "strings": "off" - }, + } } } From a2a74232f7f30df48bdd7c1f0221120964e15a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filip Niklas <118931755+Firgrep@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 21:16:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/10] docs: fix syntax errors --- .../nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx index 9614f07d..cb9d7ee6 100644 --- a/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/nothing/difference-between-being-and-nothing.mdx @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ the difference is exactly immediate and so nothing determinate can be made out about it that would definitively show that it is one or the other, namely, that it is _this_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` or _the same type of_ immediate difference between `being` and `nothing` (as being the -instance of a class). For all intends and purposes, this matter may be +instance of a class). For all intents and purposes, this matter may be inconsequential but it is not unambiguous. {/* TODO Revisit this when commentary on the Concept is written. Trisokkas uses the term "preserve" as a peculiar characteristic of the concept. */} @@ -176,9 +176,9 @@ simply be. ### Parallel Categories, Divergent Conceptions (Niklas) -When regarding the respective transitions of `being` and `nothing`, note that in -the text concerning the development of these categories is slightly divergent. -The development of `being` ends with it turning out to be `nothing`, whereas the +When considering the respective transitions of being and nothing, note that the +text concerning the development of these categories is slightly divergent.. The +development of `being` ends with it turning out to be `nothing`, whereas the development of `nothing` ends with it turning out to be _the same as_ `being`. The former case uses _is_ whereas the latter case uses _same_. The first