Refactor/kos #77
Refactor/kos #77
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…to refactor/kos
WalkthroughThis pull request represents a comprehensive restructuring of the cryptocurrency SDK, focusing on modularization, error handling, and chain support. The changes involve removing several packages like Changes
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant User
participant ChainRegistry
participant Chain
participant Crypto
participant Transaction
User->>ChainRegistry: Get chain by ID
ChainRegistry-->>User: Return Chain instance
User->>Chain: Derive key from mnemonic
Chain->>Crypto: Generate seed
Crypto-->>Chain: Return seed
Chain->>Crypto: Derive private key
Crypto-->>Chain: Return private key
User->>Chain: Get address from public key
Chain-->>User: Return blockchain address
User->>Chain: Sign transaction
Chain->>Transaction: Prepare transaction
Chain->>Crypto: Sign transaction
Crypto-->>Chain: Return signed transaction
Chain-->>User: Return signed transaction
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (2)
deny.toml (2)
27-28: Consider reducing the skip-tree depthThe skip-tree depth of 20 for prost-wkt packages is quite high. This might mask potential dependency conflicts deeper in the tree.
Consider:
- Reducing the depth to a more reasonable number (e.g., 5-10)
- Documenting why such a high depth is necessary if it can't be reduced
Line range hint
1-58: Add documentation for dependency decisionsGiven this is part of a larger refactoring effort, it would be helpful to:
- Document the rationale for specific version pins in the skip list
- Add comments explaining why certain dependencies can't be upgraded
- Document the relationship between these changes and the broader refactoring goals
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (2)
packages/kos/src/protos/generated/klv/proto.rsis excluded by!**/generated/**packages/kos/src/protos/generated/trx/protocol.rsis excluded by!**/generated/**
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
deny.toml(2 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (2)
deny.toml (2)
46-46: Verify the need for BSD-2-Clause license
The addition of BSD-2-Clause to allowed licenses is reasonable, but let's verify which new dependencies require this license.
15-22: Verify security implications of pinned dependency versions
Several dependencies are pinned to older versions, particularly cryptographic libraries:
These older versions might have known security vulnerabilities.
Let's check for any security advisories:
✅ Verification successful
Let me check the actual usage of these dependencies to better understand if they are direct dependencies or transitive ones that need to be skipped.
Let me check the actual content of Cargo.toml to understand the dependency structure better.
Dependencies in deny.toml are safe to skip
Based on the verification:
- The cryptographic dependencies in workspace are using newer versions:
- sha2 = "0.10" (workspace) vs sha2 = "0.9.9" (deny skip)
- hmac = "0.12" (workspace) vs hmac = "0.8.1" (deny skip)
- The older versions listed in deny.toml are likely transitive dependencies that need to be skipped due to dependency resolution conflicts.
- The security scan revealed that while sha2 0.9.7 had vulnerabilities, the skipped version 0.9.9 is newer than the vulnerable version and includes the fixes.
- No security vulnerabilities were found for block-buffer, digest, and hmac versions.
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securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, ecosystem: RUST, package: "'$pkg'") {
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (5)
.github/workflows/pull-develop.yaml (1)
Line range hint
1-70: Consider workflow improvementsConsider these enhancements to make the workflow more robust:
- Add caching for npm dependencies if webpack-npm is used
- Add job timeouts to prevent hanging builds
- Consider adding status checks for the build artifacts
Example implementation:
jobs: format: runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 15 env: USER: ${{ secrets.GIT_USER }} TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GIT_PASS }} build: needs: [ format ] runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 20 steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v3 with: submodules: recursive + - uses: actions/cache@v3 + with: + path: | + node_modules + key: ${{ runner.os }}-npm-${{ hashFiles('**/package-lock.json') }} + restore-keys: | + ${{ runner.os }}-npm- - name: RustUp uses: klever-io/kos-rs/.github/actions/rustup@develop with: with_cache: true - name: Build run: make webpack-npm + - name: Verify Build Artifacts + run: | + if [ ! -f "dist/main.js" ]; then + echo "Build artifacts not found" + exit 1 + fi.github/workflows/pull-master-release.yaml (4)
Line range hint
15-19: Consider using GITHUB_TOKEN for most operationsWhile the workflow uses custom secrets (
GIT_USER,GIT_PASS), consider using the built-inGITHUB_TOKENwhere possible as it has automatic token rotation and scope limitations. Only use custom tokens when absolutely necessary for cross-repository operations.
Line range hint
55-59: Update deprecated GitHub Actions syntaxThe
set-outputcommand is deprecated. Replace it with the new$GITHUB_OUTPUTenvironment file syntax:- echo "::set-output name=title::$PR_TITLE" + echo "title=$PR_TITLE" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
Line range hint
71-78: Enhance error handling and validationThe current error handling is basic. Consider adding:
- Pre-checks for required files before packaging
- Validation of the VERSION file content
- More detailed error messages for debugging
- - name: Package kos-js - run: zip -r ./demo/kos-js.zip ./demo/kos || { echo 'Packaging failed'; exit 1; } + - name: Package kos-js + run: | + if [ ! -d "./demo/kos" ]; then + echo "Error: ./demo/kos directory not found" + exit 1 + fi + zip -r ./demo/kos-js.zip ./demo/kos || { echo "Error: Packaging failed with exit code $?"; exit 1; }
Line range hint
80-92: Add version verification before NPM publishConsider adding a version check to ensure the NPM package version matches the one in Cargo.toml and hasn't been published already.
- name: Publish npm module - run: npm publish ./demo/kos --access public + run: | + PACKAGE_VERSION=$(node -p "require('./demo/kos/package.json').version") + CARGO_VERSION=$(cat VERSION) + if [ "$PACKAGE_VERSION" != "$CARGO_VERSION" ]; then + echo "Error: Version mismatch between package.json ($PACKAGE_VERSION) and VERSION file ($CARGO_VERSION)" + exit 1 + fi + if npm view "@klever/kos@$PACKAGE_VERSION" version &>/dev/null; then + echo "Error: Version $PACKAGE_VERSION already exists on NPM" + exit 1 + fi + npm publish ./demo/kos --access public env: NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (2)
packages/kos/src/protos/generated/klv/mod.rsis excluded by!**/generated/**packages/kos/src/protos/generated/trx/mod.rsis excluded by!**/generated/**
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.github/workflows/pull-develop.yaml(2 hunks).github/workflows/pull-master-release.yaml(2 hunks)Makefile(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (5)
.github/workflows/pull-develop.yaml (2)
54-54: LGTM! Minor formatting improvement.
The spacing adjustment in the needs directive improves readability while maintaining functionality.
Line range hint 1-70: Verify build process after .env removal
According to the AI summary, the .env file restoration steps have been removed. Let's verify if any environment variables are still required for the build process.
✅ Verification successful
Build process is safe after .env removal
The build process does not depend on any environment variables from .env files:
- The webpack configuration (demo/webpack.config.js) uses only static configuration
- The Makefile's webpack-npm target uses wasm-pack with fixed arguments
- The only environment variables in the workflow (GIT_USER and GIT_PASS) are properly configured as GitHub secrets
- No .env files were found in the repository
The removal of .env file restoration steps does not impact the build process.
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Makefile (2)
Line range hint 1-48: Overall Makefile structure looks good
The Makefile maintains a clean structure with:
- Clear separation of concerns between different build targets
- Proper declaration of phony targets
- Consistent formatting and organization
26-26: Ensure dependent projects are updated with new paths
The change in output directory from ../../demo/kos to ../../demo/kos-web might affect projects that consume these WebAssembly builds.
Let's check for potential references to the old path:
Also applies to: 29-29
.github/workflows/pull-master-release.yaml (1)
28-31: Verify the custom RustUp action's maintenance status
The workflow uses a custom RustUp action from the repository itself. Ensure this action is well-maintained and regularly updated with the latest security patches. Consider using official actions like actions-rs/toolchain as an alternative.
✅ Verification successful
Let me verify if this action is from another repository by checking the reference.
I notice that the action is referenced from klever-io/kos-rs/.github/actions/rustup@develop, which means it's from the same repository. Let me verify if this repository is the klever-io/kos-rs repository and check for the action in the current branch.
Let me check the content of the rustup action to verify its implementation.
Custom RustUp action is well-maintained and follows best practices
The custom RustUp action is properly implemented within the same repository and follows security best practices:
- Uses official actions for core functionality (actions/cache, KyleMayes/install-llvm-action, etc.)
- Implements proper caching strategies for Rust toolchain, LLVM, and dependencies
- Installs necessary development tools and dependencies with locked versions
- Sets up required components like protobuf, cmake, and wasm-pack
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Actionable comments posted: 7
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (7)
packages/kos-mobile/Cargo.toml (1)
30-31: Consider using workspace-level version management for numeric dependenciesWhile adding
num-bigintandnum-traitsis fine, consider managing their versions at the workspace level for consistency with other dependencies.-num-bigint = "0.4" -num-traits = "0.2" +num-bigint = { workspace = true } +num-traits = { workspace = true }packages/kos-web/Cargo.toml (1)
17-32: Consider using workspace version management for more dependencies.While some dependencies correctly use workspace inheritance, others have fixed versions. Consider moving more version specifications to the workspace level for better maintenance:
strumserde-wasm-bindgenqrcode-generatorenum_dispatchpempostcardnum-bigintnum-traitsThis would:
- Centralize version management
- Reduce potential version conflicts
- Make updates easier to manage
packages/kos-web/src/lib.rs (2)
54-59: Consider parameterizing QR code optionsThe function uses hard-coded values for size (1024) and error correction level (Low), which might not be suitable for all use cases.
Consider making these parameters configurable:
-pub fn generate_qr(data: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> { +pub fn generate_qr( + data: &str, + size: u32, + ecc: QrCodeEcc +) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> { + if size == 0 || size > 4096 { + return Err(Error::InvalidInput("Size must be between 1 and 4096".into())); + } - qrcode_generator::to_png_to_vec(data, QrCodeEcc::Low, 1024) + qrcode_generator::to_png_to_vec(data, ecc, size) .map_err(|e| Error::InvalidString(format!("Invalid QRCode data: {}", e))) }
1-59: Consider implementing a validation moduleGiven that multiple functions require input validation, consider creating a dedicated validation module to centralize and standardize validation logic. This would improve maintainability and ensure consistent validation across the codebase.
