Expand on the threat model in goals/non-goals.

README.md

@@ -49,8 +49,14 @@ DBSC is bound to a device with cryptographic keys that cannot be exported from t
 ### Goals
 Reduce session theft by offering an alternative to long-lived cookie bearer tokens, that allows session authentication that is bound to the user's device. This makes the internet safer for users in that it is less likely their identity is abused, since malware is forced to act locally and thus becomes easier to detect and mitigate. At the same time the goal is to disrupt the cookie theft ecosystem and force it to adapt to new protections.
 
+DBSC's primary threat model is that of an attacker who can read and tamper with the user agent, such as with a malware-compromised browser, in which the malware can read and modify browser memory and secrets stored on disk. In many operating systems, malware may be able to obtain privileged (root, kernel, etc.) access. DBSC aims to address this threat by establishing a cryptographic protocol in which secrets can be stored in dedicated systems (such as secure enclaves), though DBSC does not specify how implementors should store, backup, or sync keys as long as such storage is robust against the described threat. 
+
+As a secondary consideration, DBSC also mitigates against certain types of network and server compromise, such as network Attackers-in-the-Middle (where an attacker can read or modify network traffic) or HTTP server log leaks (where a server mistakenly logs full HTTP request/response headers to logs which can be read by unprivileged insiders).
+
+In all of these scenarios, DBSC aims to enforce the specific constraint that *temporary read/write access to a user agent or network traffic does not enable long-lived access to any established DBSC sessions*. For example, if an attacker has malware running within a victim browser process, they should be unable to continue to authenticate as the victim browser once that malware is removed. (Note, however, that the definition of "long-lived" depends upon the configured refresh period; within that period, attackers *may* continue to have short-lived access to any established sessions.)
+
 ### Non-goals
-DBSC will not prevent temporary access to the browser session while the attacker is resident on the user’s device. The private key should be stored as safe as modern desktop operating systems allow, preventing exfiltration of the session private key, but the signing capability will still be available for any program running as the user on the user’s device. 
+DBSC will not prevent temporary access to any browser sessions while the attacker has ongoing access to a compromised user-agent. An attacker with ongoing access to a compromised user agent (or network AitM, etc) will be able to continuously access fresh DBSC-controlled bearer tokens, and an attacker with malware running on a compromised device will, on many modern operating systems, be able to treat even secure elements as a signing oracle, in order to provide proof-of-possession of the DBSC secret keys.
 
 ### What makes Device Bound Session Credentials different
 DBSC is not the first proposal towards these goals, with a notable one being [Token Binding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Token_Binding). This proposal offers two important features that we believe makes it easier to deploy than previous proposals. DBSC provides application-level binding and browser initiated refreshes that can make sure devices are still bound to the original device.