Clarify attacker capabilities #564
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cjpatton
reviewed
Oct 11, 2023
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LGTM |
Co-authored-by: Christopher Patton <[email protected]>
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@dennisjackson can I interpret your LGTM as approval? @cjpatton, are you able to take a look at the linked issues? |
dennisjackson
approved these changes
Oct 13, 2023
Yes. My two cents are that thetext is general enough to cover the various issues and specific enough to be easy to understand. |
cjpatton
approved these changes
Oct 13, 2023
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This addresses the concerns raised, in my opinion. It acknowledges that in Split Mode the attack surface changes in a way that ECH cannot address on its own. I think @kazuho would prefer we not describe Split Mode, but the precedent has been sent and I don't think we can change this at this point.
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@chris-wood Thank you for writing this. The changes look good. |
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Closes #513
Closes #544
The intent here is to punt entirely on the mechanism by which messages between client-facing and backend servers are protected in transit, and simply to state the assumption that these messages do not let the attacker trivially learn information that ECH otherwise protects via encryption. Suggestions for further clarifications are welcome!
cc @dennisjackson, @davidben, @cjpatton