This could be implemented as a new module:
mod validation { use super::Error; pub fn validate_password(password: &str) -> Result<(), Error> { // Password validation logic } pub fn validate_pem_tag(tag: &str) -> Result<(), Error> { // PEM tag validation logic } // Other validation functions }packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs (1)
273-298: Add more comprehensive unit tests for wallet functionalitiesThe current test
test_export_importchecks only the restoration of keys from a mnemonic. Consider adding tests for:
- Restoring from a private key.
- Restoring from PEM files.
- Signing messages and transactions.
- Handling of error cases.
Would you like assistance in generating additional unit tests to improve coverage?
packages/kos-mobile/src/number.rs (2)
31-67: Consider implementing arithmetic traits forBigNumberImplementing standard Rust arithmetic traits like
Add,Sub,Mul, andDivforBigNumberwould make the code more idiomatic and allow for operator overloading, improving usability.Apply this diff to implement the arithmetic traits:
+use std::ops::{Add, Div, Mul, Sub}; + +impl Add for BigNumber { + type Output = Result<BigNumber, String>; + fn add(self, other: Self) -> Result<BigNumber, String> { + let left = self.to_bigint()?; + let right = other.to_bigint()?; + Ok(BigNumber { + value: (left + right).to_string(), + }) + } +} + +impl Sub for BigNumber { + type Output = Result<BigNumber, String>; + fn sub(self, other: Self) -> Result<BigNumber, String> { + let left = self.to_bigint()?; + let right = other.to_bigint()?; + Ok(BigNumber { + value: (left - right).to_string(), + }) + } +} + +impl Mul for BigNumber { + type Output = Result<BigNumber, String>; + fn mul(self, other: Self) -> Result<BigNumber, String> { + let left = self.to_bigint()?; + let right = other.to_bigint()?; + Ok(BigNumber { + value: (left * right).to_string(), + }) + } +} + +impl Div for BigNumber { + type Output = Result<BigNumber, String>; + fn div(self, other: Self) -> Result<BigNumber, String> { + let left = self.to_bigint()?; + let right = other.to_bigint()?; + if right.is_zero() { + return Err("Cannot divide by zero".to_string()); + } + Ok(BigNumber { + value: (left / right).to_string(), + }) + } +}
Line range hint
25-99: Add unit tests forBigNumberoperationsAdding unit tests for the
BigNumberoperations would help ensure correctness and prevent regressions.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
Cargo.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (6)
packages/kos-mobile/Cargo.toml(1 hunks)packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs(9 hunks)packages/kos-mobile/src/number.rs(1 hunks)packages/kos-web/Cargo.toml(1 hunks)packages/kos-web/src/lib.rs(1 hunks)packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (12)
packages/kos-mobile/Cargo.toml (3)
12-13: LGTM: Addition of "rlib" crate-type
The addition of "rlib" alongside "cdylib" and "staticlib" is a good practice, enabling the crate to be used both as a native library and as a Rust dependency.
14-15: LGTM: Feature configuration for serde
Good practice to make serialization support optional and enabled by default.
22-22: Verify workspace dependency configuration
The consolidation of multiple dependencies under kos = { workspace = true } is good for maintenance, but we should verify the workspace setup.
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the workspace dependencies and kos crate configuration.
Workspace dependency configuration is correctly set up
The workspace dependency configuration is properly structured:
- The root workspace correctly defines
kosand other shared dependencies - The
koscrate has all necessary dependencies defined with appropriate features kos-mobilecorrectly referenceskosusing workspace inheritance viaworkspace = true- Other shared dependencies in
kos-mobilealso use workspace inheritance consistently
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#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify workspace setup and dependency availability
# Check workspace root Cargo.toml for kos dependency configuration
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packages/kos-web/Cargo.toml (1)
11-12: LGTM! Correct library configuration for a WASM package.
The crate-type configuration with both cdylib and rlib is perfect for a web-focused package, allowing:
cdylibfor WebAssembly compilationrlibfor usage as a Rust library
packages/kos-web/src/lib.rs (5)
1-13: LGTM! Clean module organization
The imports and module structure are well-organized and appropriate for the functionality provided.
20-24: LGTM! Simple and efficient implementation
The function correctly converts strings to bytes without unnecessary allocations.
26-31: LGTM! Proper UTF-8 validation and error handling
The function correctly validates UTF-8 and provides clear error messages.
47-52: LGTM! Clean implementation with proper error handling
The function correctly delegates to the decrypt function and handles PEM parsing.
40-45: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add input validation for PEM tag and data
The function should validate both the PEM tag format and ensure data is not empty.
Consider adding validation:
pub fn to_pem(tag: String, data: &[u8]) -> Result<String, Error> {
+ if !tag.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_uppercase() || c == ' ') {
+ return Err(Error::InvalidInput("PEM tag must contain only uppercase ASCII characters and spaces".into()));
+ }
+ if data.is_empty() {
+ return Err(Error::InvalidInput("Data cannot be empty".into()));
+ }
let result = cipher::to_pem(tag, data)?;
Ok(result.to_string())
}packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs (2)
231-231: Handle potential decoding errors when converting private key hex to bytes
In the sign_message method, the decoding of pk_hex could fail if the hex string is invalid. Ensure that errors are properly handled and communicated.
Run the following script to check for invalid hex strings in private keys:
110-114: Ensure proper error handling for public key extraction
In the from_private_key function, after fixing the use of private_key_bytes, ensure that any errors during public key extraction are properly handled.
Run the following script to verify that get_pbk correctly handles valid and invalid private keys:
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the error handling in the codebase.
Based on the code analysis, I can now provide a final response:
Error handling for public key extraction is properly implemented
The error handling in the from_private_key function is correctly implemented with appropriate error propagation. The code:
- Validates private key format before processing
- Uses proper error wrapping with
Error::WalletManager - Leverages the chain-specific
get_pbkimplementations which have robust error handling:- Check for valid key length (32 bytes)
- Handle cryptographic operation failures
- Clean up sensitive data (zeroing private keys)
- Return appropriate chain-specific errors
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
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#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify public key extraction from private keys.
# Test with a valid private key
echo "Testing with a valid private key..."
VALID_PK="8734062c1158f26a3ca8a4a0da87b527a7c168653f7f4c77045e5cf571497d9d"
echo "Valid PK: $VALID_PK"
# Simulate calling get_pbk with the valid key (pseudo-code)
# Test with an invalid private key (wrong length)
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INVALID_PK="1234"
echo "Invalid PK: $INVALID_PK"
# Simulate calling get_pbk with the invalid key (pseudo-code)
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# Search for error handling patterns in wallet.rs
echo "Searching for error handling in wallet.rs..."
fd -e rs wallet.rs --exec rg -A 5 "Error::WalletManager"
# Look for the implementation of get_pbk
echo -e "\nSearching for get_pbk implementation..."
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rg "test.*get_pbk" -B 2 -A 10
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packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (1)
159-164: Fix potential panic in sign_message function
Using unwrap() on hex::decode(account.private_key) can cause a panic if the private key is not valid hex. Consider using the ? operator for proper error handling.
Apply this diff to handle the error properly:
fn sign_message(account: KOSAccount, hex: String) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KOSError> {
let chain = get_chain_by(account.chain_id)?;
let message = hex::decode(hex)?;
- let signature = chain.sign_message(hex::decode(account.private_key).unwrap(), message)?;
+ let private_key = hex::decode(account.private_key)?;
+ let signature = chain.sign_message(private_key, message)?;
Ok(signature)
}
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (6)
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (6)
14-22: Add documentation for the BTC struct.Consider adding documentation comments to explain the purpose of each field and their valid ranges/constraints.
#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)] +/// Represents a Bitcoin or Bitcoin-based blockchain configuration +/// +/// # Fields +/// * `id` - Chain identifier +/// * `addr_prefix` - Address prefix for Bech32 addresses (e.g., "bc" for Bitcoin) +/// * `symbol` - Token symbol (e.g., "BTC") +/// * `name` - Chain name (e.g., "Bitcoin") +/// * `use_legacy_address` - Whether to use legacy Base58 addresses +/// * `legacy_version` - Version byte for legacy addresses pub struct BTC {
29-49: Consider adding input validation for constructors.The constructors should validate the input parameters:
idshould be within a valid rangeaddr_prefixshould not be empty for non-legacy addresseslegacy_versionshould be within valid range for legacy addresses
53-71: Consider adding address checksum validation.While the Bech32 encoding includes error detection, consider adding explicit validation of the generated address format before returning.
103-175: Add documentation for Chain trait implementation.Consider adding documentation for the public interface methods to explain:
- Expected input formats
- Error conditions
- Return value specifications
Also, consider making the decimals value configurable instead of hardcoding it to 8.
177-232: Enhance test coverage with edge cases.Consider adding tests for:
- Invalid mnemonic phrases
- Invalid paths
- Invalid public/private key lengths
- Error conditions in address generation
- Legacy address edge cases
1-232: Consider additional security measures.While the implementation is generally secure, consider:
- Adding constant-time comparisons for sensitive data
- Implementing comprehensive input validation
- Extending memory cleanup to all sensitive data operations
- Adding timing attack mitigations
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packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (3)
1-12: LGTM! Imports and constants are well organized.
All necessary dependencies are properly imported and the Bitcoin message prefix is correctly defined.
163-170: Good security practice: zeroing sensitive data.
Excellent practice of zeroing out the private key bytes after use. Consider extending this to other methods handling sensitive data.
93-100: Ensure message preparation follows Bitcoin standards.
The message preparation follows the Bitcoin signed message format, but consider adding a test vector from the Bitcoin Core implementation to verify compatibility.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (5)
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (1)
139-158: Add documentation for the sign_transaction functionWhile the implementation is solid with proper error handling, adding documentation would help explain the transaction signing process and the expected format of the raw transaction data.
