Handle the case of missing EKU in _is_preissuer (#658)

RFC 6962 stipulate that the TBSCertificate can be either signed by:
- A special purpose CA Precertificate Signing Certificate with an EKU
- The final CA Certificate with no mandatory EKU
In _is_preissuer was failing on the later if no EKU was present

In both case, the certificate must be a valid CA

Resolves: #658
Signed-off-by: Cyril Cordoui <[email protected]>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ All versions prior to 0.9.0 are untracked.
   reducing the number of cryptographic operations and network roundtrips
   required when signing more than one input
   ([#645](https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/pull/645))
-  
+
 * `sigstore sign` now uses an ephemeral P-256 keypair, rather than P-384
   ([#662](https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/pull/662))
 
@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ All versions prior to 0.9.0 are untracked.
   `sigstore.oidc.detect_credential` API
   ([#641](https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/pull/641))
 
+* Fixed a case where `sigstore sign` could fail using a private instance
+  (and `sigstore verrify`) due to a missing due to a missing `ExtendedKeyUsage`
+  in the CA
+  We now enforce the fact that the TBSPrecertificate signer must be a valid CA
+  ([#658](https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/pull/658))
+
 ## [1.1.2]
 
 ### Fixed

sigstore/_internal/sct.py

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, rsa
-from cryptography.x509 import Certificate, ExtendedKeyUsage
+from cryptography.x509 import Certificate, ExtendedKeyUsage, ExtensionNotFound
 from cryptography.x509.certificate_transparency import (
     LogEntryType,
     SignedCertificateTimestamp,
@@ -37,7 +37,13 @@
     KeyringLookupError,
     KeyringSignatureError,
 )
-from sigstore._utils import DERCert, KeyID, key_id
+from sigstore._utils import (
+    DERCert,
+    InvalidCertError,
+    KeyID,
+    cert_is_ca,
+    key_id,
+)
 from sigstore.errors import Error
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -127,7 +133,11 @@ def _pack_digitally_signed(
 
 
 def _is_preissuer(issuer: Certificate) -> bool:
-    ext_key_usage = issuer.extensions.get_extension_for_class(ExtendedKeyUsage)
+    try:
+        ext_key_usage = issuer.extensions.get_extension_for_class(ExtendedKeyUsage)
+    # If we do not have any EKU, we certainly do not have CT Ext
+    except ExtensionNotFound:
+        return False
 
     return ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY in ext_key_usage.value
 
@@ -139,6 +149,16 @@ def _get_issuer_cert(chain: List[Certificate]) -> Certificate:
     return issuer
 
 
+def _cert_is_ca(cert: Certificate) -> bool:
+    logger.debug(f"Found {cert.subject} as issuer, verifying if it is a ca")
+    try:
+        cert_is_ca(cert)
+    except InvalidCertError as e:
+        logger.debug(f"Invalid {cert.subject}: failed to validate as a CA: {e}")
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
 class InvalidSCTError(Error):
     """
     Raised during SCT verification if an SCT is invalid in some way.
@@ -231,7 +251,13 @@ def verify_sct(
         # find its issuer in the chain and calculate a hash over
         # its public key information, as part of the "binding" proof
         # that ties the issuer to the final certificate.
-        issuer_pubkey = _get_issuer_cert(chain).public_key()
+        issuer_cert = _get_issuer_cert(chain)
+        issuer_pubkey = issuer_cert.public_key()
+
+        if not _cert_is_ca(issuer_cert):
+            raise InvalidSCTError(
+                f"Invalid issuer pubkey basicConstraint (not a CA): {issuer_pubkey}"
+            )
 
         if not isinstance(issuer_pubkey, (rsa.RSAPublicKey, ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey)):
             raise InvalidSCTError(

sigstore/_utils.py

@@ -226,28 +226,24 @@ def cert_is_ca(cert: Certificate) -> bool:
         # No BasicConstrains means that this can't possibly be a CA.
         return False
 
-    digital_signature = False
     key_cert_sign = False
     try:
         key_usage = cert.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(ExtensionOID.KEY_USAGE)
         key_cert_sign = key_usage.value.key_cert_sign  # type: ignore
-        digital_signature = key_usage.value.digital_signature  # type: ignore
     except ExtensionNotFound:
         raise InvalidCertError("invalid X.509 certificate: missing KeyUsage")
 
     # If all three states are set, this is a CA.
-    if ca and key_cert_sign and digital_signature:
+    if ca and key_cert_sign:
         return True
 
-    # Non-CA in the Sigstore ecosystem have `digitalSignature` but neither of
-    # the CA states.
-    if digital_signature and not (ca or key_cert_sign):
+    if not (ca or key_cert_sign):
         return False
 
     # Anything else is an invalid state that should never occur.
     raise InvalidCertError(
-        f"invalid certificate states: KeyUsage.digitalSignature={digital_signature}, "
-        f"KeyUsage.keyCertSign={key_cert_sign}, BasicConstraints.ca={ca}"
+        f"invalid certificate states: KeyUsage.keyCertSign={key_cert_sign}"
+        f", BasicConstraints.ca={ca}"
     )
 
 

test/unit/test_utils.py

@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ def test_cert_is_ca(x509_testcase, testcase, valid):
         "bogus-root-noncritical-bc.pem",
         "bogus-root-invalid-ku.pem",
         "bogus-root-missing-ku.pem",
-        "bogus-leaf-invalid-ku.pem",
     ],
 )
 def test_cert_is_ca_invalid_states(x509_testcase, testcase):
@@ -135,6 +134,7 @@ def test_cert_is_ca_invalid_states(x509_testcase, testcase):
         ("bogus-root.pem", True),
         ("bogus-intermediate.pem", False),
         ("bogus-leaf.pem", False),
+        ("bogus-leaf-invalid-ku.pem", False),
     ],
 )
 def test_cert_is_root_ca(x509_testcase, testcase, valid):