Aura Consensus Protocol Audit Findings Commentary

This document is prepared in response to the draft audit report provided by Jean-Philippe Aumasson (08/12/17), SHA256 hash of aura-audit-report.md is 8040fe95d91b2d77f1f0df2af5ba23c85ee487b18dde650dd46cfc82686d0b3d

Protocol review

Risks of synchronized time

The report indicates certain risks of [un]synchronized time and related attacks. We believe these concerns are valid and are mostly the consequences of the basics of the protocol (it is based on physical time)

Resilience to malicious nodes

No commentary.

Denial-of-service attacks

No commentary.

Finality conditions

We've identified the same case to cause confusion as well (specification stating >= 1/2 of the validators, while code requires > 1/2).

With regards to would_be_finalized calculation, we currently believe that this code is correct and is expressing the same > 1/2 requirement, but is "forecasting" finalization for the next signer.

Recommended course of action:

• P1 Consult with Parity maintainers with regards to the original intent and actual implementation. Which constraint ("greater" or "stricly greater") should in fact be specified and implemented
• P2 Further analyze the correctness of would_be_finalized definition
• P2.1 Provide meaningful in-code commentary on how build_ancestry_subchain operates

Finality delay

No commentary at this moment, but we are further researching this concern.

Code review

Unsafe code

The report mentions use of unsafe code in bigint::hash where it is used to efficiently compare two byte arrays. As mentioned, this doesn't seem to be a security risk. However, it is still an instance of unsafe code which would always raise at least some concern.

At the core of this issue there's a question of potential performance gains. In order to address it to best of our ability, we've conducted a few comparative benchmarks. Firstly, we ran simple benchmarks (slice equality vs memcp) both on rust stable (rustc 1.22.1 (05e2e1c41 2017-11-22)) and rust nighty (rustc 1.22.1 (05e2e1c41 2017-11-22)) and did not see any gains (the results were very similar in both cases):

test cmp      ... bench:           4 ns/iter (+/- 1)
test cmp_loop ... bench:       4,251 ns/iter (+/- 215)
test eq       ... bench:           4 ns/iter (+/- 1)
test eq_loop  ... bench:       4,269 ns/iter (+/- 622)

The source code for this benchmark is available at byte-cmp

To continue this effort, we further sampled some libraries available on crates.io.

fastcmp was seemingly able to show different results:

test fast_compare_equal    ... bench:          10 ns/iter (+/- 0) = 25600 MB/s
test fast_compare_unequal  ... bench:          10 ns/iter (+/- 0) = 25600 MB/s
test slice_compare_equal   ... bench:          21 ns/iter (+/- 1) = 12190 MB/s
test slice_compare_unequal ... bench:          21 ns/iter (+/- 0) = 12190 MB/s

At the core of its implementation method also lies memcmp. The reason for the significant discrepancy in results is being further investigated. At this moment, we can only state that the optimization method used in parity may produce much more efficient code so its worth keeping around. However, we'd recommend the following course of action:

• C1 Prepare a patch for bigint::hash that explains the necessity of using unsafe code (and memcmp) in prose to make this code easier to understand for others.

Step number cast from 64- to 32-bit

The report indicates a cast of a 64-bit number to 32-bit one in AuRa code. The concern is valid, however, this behaviour will only be triggered 100-500 years later. That said, the following course of action was taken:

• C2 Avoid casting down to 32-bit by dropping the need to use Duration type for representing step duration (which is typically single or double digits seconds) https://github.com/oraclesorg/parity/commit/fa2ddce949d8a227b7135b300003f0a5bceddc0f
• C2.1 Prepare a PR and get it merged into the main repository (or get resolved in any other way) openethereum/parity-ethereum#7282

Potential integer overflow

The report highlights that step increment function might overflow the counter, especially when parity is compiled for a 32-bit system. This event is also quite far in the future, however, the following course of action was taken:

• C3 Shutdown parity when such event occurs as there's not much that can be done at that point https://github.com/oraclesorg/parity/commit/fa2ddce949d8a227b7135b300003f0a5bceddc0f
• C3.1 Prepare a PR and get it merged into the main repository (or get resolved in any other way) openethereum/parity-ethereum#7282

Potential division by zero

The report shows that Step calibration function might panic on division by zero. This is a valid concern. If somebody will configure Parity with a step duration of 0 seconds, it'll quickly panic, however, the error won't necessarily be very informative. This case highlights the lack of refinement types in Rust. Following course of action was taken:

• C4 Guard step duration parameter to be positive and crash Parity otherwise https://github.com/oraclesorg/parity/commit/fa2ddce949d8a227b7135b300003f0a5bceddc0f
• C4.1 Prepare a PR and get it merged into the main repository (or get resolved in any other way) openethereum/parity-ethereum#7282

Other possible improvements

The report suggests few other improvements. First one is to improve the measurement of timing. There is no indication at this point that this is a concern. Course of action:

• C5 Try out https://github.com/jedisct1/rust-coarsetime to see how much more performant it is
• C6 Research the importance of measurement timing

The other suggested improvement is erroneous as it suggests that the code doesn't check of RNG creation failure, while in fact it does.