Add documentation like this:
#[uniffi::export] +/// Signs a raw transaction using the provided account's private key +/// +/// # Arguments +/// * `account` - The account containing the private key and chain information +/// * `raw` - Hex-encoded raw transaction data +/// +/// # Returns +/// A signed transaction containing the original data and the signature fn sign_transaction(account: KOSAccount, raw: String) -> Result<KOSTransaction, KOSError> {packages/kos-mobile/src/number.rs (4)
7-10: Add documentation for the public APIThe
BigNumberstruct and its methods should be documented with rustdoc comments explaining their purpose, parameters, and examples of usage.Add documentation like this:
+/// Represents an arbitrary-precision number. +/// +/// # Examples +/// ``` +/// let num = BigNumber::new("123456789")?; +/// ``` #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, uniffi::Record)] pub struct BigNumber { pub value: String, }
8-10: Consider optimizing the internal representationThe current implementation stores the number as a String and parses it on every operation. Consider storing the parsed
BigIntinternally to improve performance.pub struct BigNumber { - pub value: String, + value: String, + cached_bigint: Option<BigInt>, }
12-24: Implement Display trait for better string representationConsider implementing the Display trait to provide a consistent string representation of BigNumber.
Add this implementation:
impl std::fmt::Display for BigNumber { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { write!(f, "{}", self.value) } }
1-99: Consider adding unit tests for the BigNumber moduleThe file lacks unit tests to verify the behavior of arithmetic operations, error handling, and edge cases.
Would you like me to help generate comprehensive unit tests for this module?
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🔇 Additional comments (6)
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (5)
385-399: LGTM: Comprehensive test coverage for new functionality
The test coverage for the new sign_message function is good, including verification of the signature length.
161-166:
Fix potential panic in sign_message function
The function uses unwrap() on hex::decode(account.private_key) which could panic if the private key is not valid hex.
Apply this diff to fix the issue:
fn sign_message(account: KOSAccount, hex: String) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KOSError> {
let chain = get_chain_by(account.chain_id)?;
let message = hex::decode(hex)?;
- let signature = chain.sign_message(hex::decode(account.private_key).unwrap(), message)?;
+ let private_key = hex::decode(account.private_key)?;
+ let signature = chain.sign_message(private_key, message)?;
Ok(signature)
}1-8: Verify the integration of the new number module
The imports have been updated to use a unified kos module structure, which is a good architectural change. However, let's verify the new number module's integration.
✅ Verification successful
The number module integration is properly implemented
The module provides a well-structured BigNumber implementation with FFI exports for numerical operations. The module is:
- Properly declared in
lib.rs - Contains complete implementation with proper error handling
- Includes FFI exports for cross-platform usage
- Is also referenced in the web package, showing consistent architecture across platforms
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check if the number module is properly integrated and used
# Test: Look for usage of types/functions from the number module
rg -l "use (self::)?number::"
Length of output: 31
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's try a broader search to understand the number module's usage
# First, check the content of the number module
echo "=== Content of number module ==="
cat packages/kos-mobile/src/number.rs || true
echo -e "\n=== Usage of number module components ==="
# Search for any reference to the number module or its components
rg "number::" --type rust
echo -e "\n=== Direct module references ==="
# Search for direct module references
rg "mod number" --type rust
Length of output: 3160
37-37: Verify chain_id type changes across the codebase
The change from i32 to u32 for chain_id is a good improvement as chain IDs should never be negative. However, we need to ensure all chain ID comparisons and conversions have been updated accordingly.
Also applies to: 46-46
✅ Verification successful
Type change for chain_id is consistent across the codebase
The change from i32 to u32 for chain_id is safe as all usages in the codebase are already using unsigned types:
packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rsusesu32packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rsusesu32packages/kos/src/chains/eth/models.rsusesu64(which is compatible withu32)packages/kos/src/protos/generated/klv/proto.rsuses byte vectorpackages/kos/src/chains/klv/models.rsuses String
No incompatible usages or type conversions were found that would be affected by this change.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for potential missed chain_id type conversions
# Test: Look for chain_id usage patterns that might need updates
rg "chain_id.*i32|chain_id.*as i32"
Length of output: 37
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's search for all chain_id usages to verify the type consistency
rg "chain_id" -A 2 --type rust
# Also search for type declarations containing chain_id
ast-grep --pattern 'struct $_ {
$$$
chain_id: $_,
$$$
}'
Length of output: 11213
19-20: Ensure consistent error mapping for number operations
The addition of KOSNumberError variant is good for better error categorization. However, we should verify that all number-related operations properly map to this error type.
✅ Verification successful
Let me analyze the number-related operations in the codebase to verify error mapping consistency.
Based on the analysis of the codebase, I can now generate the final response:
Number error handling is consistently implemented
The KOSNumberError variant is properly used across all number-related operations in the mobile package:
- Invalid number parsing
- Division by zero checks
- BigInt conversions
The web package uses its own consistent error type (InvalidNumberParse) for similar operations, which is appropriate given the separate error handling domains.
🏁 Scripts executed
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#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for consistent error mapping
# Test: Look for potential number operations that might need error mapping
rg "KOSNumber|parse|to_string|as_str"
Length of output: 24925
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Look for number-related operations and error handling in the codebase
ast-grep --pattern 'KOSError::KOSNumber'
Length of output: 401
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Look for number operations implementation
ast-grep --pattern 'fn $_(KOSNumber $_, $_) {
$$$
}'
Length of output: 56
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for other potential number error variants
rg "Error::.*(Number|Parse)" -A 2
Length of output: 1393
packages/kos-mobile/src/number.rs (1)
31-38: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add overflow checks for arithmetic operations
The current implementation doesn't handle potential overflow scenarios in arithmetic operations.
Let's verify if there are any existing overflow checks in the codebase:
Consider adding overflow checks:
fn big_number_add(lhs: BigNumber, rhs: BigNumber) -> Result<BigNumber, KOSError> {
let left = lhs.to_bigint()?;
let right = rhs.to_bigint()?;
+ // Check if the result would be unreasonably large
+ if left.bits() > 1024 || right.bits() > 1024 {
+ return Err(KOSError::KOSNumber("Number too large".to_string()));
+ }
Ok(BigNumber {
value: (left + right).to_string(),
})
}
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (7)
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (5)
31-40: Consider documenting the default legacy_version valueThe
legacy_versionis set to 0 innew_btc_based, but it's not clear if this is intentional since this constructor setsuse_legacy_addressto false.Consider adding a comment explaining why the legacy_version is set to 0 when legacy addresses are not used, or consider making it an Option to better represent its usage.
55-73: Consider implementing zeroize for sensitive dataWhile the address generation logic is correct, consider clearing sensitive data after use.
Consider implementing zeroize for
pubkey_bytes:+ use zeroize::Zeroize; let mut pubkey_bytes = [0; 33]; pubkey_bytes.copy_from_slice(&public_key[..33]); let hash = ripemd160_digest(&pubkey_bytes); + pubkey_bytes.zeroize();
181-183: Consider implementing get_tx_infoThe
get_tx_infomethod currently returnsNotSupported. Consider implementing this method to provide transaction information parsing capability.Would you like me to help implement the transaction info parsing functionality? This would involve parsing the raw transaction data to extract details like inputs, outputs, and amounts.
172-179: LGTM! Secure private key handlingGood practice of zeroing out private key data after use with
fill(0). Consider using a more secure zeroing method likezeroizefor additional security.- pvk_bytes.fill(0); + use zeroize::Zeroize; + pvk_bytes.zeroize();
186-258: Consider adding more test casesWhile the current test coverage is good, consider adding tests for:
- Error cases (invalid private keys, public keys)
- Edge cases in address generation
- Message signing with empty messages
- Transaction signing with invalid inputs
Example test case for invalid private key:
#[test] fn test_invalid_private_key() { let btc = BTC::new(); let invalid_pvk = vec![0; 31]; // Too short let result = btc.get_pbk(invalid_pvk); assert!(matches!(result, Err(ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey))); }packages/kos/src/chains/btc/models.rs (2)
48-49: Remove redundant conversion of signature toVec<u8>On line 48,
sig.to_vec()returns aVec<u8>, which is assigned tosignature. On line 49, callingto_vec()onsignatureagain is unnecessary and redundant.You can eliminate the redundant conversion:
let signature = sig.to_vec(); -let mut signature = signature.to_vec(); +let mut signature = signature;
31-55: Avoid unnecessary cloning of the transaction insignmethodCloning the entire transaction at the start of the
signmethod and reassigningselfat the end may be inefficient. Sinceselfis mutable, you can modify it directly without cloning.Consider refactoring the code to operate on
selfdirectly:- let mut tx = self.clone(); + let tx = self; // ... - tx.inputs[i].script_sig = script_sig; + self.inputs[i].script_sig = script_sig; // ... - *self = tx;
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🔇 Additional comments (4)
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (4)
1-13: LGTM! Well-structured imports
The imports are well-organized and properly use no_std compatible modules from alloc, which is essential for embedded systems compatibility.
16-24: LGTM! Well-designed struct with clear fields
The BTC struct is well-designed with all necessary fields for both modern and legacy address support.
95-102: LGTM! Correct Bitcoin message preparation
The message preparation follows the Bitcoin signing standard correctly, properly prefixing the message with the Bitcoin signature prefix and message length.
1-258: Verify security-sensitive function implementations
Let's verify the implementation of security-sensitive functions across the codebase.
✅ Verification successful
Proper handling of sensitive data confirmed
The verification shows consistent security practices across the codebase:
- All chain implementations properly zeroize private key bytes after use with
fill(0) - The BTC implementation follows the same secure pattern as other chains for handling sensitive data
- Private keys are properly cleaned up in both transaction signing and message signing operations
🏁 Scripts executed
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Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for proper zeroizing of sensitive data in other chain implementations
echo "Checking for sensitive data handling patterns..."
rg -n "fill\(0\)" --type rust
# Check for consistent private key length validation
echo "Checking private key validation patterns..."
ast-grep --pattern 'if $_len != 32 {
return Err(ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey);
}'
# Check for proper error handling in cryptographic operations
echo "Checking error handling in crypto operations..."
rg -n "Ok\((private_to_public|sign|verify)" --type rust
Length of output: 3133
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Actionable comments posted: 5
♻️ Duplicate comments (3)
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/models.rs (3)
40-41:⚠️ Potential issueIncorrect access of
script_pubkeyfor inputIn the
signmethod, you're accessingoutputs[input.vout as usize].script_pubkeyto obtain thescript_pubkey, butinput.voutrefers to the index of the output in the previous transaction being spent, not the current transaction's outputs.To correctly sign the transaction, you need to obtain the
script_pubkeyfrom the previous transaction's output that the input references. This requires:
- Providing the previous transactions or their outputs to the
signmethod.- Modifying the method signature to accept the necessary data.
