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Mark the end of IA2 init #296
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runtime, init: mark init as finished via signpost mmap
fw-immunant 4bafb83
runtime/track_memory_map: forbid pkey_mprotecting another trusted com…
fw-immunant 9e437a8
runtime/track_memory_map: warn about re-mprotecting memory only after…
fw-immunant f7548d8
runtime/track_memory_map: allow re-mprotecting memory during init
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Don't we want to track ownership of things like stacks mappings? If I read this correctly we won't actually mark these regions allocated during init as owned by a particular compartment?
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You're right that our memory map doesn't know about stack mappings and other "preexisting" mappings like the vDSO. If we want to fully mirror the kernel's idea of the process' memory map, we would need those, but I'm not 100% sure whether this is a security concern. Specifically, I guess an attack could involve unmapping the original stack and remapping other data in its place, which would then allow corrupting data used during process termination (post-
main
and dtors). But the original stack is also compartment zero anyway, right?I'll punt on this for now but will file a bug. (EDIT: filed as #315)
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Note that allowing re-protecting memory during init here is not required because we don't know about stack mappings; these are separate concerns.