doc: add fault resolution ADR

docs/docs/adrs/adr-018-fault-resolutions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+---
+sidebar_position: 19
+title: Fault Resolutions
+---
+# ADR 018: Fault Resolutions
+
+## Changelog
+* 17th July 2024: Initial draft
+
+## Status
+
+Proposed
+
+## Context
+
+Partial Set Security ([PSS](./adr-015-partial-set-security.md)) allows a subset of a provider chain's validator set to secure a consumer chain.
+ While this shared security scheme has many advantages, it comes with a risk known as the
+ [subset problem](https://informal.systems/blog/replicated-vs-mesh-security#risks-of-opt-in-security-also-known-as-ics-v-2).
+ This problem arises when a malicious majority of validators from the provider chain collude and misbehave on a consumer chain.
+ This threat is particularly relevant for Opt-in chains, since they might be secured by a relatively small subset of the provider's validator set.  
+
+In cases of collusion, various types of misbehaviour can be performed by the validators, such as:
+
+* Incorrect executions to break protocol rules in order to steal funds.
+* Liveness attacks to halt the chain or censor transactions.
+* Oracle attacks to falsify information used by the chain logic.
+
+Currently, these types of attacks aren't handled in PSS, leaving the malicious validators unpunished.
+
+A potential solution for the handling of incorrect executions is to use fraud proofs.
+ This technology allows proving incorrect state transitions of a chain without a full node.
+ However, this is a complex technology and and there is no framework that works for Cosmos chains to this day.
+
+
+To address this risk in PSS, a governance-gated slashing solution can be used to handle all types of misbehavior resulting from validator collusion. As fraud proof technology matures, part of the solution could potentially be automated.
+
+
+This ADR proposes a fault resolution mechanism, which is a type of governance proposal that can be used to vote on the slashing of validators that misbehave on Opt-in consumer chains.
+
+In what follows, we describe the implementation of a fault resolution mechanism that handles incorrect executions on consumer chains,
+ as a first iteration.
+
+
+## Decision
+
+The proposed solution introduces a new `consumer-fault-resolution` governance proposal type to the `provider` module, which allows
+ validators to be penalised for committing faults on an Opt-in consumer chain.
+
+If such a proposal passes, the proposal handler tombstones all the validators listed in the proposal and slashes them by a per-consumer chain predefined
+ amount or the default value used for double-sign infractions.
+
+The proposal has the following fields:
+
+- **Description**: This field should be filled with a fault definition describing the type of misbehavior that the validators executed
+ on an Opt-in consumer chain. A fault definition should precisely describe how an attack was performed and why it is eligible as a slashable fault, see fault definition (see [fault definitions](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/preventing-intersubjective-faults-in-ics/14103#fault-definitions-4) in "Preventing Intersubjective faults in ICS").
+- **Consumer Chain**: The chain that the fault was related to.
+- **Validators**: The list of all the validators to be slashed.
+
+In addition, in order to prevent spamming, users must pay a default fee of `100ATOM` to submit a fault resolution to the provider.
+ This amount is stored in a new `consumer-fault-resolution-fee` parameter of the `provider` module.
+
+### Validations
+
+The submission of a fault resolution succeeds only if all of the following conditions are met:
+
+- the consumer chain is an Opt-in chain
+- all listed validators were opted-in to the consumer chain in the past unbonding-period
+- the `100ATOM` fee is provided
+
+### Additional considerations
+
+Fault resolution proposals should be `expedited`  to minimize the time given to the listed validators to
+to unbond to avoid punishment (see [Expedited Proposals](https://docs.cosmos.network/v0.50/build/modules/gov#expedited-proposals)) .
+
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- Provide the ability to slash and tombstone validators for committing incorrect executions on Opt-in consumer chains.
+
+### Negative
+
+- Assuming that malicious validators unbond immediately after misbehaving, a fault resolution has to be submitted within a maximum
+ of two weeks in order to slash the validators.
+
+### Neutral
+
+- Fault definitions need to have a clear framework in order to avoid debates about whether an attack has actually taken place.  
+
+## References
+
+ * [Preventing intersubjective faults in ICS](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/preventing-intersubjective-faults-in-ics/14103)
+
+* [Enabling Opt-in and Mesh Security with Fraud Votes](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/enabling-opt-in-and-mesh-security-with-fraud-votes/10901)
+
+* [CHIPs discussion phase: Partial Set Security](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/chips-discussion-phase-partial-set-security-updated/11775)
+
+* [Replicated vs. Mesh Security](https://informal.systems/blog/replicated-vs-mesh-security#risks-of-opt-in-security-also-known-as-ics-v-2)
+
+
+

docs/docs/adrs/intro.md

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ To suggest an ADR, please make use of the [ADR template](./templates/adr-templat
 - [ADR 011: Improving testing and increasing confidence](./adr-011-improving-test-confidence.md)
 - [ADR 016: Security aggregation](./adr-016-securityaggregation.md)
 - [ADR 017: ICS with Inactive Provider Validators](./adr-017-allowing-inactive-validators.md)
+- [ADR 018: Fault Resolutions](./adr-018-fault-resolutions.md)
 
 ### Rejected