To fix this issue, consider modifying the method signature and accessing the
script_pubkeyappropriately:pub fn sign(&mut self, private_key: &[u8], prev_outputs: &[Output]) -> Result<(), ChainError> { // ... .map(|(i, input)| { - let script_pubkey = outputs[input.vout as usize].script_pubkey.clone(); + let script_pubkey = prev_outputs[i].script_pubkey.clone(); let hash = self.calculate_segwit_hash(i, &script_pubkey)?; Ok((hash, script_pubkey)) }) // ... }
179-193:⚠️ Potential issueUse VarInt encoding for counts and lengths in serialization
In the
serializemethod, counts of inputs and outputs, as well as lengths ofscript_sigandscript_pubkey, should be encoded using VarInt format according to the Bitcoin protocol specification. Currently, the code writes these counts and lengths directly asu8, which can lead to incorrect serialization for values larger than 255.To fix this issue, replace the direct
u8casts with VarInt encoding:- raw_tx.push(self.inputs.len() as u8); + raw_tx.extend(encode_varint(self.inputs.len() as u64)); for input in &self.inputs { raw_tx.extend(&input.txid); raw_tx.extend(&input.vout.to_le_bytes()); - raw_tx.push(input.script_sig.len() as u8); + raw_tx.extend(encode_varint(input.script_sig.len() as u64)); raw_tx.extend(&input.script_sig); raw_tx.extend(&input.sequence.to_le_bytes()); } - raw_tx.push(self.outputs.len() as u8); + raw_tx.extend(encode_varint(self.outputs.len() as u64)); for output in &self.outputs { raw_tx.extend(&output.value.to_le_bytes()); - raw_tx.push(output.script_pubkey.len() as u8); + raw_tx.extend(encode_varint(output.script_pubkey.len() as u64)); raw_tx.extend(&output.script_pubkey); }Ensure that you implement the
encode_varintfunction to properly encode values.
211-227:⚠️ Potential issueAvoid using
unwrap()to prevent potential panics in parsing functionsIn the
read_u32andread_u64functions, usingunwrap()ontry_into()can cause the program to panic if the slice cannot be converted. It's better to handle this error and propagate it appropriately.Modify the code to handle potential errors from
try_into():fn read_u32(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u32, ChainError> { if cursor.len() < 4 { return Err(ChainError::InvalidData("Insufficient bytes for u32".into())); } - let value = u32::from_le_bytes(cursor[..4].try_into().unwrap()); + let value = u32::from_le_bytes(cursor[..4].try_into().map_err(|_| ChainError::InvalidData("Failed to parse u32".into()))?); *cursor = &cursor[4..]; Ok(value) } fn read_u64(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u64, ChainError> { if cursor.len() < 8 { return Err(ChainError::InvalidData("Buffer underflow".into())); } - let value = u64::from_le_bytes(cursor[..8].try_into().unwrap()); + let value = u64::from_le_bytes(cursor[..8].try_into().map_err(|_| ChainError::InvalidData("Failed to parse u64".into()))?); *cursor = &cursor[8..]; Ok(value) }Apply similar changes to other instances where
unwrap()is used ontry_into().
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (2)
38-60: Consider adding error context informationThe
ChainErrorenum effectively categorizes errors, but it could benefit from additional context information for better debugging.Consider enhancing error variants with additional context:
#[derive(Debug)] pub enum ChainError { - ErrDerive, + ErrDerive { path: String }, - InvalidPrivateKey, + InvalidPrivateKey { details: String }, // ... other variants - InvalidData(String), + InvalidData { message: String, source: Option<Box<dyn std::error::Error>> }, }
241-257: Consider implementing builder pattern for Transaction structThe current implementation could benefit from a more flexible construction pattern.
Consider implementing a builder pattern:
impl Transaction { pub fn builder() -> TransactionBuilder { TransactionBuilder::default() } } #[derive(Default)] pub struct TransactionBuilder { raw_data: Option<Vec<u8>>, tx_hash: Option<Vec<u8>>, signature: Option<Vec<u8>>, } impl TransactionBuilder { pub fn raw_data(mut self, raw_data: Vec<u8>) -> Self { self.raw_data = Some(raw_data); self } // ... other builder methods pub fn build(self) -> Transaction { Transaction { raw_data: self.raw_data.unwrap_or_default(), tx_hash: self.tx_hash.unwrap_or_default(), signature: self.signature.unwrap_or_default(), } } }
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packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs(1 hunks)packages/kos/src/chains/btc/models.rs(1 hunks)packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (4)
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (3)
233-239: Consider using a decimal type for transaction values
Using f64 for financial values can lead to precision issues.
283-398: Consider extracting chain configuration to a separate file
The chain registry contains a large number of inline chain configurations with magic numbers.
454-455: Implement missing custom chain types
The CustomSubstrate and CustomCosmos variants in CustomChainType are not implemented.
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (1)
158-159: Handle transaction version and witness flag correctly in sign_tx
When signing a transaction in the sign_tx method, ensure that the transaction version and SegWit marker are properly set. The current implementation may not correctly handle these aspects, which can lead to invalid transactions.
Please verify that the BTCTransaction::from_raw method correctly parses the transaction version and handles the SegWit marker and flags. Additionally, ensure that the signed transaction includes the witness data when serialized.
Run the following script to check the transaction parsing and serialization:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the code analysis results, I can now provide the final response:
Transaction version and witness handling are properly implemented
The codebase correctly handles both transaction versioning and SegWit data:
- Transaction version is properly read from raw data and serialized in little-endian format
- SegWit transactions are detected by checking for non-empty witness data
- Proper SegWit marker (0x00) and flag (0x01) are added when witness data is present
- Witness data is correctly serialized with proper length prefixes
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify transaction parsing and serialization with witness data.
# Test: Print the transaction structure after parsing.
cargo test -- --nocapture test_parse_transaction_with_witness
# Expected Result: The test should display the parsed transaction with correct version, inputs, outputs, and witness data.
Length of output: 159
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the implementation of BTCTransaction and its methods
ast-grep --pattern 'impl BTCTransaction {
$$$
fn from_raw($$$) {
$$$
}
$$$
}'
# Also search for any witness-related code
rg -A 5 "witness" packages/kos/src/chains/btc/
Length of output: 2169
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the transaction version handling
rg -A 5 "version" packages/kos/src/chains/btc/
# Also check the from_raw implementation specifically
ast-grep --pattern 'fn from_raw($$$) {
$$$
}'
Length of output: 3954
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Actionable comments posted: 2
♻️ Duplicate comments (4)
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/models.rs (1)
33-44:⚠️ Potential issueAccessing incorrect script_pubkey for input.
You are referencing the current transaction’s outputs (
outputs[input.vout as usize].script_pubkey) instead of the previous transaction’s outputs when constructing the SegWit hash. This is the same issue flagged in a past review comment, so please ensure you retrieve thescript_pubkeyfrom the transaction being spent, not from the transaction under construction.packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (3)
63-69:⚠️ Potential issueMissing SHA256 step in Bech32 address generation.
The call to
ripemd160_digest(&pubkey_bytes)omits the usual preliminarysha256_digeststep required by the standard P2WPKH (Bech32) process. This matches the issue flagged in a past review comment, so please update to:- let hash = ripemd160_digest(&pubkey_bytes); + let sha256_hash = sha256_digest(&pubkey_bytes); + let hash = ripemd160_digest(&sha256_hash);
83-93:⚠️ Potential issueMissing SHA256 step in legacy address generation.
As with Bech32 addresses, P2PKH (legacy) addresses typically require a SHA256 before the RIPEMD160 hashing. Reference the Bitcoin developer documentation. This issue also aligns with a previous flag in past reviews.
130-132: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionHonor the
_is_legacyparameter for derivation paths.Currently,
get_pathalways returns a BIP84 path ("m/84'/0'/0'/0/{}"), ignoringis_legacy. For legacy addresses, BIP44 or BIP49 is common—depending on the desired format. This was highlighted in a past review comment.
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packages/kos/src/chains/btc/models.rs (1)
30-60: Consider handling non-SegWit inputs and different SIGHASH types.
Currently, the sign method only applies a single SIGHASH type (SIGHASH_ALL) and stores signatures in the witness for every input. This approach is fine for typical SegWit transactions, but in scenarios involving non-SegWit inputs or different SIGHASH types, it may not work as intended. Verify whether broader support for non-SegWit inputs and different signature types is required in your use case.
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🧹 Nitpick comments (6)
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (3)
1-1: Document the purpose of thenumbermodule.Add documentation comments explaining the purpose and functionality of the new module.
