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Create nf_ttp_t1566-001_ipfs_phishing.md
hunting rule for MDE to look for the use of IPFS Web 3.3 platform to host malicious landing pages.
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# TTP Detection Rule: Check for Phishing Emails Using IPFS in Phishing Campaigns | ||
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## Query Information | ||
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#### MITRE ATT&CK Technique(s) | ||
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| Technique ID | Title | Link | | ||
|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------| | ||
| T1566.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link| [Phishing: Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/) | | ||
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#### Description | ||
This detection rule focuses on identifying phishing emails that potentially use the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host malicious content. The usage of IPFS in phishing campaigns is a sophisticated technique as it can bypass conventional security measures. The rule involves checking for subsequent connections to IPFS-hosted sites, which could indicate the execution of a phishing attack utilizing this decentralized file hosting system. | ||
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#### Risk | ||
The risk targeted by this detection rule is the exploitation of IPFS in phishing campaigns, a method that could lead to successful phishing attacks due to the unconventional nature of IPFS as a hosting platform. Phishing attacks using IPFS can be more difficult to detect and can pose a significant threat to organizational security. | ||
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#### Author <Optional> | ||
- **Name:** Gavin Knapp | ||
- **Github:** [https://github.com/m4nbat](https://github.com/m4nbat) | ||
- **Twitter:** [https://twitter.com/knappresearchlb](https://twitter.com/knappresearchlb) | ||
- **LinkedIn:** [https://www.linkedin.com/in/grjk83/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/grjk83/) | ||
- **Website:** | ||
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#### References | ||
- [Talos Intelligence on IPFS Abuse](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/) | ||
- [Cisco-Talos IOCs](https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/tree/main/2022/11) | ||
- [Volexity Threat Intel](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/volexity/threat-intel/main/2023/2023-06-28%20POWERSTAR/attachments/ipfs.txt) | ||
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## Defender For Endpoint | ||
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```KQL | ||
//check for phishing emails potentially using ipfs to host malicious content used in phishing campaigns. | ||
let domains = externaldata (data:string)[h@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/volexity/threat-intel/main/2023/2023-06-28%20POWERSTAR/attachments/ipfs.txt"]; | ||
EmailEvents | ||
| where Timestamp > ago (30d) | ||
| join EmailUrlInfo on NetworkMessageId | ||
| where Url has_any (domains) and DeliveryAction !~ "Blocked" | ||
``` | ||
## Sentinel | ||
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```KQL | ||
//check for subsequent connections to the site | ||
let domains = externaldata (data:string) | ||
[h@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/volexity/threat-intel/main/2023/2023-06-28%20POWERSTAR/attachments/ipfs.txt"]; | ||
DeviceNetworkEvents | ||
| where TimeGenerated > ago (30d) | ||
| where RemoteUrl has_any (domains) | ||
``` |