update changelog and fix nits

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ Add an entry to the unreleased section whenever merging a PR to main that is not
 ## v2.1.0-lsm-provider
 
 * (feature!) [#1280](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1280) provider proposal for changing reward denoms
+* (feature!) [#826](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826) add new endpoint to provider to handle consumer light client attacks
+* (feature!) [#1227](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1227) add new endpoint to provider to handle consumer double signing attacks
+
+
+### Cryptographic verification of equivocation
+* New feature enabling the provider chain to verify equivocation evidence on its own instead of trusting consumer chains, see [EPIC](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/issues/732).
+
 
 ## v2.0.0-lsm
 

docs/docs/features/slashing.md

@@ -34,3 +34,19 @@ The offending validator will effectively get slashed and tombstoned on all consu
 
 <!-- markdown-link-check-disable-next-line -->
 You can find instructions on creating `EquivocationProposal`s [here](./proposals#equivocationproposal).
+
+# Cryptographic verification of equivocation
+The Cryptographic verification of equivocation allows external agents to submit evidences of light client and double signing attack observed on a consumer chain. When a valid evidence is received, the malicious validators will be permanently jailed on the provider.
+
+The feature is outlined in this [ADR-005](../adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md)
+
+By sending a `MsgSubmitConsumerMisbehaviour` or a `MsgSubmitConsumerDoubleVoting` transaction, the provider will
+ verify the reported equivocation and, if successful, jail the malicious validator.
+
+:::info
+Note that this feature can only lead to the jailing of the validators responsible for an attack on a consumer chain. However, an [equivocation proposal](#double-signing-equivocation) can still be submitted to execute the slashing and the tombstoning of the a malicious validator afterwards. 
+:::
+
+
+
+

tests/e2e/actions.go

@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ func (tr TestRun) submitChangeRewardDenomsProposal(action submitChangeRewardDeno
 	//#nosec G204 -- Bypass linter warning for spawning subprocess with cmd arguments.
 	// CHANGE REWARDS DENOM PROPOSAL
 	bz, err = exec.Command("docker", "exec", tr.containerConfig.instanceName, providerChain.binaryName,
-		"tx", "gov", "submit-legacy-proposal", "change-reward-denoms", "/change-reward-denoms-proposal.json",
+		"tx", "gov", "submit-proposal", "change-reward-denoms", "/change-reward-denoms-proposal.json",
 		`--from`, `validator`+fmt.Sprint(action.from),
 		`--chain-id`, string(providerChain.chainId),
 		`--home`, tr.getValidatorHome(providerChain.chainId, action.from),

x/ccv/provider/client/proposal_handler.go

@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ func SubmitChangeRewardDenomsProposalTxCmd() *cobra.Command {
 		The proposal details must be supplied via a JSON file.
 
 		Example:
-		$ <appd> tx gov submit-legacy-proposal change-reward-denoms <path/to/proposal.json> --from=<key_or_address>
+		$ <appd> tx gov submit-proposal change-reward-denoms <path/to/proposal.json> --from=<key_or_address>
 
 		Where proposal.json contains:
 		{