Summary
concat
built-in can write over the bounds of the memory buffer that was allocated for it and thus overwrite existing valid data. The root cause is that the build_IR
for concat
doesn't properly adhere to the API of copy functions (for >=0.3.2
the copy_bytes
function).
A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production.
Tracked in issue #3737
Details
The build_IR
allocates a new internal variable for the concatenation:
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dst_maxlen = sum( |
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[arg.typ.maxlen if isinstance(arg.typ, _BytestringT) else arg.typ.m for arg in args] |
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) |
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# TODO: try to grab these from semantic analysis |
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if isinstance(args[0].typ, StringT): |
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ret_typ = StringT(dst_maxlen) |
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else: |
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ret_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen) |
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# Node representing the position of the output in memory |
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dst = IRnode.from_list( |
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context.new_internal_variable(ret_typ), |
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typ=ret_typ, |
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location=MEMORY, |
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annotation="concat destination", |
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) |
Notice that the buffer is allocated for the maxlen
+ 1 word to actually hold the length of the array.
Later the copy_bytes
function is used to copy the actual source arguments to the destination:
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do_copy = [ |
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"seq", |
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copy_bytes(dst_data, argdata, arglen, arg.typ.maxlen), |
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["set", ofst, ["add", ofst, arglen]], |
The dst_data
is defined via:
data ptr
- to skip the 1 word that holds the length
offset
- to skip the source arguments that were already written to the buffer
- the
offset
is increased via: ["set", ofst, ["add", ofst, arglen]]
, ie it is increased by the length of the source argument
Now, the copy_bytes
function has multiple control flow paths, the following ones are of interest:
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if length_bound <= 32: |
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copy_op = STORE(dst, LOAD(src)) |
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ret = IRnode.from_list(copy_op, annotation=annotation) |
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return b1.resolve(b2.resolve(b3.resolve(ret))) |
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# general case, copy word-for-word |
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# pseudocode for our approach (memory-storage as example): |
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# for i in range(len, bound=MAX_LEN): |
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# sstore(_dst + i, mload(src + i * 32)) |
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i = IRnode.from_list(_freshname("copy_bytes_ix"), typ=UINT256_T) |
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# optimized form of (div (ceil32 len) 32) |
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n = ["div", ["add", 31, length], 32] |
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n_bound = ceil32(length_bound) // 32 |
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dst_i = add_ofst(dst, _mul(i, dst.location.word_scale)) |
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src_i = add_ofst(src, _mul(i, src.location.word_scale)) |
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copy_one_word = STORE(dst_i, LOAD(src_i)) |
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main_loop = ["repeat", i, 0, n, n_bound, copy_one_word] |
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return b1.resolve( |
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b2.resolve(b3.resolve(IRnode.from_list(main_loop, annotation=annotation))) |
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) |
Note that the function itself contains the following note:
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# NOTE: may pad to ceil32 of `length`! If you ask to copy 1 byte, it may |
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# copy an entire (32-byte) word, depending on the copy routine chosen. |
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# TODO maybe always pad to ceil32, to reduce dirty bytes bugs |
That is we can ask for a copy of 1B
yet a whole word is copied.
Consider the first interesting path - if the dst_data
's distance to the end of the concat data buffer is < 32B
, the copy_op = STORE(dst, LOAD(src))
from copy_bytes
will result in buffer overflow as it essentially will mstore
to dst_data
the mload
of the source (mload will load whole word and the distance of the dst_data
to the word boundary is <32B
).
From the two mentioned paths in copy_bytes
it can be seen that both sources from memory and storage can cause the corruption.
PoC
The main attack vector that was found was when the concat
is inside an internal
function. Suppose we have an external
function that calls internal
one. In such case the address space is divided such that the memory for the internal function is in lower portion of the adr space. As such the buffer overflow can overwrite valid data of the caller.
Here is a simple example:
#@version ^0.3.9
@internal
def bar() -> uint256:
sss: String[2] = concat("a", "b")
return 1
@external
def foo() -> int256:
a: int256 = -1
b: uint256 = self.bar()
return a
foo
should clearly return -1
, but it returns 452312848583266388373324160190187140051835877600158453279131187530910662655
-1
was used intentionally due to its bit structure but the value here is fairly irelevant. In this example during the second iteration of the for loop in the build_IR
mload
to dst+1
will be executed (because len('a') == 1), thus the function will write 1B
over the bounds of the buffer. The string 'b' is stored such that its right-most byte is a zero byte. So a zero byte will be written over the bounds. So when -1
is considered it's left-most B will be overwritten to all 0. Therefore it can be seen: 452312848583266388373324160190187140051835877600158453279131187530910662655 == (2**248-1)
will output True
.
IR
If we look at the contract's IR (vyper --no optimize -f ir), we see:
# Line 30
/* a: int256 = -1 */ [mstore, 320, -1 <-1>],
And for the second iteration of the loop in concat:
len,
[mload, arg],
[seq,
[with,
src,
[add, arg, 32],
[with,
dst,
[add, [add, 256 <concat destination>, 32], concat_ofst],
[mstore, dst, [mload, src]]]],
[set, concat_ofst, [add, concat_ofst, len]]]]],
[mstore, 256 <concat destination>, concat_ofst],
256 <concat destination>]],
So the address of the int
is 320.
