refactor: Adding logic to check more L2 chains fo guard CM

audits/README.md

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ An internal audit with a focus on `Update for Community Multisig (CM)` is locate
 
 An internal audit with a focus on `OptimismMesseger and WormholeMessenger` is located in this folder: [internal audit 9](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/internal9).
 
+An internal audit with a focus on `Guard for Community Multisig (CM) (modular version)` is located in this folder: [internal audit 10](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/internal10).
+
 ### External audit
 Following the initial contracts [audit report](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/Valory%20Review%20Final.pdf),
 the recommendations are addressed here: [feedback](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/Addressing%20Initial%20ApeWorX%20Recommentations.pdf).

audits/internal10/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# autonolas-governance-audit
+The review has been performed based on the contract code in the following repository:<br>
+`https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance` <br>
+commit: `bde297d7dbb601fbe796f56fe03e917d60282cd0` or `tag: v1.1.11-pre-internal-audit` <br> 
+
+Update: 06-03-2024  <br>
+
+## Objectives
+The audit focused on Guard contract for community mutisig (modular version). <BR>
+
+### Flatten version
+Flatten version of contracts. [contracts](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/internal10/analysis/contracts)
+
+### Coverage
+Hardhat coverage has been performed before the audit and can be found here:
+```sh
+--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
+File                                  |  % Stmts | % Branch |  % Funcs |  % Lines |Uncovered Lines |
+--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
+ contracts/multisigs/                 |    98.18 |    96.15 |      100 |       99 |                |
+  GuardCM.sol                         |    98.11 |    96.05 |      100 |    98.95 |            223 |
+  VerifyData.sol                      |      100 |      100 |      100 |      100 |                |
+ contracts/multisigs/bridge_verifier/ |    49.12 |    47.37 |       50 |    49.44 |                |
+  ProcessBridgedDataArbitrum.sol      |        0 |        0 |        0 |        0 |... 55,56,60,64 |
+  ProcessBridgedDataGnosis.sol        |      100 |      100 |      100 |      100 |                |
+  ProcessBridgedDataOptimism.sol      |        0 |        0 |        0 |        0 |... 75,76,80,83 |
+  ProcessBridgedDataPolygon.sol       |      100 |      100 |      100 |      100 |                |
+  ProcessBridgedDataWormhole.sol      |        0 |        0 |        0 |        0 |... 67,72,73,77 |
+  VerifyBridgedData.sol               |      100 |      100 |      100 |      100 |                |
+--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
+```
+Please, pay attention. More tests are needed and magic offsets (like MIN_ARBITRUM_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) can only be checked during testing
+[x] fixed
+
+### Storage timelock
+Using sol2uml tools: https://github.com/naddison36/sol2uml <br>
+```bash
+sol2uml storage . -f png -c GuardCM -o .
+Generated png file GuardCM.png
+```
+Storage: [GuardCM](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/internal10/analysis/GuardCM.png)
+
+### Security issues
+Details in [slither_full](https://github.com/valory-xyz/autonolas-governance/blob/main/audits/internal10/analysis/slither_full.txt) <br>
+All is false positive, discussed https://github.com/pessimistic-io/slitherin/blob/master/docs/arbitrary_call.md
+
+Minor issue: <br>
+- Cached bytes4(data)
+```
+Dubious typecast in VerifyData._verifyData(address,bytes,uint256) (ProcessBridgedDataArbitrum-flatten.sol#25-38):
+	bytes => bytes4 casting occurs in targetSelectorChainId |= uint256(uint32(bytes4(data))) << 160 (ProcessBridgedDataArbitrum-flatten.sol#30)
+	bytes => bytes4 casting occurs in revert NotAuthorized(address,bytes4,uint256)(target,bytes4(data),chainId) (ProcessBridgedDataArbitrum-flatten.sol#36)
+```
+[x] fixed
+
+- Checking for verifierL2s is contract in set function.
+```
+function setBridgeMediatorL1BridgeParams(
+if (verifierL2s[i].code.length == 0) {
+    revert AddressEmptyCode(verifierL2s[i]);
+}
+because if verifierL2s[i] is EOA
+bridgeParams.verifierL2.delegatecall - always success, 
+ref: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/utils/Address.sol#L124
+```
+[x] fixed
+
+- Needing fix revert message
+```
+Code correct. Ref: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/utils/Address.sol#L146
+revert("Function call reverted");
+replace to error-style message 
+revert FailedInnerCall();
+```
+[x] fixed