feat: wrapping up conflict of determinations and adding interpretation

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src/pages/hegel/guides/intro-logic.md

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 > The basis of the [conception of modern philosophy is] in the insight into the _necessary conflict_ of the determinations of the understanding with themselves. - The reflection already mentioned consists in _transcending_ the concrete immediate, in determining_ and _parting_ it. But this reflection must _equally transcend_ its _separating_ determinations and above all _connect_ them. The conflict of determinations breaks out precisely at the point of connection. This reflective activity of connection belongs in itself to reason, and to rise above the determinations ad attain insight into their discord is the great negative step on the way to the true concept of reason (Hegel, 2010, 26/21.30).
 
-When logic is not considered on its own terms but merely in relation to sensuous existence, one fails to grasp that logic is in fact in conflict with itself. Discord and struggle are not exclusive to the domain of worldly reality but are also—perhaps more intensely—active in the domain of logic and reason. Philosophy disciplines the ability to distinguish what is proper to each domain and being able to understand when an apparent conflict belongs to worldly reality, the realm of pure logic or is an erroneous mismatch between the two. 
+When logic is not considered on its own terms but merely in relation to sensuous existence, one fails to grasp that logic is in fact in conflict with itself. Discord and struggle are not exclusive to the domain of worldly reality but are also—perhaps more intensely—active in the domain of logic and reason. Philosophy disciplines the ability to distinguish what is proper to each domain and being able to understand when an apparent conflict belongs to worldly reality, the realm of pure logic or is an erroneous mismatch between the two.
+
+Hegel notes a further error in the case where one is discouraged by a contradiction in the understanding and resolves to find accord and stability in sensuous reality. But, and here Hegel criticizes the Kantian transcendental standpoint once more, if one resolves to look to sensuous reality as the criterion of truth, in the same instance one cannot determine the thing in question to have _any_ independent truth since the truth of the matter is settled _only_ as it appears. "This is like attributing right insight to someone," Hegel writes, "with the stipulation, however, that he is not fit to see what is true but only what is false" (Hegel, 2010, 26/21.30). To put this another way, if by truth one understands a independent standard, then this immediately clashes with the knowledge through appearances, since knowing here is totally dependent on appearances and cannot make _any_ independent claims about the matter at hand. To emphasize this point further, if the transcendental arrangement is actually granted, then one cannot truly speak of laws of nature or even state that the sky is there the moment one turns one's gaze towards the ground. This is why, if Hegel is right, this claim that sensuous reality is the sole arbiter of truth leads to absurdity.
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+Finally, Hegel then points out that as the understanding (according to transcendental idealism) cannot apply its determinations or concepts to things in themselves, it must therefore mean that these determinations are in themselves something untrue and consequently cannot be turned upon itself or anything else related to pure reason. The standard set for the understanding is based on experience and empirical objects, but the categories that define these empirical objects are not themselves empirical—they are precisely pure—and so the categories of the understanding cannot apply to anything other than sensuous reality. But this is incoherent, since the categories themselves are pure, their validity cannot come from sensuous reality. "If they cannot be determinations of _the thing in itself_, still less can they be determinations of the _understanding_, to which one ought to concede at least the dignity of a thing" (Hegel, 2010, 27/21.31). In this Kantian regime, according to Hegel, one cannot consistently use the tools by which the understanding navigates the world to also navigate the realm of ideas and thoughts, with the result being that the understanding (or the mind) cannot be a thing, much less be said to exist.
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+The cause for this error, Hegel diagnoses, lies in the fact that the determinations or categories of the understanding were never given an independent examination and immanent deduction but were simply taken for granted.  
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+#### On the Absurdity of Knowledge Based on Appearances (Niklas)
+
+Further observations may be drawn regarding the absurdity of truth vis-à-vis appearances (what we can call the double-standard of knowledge) in inspecting its implicit elements. When it is posited that knowledge is split by way of subject matters, and that of certain subject matters one can know nothing about (such as things-in-themselves) but others one can have knowledge (such as what appears in experience), knowledge remains the common element in both. The incoherence may be traced to an unstated third element that orchestrates the mediation between knowledge based on appearances and knowledge as such. This third element can be either one of the two extremes (knowledge based on appearances or knowledge as such) or something else entirely. It seems that, according to Hegel, if transcendental idealism is taken at face value, one subscribes to the view that knowledge based in appearances grounds both itself and knowledge as such, yet Hegel's criticism is that this precisely leads to absurdity which subsequently must mean that Kant merely takes for granted either that knowledge as such grounds both itself and knowledge based in appearances or that there is another third, yet unknown, common denominator. The latter seems to align well with Kant's own thinking in the _First Critique_:
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+> All that seems necessary for an introduction or a preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought (Kant, 1998, 135/A15).
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+In fairness to Kant, however, more emphasis is placed on pure concepts as the argument of transcendental idealism develops. Kant, in contrast to Hume, places pure categories or pure concepts in the purview of reason such that these cannot have their validity or truth established by sensuous reality, but that, rather, they serve to establish the validity and truth of sensuous reality. There are also a number of other key concepts—called _concepts of reason_—that never directly interact with sensuous reality, such as ethical principles or the concept of world (see Kant, 1998, 394/A311). Indeed, concepts of reason are in this way genuinely unconditional. With these things in mind, the thrust of Hegel's criticism is somewhat blunted, yet his real target is the fact that transcendental idealism has invalid or weak means to establish the truth of the very tools of cognition it purports to use to establish truth _tout court_. 
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+The take-home message thus being that, if Hegel is right, philosophy cannot but begin with metaphysics or, if it deigns to begin elsewhere, such as the instrument of cognition or conscious experience, be forced to take for granted a bad one.
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+### Logic as Non-Metaphysical
+
+TBC
 
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