53-54: Change size parameter type to u32For consistency with other changes and to prevent negative values, consider changing the size parameter type from
i32tou32. This would eliminate the need for runtime checks against negative values.-fn generate_mnemonic(size: i32) -> Result<String, KOSError> { +fn generate_mnemonic(size: u32) -> Result<String, KOSError> { - Ok(kos::crypto::mnemonic::generate_mnemonic(size as usize)?.to_phrase()) + Ok(kos::crypto::mnemonic::generate_mnemonic(size as usize)?.to_phrase())
395-409: Consider adding more test cases for message signingWhile the basic functionality is tested, consider adding tests for:
- Empty messages
- Very large messages
- Messages with special characters
- Invalid hex strings
packages/kos-web/src/lib.rs (1)
54-59: Consider making QR code parameters configurable.The function uses fixed values for error correction level (Low) and size (1024). Consider making these parameters configurable to support different use cases:
- Higher error correction levels for better reliability
- Different sizes for various display requirements
-pub fn generate_qr(data: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> { +pub fn generate_qr( + data: &str, + ecc: Option<QrCodeEcc>, + size: Option<u32> +) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> { qrcode_generator::to_png_to_vec( data, - QrCodeEcc::Low, - 1024 + ecc.unwrap_or(QrCodeEcc::Medium), + size.unwrap_or(256) ).map_err(|e| Error::InvalidString(format!("Invalid QRCode data: {}", e))) }packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (2)
635-683: Consider caching the chain registry.Each method creates a new
ChainRegistryinstance. For better performance, consider caching the registry:+use once_cell::sync::Lazy; + +static CHAIN_REGISTRY: Lazy<ChainRegistry> = Lazy::new(ChainRegistry::new); + fn get_chain_by_id(&self, id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { for &(chain_id, ref chain_info) in self.registry { if chain_id == id { return Some((chain_info.factory)()); } } None }
685-724: Use cached registry in public interface.The public interface functions create a new registry for each call. Use the cached registry suggested above:
pub fn get_chain_by_id(id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { - ChainRegistry::new().get_chain_by_id(id) + CHAIN_REGISTRY.get_chain_by_id(id) } pub fn get_chain_by_base_id(base_id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { - ChainRegistry::new().get_chain_by_base_id(base_id) + CHAIN_REGISTRY.get_chain_by_base_id(base_id) } pub fn get_chains() -> Vec<u32> { - ChainRegistry::new().get_chains() + CHAIN_REGISTRY.get_chains() } pub fn is_chain_supported(id: u32) -> bool { - ChainRegistry::new().is_chain_supported(id) + CHAIN_REGISTRY.is_chain_supported(id) } pub fn get_supported_chains() -> Vec<u32> { - ChainRegistry::new().get_supported_chains() + CHAIN_REGISTRY.get_supported_chains() }
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🔇 Additional comments (16)
packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (3)
161-166: Fix potential panic in sign_message functionThe function uses
unwrap()onhex::decode(account.private_key)which could panic if the private key is not valid hex.Apply this diff to handle the error properly:
fn sign_message(account: KOSAccount, hex: String) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KOSError> { let chain = get_chain_by(account.chain_id)?; let message = hex::decode(hex)?; - let signature = chain.sign_message(hex::decode(account.private_key).unwrap(), message)?; + let private_key = hex::decode(account.private_key)?; + let signature = chain.sign_message(private_key, message)?; Ok(signature) }
37-37: LGTM! Good type safety improvement.The change from
i32tou32forchain_idis a good improvement as chain IDs cannot be negative.Also applies to: 46-46
139-158: LGTM! Well-implemented new functionality.The new functions for transaction signing and chain support verification are well-implemented with proper error handling and clear interfaces.
Also applies to: 169-176
packages/kos-web/src/lib.rs (8)
14-18: Add input validation for word count.The function should validate that the count parameter is within acceptable bounds for mnemonic generation (typically 12, 15, 18, 21, or 24 words).
20-24: LGTM!The implementation is correct and safely converts strings to bytes.
26-31: LGTM!The implementation correctly handles UTF-8 validation with proper error handling.
33-38: Add input validation for password and data.The function should validate that neither the password nor data is empty, and potentially enforce minimum password strength requirements.
40-45: Add input validation for PEM tag.Consider validating the PEM tag to ensure it meets the required format.
47-52: LGTM!The implementation correctly handles PEM decryption with proper error propagation.
61-64: LGTM!The implementation correctly delegates to the underlying chain support check.
66-69: LGTM!The implementation correctly retrieves the list of supported chains.
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (5)
38-181: LGTM!The error handling implementation is comprehensive with:
- Well-defined error variants
- Clear error messages
- Ergonomic error conversions
233-239: Consider using a decimal type for transaction values.Using
f64for financial values can lead to precision issues. Consider using a decimal type or fixed-point arithmetic.
259-273: Add documentation for Chain trait methods.The Chain trait methods lack documentation explaining their purpose, parameters, and return values.
282-683: Consider extracting chain configuration to a separate file.The chain registry contains a large number of inline chain configurations with magic numbers. This makes it difficult to maintain and validate the configurations.
705-706: Implement missing custom chain types.The
CustomSubstrateandCustomCosmosvariants inCustomChainTypeare not implemented, returningNone. This could lead to confusion for users trying to use these chain types.
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🧹 Nitpick comments (7)
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (2)
129-133: Preserve error context in Ed25519Err conversionThe current implementation discards the specific error details from Ed25519Err. Consider preserving the error context for better debugging.
impl From<Ed25519Err> for ChainError { - fn from(_: Ed25519Err) -> Self { - ChainError::Ed25519Error + fn from(err: Ed25519Err) -> Self { + ChainError::InvalidString(err.to_string()) } }
644-652: Optimize chain lookup performanceThe current implementation creates a new chain instance for every lookup in
get_chain_by_base_id. This could be inefficient when called frequently.Consider caching the chain instances or using a more efficient lookup method:
impl ChainRegistry { fn get_chain_by_base_id(&self, base_id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { self.registry .iter() .find(|(_, info)| { let chain = (info.factory)(); chain.get_id() == base_id }) .map(|(_, info)| (info.factory)()) } }packages/kos/src/crypto/bignum.rs (4)
27-34: Enhance documentation for RLP encoding formatThe implementation would benefit from detailed documentation explaining:
- The byte order in the encoded format
- The significance of removing leading zeros
- The relationship between LE conversion and RLP encoding
52-64: Improve floating-point conversion precisionThe
to_f64implementation may lose precision due to:
- Accumulating multiplications (value *= 256.0)
- No documented precision guarantees
Consider using a more stable algorithm:
pub fn to_f64(&self, precision: u32) -> f64 { let bytes = self.0; let mut value: f64 = 0.0; - for i in 0..32 { - value *= 256.0; - value += bytes[i] as f64; + // Process bytes in reverse order for better precision + for i in (0..32).rev() { + value = value / 256.0 + bytes[i] as f64; } - value /= powi(10.0, precision as i32); + value / powi(10.0, precision as i32) - value }
174-193: Document the power function implementationThe
powifunction uses an efficient binary exponentiation algorithm but lacks documentation explaining:
- The algorithm's complexity (O(log n))
- Edge cases handling
- Performance characteristics
7-172: Ensure constant-time operations for cryptographic safetyThe U256 implementation handles sensitive data but may be vulnerable to timing attacks due to:
- Variable-time comparisons in string operations
- Early returns in loops
- Non-constant-time floating-point operations
Consider using constant-time operations where possible, especially for equality comparisons and conversions.
packages/kos/src/chains/bch/mod.rs (1)
52-55: DefineC0_SHIFT_COUNTas a constant for clarityThe shift count value
35is used directly in the code with an explanatory comment. Defining it as a constant improves code readability and maintainability.Define
C0_SHIFT_COUNTas a constant:+ const C0_SHIFT_COUNT: u32 = 35; for &item in p_input.iter() { - let check0 = (check >> 35) as u8; // Assuming C0_SHIFT_COUNT is 35, as it's not defined in the original code + let check0 = (check >> C0_SHIFT_COUNT) as u8;
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🔇 Additional comments (6)
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (3)
705-706: Implement missing custom chain typesThe
CustomSubstrateandCustomCosmosvariants returnNone. This could lead to confusion for users trying to use these chain types.Would you like me to help implement these custom chain types or create an issue to track this task?
233-239:⚠️ Potential issueUse a decimal type for transaction values
Using
f64for financial values can lead to precision issues. Consider using a decimal type or string representation.#[derive(Serialize)] pub struct TxInfo { pub sender: String, pub receiver: String, - pub value: f64, + pub value: String, // or use a decimal crate pub tx_type: TxType, }Likely invalid or redundant comment.
259-273: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionAdd documentation for Chain trait methods
The Chain trait methods lack documentation explaining their purpose and parameters. This makes it harder for developers to implement the trait correctly.
pub trait Chain { + /// Returns the unique identifier for this chain fn get_id(&self) -> u32; + /// Returns the human-readable name of the chain fn get_name(&self) -> &str; + /// Returns the token symbol for this chain fn get_symbol(&self) -> &str; + /// Returns the number of decimal places for token amounts fn get_decimals(&self) -> u32; + /// Converts a mnemonic phrase to a seed + /// # Arguments + /// * `mnemonic` - The mnemonic phrase + /// * `password` - Optional password for additional security fn mnemonic_to_seed(&self, mnemonic: String, password: String) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ChainError>; // Add documentation for remaining methods... }Likely invalid or redundant comment.
packages/kos/src/crypto/bignum.rs (2)
17-25: Add input validation in RLP decodingThe RLP decoding implementation should validate the input length to prevent potential buffer overflow.
77-94: LGTM! Robust hex string parsing implementationThe implementation includes proper:
- Input length validation
- Zero-padding
- Error handling for invalid hex strings
packages/kos/src/chains/bch/mod.rs (1)
120-122: Clean up sensitive data inpubkey_bytesThe
pubkey_bytesarray contains sensitive data and should be zeroed out after use, similar to how private keys are handled elsewhere in the code.Apply this diff to zero out
pubkey_bytesafter use:pubkey_bytes.copy_from_slice(&public_key[..33]); + // Zero out pubkey_bytes after use to prevent sensitive data leakage + pubkey_bytes.fill(0);
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Actionable comments posted: 2
♻️ Duplicate comments (3)
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (3)
233-239:⚠️ Potential issueUse a decimal type for financial values
Using f64 for financial values can lead to precision issues. Consider using a decimal type or string representation.
259-273: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionAdd documentation for Chain trait methods
The Chain trait methods lack documentation explaining their purpose, parameters, and return values.
705-706:⚠️ Potential issueImplement missing custom chain types
The CustomSubstrate and CustomCosmos variants in CustomChainType are not implemented, returning None. This could lead to confusion for users trying to use these chain types.
🧹 Nitpick comments (3)
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (3)
130-133: Consider preserving error details in From implementationsThe From implementation for Ed25519Err discards the original error details. Consider including the error message in ChainError::Ed25519Error variant.
-impl From<Ed25519Err> for ChainError { - fn from(_: Ed25519Err) -> Self { - ChainError::Ed25519Error - } -} +impl From<Ed25519Err> for ChainError { + fn from(err: Ed25519Err) -> Self { + ChainError::InvalidString(err.to_string()) + } +}
185-208: Document error code mappingsThe to_u32() method maps errors to numeric codes without documentation explaining their significance or usage. Consider adding documentation to explain the purpose of these codes and their intended use.
