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feat: sign message v2 #74
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WalkthroughThe changes introduce new functions for verifying message signatures within the TRX module of the kos-sdk. Specifically, the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 3
📜 Review details
Configuration used: .coderabbit.yaml
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
- packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (3 hunks)
- packages/kos-sdk/src/wallet.rs (1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (5)
packages/kos-sdk/src/wallet.rs (2)
410-419
: New method added:verify_message_signature
The new method
verify_message_signature
has been added to theWallet
implementation. This method allows for verifying a message signature using the wallet's public address.A few observations:
- The method signature is correct and consistent with Rust conventions.
- It properly uses
self.chain
to call the underlyingverify_message_signature
function.- The method correctly passes the wallet's public address as a string slice.
The implementation looks good and adds valuable functionality to the
Wallet
struct. It allows users to verify message signatures, which is crucial for ensuring message integrity and authenticity.To ensure this method is properly integrated and doesn't conflict with existing code, let's verify its usage:
✅ Verification successful
Verification Successful:
verify_message_signature
is properly integrated and tested across the codebase.
- The method is utilized in multiple modules, ensuring broad applicability.
- Comprehensive tests exist to validate its functionality.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check for any existing uses or tests of the new verify_message_signature method # Test: Search for any existing uses of verify_message_signature rg --type rust 'verify_message_signature' # Test: Check if there are any new tests added for this method rg --type rust 'fn test.*verify_message_signature'Length of output: 3035
Line range hint
1-419
: Overall assessment: Good addition with minor improvements neededThe addition of the
verify_message_signature
method to theWallet
struct is a valuable feature that enhances the functionality of the wallet. It allows for message signature verification, which is crucial for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of messages in blockchain systems.Considerations:
- The change is minimal and focused, which reduces the risk of introducing bugs.
- The method integrates well with the existing
Wallet
structure and uses the underlyingchain
object appropriately.- The feature aligns well with the existing
sign_message
method, providing a complete set of signing and verification capabilities.Suggestions for improvement:
- Add comprehensive documentation for the new method.
- Implement unit tests to ensure the method works as expected and to prevent future regressions.
- Consider updating any relevant user documentation or README files to mention this new capability.
As this feature adds to the cryptographic capabilities of the wallet, ensure that:
- The underlying
chain.verify_message_signature
method is using secure and up-to-date cryptographic libraries.- Any errors from the underlying verification process are properly propagated and handled.
- The feature is consistent with industry standards for message signing and verification in blockchain wallets.
To ensure the change doesn't have unintended consequences:
✅ Verification successful
The addition of the
verify_message_signature
method in theWallet
struct has been thoroughly reviewed and integrates seamlessly with the existing codebase. No conflicts or unintended side effects were identified.Next Steps:
- Documentation: Ensure that the
README.md
is updated to include details about the newverify_message_signature
method.- Testing: Implement and verify unit tests for the new method to maintain code reliability and prevent future regressions.
Overall, this enhancement strengthens the wallet's functionality without introducing any adverse impacts.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check for any potential impacts on other parts of the codebase # Test: Check if there are any other files that might need updating due to this new method rg --type rust 'impl Wallet' # Test: Verify if there are any existing message verification methods that this might replace or complement rg --type rust 'verify.*message' # Test: Check for any documentation files that might need updating fd README.mdLength of output: 3035
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (3)
144-151
: Functionsign_message
ApprovedThe
sign_message
function correctly signs a message using the account's private key. The implementation follows best practices and handles errors appropriately.
401-416
: Testshould_sign_message
ApprovedThe
should_sign_message
test correctly verifies that thesign_message
function produces a signature of the expected length.
417-432
:⚠️ Potential issueUpdate Test
should_verify_message_signature
to Use Public KeyAfter modifying
verify_message_signature
to use the public key instead of the private key, this test should be updated accordingly. Ensure that the test provides the public key and verifies the signature without requiring the private key.Run the following script to check for usages of
verify_message_signature
that need updating:#!/bin/bash # Description: Find all calls to `verify_message_signature` that pass `KOSAccount`. # Expected Result: List of code locations where `verify_message_signature` is called with `KOSAccount`. rg --type rust 'verify_message_signature\(\s*account'
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (1)
400-414
: The test case forsign_message
is good, but could be improved.The test correctly verifies the signature length. However, consider adding an additional check to verify the actual content of the signature, perhaps by using the
verify_message_signature
function to ensure the signature is valid.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: .coderabbit.yaml
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
- packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (2 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (4)
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (4)
144-151
: LGTM: Thesign_message
function is well-implemented.The function correctly uses the account's private key to sign the message, following good cryptographic practices.
153-164
: Great improvement: Theverify_message_signature
function now uses public key cryptography.This implementation addresses the security concern raised in the previous review. It now correctly uses the public address for signature verification instead of requiring the private key, which is a significant security improvement.
416-445
: Excellent test case forverify_message_signature
.This test comprehensively covers both the happy path (valid signature) and error path (invalid signature). It ensures that the function correctly verifies valid signatures and rejects invalid ones, with appropriate error handling.
Line range hint
1-445
: Security concern:KOSAccount
still derivesClone
While the new changes significantly improve the security of the message signing and verification process, there's still a potential security risk with the
KOSAccount
struct deriving theClone
trait. This allows instances containing sensitive data likeprivate_key
to be duplicated in memory.Consider one of the following options:
- Remove the
Clone
derivation fromKOSAccount
.- Implement a custom
Clone
that securely handles sensitive fields.This change would further enhance the overall security of the codebase.
✅ Verification successful
Security Update:
KOSAccount
no longer derivesClone
The
KOSAccount
struct no longer derives theClone
trait, mitigating the previously identified security risk of duplicating sensitive data in memory.🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Verify if KOSAccount still derives Clone # Expected Result: Confirmation that KOSAccount derives Clone rg --type rust '#\[derive\(.*Clone.*\)\].*struct\s+KOSAccount'Length of output: 64
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Tests