Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Add a note about ballot key reuse #8

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Mar 7, 2024
Merged

Add a note about ballot key reuse #8

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
1 commit
Select commit
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
5 changes: 4 additions & 1 deletion main.tex
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -373,7 +373,10 @@ \subsubsection{\texorpdfstring{$\func{SetupVoter}$}{SetupVoter}}
\item Generates a proof of representation $\func{RepProve}(\{G, H\}, C_i ; \{s, r\}) \mapsto \Pi_{\text{rep},i}$.
\item Posts $(i, C_i, \Pi_{\text{rep},i})$ to $\mathcal{B}$ as an authenticated message signed with its voter signing key from $L_{\text{voters}}$.
\end{enumerate}
We note that it is safe for a voter to reuse their ballot key across multiple elections.

We note that a voter may reuse their ballot key across multiple elections.
As described later, the value $s_i G$ will be revealed publicly during the tally process; this value will be common to any ballots cast using this key across all such elections.
However, it is not possible to link $s_i G$ to $C_i$ even under these circumstances.


\subsubsection{\texorpdfstring{$\func{VerifySetup}$}{VerifySetup}}
Expand Down