+/// Maps ChainError variants to numeric error codes. +/// These codes are used for external error handling and logging. +/// +/// Error code ranges: +/// 1-10: Core operation errors +/// 11-20: Validation errors +/// 21-30: External service errors pub fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 { match self { ChainError::ErrDerive => 1,
249-257: Implement Default trait instead of custom default methodInstead of implementing a custom default() method, implement the standard Default trait for better interoperability with Rust's ecosystem.
-#[allow(clippy::should_implement_trait)] -pub fn default() -> Self { +impl Default for Transaction { + fn default() -> Self { Self { raw_data: Vec::new(), tx_hash: Vec::new(), signature: Vec::new(), } } -} +}
| pub fn get_chain_by_id(id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { | ||
| ChainRegistry::new().get_chain_by_id(id) | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Use static initialization for ChainRegistry
Creating a new ChainRegistry instance for each operation is inefficient. Consider using a static instance with lazy initialization.
+use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
+
+static CHAIN_REGISTRY: Lazy<ChainRegistry> = Lazy::new(ChainRegistry::new);
+
pub fn get_chain_by_id(id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> {
- ChainRegistry::new().get_chain_by_id(id)
+ CHAIN_REGISTRY.get_chain_by_id(id)
}Also applies to: 710-724
| fn get_chain_by_base_id(&self, base_id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { | ||
| for (_, chain_info) in self.registry { | ||
| let chain = (chain_info.factory)(); | ||
| if chain.get_id() == base_id { | ||
| return Some(chain); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| None | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Optimize chain lookup performance
The get_chain_by_base_id method creates a new chain instance for each registry entry during lookup. Consider restructuring to avoid unnecessary instantiations.
fn get_chain_by_base_id(&self, base_id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> {
- for (_, chain_info) in self.registry {
- let chain = (chain_info.factory)();
- if chain.get_id() == base_id {
- return Some(chain);
+ for &(chain_id, ref chain_info) in self.registry {
+ // First check if this chain is a candidate by calling get_id
+ // on a temporary instance
+ let temp_chain = (chain_info.factory)();
+ if temp_chain.get_id() == base_id {
+ return Some(temp_chain);
}
}
None
}Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
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Actionable comments posted: 0
♻️ Duplicate comments (4)
packages/kos/src/chains/movr/mod.rs (4)
54-56:⚠️ Potential issueAdd input validation for empty mnemonics.
The mnemonic_to_seed method should validate that the input mnemonic is not empty.
fn mnemonic_to_seed(&self, mnemonic: String, password: String) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ChainError> { + if mnemonic.trim().is_empty() { + return Err(ChainError::InvalidMnemonic); + } Ok(bip32::mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, password)?) }
58-61:⚠️ Potential issueValidate derivation path format.
The derive method should validate the path format before processing.
fn derive(&self, seed: Vec<u8>, path: String) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ChainError> { + if !bip32::is_valid_path(&path) { + return Err(ChainError::InvalidDerivationPath); + } let result = bip32::derive(&seed, path)?; Ok(Vec::from(result)) }
70-77:⚠️ Potential issueAdd public key length validation.
The get_address method should validate the public key length before accessing its slice.
fn get_address(&self, public_key: Vec<u8>) -> Result<String, ChainError> { + if public_key.len() < 65 { + return Err(ChainError::InvalidPublicKey); + } let pbk_hash = keccak256_digest(&public_key[1..]); let mut address_bytes: [u8; crate::chains::eth::ETH_ADDR_SIZE] = [0; crate::chains::eth::ETH_ADDR_SIZE];
104-117:⚠️ Potential issueImprove message signing security and flexibility.
The sign_message method has several issues:
- Uses fixed-size arrays without proper length validation
- Assumes message is exactly 32 bytes
- Could benefit from message hashing for consistent length handling
+use crate::crypto::hash::keccak256_digest; fn sign_message(&self, private_key: Vec<u8>, message: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ChainError> { if private_key.len() != 32 { return Err(ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey); } - let mut pvk_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32]; - pvk_bytes.copy_from_slice(&private_key[..32]); - - let mut payload_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32]; - payload_bytes.copy_from_slice(&message[..32]); + let pvk_bytes = private_key_from_vec(&private_key)?; + let payload_hash = keccak256_digest(&message); - let sig = secp256k1::Secp256K1::sign(&payload_bytes, &pvk_bytes)?; + let sig = secp256k1::Secp256K1::sign(&payload_hash, &pvk_bytes)?; Ok(sig.to_vec()) }
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
packages/kos/src/chains/movr/mod.rs (2)
19-39: Consider using constants for chain properties.The chain IDs and decimals could be defined as constants to improve maintainability and prevent magic numbers.
pub struct MOVR { id: u32, name: String, symbol: String, decimals: u32, } +const MOVR_CHAIN_ID: u32 = 32; +const GLMR_CHAIN_ID: u32 = 34; +const CHAIN_DECIMALS: u32 = 18; + impl MOVR { #[allow(dead_code)] pub fn new() -> Self { MOVR { - id: 32, + id: MOVR_CHAIN_ID, name: "Moonriver".to_string(), symbol: "MOVR".to_string(), - decimals: 18, + decimals: CHAIN_DECIMALS, } } #[allow(dead_code)] pub fn new_glmr() -> Self { MOVR { - id: 34, + id: GLMR_CHAIN_ID, name: "Moonbeam".to_string(), symbol: "GLMR".to_string(), - decimals: 18, + decimals: CHAIN_DECIMALS, } } }
119-124: Document unsupported functionality.Consider adding a documentation comment explaining why get_tx_info is not supported and if there are plans to support it in the future.
+ /// Transaction info parsing is currently not supported for MOVR chain. + /// TODO: Implement transaction parsing support fn get_tx_info( &self, _raw_tx: Vec<u8>, ) -> Result<crate::chains::TxInfo, crate::chains::ChainError> { Err(ChainError::NotSupported) }
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🔇 Additional comments (2)
packages/kos/src/chains/movr/mod.rs (2)
1-17: LGTM! Well-structured imports and struct definition.The imports are comprehensive and the struct fields appropriately capture the essential blockchain properties.
94-102: Excellent security practice!Good implementation of zeroing out private key data after use in sign_raw method.
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Actionable comments posted: 5
♻️ Duplicate comments (9)
packages/kos/src/chains/klv/mod.rs (1)
112-112:⚠️ Potential issueFix typo in variable name.
The variable name
prepared_messafeshould beprepared_message.-let prepared_messafe = KLV::prepare_message(message); +let prepared_message = KLV::prepare_message(message);packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (5)
242-248:⚠️ Potential issueUse a decimal type for financial values
Using
f64for financial values can lead to precision issues due to floating-point arithmetic limitations.Consider using a decimal type or string representation for the value field.
282-296: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionAdd comprehensive documentation for Chain trait
The Chain trait lacks documentation explaining the purpose of each method and their expected behavior.
Add trait and method documentation to help implementers understand the requirements.
708-710: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionUse static initialization for ChainRegistry
Creating a new ChainRegistry instance for each operation is inefficient.
Consider using a static instance with lazy initialization.
Also applies to: 733-735, 737-739, 741-743, 745-747
667-675: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionOptimize chain lookup performance
The get_chain_by_base_id method creates a new chain instance for each registry entry during lookup.
Consider restructuring to avoid unnecessary instantiations.
728-729:⚠️ Potential issueImplement missing custom chain types
The CustomSubstrate and CustomCosmos variants in CustomChainType are not implemented.
Either implement these variants or document why they're not supported.
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (3)
62-63:⚠️ Potential issueFix missing SHA256 step in address generation.
Both address generation methods are missing the initial SHA256 hash of the public key before RIPEMD160, which is required by the Bitcoin protocol (Hash160 = RIPEMD160(SHA256(pubkey))).
Apply this fix to both methods:
- let hash = ripemd160_digest(&pubkey_bytes); + let sha256_hash = sha256_digest(&pubkey_bytes); + let hash = ripemd160_digest(&sha256_hash);Also applies to: 82-83
94-101:⚠️ Potential issueFix incorrect message length encoding.
The message length is currently encoded as ASCII string bytes, which is incorrect according to the Bitcoin message signing protocol. It should be encoded as a VarInt.
Implement a VarInt encoding function and use it:
+ fn encode_varint(n: u64) -> Vec<u8> { + if n < 0xfd { + vec![n as u8] + } else if n <= 0xffff { + vec![0xfd, (n & 0xff) as u8, ((n >> 8) & 0xff) as u8] + } else if n <= 0xffffffff { + vec![ + 0xfe, + (n & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 8) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 16) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 24) & 0xff) as u8, + ] + } else { + vec![ + 0xff, + (n & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 8) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 16) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 24) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 32) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 40) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 48) & 0xff) as u8, + ((n >> 56) & 0xff) as u8, + ] + } + } pub fn prepare_message(message: Vec<u8>) -> [u8; 32] { let mut msg = Vec::new(); msg.extend_from_slice(BITCOIN_MESSAGE_PREFIX.as_bytes()); - msg.extend_from_slice(message.len().to_string().as_bytes()); + msg.extend_from_slice(&encode_varint(message.len() as u64)); msg.extend_from_slice(&message);
129-131:⚠️ Potential issueUse correct derivation path based on address type.
The method currently always returns the BIP84 path (m/84'/0'/0'/0/{}), which is only correct for native SegWit addresses. For legacy addresses, it should use BIP44 (m/44'/0'/0'/0/{}).
fn get_path(&self, index: u32, _is_legacy: bool) -> String { - format!("m/84'/0'/0'/0/{}", index) + if self.use_legacy_address { + format!("m/44'/0'/0'/0/{}", index) + } else { + format!("m/84'/0'/0'/0/{}", index) + } }
🧹 Nitpick comments (12)
packages/kos/src/chains/klv/mod.rs (2)
162-255: Consider adding negative test cases.While the current test coverage is good, consider adding tests for:
- Invalid mnemonics
- Invalid transaction formats
- Error cases in address encoding
- Invalid signature verification
65-70: Good security practices in private key handling.The implementation:
✅ Cleans up private key material usingfill(0)
✅ Properly validates inputs
✅ Has comprehensive error handlingConsider adding:
- Memory barriers after private key cleanup
- Additional validation for public key format
Also applies to: 117-122
packages/kos/src/chains/mod.rs (4)
63-127: Standardize error message formattingThe Display implementation has inconsistent error message formatting. Some variants include a colon and others don't. Some start with lowercase, others with uppercase.
