Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Update MS.AAD.3.3v1 to decouple the policy from MS.AAD.3.1v1 and match the updated rego checks #1588

Draft
wants to merge 2 commits into
base: main
Choose a base branch
from
Draft

Update MS.AAD.3.3v1 to decouple the policy from MS.AAD.3.1v1 and match the updated rego checks #1588

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
2 commits
Select commit Hold shift + click to select a range
47ad963
Updated AAD.3.3
ahuynhMITRE Feb 20, 2025
7ea4f47
reverting AAD.3.3v2 -> v1
ahuynhMITRE Feb 20, 2025
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions PowerShell/ScubaGear/baselines/aad.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -229,11 +229,11 @@ If phishing-resistant MFA has not been enforced, an alternative MFA method SHALL
- [T1110.003: Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/)

#### MS.AAD.3.3v1
If phishing-resistant MFA has not been enforced and Microsoft Authenticator is enabled, it SHALL be configured to show login context information.
If Microsoft Authenticator is enabled, it SHALL be configured to show login context information.

<!--Policy: MS.AAD.3.3v1; Criticality: SHALL -->
- _Rationale:_ This stopgap security policy helps protect the tenant when phishing-resistant MFA has not been enforced and Microsoft Authenticator is used. This policy helps improve the security of Microsoft Authenticator by showing user context information, which helps reduce MFA phishing compromises.
- _Last modified:_ June 2023
- _Rationale:_ This policy helps protect the tenant when Microsoft Authenticator is used by showing user context information, which helps reduce MFA phishing compromises.
- _Last modified:_ February 2025
- _MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:_
- [T1110: Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/)
- [T1110.001: Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/)
Expand Down
Loading