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Synchronously check all transactions
to have non-zero length
#3885
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As part of `newPayload` block hash verification, the `transactionsRoot` is computed by the EL. Because Merkle-Patricia Tries cannot contain `[]` entries, MPT implementations typically treat setting a key to `[]` as deleting the entry for the key. This means that if a CL receives a block with `transactions` containing one or more zero-length transactions, that such transactions will effectively be skipped when computing the `transactionsRoot`. Note that `transactions` are opaque to the CL and zero-length transactions are not filtered out before `newPayload`. ```python # https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718 def compute_trie_root_from_indexed_data(data): """ Computes the root hash of `patriciaTrie(rlp(Index) => Data)` for a data array. """ t = HexaryTrie(db={}) for i, obj in enumerate(data): k = encode(i, big_endian_int) t.set(k, obj) # Implicitly skipped if `obj == b''` (invalid RLP) return t.root_hash ``` In any case, the `blockHash` validation may still succeed, resulting in a potential `SYNCING/ACCEPTED` result to `newPayload` by spec. Note, however, that there is an effective hash collision if a payload is modified by appending one or more zero-length transactions to the end of `transactions` list: In the trivial case, a block with zero transactions has the same `transactionsRoot` (and `blockHash`) as one of a block with one `[]` transaction (as that one is skipped). This means that the same `blockHash` can refer to a valid block (without extra `[]` transactions added), but also can refer to an invalid block. Because `forkchoiceUpdated` refers to blocks by `blockHash`, outcome may be nondeterministic and implementation dependent. If `forkchoiceUpdated` deems the `blockHash` to refer to a `VALID` object (obtained from a src that does not have the extra `[]` transactions, e.g., devp2p), then this could result in honest attestations to a CL beacon block with invalid `[]` transactions in its `ExecutionPayload`, risking finalizing it. The problem can be avoided by returning `INVALID` in `newPayload` if there are any zero-length `transactions` entries, preventing optimistic import of such blocks by the CL.
Reject blocks with zero length transactions early when no EL connected. - ethereum/consensus-specs#3885
Reject blocks with zero length transactions early when no EL connected. - ethereum/consensus-specs#3885
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if b'' in execution_payload.transactions: | ||
return False |
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I think I understand the implications of the PR and agree that zero-length transactions should be rejected, but I'm not certain that verify_and_notify_new_payload
is best location for such a check. I feel like notify_new_payload
via the Engine API should return false if it sees this.
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I think notify_new_payload
is not an Engine API thing anymore. In fact, verify_and_notify_new_payload
is an Engine API. AFAIU, the reason that we have the logic of verify_and_notify_new_payload
in the consensus-specs is because we want to show what the function does, but it doesn't mean that it's an CL thing.
So I think putting it in verify_and_notify_new_payload
already makes sense because it's a "verify" thing.
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Hmm okay, well in that case I guess it doesn't hurt to add. Let's do it!
@etan-status could you merge in dev & make similar changes to electra?
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Yep, verify_and_notify_new_payload
is a mock implementation for the minimal EL checks that have to be done.
This is the matching spec that describes the additional check for zero length transactions.
Co-authored-by: Justin Traglia <[email protected]>
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LGTM 👍 thanks Etan!
Since If this check is not relevant to the CL, I don't think we should include it in the spec since it will distract CL researchers. Do you think this check is relevant to the CL? I feel that this issue is related to MPT and it's very opaque to the CL and the CL researchers have to dig deeply why we need this check which I think they don't need to. What do you think? |
Note that certain CL implementations support syncing without a connected EL for maintenance use cases, and if |
I've decided to push this to a later release. We need more folks to review this. |
As part of
newPayload
block hash verification, thetransactionsRoot
is computed by the EL. Because Merkle-Patricia Tries cannot contain[]
entries, MPT implementations typically treat setting a key to[]
as deleting the entry for the key. This means that if a CL receives a block withtransactions
containing one or more zero-length transactions, that such transactions will effectively be skipped when computing thetransactionsRoot
. Note thattransactions
are opaque to the CL and zero-length transactions are not filtered out beforenewPayload
.In any case, the
blockHash
validation may still succeed, resulting in a potentialSYNCING/ACCEPTED
result tonewPayload
by spec.Note, however, that there is an effective hash collision if a payload is modified by appending one or more zero-length transactions to the end of
transactions
list: In the trivial case, a block with zero transactions has the sametransactionsRoot
(andblockHash
) as one of a block with one[]
transaction (as that one is skipped).This means that the same
blockHash
can refer to a valid block (without extra[]
transactions added), but also can refer to an invalid block. BecauseforkchoiceUpdated
refers to blocks byblockHash
, outcome may be nondeterministic and implementation dependent. IfforkchoiceUpdated
deems theblockHash
to refer to aVALID
object (obtained from a src that does not have the extra[]
transactions, e.g., devp2p), then this could result in honest attestations to a CL beacon block with invalid[]
transactions in itsExecutionPayload
, risking finalizing it.The problem can be avoided by returning
INVALID
innewPayload
if there are any zero-lengthtransactions
entries, preventing optimistic import of such blocks by the CL.