Consider standardizing the error messages:
- ChainError::ErrDerive => write!(f, "Derive error"), - ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey => write!(f, "Invalid private key"), - ChainError::CurveError(e) => write!(f, "Curve error: {}", e), + ChainError::ErrDerive => write!(f, "derive error: failed to derive key"), + ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey => write!(f, "private key error: invalid format"), + ChainError::CurveError(e) => write!(f, "curve error: {}", e),
136-140: Preserve error context in From implementationsSeveral From trait implementations discard the original error details, which could be valuable for debugging.
Consider preserving error details:
impl From<Ed25519Err> for ChainError { - fn from(_: Ed25519Err) -> Self { - ChainError::Ed25519Error + fn from(e: Ed25519Err) -> Self { + ChainError::InvalidString(e.to_string()) } }Also applies to: 142-146, 148-152, 166-170, 172-176
250-255: Add documentation for Transaction struct fieldsThe Transaction struct lacks documentation explaining the purpose of each field.
Add field documentation:
pub struct Transaction { + /// The raw transaction data before signing pub raw_data: Vec<u8>, + /// The transaction hash/identifier pub tx_hash: Vec<u8>, + /// The signature data after signing pub signature: Vec<u8>, + /// Chain-specific options required for transaction processing pub options: Option<ChainOptions>, }
708-747: Add documentation for public API functionsThe public API functions lack documentation explaining their purpose and usage.
Add function documentation:
+/// Returns a chain implementation for the given chain ID +/// +/// # Arguments +/// * `id` - The unique identifier of the chain +/// +/// # Returns +/// * `Some(Box<dyn Chain>)` - The chain implementation if found +/// * `None` - If no chain exists for the given ID pub fn get_chain_by_id(id: u32) -> Option<Box<dyn Chain>> { ChainRegistry::new().get_chain_by_id(id) }packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (1)
15-51: Add documentation for the struct and constructors.While the implementation is correct, adding documentation would improve maintainability:
- Document the purpose of each field in the
BTCstruct- Add examples for each constructor showing typical usage
#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)] +/// Represents a Bitcoin or Bitcoin-based blockchain configuration +/// +/// # Fields +/// * `id` - Chain identifier +/// * `addr_prefix` - Address prefix (e.g., "bc" for Bitcoin) +/// * `symbol` - Chain symbol (e.g., "BTC") +/// * `name` - Chain name +/// * `use_legacy_address` - Whether to use legacy address format +/// * `legacy_version` - Version byte for legacy address format pub struct BTC { pub id: u32, pub addr_prefix: String,packages/kos/Cargo.toml (1)
50-63: Consider using workspace versions consistentlySome dependencies use workspace versions while others don't. Consider using workspace versions for all dependencies where possible to maintain consistency.
packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs (2)
187-194: Consider returning Result instead of empty string for None values.The
get_pathmethod returns an empty string whenpathis None, which could mask errors or lead to silent failures. Consider returning aResulttype instead.Apply this diff to improve error handling:
- pub fn get_path(&self) -> String { - match self.path { - Some(ref path) => path.clone(), - None => String::new(), - } + pub fn get_path(&self) -> Result<String, Error> { + self.path.clone().ok_or(Error::WalletManager( + "Wallet path not available".to_string(), + )) }
228-241: Add input validation for message size.The
sign_messagemethod doesn't validate the size of the input message, which could lead to potential issues with oversized messages.Add size validation before signing:
pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> { + const MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB + if message.len() > MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE { + return Err(Error::WalletManager("Message too large".to_string())); + } + match self.private_key {packages/kos/src/chains/trx/mod.rs (2)
272-276: Consider using Option for empty addresses.Returning empty strings for unknown transaction types makes it difficult to distinguish between valid empty addresses and error cases.
- pub struct TxInfo { - sender: String, - receiver: String, - value: f64, - tx_type: TxType, - } + pub struct TxInfo { + sender: Option<String>, + receiver: Option<String>, + value: f64, + tx_type: TxType, + }
280-342: Enhance test coverage and documentation.Consider adding:
- Tests for error cases (invalid private keys, addresses)
- Tests for different contract types
- Documentation for the test vectors explaining their source and significance
Example test for error case:
#[test] fn test_invalid_private_key() { let invalid_key = vec![1; 31]; // Wrong length let tx = Transaction { raw_data: vec![], tx_hash: vec![], signature: vec![], options: None, }; assert!(matches!( crate::chains::trx::TRX {}.sign_tx(invalid_key, tx), Err(ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey) )); }
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🔇 Additional comments (22)
packages/kos/src/chains/klv/mod.rs (4)
1-21: LGTM! Imports and constants are well-organized.The imports cover all necessary functionality, and the constants are correctly defined for the Klever blockchain.
25-31: Message preparation implementation is correct.The message preparation follows Klever's protocol specification:
- Prefix with "\x17Klever Signed Message:\n"
- Append message length as ASCII string
- Append message
- Hash with Keccak256
This implementation matches Klever's protocol requirements.
61-63: Derivation path implementation is correct for Klever.The fully hardened path
m/44'/690'/0'/0'/{}'is intentional and follows Klever's specifications, differing from the typical BIP44 standard.
82-109: Transaction signing implementation is robust.The implementation:
- Properly decodes the transaction
- Handles protobuf encoding/decoding
- Uses Blake2b for transaction hashing
- Includes comprehensive error handling
packages/kos/src/chains/btc/mod.rs (2)
1-14: LGTM! Well-organized imports and constants.The imports are comprehensive and logically grouped, covering all necessary functionality for Bitcoin operations.
260-342: LGTM! Comprehensive test coverage.The test module includes thorough testing of:
- Key derivation
- Address generation (both new and legacy)
- Message signing
- Transaction signing
All tests use well-known test vectors for validation.
packages/kos/Cargo.toml (3)
19-24: LGTM! Well-optimized release profileThe release profile is well configured with size optimizations, LTO, and symbol stripping, which is ideal for mobile platforms.
30-48: Update dependencies to latest stable versionsSeveral dependencies have newer versions available:
hmac0.12 → 0.13sha2andsha30.10 → 0.11pbkdf20.12.2 → 0.13
14-15: Verify staticlib support for mobile platformsThe addition of "staticlib" to crate-type suggests this library will be used in mobile platforms. Ensure that the necessary mobile platform configurations (iOS, Android) are properly set up in the build pipeline.
✅ Verification successful
Mobile platform configurations are properly set up
The addition of "staticlib" to crate-type is well-justified, as the codebase has a dedicated mobile package (kos-mobile) with comprehensive iOS and Android configurations, including build scripts and platform-specific project files.
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packages/kos-mobile/src/lib.rs (4)
162-167: Replace unwrap with proper error handlingThe
sign_messagefunction usesunwrap()which could panic. Use the?operator instead for consistent error handling.
54-54: Add input validation for mnemonic sizeThe
generate_mnemonicfunction should validate that the size parameter is positive before casting to usize.
139-159: LGTM! Well-implemented transaction signingThe transaction signing implementation has proper error handling and comprehensive test coverage.
169-177: LGTM! Clean chain support implementationThe chain support functions are well-implemented with good test coverage.
deny.toml (3)
11-11: Document rationale for dependency version constraintsPlease document the reasoning behind these specific version constraints, particularly:
- Why [email protected] and [email protected] are pinned
- The compatibility requirements for [email protected]
- Any specific features needed from [email protected]
This documentation will help with future maintenance and upgrades.
Also applies to: 14-16
32-32: LGTM: BSD-2-Clause license additionThe addition of BSD-2-Clause to the allowed licenses list is appropriate and aligns well with the project's existing permissive license policy.
9-13: Verify security implications of older cryptography package versionsSeveral cryptography-related packages are being pinned to older versions:
This could pose security risks if these versions have known vulnerabilities.
Let's check for any known security advisories:
✅ Verification successful
Cryptography package versions verified as secure
The pinned versions have no known security vulnerabilities, and [email protected] is newer than the last reported vulnerable version (0.9.7). While newer versions exist, they are all pre-releases, making the current stable versions a reasonable choice.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for security advisories for the pinned crypto packages for pkg in "block-buffer" "digest" "hmac" "sha2"; do echo "Checking $pkg..." gh api graphql -f query=' { securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, ecosystem: RUST, package: "'$pkg'") { nodes { advisory { summary severity publishedAt } vulnerableVersionRange firstPatchedVersion { identifier } } } }' done # Check latest versions on crates.io for pkg in "block-buffer" "digest" "hmac" "sha2"; do echo "Latest version of $pkg:" curl -s "https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/$pkg" | jq -r '.crate.max_version' doneLength of output: 3085
packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs (4)
96-96: Fix incorrect documentation comment.The documentation comment incorrectly states "restore wallet from mnemonic" for the
from_private_keyfunction.
109-111: Remove redundant hex decoding of private key bytes.The private key bytes are unnecessarily decoded twice, as they're already decoded at line 99.
130-131: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionFix incorrect documentation comment.
The documentation comment incorrectly states "restore wallet from mnemonic" for the
from_kc_pemfunction.Apply this diff to fix the documentation:
- /// restore wallet from mnemonic + /// restore wallet from Klever Connect PEM fileLikely invalid or redundant comment.
274-299: Expand test coverage.The test suite only covers the basic export/import functionality. Consider adding tests for:
- Error cases (invalid mnemonics, private keys)
- Message signing
- Transaction signing
- Different account types
- Chain validation
Let's check the overall test coverage:
packages/kos/src/chains/trx/mod.rs (2)
1-22: LGTM! Constants and imports are well-organized.The constants match TRON's specifications, and the imports are correctly using no_std compatible modules.
1-342: Verify consistent private key handling across chain implementations.Let's ensure other chain implementations follow the same security practices for private key handling.
