Merge pull request #2 from terencechain/epbs_eip_repo_periods

Fix periods

EIPS/eip-9999.md

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The full consensus changes can be found in the consensus-specs Github repository
 
 - [Beacon Chain](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/beacon-chain.md) changes.
 - [Fork choice](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/fork-choice.md) changes.
-- [P2P](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/p2p-interface.md) changes
+- [P2P](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/p2p-interface.md) changes.
 - [Honest validator guide](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/validator.md) changes.
 - A new [honest builder](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/builder.md) guide. 
 - [Fork logic](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/1508f51b80df5488a515bfedf486f98435200e02/specs/_features/eipxxxx/fork.md) changes. 
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The `ExecutionPayloadHeader` object is changed to only track the minimum informa
 State transition logic is modified by: 
 
 - A new beacon state getter `get_ptc` returns the PTC members for a given slot. 
-- `get_attesting_indices` is modified to not return the beacon committee members that are included in the PTC
+- `get_attesting_indices` is modified to not return the beacon committee members that are included in the PTC.
 - `process_withdrawals` is modified as follows. Withdrawals are obtained directly from the beacon state instead of the execution payload. They are deducted from the beacon chain. The beacon state `latest_widthdrawals_root` is updated with the HTR of this list. The next execution payload MUST include withdrawals matching the `state.latest_withdrawals_root`. 
 - `process_execution_payload` is removed from `process_block`. Instead a new function `process_execution_payload_header` is included, this function validates the `SignedExecutionPayloadHeader` included in the `BeaconBlockBody` and transfers the payment from the builder's balance to the proposer. 
 - `process_deposit_request` is removed from `process_operations` and deferred until `process_execution_payload`. 
@@ -186,12 +186,12 @@ The class `Store` is modified to track the following fields:
 
 #### P2P changes
 
-- A new global topic for broadcasting `SignedExecutionPayloadHeader` messages (builder bids)
+- A new global topic for broadcasting `SignedExecutionPayloadHeader` messages (builder bids).
 - A new global topic for broadcasting `PayloadAttestationMessage` objects. 
 
 ### Engine API
 
-No changes needed
+No changes needed.
 
 ## Rationale
 
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ The following features of fork choice are guaranteed under specified margins of
 
 Proposer unconditional payment refers to the following. An Ethereum slot can be either:
 
-- *Full*: both the beacon block and the execution payload have been revealed and included on-chain
+- *Full*: both the beacon block and the execution payload have been revealed and included on-chain.
 - *Skipped*: No beacon block (and therefore no execution payload) has been included on-chain for this slot. 
 - *Empty*: The beacon block has been included on-chain, but the committed execution payload has not. 
 
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ There is no penalty for PTC nor payload equivocation (that is revealing the righ
 
 Another mitigation mechanism is to add new slashing conditions for payload equivocation or PTC equivocations (both are signed messages by validators). 
 
-Since this attack results in a split view at a cost for the builder (the payload is revealed and may not be included) this EIP opted for simplicity of implementation
+Since this attack results in a split view at a cost for the builder (the payload is revealed and may not be included) this EIP opted for simplicity of implementation.
 
 
 ### Withdrawals
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ This EIP introduces backward incompatible changes to the block validation rule s
 
 ### Reorg resistance 
 
-`PROPOSER_SCORE_BOOST` is reduced from 40 to 20. This does not allow however a ex-ante reorg by a proposer with 20% of the total stake as the attacker's payload will also not be included. Proposers are protected against *1-slot sandwich* reorgs by a colluding set of validators and builders controlling more than 20% of the total stake
+`PROPOSER_SCORE_BOOST` is reduced from 40 to 20. This does not allow however a ex-ante reorg by a proposer with 20% of the total stake as the attacker's payload will also not be included. Proposers are protected against *1-slot sandwich* reorgs by a colluding set of validators and builders controlling more than 20% of the total stake.
 
 ### Builder safety