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Update index.html #722

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Nov 27, 2023
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Update index.html #722

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12 changes: 6 additions & 6 deletions src/index.html
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Expand Up @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ <h2 class="Markdown--h2-as-h3">Latest updates</h2>
<li>June 27, 2022 - Orange International Carrier (AS5511) has fully deployed RPKI Origin Validation on their global worldwide network. (<a href="https://twitter.com/OrangeIC/status/1541436188241891328">source</a>)
<li>March 15, 2022 - KPN (AS1136), the largest Internet provider in the Netherlands, now rejects RPKI-invalid BGP routes on its EBGP edge. (<a href="https://twitter.com/JobSnijders/status/1503649158422487040">source</a>)
<li>June 3, 2021 - NOS Communicações (AS2860), a leading Internet Service Provider in Portugal, has signed its prefixes and is dropping invalids.
<li>May 20, 2021 - Comcast (AS7922), one of the largest Internet Service Provider in the US, has signed its prefixes and is now dropping invalids over all BGP sessions. (<a href="https://corporate.comcast.com/stories/improved-bgp-routing-security-adds-another-layer-of-protection-to-network">source</a>)
<li>May 20, 2021 - Comcast (AS7922), one of the largest Internet Service Providers in the US, has signed its prefixes and is now dropping invalids over all BGP sessions. (<a href="https://corporate.comcast.com/stories/improved-bgp-routing-security-adds-another-layer-of-protection-to-network">source</a>)
<li>March 26, 2021 - Lumen (AS3356), <a href="https://asrank.caida.org/asns/3356/as-core">the largest worldwide transit backbone</a>, is now dropping invalids over all BGP sessions. (<a href="https://blog.lumen.com/lumen-enhances-routing-security-with-resource-public-key-infrastructure-rpki/">source</a>)
<li>March 15, 2021 - Vocus (AS4826), a leading Australian ISP, has signed its prefixes with RPKI and is now dropping invalids. (<a href="https://twitter.com/pmawson/status/1371642968512237569">source</a>)
<li>March 1, 2021 - HEANet (AS1213) Ireland's National Research & Education Network deploys the RPKI Infrastructure on its IP Network. (<a href="https://twitter.com/natural20/status/1366385420360155144">source</a>)
Expand All @@ -86,12 +86,12 @@ <h2 class="Markdown--h2-as-h3">Latest updates</h2>
<li>December 14, 2020 - Belnet (AS2611) NREN and first Belgian ISP to implement RPKI and drop invalid routes. (<a href="https://belnet.be/en/belnet-has-successfully-implemented-rpki">source</a>)
<li>December 1, 2020 - RETN (AS9002) has deployed RPKI-based BGP route origin validation. (<a href="https://twitter.com/RETNnet/status/1333735456408793089">source</a>)
<li>September 14, 2020 - HOPUS (AS44530) is now filtering all eBGP sessions using RPKI ROV. (<a href="https://twitter.com/afenioux/status/1305430383345971201">source</a>)
<li>September 2, 2020 - Netflix has deployed RPKI globally and is dropping invalids prefixes. (<a href="https://openconnect.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360039673152">source</a>)
<li>September 1, 2020 - Swisscom is fully dropping RPKI invalids since end of July. (<a href="https://twitter.com/swisscom_csirt/status/1300666695959244800">source</a>)
<li>September 2, 2020 - Netflix has deployed RPKI globally and is dropping invalid prefixes. (<a href="https://openconnect.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360039673152">source</a>)
<li>September 1, 2020 - Swisscom is fully dropping RPKI invalids since the end of July. (<a href="https://twitter.com/swisscom_csirt/status/1300666695959244800">source</a>)
<li>August 26, 2020 - Google is currently deploying RPKI. The network operator signed more than 90% of its prefixes.
<li>August 7, 2020 - HKIX, an Internet Exchange in Hong Kong deployed RPKI validation on all its member sessions and is now dropping RPKI invalids on their route servers. (<a href="https://www.hkix.net/hkix/route-policy.htm">source</a>)
<li>July 24, 2020 - Telstra AS1221, Australia’s leading telecommunications and technology company, now filters RPKI invalids. (<a href="http://lists.ausnog.net/pipermail/ausnog/2020-July/044367.html">source</a>)
<li>July 13, 2020 - Chilean Government Network (Red de Conectividad del Estado) at AS17147 succesfully deployed RPKI filtering and drops invalid prefixes. (<a href="https://twitter.com/BenjaMatias/status/1278565243136942081">source</a>)
<li>July 13, 2020 - Chilean Government Network (Red de Conectividad del Estado) at AS17147 successfully deployed RPKI filtering and drops invalid prefixes. (<a href="https://twitter.com/BenjaMatias/status/1278565243136942081">source</a>)
<li>July 6, 2020 – GR-IX, the Greek Internet Exchange, is now dropping RPKI invalids on their route servers (<a href="https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/connect-wg/2020-July/000109.html">source</a>)
<li>June 16, 2020 – Hurricane Electric AS6939, a major transit provider deployed RPKI filters (<a href="https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2020-June/108277.html">source</a>)
<li>June 16, 2020 - AnacondaWeb AS265656, an ISP and hosting provider from Temuco (Chile), successfully deployed RPKI signing and filtering. (<a href="https://twitter.com/pcolomes/status/1271336495400574977">source</a>)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ <h2 id="faq">FAQ</h2>