✅ Verification successful
Private key handling is secure across all chain implementations
All chain implementations follow cryptographic best practices:
- Properly clear private keys from memory after use
- Use standard cryptographic primitives
- Validate private key inputs
- No persistence or logging of sensitive data
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for private key handling patterns across chain implementations echo "Checking for private key zeroing patterns..." rg -U "(?s)fn sign_.*?private_key.*?\{.*?fill\(0\)" packages/kos/src/chains/ echo "Checking for potential private key leaks..." rg "println.*private" packages/kos/src/chains/ echo "Checking for unsafe cryptographic patterns..." ast-grep --pattern 'impl $_ { $$$ fn sign_$_($_, private_key: Vec<u8>, $_) { $$$ } $$$ }'Length of output: 32130
| pub struct Wallet { | ||
| chain: u32, | ||
| account_type: AccountType, | ||
| public_address: String, | ||
| index: Option<u32>, | ||
| encrypted_data: Option<Vec<u8>>, | ||
| mnemonic: Option<String>, | ||
| private_key: Option<String>, | ||
| path: Option<String>, | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider implementing secure memory handling for sensitive data.
The Wallet struct contains sensitive cryptographic material (private keys, mnemonics). Consider using a secure memory implementation like zeroize to ensure sensitive data is properly wiped from memory when dropped.
Apply this diff to add secure memory handling:
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use strum::{EnumCount, IntoStaticStr};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
#[wasm_bindgen]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))]
+#[derive(Zeroize)]
+#[zeroize(drop)]
pub struct Wallet {
chain: u32,
account_type: AccountType,
public_address: String,
index: Option<u32>,
encrypted_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+ #[zeroize(skip)]
mnemonic: Option<String>,
+ #[zeroize(skip)]
private_key: Option<String>,
path: Option<String>,
}Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| let hash = sha256_digest(&hash[..]); | ||
| address_with_checksum[21..].copy_from_slice(&hash[0..4]); | ||
| let bytes_addr = b58enc(&address_with_checksum[..]); | ||
| String::from_utf8(bytes_addr).unwrap() |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Replace unwrap() with proper error handling.
The unwrap() call on String::from_utf8 could panic if the base58 encoding produces invalid UTF-8 bytes.
- String::from_utf8(bytes_addr).unwrap()
+ String::from_utf8(bytes_addr).map_err(|_| ChainError::InvalidAddress)?📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| String::from_utf8(bytes_addr).unwrap() | |
| String::from_utf8(bytes_addr).map_err(|_| ChainError::InvalidAddress)? |
| Ok(t) => return Ok(t), | ||
| Err(_) => {} | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Improve error handling in transaction decoding.
The empty error block discards valuable error information. Consider propagating the error or logging it.
- Err(_) => {}
+ Err(e) => {
+ // Try decoding as raw transaction before giving up
+ // If this also fails, the error will be propagated
+ }Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| match contract_type { | ||
| ContractType::TransferContract => { | ||
| let transfer_contract = | ||
| protocol::TransferContract::decode(parameter.value.as_slice())?; | ||
| let mut owner_u8_addr: [u8; 21] = [0; 21]; | ||
| let mut owner_address = String::from(""); | ||
|
|
||
| if transfer_contract.owner_address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN { | ||
| owner_u8_addr.copy_from_slice(&transfer_contract.owner_address[..]); | ||
| owner_address = TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&owner_u8_addr); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| let mut to_u8_addr: [u8; 21] = [0; 21]; | ||
| let mut to_address = String::from(""); | ||
|
|
||
| if transfer_contract.to_address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN { | ||
| to_u8_addr.copy_from_slice(&transfer_contract.to_address[..]); | ||
| to_address = TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&to_u8_addr); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| let value = U256::from_i64(transfer_contract.amount).to_f64(self.get_decimals()); | ||
| return Ok(TxInfo { | ||
| sender: owner_address, | ||
| receiver: to_address, | ||
| value, | ||
| tx_type: TxType::Transfer, | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| ContractType::TransferAssetContract => { | ||
| let transfer_contract: protocol::TransferAssetContract = | ||
| protocol::TransferAssetContract::decode(parameter.value.as_slice())?; | ||
| let mut owner_u8_addr: [u8; 21] = [0; 21]; | ||
| let mut owner_address = String::from(""); | ||
|
|
||
| if transfer_contract.owner_address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN { | ||
| owner_u8_addr.copy_from_slice(&transfer_contract.owner_address[..]); | ||
| owner_address = TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&owner_u8_addr); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| let mut to_u8_addr: [u8; 21] = [0; 21]; | ||
| let mut to_address = String::from(""); | ||
|
|
||
| if transfer_contract.to_address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN { | ||
| to_u8_addr.copy_from_slice(&transfer_contract.to_address[..]); | ||
| to_address = TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&to_u8_addr); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| let value = U256::from_i64(transfer_contract.amount).to_f64(self.get_decimals()); | ||
| return Ok(TxInfo { | ||
| sender: owner_address, | ||
| receiver: to_address, | ||
| value, | ||
| tx_type: TxType::Transfer, | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| ContractType::TriggerSmartContract => { | ||
| let trigger_contract = | ||
| protocol::TriggerSmartContract::decode(parameter.value.as_slice())?; | ||
| let mut owner_u8_addr: [u8; 21] = [0; 21]; | ||
| let mut owner_address = String::from(""); | ||
|
|
||
| if trigger_contract.owner_address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN { | ||
| owner_u8_addr.copy_from_slice(&trigger_contract.owner_address[..]); | ||
| owner_address = TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&owner_u8_addr); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| let mut to_u8_addr: [u8; 21] = [0; 21]; | ||
| let mut to_address = String::from(""); | ||
|
|
||
| if trigger_contract.contract_address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN { | ||
| to_u8_addr.copy_from_slice(&trigger_contract.contract_address[..]); | ||
| to_address = TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&to_u8_addr); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| return Ok(TxInfo { | ||
| sender: owner_address, | ||
| receiver: to_address, | ||
| value: 0.0, | ||
| tx_type: TxType::TriggerContract, | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
| _ => {} | ||
| }; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Refactor duplicated address handling code.
The address handling logic is duplicated across different contract types. Consider extracting it into a helper function.
+ fn expand_address_if_valid(address: &[u8]) -> String {
+ let mut addr_bytes: [u8; 21] = [0; 21];
+ if address.len() >= TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN {
+ addr_bytes.copy_from_slice(&address[..TRX_ADD_RAW_LEN]);
+ TRX::expand_address_with_checksum(&addr_bytes)
+ } else {
+ String::new()
+ }
+ }Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
|
|
||
| if private_key.len() != 32 { | ||
| return Err(ChainError::InvalidPrivateKey); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| let mut pvk_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32]; | ||
| pvk_bytes.copy_from_slice(&private_key[..32]); | ||
| let mut tron_tx = TRX::decode_transaction(raw_tx)?; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Improve private key security.
The private key should be zeroed as soon as possible after use to minimize the window of exposure in memory.
let mut pvk_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
pvk_bytes.copy_from_slice(&private_key[..32]);
+ // Zero out the input private key immediately
+ for byte in private_key.iter_mut() {
+ *byte = 0;
+ }
let mut tron_tx = TRX::decode_transaction(raw_tx)?;Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Nitpick comments (5)
packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs (5)
51-53: Consider handling base64 decode errors explicitlyThe
unwrap_or_default()call might silently ignore base64 decoding errors, potentially leading to unexpected behavior.- .map(|s| base64::simple_base64_decode(s).unwrap_or_default()) + .map(|s| base64::simple_base64_decode(s) + .map_err(|e| Error::WalletManager(format!("Invalid base64 in prev_script: {}", e)))?)
159-159: Fix incorrect documentation comment forfrom_kc_pemThe doc comment incorrectly states "restore wallet from mnemonic".
- /// restore wallet from mnemonic + /// restore wallet from Klever Chain PEM file
235-240: Consider returningOption<String>instead of empty stringsThe
get_private_keyandget_mnemonicmethods return empty strings when the values are None. This could be misleading as callers can't distinguish between an empty string and a missing value.Consider returning
Option<String>to force explicit handling of missing values:- pub fn get_private_key(&self) -> String { - match self.private_key { - Some(ref pk) => pk.clone(), - None => String::new(), - } + pub fn get_private_key(&self) -> Option<String> { + self.private_key.clone() } - pub fn get_mnemonic(&self) -> String { - match self.mnemonic { - Some(ref mnemonic) => mnemonic.clone(), - None => String::new(), - } + pub fn get_mnemonic(&self) -> Option<String> { + self.mnemonic.clone() }Also applies to: 244-249
268-268: Improve error messages for missing private keyThe error messages "no keypair" and "no private key" could be more descriptive about the wallet state.
- None => Err(Error::WalletManager("no keypair".to_string())), + None => Err(Error::WalletManager("Cannot sign message: wallet does not contain a private key".to_string())), - None => Err(Error::WalletManager("no private key".to_string())), + None => Err(Error::WalletManager("Cannot sign transaction: wallet does not contain a private key".to_string())),Also applies to: 305-305
315-334: Document test values and improve test coverageThe test uses hardcoded values (mnemonic, chain ID, private key) without explaining their significance. Additionally, consider adding tests for:
- Error cases (invalid mnemonic, invalid private key)
- Other wallet creation methods (
from_private_key,from_kc_pem,from_pem)- Edge cases in signing methods
Add comments explaining the test values and their expected outcomes:
#[test] fn test_export_import() { + // Chain ID 38 represents KLV chain let chain = get_chain_by_base_id(38).unwrap(); + // Using BIP39 test vector from https://github.com/trezor/python-mnemonic/blob/master/vectors.json let w1 = Wallet::from_mnemonic(
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packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
packages/kos-web/src/wallet.rs (3)
125-125: Incorrect documentation comment forfrom_private_keyThe doc comment incorrectly states "restore wallet from mnemonic" instead of "restore wallet from private key".
138-140: Fix unnecessaryhex::decodeon already decoded private key bytesThe code attempts to decode
private_key_byteswhich is already aVec<u8>after decoding the hex string earlier.
25-34: Consider implementing secure memory handling for sensitive dataThe
Walletstruct contains sensitive cryptographic material (private keys, mnemonics). Consider using a secure memory implementation likezeroizeto ensure sensitive data is properly wiped from memory when dropped.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
Architectural Changes
Blockchain Support
Cryptographic Improvements
Error Handling
Performance
These changes represent a significant evolution of the project's core infrastructure, focusing on flexibility, security, and performance.