Home

Welkom bij de handboek-digitaal-burgerschap wiki!

“The question of whether a decision, judgement, or memory is “correct” (in a normative way) is usually secondary to the question of whether that decision, judgement, or memory is helpful in the current situation.” Pohl, R., & Pohl, R. F. (Eds.). (2004). Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory. Psychology Press.

Bron: Cognitive Bias Part 1 by Krisztina Szerovay

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103(3), 582-591.

The study of heuristics and biases in judgment has been criticized in several publications by G. Gigerenzer, who argues that "biases are not biases" and "heuristics are meant to explain what does not exist" (1991, p. 102). This article responds to Gigerenzer's critique and shows that it misrepresents the authors' theoretical position and ignores critical evidence. Contrary to Gigerenzer's central empirical claim, judgments of frequency - not only subjective probabilities - are susceptible to large and systematic biases. A postscript responds to Gigerenzer's (1996) reply.

Gigerenzer portrays the discrepancy between individual and aggregate assessments as incompatible with our theoretical position, but he is wrong. On the contrary, we drew a distinction between two modes of judgment under uncertainty, which we labeled the inside and the outside views (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1982b; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). In the **outside view **(or frequentistic approach) the case at hand is treated as an instance of a broader class of similar cases, for which the frequencies of outcomes are known or can be estimated. In the inside view (or single-case approach) predictions are based on specific scenarios and impressions of the particular case. We proposed that people tend to favor the inside view and as a result underweight relevant statistical data.

Sloman, S., & Fernbach, P. (2018). The knowledge illusion: Why we never think alone. Penguin.

We all think we know more than we actually do. Humans have built hugely complex societies and technologies, but most of us don’t even know how a pen or a toilet works. How have we achieved so much despite understanding so little? Cognitive scientists Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach argue that we survive and thrive despite our mental shortcomings because we live in a rich community of knowledge. The key to our intelligence lies in the people and things around us. We’re constantly drawing on information and expertise stored outside our heads: in our bodies, our environment, our possessions, and the community with which we interact—and usually we don’t even realize we’re doing it. The human mind is both brilliant and pathetic. We have mastered fire, created democratic institutions, stood on the moon, and sequenced our genome. And yet each of us is error prone, sometimes irrational, and often ignorant. The fundamentally communal nature of intelligence and knowledge explains why we often assume we know more than we really do, why political opinions and false beliefs are so hard to change, and why individual-oriented approaches to education and management frequently fail. But our collaborative minds also enable us to do amazing things. The Knowledge Illusion contends that true genius can be found in the ways we create intelligence using the community around us.