The dst
is defined as: [add, [add, 256 <concat destination>, 32], concat_ofst],
.
In the second iteration the concat_ofst
will be 1 because len('a)==1
so 256+32+1 = 289
. Now this address will be mstored
to - so the last mstored B will have the address 289+32=320
which clearly overlaps with the address of the int a
.
PoC 2
Due to how immutables
are handled, they can be corrupted too:
#@version ^0.3.9
i: immutable(int256)
@external
def __init__():
i = -1
s: String[2] = concat("a", "b")
@external
def foo() -> int256:
return i
Output of calling foo()
= 452312848583266388373324160190187140051835877600158453279131187530910662655
.
Impact
The buffer overflow can result in the change of semantics of the contract. The overflow is length-dependent and thus it might go unnoticed during contract testing.
However, certainly not all usages of concat
will result in overwritten valid data as we require it to be in an internal
function and close to the return
statement where other memory allocations don't occur.
Concluding remarks
The bug based on the fast path in copy_bytes
was likely introduced in: 548d35d720fb6fd8efbdc0ce525bed259a73f0b9
. git bisect
was used between v0.3.1 and v0.3.2, forge test
was run and the test asserted that the function indeed returns -1.
For the general case, 0.3.0
and 0.3.1
are also affected.
Summary
concat
built-in can write over the bounds of the memory buffer that was allocated for it and thus overwrite existing valid data. The root cause is that thebuild_IR
forconcat
doesn't properly adhere to the API of copy functions (for>=0.3.2
thecopy_bytes
function).A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production.
Tracked in issue #3737
Details
The
build_IR
allocates a new internal variable for the concatenation:vyper/vyper/builtins/functions.py
Lines 534 to 550 in 3b310d5
Notice that the buffer is allocated for the
maxlen
+ 1 word to actually hold the length of the array.Later the
copy_bytes
function is used to copy the actual source arguments to the destination:vyper/vyper/builtins/functions.py
Lines 569 to 572 in 3b310d5
The
dst_data
is defined via:data ptr
- to skip the 1 word that holds the lengthoffset
- to skip the source arguments that were already written to the bufferoffset
is increased via:["set", ofst, ["add", ofst, arglen]]
, ie it is increased by the length of the source argumentNow, the
copy_bytes
function has multiple control flow paths, the following ones are of interest:vyper/vyper/codegen/core.py
Lines 270 to 273 in 3b310d5
vyper/vyper/codegen/core.py
Lines 301 to 320 in 3b310d5
Note that the function itself contains the following note:
vyper/vyper/codegen/core.py
Lines 245 to 247 in 3b310d5
That is we can ask for a copy of
1B
yet a whole word is copied.Consider the first interesting path - if the
dst_data
's distance to the end of the concat data buffer is< 32B
, thecopy_op = STORE(dst, LOAD(src))
fromcopy_bytes
will result in buffer overflow as it essentially willmstore
todst_data
themload
of the source (mload will load whole word and the distance of thedst_data
to the word boundary is<32B
).From the two mentioned paths in
copy_bytes
it can be seen that both sources from memory and storage can cause the corruption.PoC
The main attack vector that was found was when the
concat
is inside aninternal
function. Suppose we have anexternal
function that callsinternal
one. In such case the address space is divided such that the memory for the internal function is in lower portion of the adr space. As such the buffer overflow can overwrite valid data of the caller.Here is a simple example:
foo
should clearly return-1
, but it returns452312848583266388373324160190187140051835877600158453279131187530910662655
-1
was used intentionally due to its bit structure but the value here is fairly irelevant. In this example during the second iteration of the for loop in thebuild_IR
mload
todst+1
will be executed (because len('a') == 1), thus the function will write1B
over the bounds of the buffer. The string 'b' is stored such that its right-most byte is a zero byte. So a zero byte will be written over the bounds. So when-1
is considered it's left-most B will be overwritten to all 0. Therefore it can be seen:452312848583266388373324160190187140051835877600158453279131187530910662655 == (2**248-1)
will outputTrue
.IR
If we look at the contract's IR (vyper --no optimize -f ir), we see:
And for the second iteration of the loop in concat:
So the address of the
int
is 320.The
dst
is defined as:[add, [add, 256 <concat destination>, 32], concat_ofst],
.In the second iteration the
concat_ofst
will be 1 becauselen('a)==1
so256+32+1 = 289
. Now this address will bemstored
to - so the last mstored B will have the address289+32=320
which clearly overlaps with the address of theint a
.PoC 2
Due to how
immutables
are handled, they can be corrupted too:Output of calling
foo()
=452312848583266388373324160190187140051835877600158453279131187530910662655
.Impact
The buffer overflow can result in the change of semantics of the contract. The overflow is length-dependent and thus it might go unnoticed during contract testing.
However, certainly not all usages of
concat
will result in overwritten valid data as we require it to be in aninternal
function and close to thereturn
statement where other memory allocations don't occur.Concluding remarks
The bug based on the fast path in
copy_bytes
was likely introduced in:548d35d720fb6fd8efbdc0ce525bed259a73f0b9
.git bisect
was used between v0.3.1 and v0.3.2,forge test
was run and the test asserted that the function indeed returns -1.For the general case,
0.3.0
and0.3.1
are also affected.