Rand is a community project and cannot provide legally-binding guarantees of security.

Rand provides the marker traits CryptoRng, TryCryptoRng and CryptoBlockRng. Generators implementing one of these traits and used in a way which meets the following additional constraints:

• Instances of seedable RNGs (those implementing SeedableRng) are constructed with cryptographically secure seed values
• The state (memory) of the RNG and its seed value are not exposed

are expected to provide the following:

• An attacker cannot predict the output with more accuracy than what would be expected through pure chance since each possible output value of any method under the above traits which generates output bytes (including RngCore::next_u32, RngCore::next_u64, RngCore::fill_bytes, TryRngCore::try_next_u32, TryRngCore::try_next_u64, TryRngCore::try_fill_bytes and BlockRngCore::generate) should be equally likely
• Knowledge of prior outputs from the generator does not aid an attacker in predicting future outputs

OsRng is a stateless "generator" implemented via getrandom. As such, it has no possible state to leak and cannot be improperly seeded.

ThreadRng will periodically reseed itself, thus placing an upper bound on the number of bits of output from an instance before any advantage an attacker may have gained through state-compromising side-channel attacks is lost.

Additionally, derivations from such an RNG (including the Rng trait, implementations of the Distribution trait, and seq algorithms) should not introduce significant bias other than that expected from the operation in question (e.g. bias from a weighted distribution).

We will attempt to uphold these premises in the following crate versions, provided that only the latest patch version is used, and with potential exceptions for theoretical issues without a known exploit:

Explanation of exceptions:

• Jitter: JitterRng is used as an entropy source when the primary source fails; this source may not be secure against side-channel attacks, see #699.
• ISAAC: the ISAAC RNG used to implement ThreadRng is difficult to analyse and thus cannot provide strong assertions of security.

In rand version 0.3 (0.3.18 and later), if OsRng fails, ThreadRng is seeded from the system time in an insecure manner.

To report a vulnerability, open a new issue. Once the issue is resolved, the vulnerability should be reported to RustSec.