Update EIP-3074: clarify handling of incorrect nonce

Merged by EIP-Bot.

EIPS/eip-3074.md

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ If `length` is greater than 97, the extra bytes are ignored for signature verifi
 The arguments (`yParity`, `r`, `s`) are interpreted as an ECDSA signature on the secp256k1 curve over the message `keccak256(MAGIC || chainId || nonce || invokerAddress || commit)`, where:
 
  - `chainId` is the current chain's [EIP-155](./eip-155.md) unique identifier padded to 32 bytes.
- - `nonce` is the signer's current nonce, left-padded to 32 bytes. Any other value is considered invalid.
+ - `nonce` is the signer's current nonce, left-padded to 32 bytes.
  - `invokerAddress` is the address of the contract executing `AUTH` (or the active state address in the context of `CALLCODE` or `DELEGATECALL`), left-padded with zeroes to a total of 32 bytes (ex. `0x000000000000000000000000AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA`).
  - `commit`, one of the arguments passed into `AUTH`, is a 32-byte value that can be used to commit to specific additional validity conditions in the invoker's pre-processing logic.