<details class="FAQItem" id="what-can-you-do" open>
<summary><span>What can you do?</span></summary>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet/?text=Check%20out%20isbgpsafeyet.com%20to%20see%20if%20your%20Internet%20Service%20Provider%20implements%20BGP%20in%20a%20safe%20way%20or%20if%20it%20leaves%20the%20Internet%20vulnerable%20to%20route%20leaks.&url=http%3A%2F%2Fisbgpsafeyet.com&via=Cloudflare">Share this page</a>. For BGP to be safe, all of the major ISPs will need to embrace RPKI. Sharing this page will increase awareness of the problem which can ultimately pressure ISPs into implementing RPKI for the good of themselves and the general public. You can also reach out to your service provider or hosting company directly and ask them to deploy RPKI and join MANRS. When the Internet is safe, everybody wins.</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet/?text=Check%20out%20isbgpsafeyet.com%20to%20see%20if%20your%20Internet%20Service%20Provider%20implements%20BGP%20in%20a%20safe%20way%20or%20if%20it%20leaves%20the%20Internet%20vulnerable%20to%20route%20leaks.&url=http%3A%2F%2Fisbgpsafeyet.com&via=Cloudflare">Share this page</a>For BGP to be safe, all of the major ISPs will need to embrace RPKI. Sharing this page will increase awareness of the problem which can ultimately pressure ISPs into implementing RPKI for the good of themselves and the general public. You can also reach out to your service provider or hosting company directly and ask them to deploy RPKI and join MANRS. When the Internet is safe, everybody wins.</p>
</details>
</div>

Expand All @@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ <h2 id="faq">FAQ</h2>
<svg class="Footer--logo" id="CloudflareDocsLogomark" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="2 12 44 20" role="img" aria-labelledby="CloudflareDocsLogomark--title CloudflareDocsLogomark--desc" fill="currentColor">
<defs>
<title id="CloudflareDocsLogomark--title">Cloudflare docs logomark</title>
<desc id="CloudflareDocsLogomark--desc">The logo for Cloudflare used in the Cloudflare’s developer documentation.</desc>
<desc id="CloudflareDocsLogomark--desc">The logo for Cloudflare used in Cloudflare’s developer documentation.</desc>
</defs>
<path d="M31.236 28.717c-.373-.548-1.003-.864-1.76-.9l-14.353-.195a.262.262 0 01-.221-.122.348.348 0 01-.035-.267.396.396 0 01.338-.268l14.48-.195c1.714-.085 3.58-1.533 4.232-3.309l.828-2.25a.503.503 0 00.023-.292c-.932-4.404-4.698-7.689-9.198-7.689-4.15 0-7.672 2.798-8.931 6.679a4.156 4.156 0 00-2.973-.864c-1.994.207-3.59 1.874-3.789 3.954a4.84 4.84 0 00.105 1.545c-3.253.097-5.853 2.871-5.853 6.29 0 .304.024.608.059.912.023.146.14.256.28.256h26.488c.151 0 .291-.11.338-.268l.198-.742c.245-.876.152-1.68-.256-2.275zM36.062 21.39c-.128 0-.268 0-.396.012-.093 0-.175.073-.21.17l-.56 2.032c-.244.876-.151 1.679.257 2.275.373.548 1.003.864 1.76.9l3.055.195c.093 0 .175.049.222.122a.356.356 0 01.035.267.396.396 0 01-.339.268l-3.182.195c-1.726.085-3.58 1.532-4.232 3.309l-.234.62c-.046.122.035.243.164.243h10.935a.289.289 0 00.28-.219 8.654 8.654 0 00.292-2.214c0-4.501-3.521-8.175-7.847-8.175"></path>
</svg>
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