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Fixes as recommended by codacy. #101

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10 changes: 2 additions & 8 deletions TODO.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ It was last updated 20 October 2018.
* something bespoke for not having to write serialization and
deserialization logic for hash strings by hand, as this is
probably the most error-prone part of writing a hashing method

* the most sensitive piece of data handled by this library is a
cleartext passphrase. OS may have trusted-path facilities for
prompting the user for a passphrase and feeding it to a KDF
Expand All @@ -53,20 +52,15 @@ It was last updated 20 October 2018.
probably not match them (they have a `crypt.conf` but it’s not the
same, and their `crypt_gensalt` is API-incompatible anyway).

[crypt.conf branch]: https://github.com/besser82/libxcrypt/tree/zack/crypt.conf

* Potential API enhancements:

* Support for "pepper" (an additional piece of information, _not_
stored in the password file, that you need to check a password)

* Reading passphrases from the terminal is finicky and there are
several competing, poorly portable, questionably sound library
functions to do it (`getpass`, `readpassphrase`, etc) -- should we
incorporate one?
* If we do, should it know how to trigger the trusted-path
password prompt in modern GUI environments? (probably)

* Make the crypt and crypt_gensalt static state thread-specific?
* Solaris 11 may have done this (its `crypt(3)` manpage describes
it as MT-Safe and I don’t see any other way they could have
Expand All @@ -75,11 +69,9 @@ It was last updated 20 October 2018.
data segment off the shared library
* alternatively, add a global lock and *crash the program* if we
detect concurrent calls

* Allow access to more of yescrypt’s tunable parameters and ROM
feature, in a way that’s generic enough that we could also use it
for e.g. Argon2’s tunable parameters

* Other yescrypt-inspired features relevant to using this library to
back a “dedicated authentication service,” e.g. preallocation of
large blocks of scratch memory
Expand All @@ -98,3 +90,5 @@ It was last updated 20 October 2018.
arguably uncopyrightable).
* Most of the test suite lacks any license or even authorship
information. We would have to track down the original authors.

[crypt.conf branch]: https://github.com/besser82/libxcrypt/tree/zack/crypt.conf