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Add guidance for choosing the field size #325
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Looks good. I think we should also add | PROOFS | 1 |
to tables 9, 10, 11, and 12, right after Field
, to be clear about the parameter values for the four concrete Prio3 VDAFs (and algorithm IDs) we define.
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Approved assuming "Connecting soundness and robustness" is addressed either in this PR or a future one.
Right, thanks for the reminder! I'll ping you for a quick review if you don't mind. |
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These tables specify parameters of the circuit; the number of proofs is not a parameter of the circuit. In fact, the gudance here is about modifying one of the circuits, say What do you think about decoupling |
For Prio3, when joint randomness is used: * RECOMMEND Field128 * Field64 MAY be used, but `PROOFS` MUST be `3` The latter is motivated by issue #177. The recommendation is based on the upper bound given by {{DPRS23}}, Theorem 1 and a matching attack described by Bas Westerbaan (see issue #311). Co-authored-by: Shan <[email protected]>
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Good point, I think that sounds better |
I'll lift to an issue and handle it after this PR. |
Closes #311.
For Prio3, when joint randomness is used:
PROOFS
MUST be3
The latter is motivated by issue #177. The recommendation is based on the upper bound given by {{DPRS23}}, Theorem 1 and a matching attack described by @bwesterb (see issue #311).