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update changelog and fix nits
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sainoe committed Sep 14, 2023
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7 changes: 7 additions & 0 deletions CHANGELOG.md
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Expand Up @@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ Add an entry to the unreleased section whenever merging a PR to main that is not
## v2.1.0-lsm-provider

* (feature!) [#1280](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1280) provider proposal for changing reward denoms
* (feature!) [#826](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826) add new endpoint to provider to handle consumer light client attacks
* (feature!) [#1227](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1227) add new endpoint to provider to handle consumer double signing attacks


### Cryptographic verification of equivocation
* New feature enabling the provider chain to verify equivocation evidence on its own instead of trusting consumer chains, see [EPIC](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/issues/732).


## v2.0.0-lsm

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16 changes: 16 additions & 0 deletions docs/docs/features/slashing.md
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Expand Up @@ -34,3 +34,19 @@ The offending validator will effectively get slashed and tombstoned on all consu

<!-- markdown-link-check-disable-next-line -->
You can find instructions on creating `EquivocationProposal`s [here](./proposals#equivocationproposal).

# Cryptographic verification of equivocation
The Cryptographic verification of equivocation allows external agents to submit evidences of light client and double signing attack observed on a consumer chain. When a valid evidence is received, the malicious validators will be permanently jailed on the provider.

The feature is outlined in this [ADR-005](../adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md)

By sending a `MsgSubmitConsumerMisbehaviour` or a `MsgSubmitConsumerDoubleVoting` transaction, the provider will
verify the reported equivocation and, if successful, jail the malicious validator.

:::info
Note that this feature can only lead to the jailing of the validators responsible for an attack on a consumer chain. However, an [equivocation proposal](#double-signing-equivocation) can still be submitted to execute the slashing and the tombstoning of the a malicious validator afterwards.
:::




2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion tests/e2e/actions.go
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Expand Up @@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ func (tr TestRun) submitChangeRewardDenomsProposal(action submitChangeRewardDeno
//#nosec G204 -- Bypass linter warning for spawning subprocess with cmd arguments.
// CHANGE REWARDS DENOM PROPOSAL
bz, err = exec.Command("docker", "exec", tr.containerConfig.instanceName, providerChain.binaryName,
"tx", "gov", "submit-legacy-proposal", "change-reward-denoms", "/change-reward-denoms-proposal.json",
"tx", "gov", "submit-proposal", "change-reward-denoms", "/change-reward-denoms-proposal.json",
`--from`, `validator`+fmt.Sprint(action.from),
`--chain-id`, string(providerChain.chainId),
`--home`, tr.getValidatorHome(providerChain.chainId, action.from),
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion x/ccv/provider/client/proposal_handler.go
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Expand Up @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ func SubmitChangeRewardDenomsProposalTxCmd() *cobra.Command {
The proposal details must be supplied via a JSON file.
Example:
$ <appd> tx gov submit-legacy-proposal change-reward-denoms <path/to/proposal.json> --from=<key_or_address>
$ <appd> tx gov submit-proposal change-reward-denoms <path/to/proposal.json> --from=<key_or_address>
Where proposal.json contains:
{
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