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doc: update cryptographic feature ADR #1389

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merged 5 commits into from
Nov 6, 2023
Merged

doc: update cryptographic feature ADR #1389

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1a11a36
update ADR
sainoe Nov 3, 2023
4e939b0
update changelog
sainoe Nov 3, 2023
b45a248
nit
sainoe Nov 6, 2023
5619464
update changelog
sainoe Nov 6, 2023
b398630
Update docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md
sainoe Nov 6, 2023
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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ title: Cryptographic verification of equivocation evidence
* 5/1/2023: First draft
* 7/23/2023: Add light client attacks handling
* 9/6/2023: Add double signing attacks handling
* 11/3/2023: Update limitations to handle amnesia attacks
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Suggested change
* 11/3/2023: Update limitations to handle amnesia attacks
* 11/3/2023: Update limitations to clarify amnesia attacks are ignored

This might be better at expressing what was changed in the adr? I didn't get the original changelog line


## Status

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ either using its infraction height or its unsigned timestamp. Note that changes
The underlying reason is that a malicious validator could take advantage of getting tombstoned
to avoid being slashed on the provider ([see comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1232#issuecomment-1693127641)).

- Currently, the endpoint can only handle "equivocation" light client attacks. This is because the "lunatic" attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to define the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)).
- Currently, the endpoint can only handle "equivocation" light client attacks. This is because the "lunatic" attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to define the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)). In addition, "amnesia" attacks are ignored, similar to CometBFT (see https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blob/main/docs/architecture/tendermint-core/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md#decision).
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## Consequences
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